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Johannes Locke.

AN

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Human Understanding.

In FOUR BOOKS.

Written by *JOHN LOCKE*, Gent.

THE ELEVENTH EDITION.

VOLUME I.

ECCLES. XI. 5.

As thou knoweſt not what is the Way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child: Even ſo thou knoweſt not the Works of God, who maketh all Things.

Quam bellum eſt velle confiteri potius neſcire quod neſcias, quam iſta effutientem naviſcare, atque ipſum ſibi diſplicere!

Cic. de Natur. Deor. l. 1.

LONDON:

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To the Right Honourable

THOMAS

Earl of *Pembroke* and *Montgomery*,

Baron Herbert *of* Cardiff, *Lord* Roſs *of* Kendal, Par, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, *and* Shurland; *Lord Preſident of His Majeſty's moſt Honourable Privy-Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the County of* Wilts, *and of* South-Wales.

My LORD,

THIS Treatiſe, which is grown up under your Lordſhip's Eye, and has ventured into the World by your Order, does now, by a natural kind of Right, come to your Lordſhip for that Protection, which you ſeveral Years ſince promiſed it. 'Tis not that I think any Name, how great ſoever, ſet at the Beginning of a Book, will be able to cover the Faults are to be found in it. Things in Print muſt ſtand and fall by their own Worth, or the Reader's Fancy. But there being nothing more to be deſired for Truth, than a fair unprejudiced Hearing, no body is more likely to procure me that, than your Lord-

ſhip, who are allowed to have got ſo intimate an Acquaintance with her, in her more retired Receſſes. Your Lordſhip is known to have ſo far advanced your Speculation in the moſt abſtract and general Knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary Reach, or common Methods, that your Allowance and Approbation of the Deſign of this Treatiſe, will at leaſt preſerve it from being condemn'd without Reading; and will prevail to have thoſe Parts a little weigh'd, which might otherwiſe, perhaps, be thought to deſerve no Conſideration, for being ſomewhat out of the common Road. The Imputation of Novelty is a terrible Charge amongſt thoſe who judge of Men's Heads, as they do of their Perukes, by the Faſhion; and can allow none to be right, but the received Doctrines. Truth ſcarce ever yet carried it by Vote any where at its firſt Appearance: New Opinions are always ſuſpected, and uſually oppoſed, without any other Reaſon, but becauſe they are not already common. But Truth, like Gold, is not the leſs ſo for being newly brought out of the Mine. 'Tis Trial and Examination muſt give it Price, and not any antique Faſhion: And though it be not yet current by the publick Stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as Nature, and is certainly not the leſs genuine. Your Lordſhip can give great and convincing Inſtances of this, whenever you pleaſe to oblige the Publick with ſome of thoſe large and comprehenſive Diſcoveries you have made of Truths hitherto unknown, unleſs to ſome few, from whom your Lordſhip has been pleaſed not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a ſufficient Reaſon, were there no other, why I ſhould dedicate

dedicate this *Eſſay* to your Lordſhip; and its having ſome little Correſpondence with ſome Parts of that nobler and vaſt Syſtem of the Sciences your Lordſhip has made ſo new, exact, and inſtructive a Draught of, I think it Glory enough, if your Lordſhip permit me to boaſt, that here and there I have fallen into ſome Thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your Lordſhip think fit, that, by your Encouragement, this ſhould appear in the World, I hope it may be a Reaſon, ſome time or other, to lead your Lordſhip farther; and you will allow me to ſay, that you here give the World an Earneſt of ſomething, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their Expectation. This, my Lord, ſhews what a Preſent I here make to your Lordſhip; juſt ſuch as the poor Man does to his rich and great Neighbour, by whom the Basket of Flowers, or Fruit, is not ill taken, though he has more Plenty of his own Growth, and in much greater Perfection. Worthleſs Things receive a Value, when they are made the Offerings of Reſpect, Eſteem, and Gratitude: Theſe you have given me ſo mighty and peculiar Reaſons to have, in the higheſt Degree, for your Lordſhip, that if they can add a Price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own Greatneſs, I can with Confidence brag, I here make your Lordſhip the richeſt Preſent you ever received. This I am ſure, I am under the greateſt Obligations to ſeek all Occaſions to acknowledge a long Train of Favours I have received from your Lordſhip; Favours, though great and important in themſelves, yet made much more ſo by the Forwardneſs, Concern, and Kind-

neſs, and other obliging Circumſtances, that never failed to accompany them. To all this, you are pleaſed to add that which gives yet more Weight and Reliſh to all the reſt: You vouchſafe to continue me in ſome Degrees of your Eſteem, and allow me a Place in your good Thoughts; I had almoſt ſaid Friendſhip. This, my Lord, your Words and Actions ſo conſtantly ſhew on all Occaſions, even to others when I am abſent, that it is not Vanity in me to mention what every body knows: But it would be want of good Manners, not to acknowledge what ſo many are Witneſſes of, and every Day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordſhip for. I wiſh they could as eaſily aſſiſt my Gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing Engagements it has to your Lordſhip. This I am ſure, I ſhould write of the *Underſtanding* without having any, if I were not extremely ſenſible of them, and did not lay hold on this Opportunity to teſtify to the World, how much I am oblig'd to be, and how much I am,

My LORD,

Dorſet-Court, 24th of *May*, 1689.

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt Humble, and

Moſt Obedient Servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER.

READER,

HERE put into thy Hands, what has been the Diverſion of ſome of my idle and heavy Hours: If it has the good Luck to prove ſo of any of thine, and thou haſt but half ſo much Pleaſure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill beſtowed. Miſtake not this, for a Commendation of my Work; nor conclude, becauſe I was pleaſed with the Doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at Larks and Sparrows, has no leſs Sport, though a much leſs conſiderable Quarry, than he that flies at nobler Game: And he is little acquainted with the Subject of this Treatiſe, the UNDERSTANDING, *who does not know, that as it is the moſt elevated Faculty of the Soul, ſo it is employed with a greater and more conſtant Delight, than any of the other. Its Searches after Truth, are a Sort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very Purſuit makes a great*

Part of the Pleaſure. Every Step the Mind takes in its Progreſs towards Knowledge, makes ſome Diſcovery, which is not only new, but the beſt too, for the Time at leaſt.

For the Underſtanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleaſed with what it diſcovers, having leſs Regret for what has eſcaped it, becauſe it is unknown. Thus he who has raiſed himſelf above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on Scraps of begg'd Opinions, ſets his own Thoughts on Work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miſs the Hunter's Satisfaction; every Moment of this Purſuit will reward his Pains with ſome Delight, and he will have Reaſon to think his Time not ill ſpent, even when he cannot much boaſt of any great Acquiſition.

This, Reader, is the Entertainment of thoſe who let looſe their own Thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughteſt not to envy them, ſince they afford thee an Opportunity of the like Diverſion, if thou wilt make uſe of thy own Thoughts in reading. 'Tis to them, if they are thy own, that I refer my ſelf: But if they are taken upon Truſt from others, 'tis no great Matter what they are, they not following Truth, but ſome meaner Conſideration: And 'tis not worth while to be concerned, what he ſays or thinks, who ſays or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgeſt for thy ſelf, I know thou wilt judge candidly; and then I ſhall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy Cenſure. For though it be certain, that there is nothing in this Treatiſe, of the Truth whereof I am not fully perſuaded; yet I conſider my ſelf as liable to Miſtakes, as I can think thee, and know that this Book muſt ſtand or fall with thee, not by any Opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findeſt little in it new or inſtructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for thoſe that had already maſtered this Subject, and made a thorough Acquaintance with their own Underſtanding; but for my own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends, who acknowledged themſelves not to have ſufficiently conſidered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with

the Hiſtory of this Eſſay, *I ſhould tell thee, that five or ſix Friends meeting at my Chamber, and diſcourſing on a Subject very remote from this, found themſelves quickly at a Stand, by the Difficulties that roſe on every Side. After we had a while puzzled our ſelves, without coming any nearer a Reſolution of thoſe Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong Courſe; and that, before we ſet our ſelves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was neceſſary to examine our own Abilities, and ſee what Objects our Underſtandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I propoſed to the Company, who all readily aſſented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this ſhould be our firſt Enquiry. Some haſty, and undigeſted Thoughts on a Subject I had never before conſidered, which I ſet down againſt our next Meeting, gave the firſt Entrance into this Diſcourſe, which having been thus begun by Chance, was continued by Intreaty; written by incoherent Parcels; and, after long Intervals of Neglect, reſum'd again, as my Humour or Occaſions permitted; and at laſt, in a Retirement, where an Attendance on my Health gave me Leiſure, it was brought into that Order thou now ſeeſt it.*

This diſcontinued Way of Writing may have occaſioned, beſides others, two contrary Faults, viz. *that too little and too much may be ſaid in it. If thou findeſt any Thing wanting, I ſhall be glad, that what I have writ gives thee any Deſire, that I ſhould have gone farther: If it ſeems too much to thee, thou mayſt blame the Subject; for when I firſt put Pen to Paper, I thought all I ſhould have to ſay on this Matter, would have been contained in one Sheet of Paper; but the farther I went, the larger Proſpect I had: New Diſcoveries led me ſtill on, and ſo it grew inſenſibly to the Bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but poſſibly it might be reduced to a narrower Compaſs than it is; and that ſome Parts of it might be contracted; the Way it has been writ in, by Catches, and many long Intervals of Interruption, being apt to cauſe ſome Repetitions. But to confeſs the Truth, I am now too lazy, or too buſy to make it ſhorter.*

I am

I am not ignorant how little I herein conſult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a Fault, ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt judicious, who are always the niceſt Readers. But they who know Sloth is apt to content it ſelf with any Excuſe, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore alledge in my Defence, that the ſame Notion, having different Reſpects, may be convenient or neceſſary to prove or illuſtrate ſeveral Parts of the ſame Diſcourſe; and that ſo it has happened in many Parts of this: But waving that, I ſhall frankly avow, that I have ſometimes dwelt long upon the ſame Argument, and expreſſed it different Ways, with a quite different Deſign. I pretend not to publiſh this Eſſay for the Information of Men of large Thoughts and quick Apprehenſions; to ſuch Maſters of Knowledge, I profeſs my ſelf a Scholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any Thing here, but what, being ſpun out of my own courſe Thoughts, is fitted to Men of my own Size, to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken ſome Pains to make plain and familiar to their Thoughts ſome Truths, which eſtabliſhed Prejudice, or the Abſtractneſs of the Ideas *themſelves, might render difficult. Some Objects had need be turned on every Side: And when the Notion is new, as I confeſs ſome of theſe are to me, or out of the ordinary Road, as I ſuſpect they will appear to others; 'tis not one ſimple View of it, that will gain it Admittance into every Underſtanding, or fix it there with a clear and laſting Impreſſion. There are few, I believe, who have not obſerved in themſelves or others, that what in one Way of propoſing was very obſcure, another Way of expreſſing it has made very clear and intelligible: Though afterward the Mind found little Difference in the Phraſes, and wonder'd why one failed to be underſtood more than the other. But every Thing does not hit alike upon every Man's Imagination. We have our Underſtandings no leſs different than our Palates; and he that thinks the ſame Truth ſhall be equally reliſh'd by every one in*

in the ſame Dreſs, may as well hope to feaſt every one with the ſame ſort of Cookery: The Meat may be the ſame, and the Nouriſhment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seaſoning; and it muſt be dreſſed another Way, if you will have it go down with ſome, even of ſtrong Conſtitutions. The Truth is, thoſe who adviſed me to publiſh it, adviſed me, for this Reaſon, to publiſh it as it is: And ſince I have been brought to let it go Abroad, I deſire it ſhould be underſtood by whoever gives himſelf the Pains to read it. I have ſo little Affection to be in Print, that if I were not flattered this Eſſay might be of ſome Uſe to others, as I think it has been to me; I ſhould have confined it to the View of ſome Friends, who gave the firſt Occaſion to it. My appearing therefore in Print, being on purpoſe to be as uſeful as I may, I think it neceſſary to make what I have to ſay, as eaſy and intelligible to all Sorts of Readers, as I can. And I had much rather the Speculative and Quick-ſighted ſhould complain of my being in ſome Parts tedious, than that any one, not accuſtomed to abſtract Speculations, or prepoſſeſſed with different Notions, ſhould miſtake, or not comprehend my Meaning.

It will poſſibly be cenſured as a great Piece of Vanity or Inſolence in me, to pretend to inſtruct this our knowing Age, it amounting to little leſs, when I own, that I publiſh this Eſſay *with Hopes it may be uſeful to others. But if it may be permitted to ſpeak freely of thoſe, who with a feigned Modeſty condemn as uſeleſs, what they themſelves write, methinks it ſavours much more of Vanity or Inſolence, to publiſh a Book for any other End; and he fails very much of that Reſpect he owes the Publick, who prints, and conſequently expects Men ſhould read that, wherein he intends not they ſhould meet with any Thing of Uſe to themſelves or others: And ſhould nothing elſe be found allowable in this Treatiſe, yet my Deſign will not ceaſe to be ſo; and the Goodneſs of my Intention ought to be ſome Excuſe for the Worthleſneſs of my Preſent. 'Tis that chiefly which ſecures me from the*

Fear

Fear of Cenſure, which I expect not to eſcape more than better Writers. Men's Principles, Notions, and Reliſhes are ſo different, that it is hard to find a Book which pleaſes or diſpleaſes all Men. I acknowledge the Age we live in is not the leaſt knowing, and therefore not the moſt eaſy to be ſatisfied. If I have not the good Luck to pleaſe, yet no body ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my Readers, except half a Dozen, this Treatiſe was not at firſt intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the Trouble to be of that Number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it ſecurely: For I ſhall find ſome better way of ſpending my Time, than in ſuch kind of Converſation. I ſhall always have the Satisfaction to have aimed ſincerely at Truth and Uſefulneſs, though in one of the meaneſt Ways. The Commonwealth of Learning is not at this Time without Maſter-builders, whoſe mighty Deſigns, in advancing the Sciences, will leave laſting Monuments to the Admiration of Poſterity: But every one muſt not hope to be a Boyle, *or a* Sydenham; *and in an Age that produces ſuch Maſters, as the Great*—Huygenius, *and the incomparable Mr.* Newton, *with ſome other of that Strain; 'tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing ſome of the Rubbiſh that lies in the Way to Knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours of ingenious and induſtrious Men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous Uſe of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree, that Philoſophy, which is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Converſation. Vague and inſignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuſe of Language, have ſo long paſſed for Myſteries of Sciences; and hard or miſapply'd Words, with little or no Meaning, have, by Preſcription, ſuch a Right to be miſtaken for deep Learning, and Heighth of Speculation,*

Speculation, that it will not be eaſy to perſuade, either thoſe who ſpeak, or thoſe who hear 'em, that they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and Hindrance of true Knowledge. To break in upon the Sanctuary of Vanity and Ignorance, will be, I ſuppoſe, ſome Service to Human Underſtanding: Though ſo few are apt to think, they deceive or are deceived in the Uſe of Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of, has any Faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I ſhall be pardon'd, if I have in the third Book dwelt long on this Subject, and endeavoured to make it ſo plain, that neither the Inveterateneſs of the Miſchief, nor the Prevalency of the Faſhion, ſhall be any Excuſe for thoſe, who will not take care about the Meaning of their own Words, and will not ſuffer the Significancy of their Expreſſions to be enquired into.

I have been told, that a ſhort Epitome of this Treatiſe, which was printed 1688, *was by ſome condemned without reading, becauſe innate* Ideas *were denied in it; they too haſtily concluding, that if innate* Ideas *were not ſuppoſed, there would be little left, either of the Notion or Proof of Spirits. If any one take the like Offence at the Entrance of this Treatiſe, I ſhall deſire him to read it thorough; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away falſe Foundations, is not to the Prejudice, but Advantage of Truth; which is never injur'd or endanger'd ſo much, as when mixed with, or built on Falſhood. In the ſecond Edition, I added as followeth:*

The Bookſeller will not forgive me, if I ſay nothing of this Second Edition, which he has promiſed, by the Correctneſs of it, ſhall make amends for the many Faults committed in the former. He deſires too, that it ſhould be known that it has one whole new Chapter concerning Identity, *and many Additions and Amendments in other Places. Theſe I muſt inform my Reader are not all new Matter, but moſt of them either farther Confirmation of what I had ſaid, or Explications, to prevent others being miſtaken in the Senſe of what was formerly printed, and*

not

not any Variation in me from it; I muſt only except the Alteration I have made in Book II. Chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning Liberty *and the* Will, *I thought deſerv'd as accurate a View, as I was capable of: Thoſe Subjects having in all Ages exerciſed the learned Part of the World, with Queſtions and Difficulties, that have not a little perplex'd Morality and Divinity; thoſe Parts of Knowledge, that Men are moſt concern'd to be clear in. Upon a cloſer Inſpection into the Working of Men's Minds, and a ſtricter Examination of thoſe Motives and Views they are turn'd by, I have found reaſon ſomewhat to alter the Thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the laſt Determination to the* Will *in all voluntary Actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the World with as much Freedom and Readineſs, as I at firſt publiſhed what then ſeem'd to me to be right; thinking my ſelf more concern'd to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppoſe that of another, when Truth appears againſt it. For 'tis Truth alone I ſeek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence ſoever it comes.*

But what Forwardneſs ſoever I have to reſign any Opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the firſt Evidence of any Error in it; yet this I muſt own, that I have not had the good Luck to receive any Light from thoſe Exceptions I have met with in Print againſt any Part of my Book; nor have, from any Thing has been urged againſt it, found reaſon to alter my Senſe, in any of the Points have been queſtion'd. Whether the Subject I have in hand requires often more Thought and Attention than curſory Readers, at leaſt ſuch as are prepoſſeſſed, are willing to allow; Or, whether any Obſcurity in my Expreſſions caſts a Cloud over it, and theſe Notions are made difficult to others Apprehenſion in my Way of treating them: So it is, that my Meaning, I find, is often miſtaken, and I have not the good Luck to be every where rightly underſtood. There are ſo many Inſtances of this, that I think it juſtice to my Reader and my ſelf,

ſelf, to conclude, that either my Book is plainly enough written to be rightly underſtood by thoſe who peruſe it with that Attention and Indifferency, which every one, who will give himſelf the Pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or elſe, that I have writ mine ſo obſcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of theſe be the Truth, 'tis my ſelf only am affected thereby, and therefore I ſhall be far from troubling my Reader with what I think might be ſaid, in anſwer to thoſe ſeveral Objections I have met with, to Paſſages here and there of my Book: Since I perſuade my ſelf, that he who thinks them of Moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or falſe, will be able to ſee, that what is ſaid, is either not well founded, or elſe not contrary to my Doctrine, when I and my Oppoſer come both to be well underſtood.

If any, careful that none of their good Thoughts ſhould be loſt, have publiſh'd their Cenſures of my Eſſays; *with this Honour done to it, that they will not ſuffer it to be an* Eſſay; *I leave it to the Publick to value the Obligation they have to their critical Pens, and ſhall not waſte my Reader's Time in ſo idle or ill-natur'd an Employment of mine, as to leſſen the Satisfaction any one has in himſelf, or gives to others, in ſo haſty a Confutation of what I have written.*

The Bookſellers preparing for the fourth Edition of my Eſſay, *gave me Notice of it, that I might, if I had Leiſure, make any Additions or Alterations I ſhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to adverti ſe the Reader, that beſides ſeveral Corrections I had made here and there, there was one Alteration which it was neceſſary to mention, becauſe it ran through the whole Book, and is of Conſequence to be rightly underſtood. What I thereupon ſaid, was this:*

Clear and Diſtinct Ideas *are Terms, which though familiar and frequent in Men's Mouths, I have reaſon to think every one, who uſes, does not perfectly underſtand. And poſſibly 'tis but here and there one, who gives himſelf*

ſelf the Trouble to conſider them ſo far as to know what he himſelf or others preciſely mean by them: I have therefore in moſt Places choſe to put determinate *or* determined, *inſtead of* clear *and* diſtinct, *as more likely to direct Men's Thoughts to my Meaning in this Matter. By thoſe Denominations, I mean ſome Object in the Mind, and conſequently* determined, i. e. *ſuch as it is there ſeen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a* determinate *or* determined *Idea, when ſuch as it is at any Time objectively in the Mind, and ſo* determined *there, it is annex'd, and without Variation* determined *to a Name or articulate Sound, which is to be ſteddily the Sign of that very ſame Object of the Mind, or* determinate *Idea.*

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, *when applied to a ſimple Idea, I mean that ſimple Appearance which the Mind has in its View, or perceives in it ſelf, when that Idea is ſaid to be in it: By* determinate, *when applied to a* complex Idea, *I mean ſuch an one as conſiſts of a determinate Number of certain ſimple or leſs complex Ideas, join'd in ſuch a Proportion and Situation, as the Mind has before its View, and ſees in it ſelf when that Idea is preſent in it, or ſhould be preſent in it, when a Man gives a Name to it: I ſay* ſhould *be; becauſe it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is ſo careful of his Language, as to uſe no Word, till he views in his Mind the preciſe* determined *Idea, which he reſolves to make it the Sign of. The Want of this, is the Cauſe of no ſmall Obſcurity and Confuſion in Men's Thoughts and Diſcourſes.*

I know there are not Words enough in any Language, to anſwer all the Variety of Ideas that enter into Men's Diſcourſes and Reaſonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uſes any Term, he may have in his Mind a determined *Idea, which he makes it the Sign of, and to which he ſhould keep it ſteddily annex'd, during that preſent Diſcourſe. Where he does not, or cannot do this,*

this, he in vain pretends to clear or diſtinct Ideas: *'Tis plain his are not ſo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but Obſcurity and Confuſion, where ſuch Terms are made uſe of, which have not ſuch a preciſe Determination.*

Upon this Ground I have thought determined *Ideas a Way of Speaking leſs liable to Miſtake, than* clear *and* diſtinct: *And where Men have got ſuch* determined *Ideas of all that they reaſon, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great Part of their Doubts and Diſputes at an End. The greateſt Part of the Queſtions and Controverſies that perplex Mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain Uſe of Words, or (which is the ſame)* indetermined Ideas, *which they are made to ſtand for; I have made choice of theſe Terms to ſignify,* 1. *Some immediate Object of the Mind, which it perceives and has before it, diſtinct from the Sound it uſes as a Sign of it.* 2. *That this Idea, thus* determined, *i. e. which the Mind has in it ſelf, and knows, and ſees there, be* determined *without any Change to that Name, and that Name* determined *to that preciſe Idea. If Men had ſuch* determined *Ideas in their Enquiries and Diſcourſes, they would both diſcern how far their own Enquiries and Diſcourſes went, and avoid the greateſt Part of the Diſputes and Wranglings they have with others.*

Beſides this, the Bookſeller will think it neceſſary I ſhould advertiſe the Reader, that there is an Addition of two Chapters wholly new; the one of the Aſſociation of Ideas, *the other of* Enthuſiaſm. *Theſe, with ſome other larger Additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themſelves after the ſame Manner, and for the ſame Purpoſe, as was done when this* Eſſay *had the ſecond Impreſſion.*

In the ſixth Edition, there is very little added or altered, the greateſt Part of what is new, is contained in the 21ſt Chapter of the ſecond Book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little Labour, tranſcribe into the Margin of the former Edition.

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7. *Powers a great Part of our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances.*
8. *And why.*
9. *Three Sorts of* Ideas *make our complex ones of Subſtances.*

10, 11. *The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.*
12. *Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.*
13. *Conjecture about Spirits.*
14. *Complex* Ideas *of Substances.*
15. Idea *of spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily Substances.*
16. *No* Idea *of abstract Substance.*
17. *The Cohesion of solid Parts, and Impulse, the primary* Ideas *of Body.*
18. *Thinking and Motivity, the primary* Ideas *of Spirit.*
19--21. *Spirits capable of Motion.*
22. Idea *of Soul and Body compared.*
23--27. *Cohesion of solid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceived, as Thinking in a Soul.*
28, 29. *Communication of Motion by Impulse, or by Thought, equally intelligible.*
30. Ideas *of Body and Spirit compared.*
31. *The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it, than that of Body.*
32. *We know nothing beyond our simple* Ideas.
33--35. Idea *of God.*
36. *No* Ideas *in our complex one of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflection.*
37. *Recapitulation.*

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective Ideas *of Substances.*

SECT.

1. *One* Idea.
2. *Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.*
3. *All artificial Things are collective* Ideas.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

SECT.

1. *Relation, what.*
2. *Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceived.*
3. *Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.*
4. *Relation different from the Things related.*
5. *Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.*
6. *Relation only betwixt two Things.*
7. *All Things capable of Relation.*
8. *The* Ideas *of Relation clearer often, than of the Subjects related.*
9. *Relations all terminate in simple* Ideas.
10. *Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subjects denominated, are Relative.*
11. *Conclusion.*

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CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect, and other Relations.

SECT.

1. *Whence their* Ideas *got.*
2. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.*
3, 4. *Relations of Time.*
5. *Relations of Place and Extenſion.*
6. *Abſolute Terms often ſtand for Relations.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

SECT.

1. *Wherein Indentity conſiſts.*
2. *Identity of Subſtance, Identity of Modes.*
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4. *Identity of Vegetables.*
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6. *Identity of Man.*
7. *Identity ſuited to the* Idea.
8. *Same Man.*
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10. *Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal Identity.*
11. *Perſonal Identity in Change of Subſtances.*
12. *Whether in the Change of thinking Subſtances.*
16. *Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame Perſon.*
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18. *Object of Reward and Puniſhment.*
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28. *The Difficulty from ill Uſe of Names.*
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CHAP. XXVIII.

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1. *Proportional.*
2. *Natural.*
3. *Inſtituted.*
4. *Moral.*
5. *Moral Good and Evil.*
6. *Moral Rules.*
7. *Laws.*
8. *Divine Law, the Meaſure of Sin and Duty.*
9. *Civil Law, the Meaſure of Crimes and Innocence.*
10, 11. *Philoſophical Law, the Meaſure of Virtue and Vice.*
12. *Its Inforcements, Commendation and Diſcredit.*
13. *Theſe three Laws the Rules of moral Good and Evil.*
14, 15. *Morality is the Relation of Actions to theſe Rules.*
16. *The Denominations of Actions often miſlead us.*
17. *Relations innumerable.*
18. *All Relations terminate in ſimple* Ideas.
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CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas.

SECT.

1. Ideas, *some Clear and some Distinct, others Obscure and Confused.*
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3. *Causes of Obscurity.*
4. *Distinct and confused, what.*
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6. *Confusion of* Ideas, *is in Reference to their Names.*
7. *Defaults which make Confusion. First, complex* Ideas *made up of too few simple ones.*
8. *Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.*
9. *Thirdly, Or are mutable or undetermined.*
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11. *Confusion concerns always two* Ideas.
12. *Causes of Confusion.*
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CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Real* Ideas *are conformable to their Archetypes.*
2. *Simple* Ideas *all real.*
3. *Complex* Ideas *are voluntary Combinations.*
4. *Mixed Modes made of consistent* Ideas, *are real.*
5. Ideas *of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of Things.*

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Adequate* Ideas, *are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.*
2. *Simple* Ideas *all adequate.*
3. *Modes are all adequate.*
4, 5. *Modes in Reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.*
6, 7. Ideas *of Substances, as referr'd to real Essences, not adequate.*
8-11. Ideas *of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.*
12. *Simple* Ideas ἐκτυπα, *and adequate.*
13. Ideas *of Substances are* ἐκτυπα, *inadequate.*
14. Ideas *of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

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CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Truth and Falſhood properly belong to Propoſitions.*
2. *Metaphyſical Truth contains a tacit Propoſition.*
3. *No* Idea, *as an Appearance in the Mind, true or falſe.*
4. Ideas *referred to any thing, may not be true or falſe.*
5. *Other Men's* Ideas, *real Exiſtence, and ſuppoſed real Eſſences, are what Men uſually refer their* Ideas *to.*

6--8. *The Cauſe of ſuch References.*

9. *Simple* Ideas *may be falſe in reference to others of the ſame Name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.*
10. Ideas *of Mixed Modes moſt liable to be falſe in this Senſe.*
11. *Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.*
12. *And why.*
13. *As referred to real Exiſtence, none of our* Ideas *can be falſe, but thoſe of Subſtance.*

14, 16. Firſt, *Simple* Ideas *in this Senſe not falſe, and why.*

15. *Though one Man's* Idea *of Blue ſhould be different from another's.*
17. Secondly, *Modes not falſe.*
18. Thirdly, Ideas *of Subſtances, when falſe.*
19. *Truth or Falſhood always ſuppoſes Affirmation or Negation.*
20. Ideas *in themſelves neither true nor falſe.*
21. *But are falſe.* Firſt, *when judged agreeable to another Man's* Idea *without being ſo.*
22. Secondly, *When judged to agree to real Exiſtence, when they do not.*
23. Thirdly, *When judged adequate, without being ſo.*
24. Fourthly, *When judged to repreſent the real Eſſence.*
25. Ideas, *when falſe.*
26. *More properly to be called Right or Wrong.*
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CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

SECT.

1. *Something unreaſonable in moſt Men.*
2. *Not wholly from Self-Love.*
3. *Nor from Education.*
4. *A Degree of Madneſs.*
5. *From a wrong Connexion of* Ideas.
6. *This Connexion, how made.*

7, 8. *Some Antipathies an Effect of it.*

9. *A great Cauſe of Errors.*

10--12. *Inſtances.*

13. *Why Time cures ſome Diſorders in the Mind, which Reaſon cannot.*

14--16. *Farther Inſtances of the Effects of the Aſſociation of* Ideas.

17. *Its Influence on intellectual Habits.*
18. *Obſervable in different Sects.*

OF
Human Underſtanding.

BOOK I. CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

§. 1. SInce it is the *Underſtanding* that ſets Man above the reſt of ſenſible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for it Nobleneſs, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Underſtanding, like the Eye whilſt it makes us ſee, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it ſelf: And it requires Art and Pains to ſet it at a Diſtance, and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties, that lie in the Way of this Enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us ſo much in the Dark to our ſelves; ſure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds, all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Underſtandings, will not only be very pleaſant, but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the Search of other Things. *An Enquiry into the Underſtanding, pleaſant and uſeful.*

§. 2. This, therefore, being my *Purpoſe*, to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of Human Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Aſſent; I ſhall not at preſent meddle with the Phyſical Conſideration of the Mind; or trouble my ſelf to examine, wherein its Eſſence conſiſts, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alteration of our Bodies, we come to have any Senſation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Underſtandings; and whether thoſe *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter or no: Theſe are Speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I ſhall decline, as lying out of my Way, in the Deſign I am now upon. It ſhall ſuffice to my preſent Purpoſe, to conſider the diſcerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects, which they have to do with: And I ſhall imagine I have not wholly miſ-employ'd my *Deſign.*

ſelf in the Thoughts I ſhall have on this Occaſion, if, in this hiſtorical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways whereby our Underſtandings come to attain thoſe Notions of Things we have, and can ſet down any Meaſures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of thoſe Perſuaſions, which are to be found amongſt Men, ſo various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet aſſerted ſomewhere or other with ſuch Aſſurance and Confidence, that he that ſhall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind, obſerve their Oppoſition, and at the ſame time conſider the Fondneſs and Devotion wherewith they are embraced, the Reſolution and Eagerneſs wherewith they are maintain'd, may perhaps have Reaſon to ſuſpect, that either there is no ſuch thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no ſufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.

Method. §. 3. It is therefore worth while to ſearch out the *Bounds* between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Meaſures, in Things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our Aſſent, and moderate our Perſuaſions. In order whereunto, I ſhall purſue this following Method.

Firſt, I ſhall enquire into the *Original* of thoſe *Ideas*, Notions, or whatever elſe you pleaſe to call them, which a Man obſerves, and is conſcious to himſelf he has in his Mind; and the Ways whereby the Underſtanding comes to be furniſhed with them.

Secondly, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, what *Knowledge* the Underſtanding hath by thoſe *Ideas*; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I ſhall make ſome Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of *Faith* or *Opinion*; whereby I mean that Aſſent, which we give to any Propoſition as true, of whoſe Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we ſhall have Occaſion to examine the Reaſons and Degrees of *Aſſent*.

Uſeful to know the Extent of our Comprehenſion. §. 4. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Underſtanding, I can diſcover the Powers thereof; how far they reach; to what *Things* they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us: I ſuppoſe it may be of uſe, to prevail with the buſy Mind of Man to be more cautious in meddling with Things exceeding its Comprehenſion; to ſtop when it is at the utmoſt Extent of its Tether; and to ſit down in a quiet Ignorance of thoſe Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities. We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward, out of an Affectation of an univerſal Knowledge, to raiſe Queſtions, and perplex our ſelves and

and others with Diſputes about Things, to which our Underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or diſtinct Preceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we can find out, how far the Underſtanding can extend its view, how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty, and in what Caſes it can only judge and gueſs; we may learn to content our ſelves with what is attainable by us in this State.

Our Capacity ſuited to our State and Concerns.

§. 5. For though the *Comprehenſion* of our Underſtandings, comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt extent of Things; yet, we ſhall have Cauſe enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our Being, for that Proportion and Degree of Knowledge, he has beſtowed on us, ſo far above all the reſt of the Inhabitants of this our Manſion. Men have reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St. *Peter* ſays) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, Whatſoever is neceſſary for the Conveniences of Life, and Information of Virtue; and has put within the reach of their diſcovery the comfortable Proviſion for this Life, and the Way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their Knowledge may come of an univerſal or perfect Comprehenſion of whatſoever is, it yet ſecures their great Concernments that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the Sight of their own Duties. Men may find Matter ſufficient to buſy their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight, and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own Conſtitution, and throw away the Bleſſings their Hands are fill'd with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every thing. We ſhall not have much reaſon to complain of the Narrowneſs of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childiſh Peeviſhneſs, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, becauſe there are ſome things that are ſet out of the reach of it. It will be no Excuſe to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Buſineſs by Candle-light, to plead that he had not bright Sun-ſhine. The Candle, that is ſet up in us, ſhines bright enough for all our Purpoſes. The Diſcoveries we can make with this, ought to ſatisfy us: And we ſhall then uſe our Underſtandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, that they are ſuited to our Faculties; and upon thoſe Grounds, they are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require

Demonſtration, and demand Certainty, where Probability only is to be had, and which is ſufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will diſ-believe every Thing, becauſe we cannot certainly know all Things; we ſhall do much what as wiſely as he, who would not uſe his Legs, but ſit ſtill and periſh becauſe he had no Wings to fly.

Knowledge of our Capacity a Cure of Scepticiſm, and Idleneſs.

§. 6. When we know our own *Strength*, we ſhall the better know what to undertake with Hopes of Succeſs: And when we have well ſurvey'd the *Powers* of our own Minds, and made ſome Eſtimate what we may expect from them, we ſhall not be inclined either to ſit ſtill, and not ſet our Thoughts on Work at all, in deſpair of knowing any thing; nor, on the other ſide, queſtion every thing, and diſclaim all Knowledge, becauſe ſome things are not to be underſtood. 'Tis of great Uſe to the Sailor to know the Length of his Line, tho' he cannot with it fathom all the Depths of the Ocean. 'Tis well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the Bottom, at ſuch Places, as are neceſſary to direct his Voyage, and caution him againſt running upon Shoals, that may ruin him. Our Buſineſs here is not to know all Things, but thoſe which concern our Conduct. If we can find out thoſe Meaſures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that ſome other Things eſcape our Knowledge.

Occaſion of this Eſſay.

§. 7. This was that which gave the firſt *Riſe* to this *Eſſay* concerning the *Underſtanding*. For I thought that the firſt Step towards ſatisfying ſeveral Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was to take a Survey of our own Underſtandings, examine our own Powers, and ſee to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I ſuſpected we began at the wrong End, and in vain ſought for Satisfaction in a quiet and ſure Poſſeſſion of Truths, that moſt concern'd us, whilſt we let looſe our Thoughts into the vaſt Ocean of *Being*, as if all that boundleſs Extent were the natural and undoubted Poſſeſſion of our Underſtandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Deciſions, or that eſcaped its Comprehenſion. Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into thoſe Depths, where they can find no ſure Footing; 'tis no wonder, that they raiſe Queſtions, and multiply Diſputes, which never coming to any clear Reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their Doubts, and to confirm them at laſt

in

in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the Bounds between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things; between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us; Men would perhaps with less Scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other.

What Idea *stands for.*

§. 8. Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into *Human Understanding*. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent Use of the Word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a Man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it. (1)

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Men's Minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and Men's Words and Actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.

Our first Enquiry then shall be, how they come into the Mind.

CHAP.

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(1) This modest Apology of our Author could not procure him the free Use of the Word *Idea*. But great Offence has been taken at it, and it has been censured as of dangerous Consequence: To which you may here see what he answers. 'The 'World, * saith the Bishop of *Worcester*, hath been 'strangely amused with *Ideas* of late; and we have 'been told, that strange Things might be done by 'the Help of *Ideas*; and yet these *Ideas*, at last, 'come to be only common Notions of Things, 'which we must make use of in our Reasoning. You, (*i. e.* the 'Author of the *Essay* concerning *Human Understanding*) say in that 'Chapter, about the Existence of God, you thought it most pro- 'per to express your self, in the most usual and familiar Way, by 'common Words and Expressions. I would you had done so quite 'through your Book; for then you had never given that Occa- 'sion, to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up your new Way of '*Ideas*, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) against the Myste- 'ries of the Christian Faith. But you might have enjoy'd the 'Satisfaction of your *Ideas* long enough before I had taken notice 'of them, unless I had found them employed about doing Mis- 'chief.

* *Answer to Mr. Locke's First Letter, p.* 93.

To which our Author (†) replies, 'Tis plain, that That which your Lordſhip apprehends, in my Book, may be of dangerous Conſequence to the Article which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, is my Introducing *new Terms*; that which your Lordſhip inſtances in, is that of *Ideas*. And the Reaſon your Lordſhip gives, in every of theſe Places, why your Lordſhip has ſuch an Apprehenſion of *Ideas*, that they may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, is, becauſe they have been applied to ſuch Purpoſes. And I might (your Lordſhip ſays) have enjoyed the Satisfaction of my *Ideas*, long enough before you had taken notice of them, unleſs your Lordſhip had found them employed in doing Miſchief. Which, at laſt, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, *viz.* That your Lordſhip fears *Ideas*, *i. e.* the Term *Ideas*, may, ſome time or other, prove of very dangerous Conſequence, to what your Lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, becauſe they have been made uſe of in Arguing againſt it. For I am ſure, your Lordſhip does not mean, that you apprehended the Things, ſignified by *Ideas*, may be of dangerous Conſequence to the Article of Faith your Lordſhip endeavours to defend, becauſe they have been made uſe of againſt it: For (beſides that your Lordſhip mentions *Terms*) that would be to expect that thoſe who oppoſe that Article, ſhould oppoſe it without any Thoughts; for the Things ſignified by *Ideas*, are nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in Thinking: So that unleſs any one can oppoſe the Article your Lordſhip defends, without thinking on ſomething, he muſt uſe the Things ſignified by *Ideas*; for he that thinks, muſt have ſome immediate Object of his Mind in thinking: *i. e.* muſt have *Ideas*.

(†) *In his Second Letter to the Biſhop of* Worceſter, p. 63, *&c.*

But whether it be the Name or Thing; *Ideas* in Sound, or *Ideas* in Signification, that your Lordſhip apprehends *may be of dangerous Conſequence to that Article of Faith, which your Lordſhip endeavours to defend:* It ſeems to me, I will not ſay a *New Way* of *Reaſoning* (for that belongs to me) but were it not your Lordſhip's, I ſhould think it a very extraordinary Way of *Reaſoning*, to write againſt a Book, wherein your Lordſhip acknowledges, they are not uſed to bad Purpoſes, nor employed to do Miſchief; only becauſe you find that *Ideas* are by thoſe who oppoſe your Lordſhip, *employ'd to do Miſchief*; and ſo apprehend, *they may be of dangerous Conſequence* to the Article your Lordſhip has engaged in the Defence of. For whether *Ideas* as *Terms*, or *Ideas* as the immediate Objects of the Mind ſignified by thoſe *Terms*, may be, in your Lordſhip's Apprehenſion, *of dangerous Conſequence to that Article*; I do not ſee how your Lordſhip's writing againſt the *Notions of Ideas*, as ſtated in my Book, will at all hinder your Oppoſers, *from employing them in doing Miſchief*, as before.

However,

However, be that as it will, ſo it is, that your Lordſhip apprehends theſe *New Terms*, theſe *Ideas with which the World hath, of late, been ſo ſtrangely amuſed*, (*though at laſt they come to be only common Notions of Things*, as your Lordſhip owns,) *may be of dangerous Conſequence* to that Article.

My Lord, if any, in their Anſwer to your Lordſhip's *Sermons*, and in their other *Pamphlets*, wherein your Lordſhip complains they have talk'd ſo much of *Ideas*, have been troubleſome to your Lordſhip with that *Term*; it is not ſtrange that your Lordſhip ſhould be tired with that Sound: But how natural ſoever it be to our weak Conſtitutions, to be offended with any Sound, wherewith an importunate Din hath been made about our Ears; yet, my Lord, I know your Lordſhip has a better Opinion of the Articles of our Faith, than to think any of them can be over-turn'd, or ſo much as ſhaken, with a Breath, formed into any Sound, or *Term* whatſoever.

Names are but the arbitrary Marks of Conceptions; and ſo they be ſufficiently appropriated to them in their Uſe, I know no other Difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of eaſy or difficult Pronunciation, and of a more or leſs pleaſant Sound; and what particular Antipathies there may be in Men, to ſome of them upon that account, is not eaſy to be foreſeen. This I am ſure, no *Term* whatſoever in it ſelf bears, one more than another, any Oppoſition to Truth of any Kind; they are only Propoſitions that do or can oppoſe the Truth of any Article or Doctrine: And thus no *Term* is privileg'd from being ſet in oppoſition to Truth.

There is no Word to be found, which may not be brought into a Propoſition, wherein the moſt ſacred and moſt evident Truths may be oppoſed; but that is not a Fault in the *Term*, but him that uſes it. And therefore I cannot eaſily perſuade my ſelf (whatever your Lordſhip hath ſaid in the Heat of your Concern) that you have beſtowed ſo much Pains upon my Book, becauſe the Word *Idea* is ſo much uſed there. For though upon my ſaying, in my Chapter about the Exiſtence of God, 'That I ſcarce uſed the Word '*Idea* in that Chapter,' your Lordſhip wiſhes, that *I had done ſo quite through my Book:* Yet, I muſt rather look upon that as a Compliment to me, wherein your Lordſhip wiſhed, that my Book had been all through ſuited to vulgar Readers, not uſed to that and the like *Terms*, than that your Lordſhip has ſuch an Apprehenſion of the Word *Idea*; or that there is any ſuch Harm in the Uſe of it, inſtead of the Word *Notion*, (with which your Lordſhip ſeems to take it to agree in Signification) that your Lordſhip would think it worth your while to ſpend any Part of your valuable Time and Thoughts about my Book, for having the Word *Idea* ſo often in it; for this would be to make your Lordſhip to write only againſt an Impropriety of Speech. I own to your Lordſhip, it is a great Condeſcenſion in your Lordſhip to have done it, if that Word have ſuch a ſhare in what your Lordſhip has writ againſt my Book, as ſome Expreſſions would perſuade

one; and I would, for the Satisfaction of your Lordſhip, change the *Term* of *Idea* for a better, if your Lordſhip, or any one, could help me to it; for that *Notion* will not ſo well ſtand for every immediate Object of the Mind in thinking, as *Idea* does, I have (as I gueſs) ſomewhere given a Reaſon in my Book, by ſhewing that the Term *Notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain Sort of thoſe Objects, which I call mixed Modes: And, I think, it would not ſound altogether ſo well, to ſay, the *Notion of Red*, and the *Notion of a Horſe*; as the *Idea of Red*, and the *Idea of a Horſe*. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no Fondneſs for, no Antipathy to any particular articulate Sounds: Nor do I think there is any Spell or Faſcination in any of them.

But the Word *Idea*, proper or improper, I do not ſee how it is the better or the worſe, becauſe *Ill-Men* have made uſe of it, or becauſe it has been made uſe of to *bad Purpoſes*; for if that be a Reaſon to condemn, or lay it by, we muſt lay by the Terms, *Scripture*, *Reaſon*, *Perception*, *Diſtinct*, *Clear*, &c. Nay, the Name of *God* himſelf will not eſcape; for I do not think any one of thoſe, or any other Term, can be produced, which hath not been made Uſe of by ſuch Men, and to ſuch Purpoſes. And therefore, if *the* Unitarians, *in their late Pamphlets have talked very much of, and ſtrangely amuſed the World with Ideas*; I cannot believe your Lordſhip will think that Word one Jot the worſe, or the more dangerous, becauſe they uſe it; any more than, for their Uſe of them, you will think *Reaſon* or *Scripture* Terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your Lordſhip ſays in the Bottom of this 93d Page, that *I might have enjoyed the Satisfaction of my* Ideas *long enough before your Lordſhip had taken Notice of them*, unleſs you had found them employed in doing Miſchief; will, I preſume, when your Lordſhip has conſidered again of this Matter, prevail with your Lordſhip, to let me *enjoy* ſtill the *Satisfaction I take in my Ideas*, *i. e.* as much Satisfaction as I can take in ſo ſmall a Matter, as is the uſing of a proper Term, notwithſtanding it *ſhould be employed by others in doing Miſchief*.

For, my Lord, if I ſhould leave it wholly out of my Book, and ſubſtitute the Word *Notion* every where in the room of it; and every body elſe do ſo too, (though your Lordſhip does not, I ſuppoſe, ſuſpect, that I have the Vanity to think they would follow my Example) my Book would, it ſeems, be the more to your Lordſhip's liking; but I do not ſee how this would one Jot abate the *Miſchief*, your Lordſhip complains of. For the *Unitarians* might as much employ *Notions*, as they do now *Ideas*, to do *Miſchief*; unleſs they are ſuch Fools to think they can conjure with this notable Word *Idea*; and that the Force of what they ſay, lies in the Sound, and not in the Signification of their Terms.

This I am ſure of, that the Truths of the Chriſtian Religion, can be no more batter'd by one Word than another; nor can they be beaten down nor endangered, by any Sound whatſoever. And I

am apt to flatter myself, that your Lordship is satisfied that there is no Harm in the Word *Ideas*, because you say, you should not have taken any Notice of my *Ideas*, if the *Enemies of our Faith had not taken up my new Way of* Ideas, *as an effectual Battery against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith*. In which Place, *by new Way of Ideas*, nothing, I think, can be construed to be meant, but my expressing my self by that of *Ideas*; and not by other more common Words, and of ancienter standing in the *English* Language.

As to the Objection, of the Author's Way by *Ideas* being *a new Way*, He thus answers: *My new Way of Ideas, or my Way by Ideas*, which often occurs in your Lordship's Letter, is, I confess, a very large and doubtful Expression; and may, in the full Latitude, comprehend my whole *Essay*; because treating of the *Understanding*, which is nothing but the Faculty of Thinking, I could not well treat of that Faculty of the Mind, which consists in Thinking, without considering the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, which I call *Ideas*: And therefore in treating of the *Understanding*, I guess it will not be thought strange, that the greatest Part of my Book has been taken up, in considering what these Objects of the Mind, in Thinking, are; whence they come; what Use the Mind makes of them, in its several Ways of Thinking; and what are the outward Marks, whereby it signifies them to others, or records them for its own Use. And this, in short, is *my Way by Ideas*, that which your Lordship calls *my new Way by Ideas*: Which, my Lord, if it be *new*, it is but a new History of an old Thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that Men always performed the Actions of *Thinking*, *Reasoning*, *Believing*, and *Knowing*, just after the same Manner that they do now: Though whether the same Account has heretofore been given of the Way how they performed these Actions, or wherein they consisted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your Lordship, I should have been safe from that gentle Reprimand of your Lordship's, for thinking *my Way of Ideas, NEW, for want of looking into other Mens Thoughts, which appear in their Book*.

Your Lordship's Words, as an Acknowledgment of your Instructions in the Case, and as a Warning to others, who will be so bold Adventurers as *to spin any Thing barely out of their own Thoughts*, I shall set down at large: And they run thus; *Whether you took this Way of* Ideas *from the Modern Philosopher, mention'd by you, is not at all Material; but I intended no Reflection upon you in it (for that you mean by my commending you as a Scholar of so great a Master.) I never meant to take from you the Honour of your own Inventions: And I do believe you, when you say, That you wrote from your own Thoughts, and the* Ideas *you had there. But many Things may seem New to one, that converses only with his own Thoughts, which really are not so, as he may find, when he looks into the Thoughts of other Men, which have appear in their Books. And therefore although I have a just Esteem for the Inventions of such, who can spin Volumes barely out of their own Thoughts, yet I am apt to think, they*

they would oblige the World more, if after they have thought so much themselves, they would examine what Thoughts others have had before them, concerning the same Things; that so those may not be thought their own Inventions, which are common to themselves and others. If a Man should try all the Magnetical Experiments himself, and publish them as his own Thoughts, he might take himself to be the Inventor of them: But he that examines and compares them with what Gibbert, *and others have done before him, will not diminish the Praise of his Diligence, but may wish he had compared his Thoughts with other Mens: by which the World wou'd receive greater Advantage, altho' he lost the Honour of being an Original.*

To alleviate my Fault herein, I agree with your Lordship, that *many Things may seem NEW, to one that converses only with his own Thoughts, which really are not so:* But I must crave leave to suggest to your Lordship, that if in spinning of them out of his own Thoughts, they seem new to him, he is certainly the Inventor of them; and they may as justly be thought his own *Invention*, as any one's; and he is as certainly the Inventor of them, as any one who thought on them before him: The Distinction of Invention, or not Invention, lying not in thinking first, or not first, but in borrowing, or not borrowing our Thoughts from another: And he to whom, spinning them out of his own Thoughts, they *seem new*, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented *Printing* in *Europe*, who, without any Communication with the *Chinese*, spun it out of his own Thoughts; though it was ever so true, that the *Chinese* had the Use of *Printing*, nay, of *Printing* in the very same Way, among them, many Ages before him. So that he that spins any Thing out of his own Thoughts, that *seems new to him*, cannot cease to think it his own Invention, should he examine ever so far, *what Thoughts others have had before him, concerning the same Thing*, and should find, by examining, that they had the same Thoughts too.

But what great *Obligation this would* be to the World, or weighty Cause of turning over and looking into Books; I confess I do not see. The great End to me, in conversing with my own or other Mens Thoughts, in Matters of Speculation, is to find Truth, without being much concern'd whether my own spinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own Thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the *Honour of an Original*, may be seen in that Place of my Book, where, if any where, that Itch of Vainglory was likeliest to have shewn itself, had I been so over-run with it, as to need a Cure. It is where I speak of Certainty, in these following Words, taken Notice of by your Lordship, in another Place: 'I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, 'real Certainty consists, which whatever it was to others, was, I 'confess, to me heretofore, one of those *Desiderata*, which I found 'great Want of.'

Here, my Lord, however *Now* this *seem'd* to me, and the more so because possibly I had in vain hunted for it in the *Books of others*; yet

yet I ſpoke of it as *New*, only to my ſelf: leaving *others*, in the undiſturb'd Poſſeſſion of what either by Invention, or Reading, was theirs before; without aſſuming to my ſelf any other Honour, but that of my own Ignorance, 'till that Time, if others before had ſhewn wherein Certainty lay. And yet, my Lord, if I had, upon this Occaſion, been forward to aſſume to my ſelf the *Honour of an Original*, I think I had been pretty ſafe in it; ſince I ſhould have had your Lordſhip for my Guarantee and *Vindicator* in that Point, who are pleaſed to call it *New*; and as ſuch, to write againſt it.

And truly, my Lord, in this reſpect, my Book has had very unlucky Stars, ſince it hath had the Misfortune to diſpleaſe your Lordſhip, with many Things in it, for their Novelty; as a *new Way of Reaſoning*; *new Hypotheſis about Reaſon*; *new Sort of Certainty*; *new Terms*; *new Way of Ideas*; *new Method of Certainty*, &c. And yet in other Places, your Lordſhip ſeems to think it worthy in me of your Lordſhip's Reflection, for ſaying, but what others have ſaid before. As where I ſay, 'In the different Make of Mens Tempers, and Appli-'cation of their Thoughts, ſome Arguments prevail more on one, 'and ſome on another, for the Confirmation of the ſame Truth.' Your Lordſhip asks, *What is this different from what Men of Underſtanding have ſaid?* Again, I take it, your Lordſhip meant not theſe Words for a Commendation of my Book, where you ſay; *But if no more be meant by*, 'The ſimple *Ideas* that come in by Sen-'ſation, or Reflection, and their being the Foundation of our 'Knowledge,' *but that our Notions of Things come in, either from our Senſes, or the Exerciſe of our Minds: As there is nothing extraordinary in the Diſcovery, ſo your Lordſhip is far enough from oppoſing that, wherein you think all Mankind are agreed.*

And again, *But what need all this great Noiſe about* Ideas *and* Certainty, *true and real* Certainty *by* Ideas; *if after all, it comes only to this, that our* Ideas *only repreſent to us ſuch Things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of Things.*

But, *The World hath been ſtrangely amuſed with* Ideas *of late*; *and we have been told, that ſtrange Things might be done by the Help of* Ideas; *and yet theſe* Ideas, *at laſt, come to be only common Notions of Things, which we muſt make uſe of in our Reaſoning.* And to the like purpoſe in other Places.

Whether, therefore, at laſt, your Lordſhip will reſolve, that it is *New* or no; or more faulty by its being *New*, muſt be left to your Lordſhip. This I find by it, that my Book cannot avoid being condemned on the one Side, or the other, nor do I ſee a Poſſibility to help it. If there be Readers that like only *New* Thoughts; or, on the other ſide, others that can bear nothing but what can be juſtified by received Authorities in Print; I muſt deſire them to make themſelves amends in that Part which they like, for the Diſpleaſure they receive in the other: But if any ſhould be ſo exact, as to find fault with both, truly, I know not well what to ſay to them. The Caſe is a plain Caſe, the Book is all over wrought, and

and there is not a Sentence in it, that is not, either from its Antiquity or Novelty, to be comdemned; and so there is a short End of it. From your Lordship indeed in particular, I can hope for something better; for your Lordship thinks the *general Design of it so good*, that that, I flatter my self, would prevail on your Lordship to preserve it from the Fire.

But as to the Way, your Lordship thinks, I should have taken to prevent the *having it thought my Invention, when it was common to me with others*, it unluckily so fell out, in the Subject of my *Essay of Human Understanding*, that I could not look into the Thoughts of other Men to inform my self. For my Design being, as well as I could, to copy Nature, and to give an Account of the Operations of the Mind in Thinking; I could look into no body's Understanding but my own, to see how it wrought; nor have a Prospect into other Mens Minds, to view their Thoughts there; and observe what Steps and Motions they took, and by what Gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themselves with Truth, and their Advance to Knowledge: What we find in their Thoughts in Books, is but the Result of this, and not the Progress and Working of their Minds, in coming to the Opinions or Conclusions they set down and published.

All, therefore, that I can say of my Book, is, That it is a Copy of my own Mind, in its several Ways of Operation. And all that I can say for the publishing of it, is, That I think the Intellectual Faculties are made, and operate alike in most Men, and that some, that I shewed it to before I published it, liked it so well, that I was confirmed in that Opinion. And therefore, if it should happen, that it should not be so, but that some Men should have Ways of Thinking, Reasoning, or arriving at Certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my Mind to use and acquiese in, I do not see of what use my Book can be to them. I can only make it my humble Request, in my own Name, and in the Name of those who are of my Size, who find their Minds work, reason, and know in the same low Way that mine does, that those Men of a more happy Genius, would shew us the Way of their nobler Flights; and particularly would discover to us their shorter or surer Way to Certainty, than by *Ideas*, and the observing their Agreement or Disagreement.

Your Lordship adds, *But now it seems, nothing is intelligible but what suits with the New Way of* Ideas. My Lord, *The New Way of* Ideas, and the old Way of speaking *Intelligibly* † was always, and ever will be the same: And if I may take the Liberty to declare my Sense of it, herein it consists: 1. That a Man use no Words, but such as he makes the Signs of certain determined Objects of his Mind in Thinking, which he can make known to another. 2. Next, That he use the same Word steadily, for the Sign of the same immediate Object of his Mind

† *Mr.* Locke's *Third Letter to the Bishop of* Worcester, *p.* 353, &c.

Mind in Thinking. 3. That he join these Words together in Propositions, according to the Grammatical Rules of that Language he speaks in. 4. That he unite those Sentences in a Coherent Discourse. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preserve himself from the Confines and Suspicion of Jargon, whether he pleases to call these immediate Objects of his Mind, which his Words do, or should stand for, *Ideas* or no.

CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

§. 1. IT is an established Opinion amongst some Men, that there are in the *Understanding* certain *Innate Principles*; some Primary Notions, Κοιναι ἔννοιαι, Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince the unprejudiced Readers of the Falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their Natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the Help of any Innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the Ideas of Colours Innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes, from external Objects: And no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and Innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties fit to attain as easy and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the Mind.

The Way shewn how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not Innate.

But because a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow his own Thoughts in the Search of Truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common Road; I shall set down the Reasons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excuse for my Mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace Truth, wherever they find it.

§. 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both *Speculative* and *Practical* (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind; which therefore, they argue, must needs be constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings and which they bring

General Assent the great Argument.

bring into the World with them, as neceſſary and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

Univerſal Conſent proves nothing innate.

§. 3. This Argument, drawn from *Univerſal Conſent*, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in Matter of Fact, that there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them Innate, if there can be any other Way ſhewn, how Men may come to that Univerſal Agreement, in the Things they do conſent in; which I preſume may be done.

What is, is; *and*, It is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be, *not univerſally aſſented to.*

§. 4. But, which is worſe, this Argument of Univerſal Conſent, which is made uſe of, to prove Innate Principles, ſeems to me a Demonſtration that there are none ſuch; becauſe there are none to which all Mankind give an Univerſal Aſſent. I ſhall begin with the Speculative, and inſtance in thoſe magnified Principles of Demonſtration; *Whatſoever is, is*; and, *'Tis impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; which of all others, I think have the moſt allow'd Title to Innate. Theſe have ſo ſettled a Reputation of Maxims univerſally received, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought ſtrange, if any one ſhould ſeem to queſtion it. But yet I take liberty to ſay, that theſe Propoſitions are ſo far from having an Univerſal Aſſent, that there are a great part of Mankind, to whom they are not ſo much as known.

Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, becauſe not known to Children, Ideots, &c.

§. 5. For, firſt 'tis evident, that all *Children* and *Ideots*, have not the leaſt Apprehenſion or Thought of them: And the want of that is enough to deſtroy that Univerſal Aſſent, which muſt needs be the neceſſary Concomitant of all Innate Truths: It ſeeming to me near a Contradiction, to ſay, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or underſtands not: Imprinting, if it ſignify any thing, being nothing elſe, but the making certain Truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind, without the Mind's perceiving it, ſeems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore *Children* and *Ideots* have Souls, have Minds, with thoſe Impreſſions upon them, they muſt unavoidably perceive them, and neceſſarily know and aſſent to theſe Truths; which ſince they do not, it is evident that there are no ſuch Impreſſions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, How can they be Innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, How can they be unknown? To ſay a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the ſame time to ſay, that the Mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this Impreſſion nothing.

No

No Propoſition can be ſaid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conſcious of. For if any one may; then by the ſame Reaſon, all Propoſitions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of aſſenting to, may be ſaid to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since, if any one can be ſaid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it muſt be only, becauſe it is capable of knowing it, and ſo the Mind is of all Truths it ever ſhall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever ſhall know: For a Man may live long, and die at laſt in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing, be the natural Impreſſion contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be every one of them Innate; and this great Point, will amount to no more, but only to a very improper Way of ſpeaking; which whilſt it pretends to aſſert the contrary, ſays nothing different from thoſe, who deny Innate Principles. For no body, I think, ever denied, that the Mind was capable of knowing ſeveral Truths. The Capacity, they ſay, is Innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what End ſuch Conteſt for certain Innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Underſtanding without being perceived, I can ſee no difference there can be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing, in reſpect of their Original: they muſt all be Innate, or all Adventitious; in vain ſhall a Man go about to diſtinguiſh them. He therefore that talks of Innate Notions in the Underſtanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diſtinct Sort of Truths) mean ſuch Truths to be in the Underſtanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if theſe Words (*to be in the Underſtanding*) have any Propriety, they ſignify to be underſtood: So that, to be in the Underſtanding, and not to be underſtood; to be in the Mind, and, never to be perceived; is all one, as to ſay, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Underſtanding. If therefore theſe two Propoſitions, *Whatſoever is, is*; and *It is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them; Infants, and all that have Souls, muſt neceſſarily have them in their Underſtandings, know the Truth of them, and aſſent to it.

§. 6. To avoid this, 'tis uſually anſwered, That all Men know and aſſent to them, *when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon*, and this is enough to prove them Innate. I anſwer,

That Men know them when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon, anſwer'd.

§. 7. Doubtful Expreſſions, that have ſcarce any Signification, go for clear Reaſons, to thoſe,

who

who being pre-poſſeſſed, take not the Pains to examine even what they themſelves ſay. For to apply this Anſwer with any tolerable Senſe to our preſent Purpoſe, it muſt ſignify one of theſe two Things: either, That as ſoon as Men come to the Uſe of Reaſon, theſe ſuppoſed native Inſcriptions come to be known, and obſerved by them: Or elſe, That the Uſe and Exerciſe of Mens Reaſons aſſiſts them in the Diſcovery of theſe Principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

If Reaſon diſcovered them, that would not prove them innate.

§. 8. If they mean that by the *Uſe of Reaſon* Men may diſcover theſe Principles; and that this is ſufficient to prove them Innate: their Way of arguing will ſtand thus, (*viz.*) That whatever Truths Reaſon can certainly diſcover to us, and make us firmly aſſent to, thoſe are all naturally imprinted on the Mind; ſince that univerſal Aſſent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the Uſe of Reaſon, we are capable to come to a certain Knowledge of, and aſſent to them; and by this Means there will be no Difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce from them: All muſt be equally allow'd Innate; they being all Diſcoveries made by the Uſe of Reaſon, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his Thoughts rightly that Way.

'Tis falſe that Reaſon diſcovers them.

§. 9. But how can theſe Men think the *Uſe of Reaſon* neceſſary to diſcover Principles that are ſuppoſed Innate, when Reaſon (if we may believe them) is nothing elſe, but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propoſitions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought Innate, which we have need of Reaſon to diſcover, unleſs, as I have ſaid, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reaſon ever teaches us, to be Innate. We may as well think the Uſe of Reaſon neceſſary to make our Eyes diſcover viſible Objects, as that there ſhould be Need of Reaſon, or the Exerciſe thereof, to make the Underſtanding ſee what is Originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the Underſtanding, before it is perceived by it. So that to make Reaſon diſcover thoſe Truths thus imprinted, is to ſay, that the Uſe of Reaſon diſcovers to a Man, what he knew before; and Men have thoſe Innate, impreſſed Truths originally, and before the Uſe of Reaſon, and yet are always ignorant of them, 'till they come to the Uſe of Reaſon; 'tis in effect to ſay, that Men know, and know them not at the ſame time.

§. 10. 'Twill perhaps be ſaid, that Mathematical Demonſtrations, and other Truths, that are not Innate, are not aſſented

assented to, as soon as propos'd, wherein they are distinguish'd from these Maxims, and other Innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these Maxims, and Mathematical Demonstrations, are in this different; that the one has need of Reason, using of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are without any the least Reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge, which requires the *Use of Reason* for the Discovery of these general Truths: since it must be confessed, that in their Discovery, there is no use made of Reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is a Deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of those Principles to depend on the Labour of our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is Search, and casting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sense be suppos'd, that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?

§. 11. Those who will take the Pains to reflect with a little Attention on the Operations of the Understanding, will find that this ready Assent of the Mind to some Truths, depends not, either on native Inscription, or the *Use of Reason*; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore having nothing to do in procuring our Assent to these Maxims, if by saying, *that Men know and assent to them, when they come to the Use of Reason*, be meant, that the Use of Reason assists us in the Knowledge of these Maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be Innate.

The coming to the Use of Reason, not the Time we come to know these Maxims.

§. 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, *when we come to the Use of Reason*, be meant, that this is the Time, when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to the *Use of Reason*, they come also to know and assent to these Maxims: this also is false and frivolous. *Viz.* It is false: Because it is evident these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the Use of Reason: And therefore the coming

ing to the Use of Reason is falsly assigned, as the Time of their discovery. How many Instances of the Use of Reason may we observe in Children, long time before they have any Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be?* And a great part of Illiterate People, and Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. I grant Men come not to the Knowledge of these general and more abstract Truths, which are thought Innate, till they come to the Use of Reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the Use of Reason, those general abstract *Ideas* are not framed in the Mind, about which those general Maxims are, which are mistaken for Innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made, and Verities introduced, and brought into the Mind by the same way, and discovered by the same Steps, as several other Propositions, which no body was ever so extravagant as to suppose Innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this discourse. I allow therefore a necessity, that Men should come to the Use of Reason, before they get the Knowledge of those general Truths; but deny, that Men's coming to the Use of Reason is the time of their discovery.

By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.

§. 13. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying, that Men know and assent to these Maxims, *when they come to the Use of Reason*, amounts in reality of Fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the Use of Reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a Man's Life; but when, is uncertain: And so may all other knowable Truths, as well as these; which therefore have no Advantage, nor Distinction from others, by this Note of being known when we come to the Use of Reason; nor are thereby proved to be Innate, but quite the contrary.

If coming to the Use of Reason were the Time of their Discovery, it would not prove them Innate.

§. 14. But *Secondly*, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the *Use of Reason*; neither would that prove them Innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the Supposition it self is false. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has a quite distinct Province, begins to exert it self? And therefore, the coming to the

Use

Uſe of Speech, if it were ſuppoſed the time, that theſe Maxims are firſt aſſented to, (which it may be with as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the Uſe of Reaſon) would be as good a Proof that they were Innate, as to ſay, they are Innate becauſe Men aſſent to them, when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon. I agree then with theſe Men of Innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of theſe general and ſelf-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exerciſe of Reaſon: But I deny that the coming to the Uſe of Reaſon, is the preciſe time when they are firſt taken notice of; and, if that were the preciſe time, I deny that it will prove them Innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this Propoſition, That Men *aſſent to them when they come to the Uſe of Reaſon*, is no more but this, That the making of general abſtract *Idea's*, and the underſtanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing up with it, Children commonly get not thoſe general *Idea's*, nor learn the Names that ſtand for them, till having for a good while exerciſed their Reaſon about familiar and more particular *Idea's*, they are, by their ordinary Diſcourſe and Actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational Converſation. If aſſenting to theſe Maxims, when Men come to the Uſe of Reaſon, can be true in any other Senſe, I deſire it may be ſhewn; or at leaſt, how in this, or any other Senſe it proves them Innate.

The Steps by which the Mind attains ſeveral Truths.

§. 15. The Senſes at firſt let in particular *Idea's*, and furniſh the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with ſome of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abſtracts them, and by degrees learns the Uſe of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furniſh'd with *Idea's* and Language, the Materials about which to exerciſe its diſcurſive Faculty: And the Uſe of Reaſon becomes daily more viſible, as theſe Materials, that give it Employment, increaſe. But though the having of general *Idea's*, and the Uſe of general Words and Reaſon uſually grow together; yet, I ſee not, how this any way proves them Innate. The Knowledge of ſome Truths, I confeſs, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that ſhews them not to be Innate. For, if we will obſerve, we ſhall find it ſtill to be about *Idea's*, not Innate, but acquir'd: It being about thoſe firſt, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earlieſt to do, which make the moſt frequent Impreſſions on their Senſes. In *Idea's*

thus got, the Mind discovers, that some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any Use of Memory; as soon as it is able to retain and receive distinct *Ideas*. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the Use of Words, or comes to that, which we commonly call the *Use of Reason*. For a Child knows certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the *Ideas* of Sweet and Bitter (*i. e.* That Sweet is not Bitter;) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that Wormwood and Sugar-plums are not the same Thing.

§. 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, 'till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and *Idea* of Equality: And then upon explaining those Words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an Innate Truth, nor was his Assent wanting till then, because he wanted the *Use of Reason*; but the Truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his Mind the clear and distinct *Ideas*, that these Names stand for: And then he knows the Truth of that Proposition, upon the same Grounds, and by the same Means, that he knew before, that a Rod and Cherry, are not the same thing; and upon the same Grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, *That it is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be*, as shall be more fully shewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general *Ideas*, about which those Maxims are; or to know the Signification of those general Terms that stand for them; or to put together in his Mind the *Ideas* they stand for: the later also will it be, before he comes to assent to those Maxims, whose Terms, with the *Ideas* they stand for, being no more Innate than those of a Cat or a Weesel, he must stay till Time and Observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity to know the Truth of these Maxims, upon the first Occasion that shall make him put together those *Ideas* in his Mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those Propositions; and therefore it is, that a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen are equal to Thirty Seven, by the same Self-evidence, that he knows One and Two be equal to Three: Yet a Child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the Use of Reason, but because the *Ideas* the Words Eighteen, Nineteen, and Thirty Seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signify'd by One, Two and Three.

§. 17.

§. 17. This Evaſion therefore of general Aſſent, when Men come to the Uſe of Reaſon, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between thoſe ſuppoſed Innate, and other Truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, Men have endeavoured to ſecure an univerſal Aſſent to thoſe they call Maxims, by ſaying, they are generally aſſented to as ſoon as propoſed, and the Terms they are propos'd in, underſtood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as ſoon as they hear and underſtand the Terms, aſſent to theſe Propoſitions, they think it is ſufficient to prove them Innate. For ſince Men never fail, after they have once underſtood the Words, to acknowledge them for undoubted Truths, they would infer, that certainly theſe Propoſitions were firſt lodged in the Underſtanding, which, without any teaching, the Mind at the very firſt Propoſal, immediately cloſes with, and aſſents to, and after that never doubts again.

Aſſenting as ſoon as propoſed and underſtood, proves them not Innate.

§. 18. In Anſwer to this, I demand, whether ready *Aſſent* given to a Propoſition upon firſt hearing, and underſtanding the Terms, be a certain Mark of an Innate Principle? If it be not, ſuch a general Aſſent is in vain urged as a Proof of them: If it be ſaid, that it is a Mark of Innate, they muſt then allow all ſuch Propoſitions to be Innate, which are generally aſſented to, as ſoon as heard, whereby they will find themſelves plentifully ſtored with Innate Principles. For upon the ſame Ground, (*viz.*) of Aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms, That Men would have thoſe Maxims paſs for Innate, they muſt alſo admit ſeveral Propoſitions about Numbers, to be Innate: And thus, *That One and Two, are equal to Three*; *that Two and Two, are equal to Four*; and a Multitude of other the like Propoſitions in Numbers, that every Body aſſents to, at firſt hearing, and underſtanding the Terms, muſt have a Place amongſt theſe Innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propoſitions made about ſeveral of them; but even natural Philoſophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propoſitions, which are ſure to meet with Aſſent, as ſoon as they are underſtood. *That two Bodies cannot be in the ſame Place*, is a Truth, that no Body any more ſticks at, than at this Maxim, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; *that White is not Black*; *that a Square is not a Circle*; *that Yellowneſs is not Sweetneſs*: Theſe and a Million of other ſuch

If ſuch an Aſſent be a Mark of Innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetneſs is not Bitterneſs; and a Thouſand the like, muſt be Innate.

Propoſitions, as many at leaſt, as we have diſtinct *Idea's*, every Man in his Wits, at firſt hearing, and knowing what the Names ſtand for, muſt neceſſarily aſſent to. If theſe Men will be true to their own Rules, *and have Aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms*, to be a Mark of Innate, they muſt allow, not only as many Innate Propoſitions, as Men have diſtinct *Idea's*; but as many as Men can make Propoſitions wherein different *Idea's* are denied one of another. Since every Propoſition, wherein one different *Idea* is denied of another, will as certainly find Aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the Terms, as this general one, *It is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; or that which is the Foundation of it, and is the eaſier underſtood of the two, *The ſame is not different*: By which account, they will have Legions of Innate Propoſitions of this one ſort, without mentioning any other. But ſince no Propoſition can be Innate, unleſs the *Idea's*, about which it is, be Innate: This will be, to ſuppoſe all our *Idea's* of Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, Figures, &c. Innate; than which, there cannot be any thing more oppoſite to Reaſon and Experience. Univerſal and ready Aſſent upon hearing and underſtanding the Terms, is (I grant) a Mark of Self-evidence: But Self-evidence, depending not on Innate Impreſſions, but on ſomething elſe, (as we ſhall ſhew hereafter) belongs to ſeveral Propoſitions, which no body was yet ſo extravagant as to pretend to be Innate.

Such leſs general Propoſitions known before theſe univerſal Maxims.

§. 19. Nor let it be ſaid, That thoſe more particular ſelf-evident Propoſitions, which are aſſented to at firſt hearing, as, *That One and Two are equal to Three*: *That Green is not Red*, &c. are received as the Conſequences of thoſe more univerſal Propoſitions, which are look'd on as Innate Principles; ſince any one, who will but take the pains to obſerve what paſſes in the Underſtanding, will certainly find, That theſe, and the like leſs general Propoſitions, are certainly known and firmly aſſented to, by thoſe, who are utterly ignorant of thoſe more general Maxims; and ſo, being earlier in the Mind than thoſe (as they are called) firſt Principles, cannot owe to them the Aſſent wherewith they are received at firſt hearing.

One and One, equal to Two, &c. not general nor uſeful, anſwered.

§. 20. If it be ſaid, that theſe Propoſitions, *viz. Two and Two are equal to Four*; *Red is not Blue*, &c. are not general Maxims, nor of any great Uſe: I anſwer, That makes nothing to the Argument of univerſal Aſſent, upon hearing and underſtanding. For, if that be the certain Mark of Innate,

Innate, whatever Propoſition can be found, that receives general Aſſent, as ſoon as heard and underſtood, that muſt be admitted for an Innate Propoſition, as well as this Maxim, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; they being upon this Ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this Maxim more remote from being Innate; thoſe general and abſtract *Idea's*, being more Strangers to our firſt Apprehenſions, than thoſe more particular ſelf-evident Propoſitions; and therefore 'tis longer before they are admitted and aſſented to by the growing Underſtanding. And as to the Uſefulneſs of theſe magnified Maxims, that perhaps will not be found ſo great as it is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully conſidered.

Theſe Maxims not being known ſometimes 'till propoſed, proves them not Innate.

§. 21. But we have not yet done with *Aſſenting to Propoſitions at firſt hearing and underſtanding their Terms*; 'tis fit we firſt take notice, That this, inſtead of being a Mark, that they are Innate, is a Proof of the contrary: ſince it ſuppoſes, that ſeveral, who underſtand and know other Things, are ignorant of theſe Principles, 'till they are propos'd to them; and that one may be unacquainted with theſe Truths, 'till he hears them from others. For if they were Innate, what need they be propos'd, in order to gaining Aſſent; when, by being in the Underſtanding, by a natural and original Impreſſion, (if there were any ſuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propoſing them, print them clearer in the Mind, than Nature did? If ſo, then the Conſequence will be, That a Man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, That theſe Principles may be made more evident to us by other Teaching, than Nature has made them by Impreſſion; which will ill agree with the Opinion of Innate Principles, and give but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the Foundations of all our other Knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that Men grow firſt acquainted with many of theſe ſelf-evident Truths, upon their being propoſed: But it is clear, that whoſoever does ſo, finds in himſelf, That he then begins to know a Propoſition, which he knew not before; and which from thenceforth he never queſtions; not becauſe it was Innate, but becauſe the Conſideration of the Nature of the Things contained in thoſe Words, would not ſuffer him to think otherwiſe, how, or whenſoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is aſſented to at

firſt hearing, and underſtanding the Terms, muſt paſs for an Innate Principle, every well-grounded Obſervation drawn from Particulars into a general Rule, muſt be Innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only ſagacious Heads light at firſt on theſe Obſervations, and reduce them into general Propoſitions, not Innate, but collected from a preceeding Acquaintance, and Reflection on particular Inſtances. Theſe, when obſerving Men have made them, unobſerving Men, when they are propoſ'd to them, cannot refuſe their Aſſent to.

Implicitly known before proposing, ſignifies that the Mind is capable of underſtanding them, or elſe ſignifies nothing.

§. 22. If it be ſaid, the Underſtanding hath an implicit *Knowledge* of theſe Principles, but not an explicit, before the firſt hearing, (as they muſt, who will ſay, That they are in the Underſtanding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted on the Underſtanding implicitly; unleſs it be this, that the Mind is capable of underſtanding and aſſenting firmly to ſuch Propoſitions. And thus all Mathematical Demonſtrations, as well as firſt Principles, muſt be received as native Impreſſions on the Mind: Which I fear they will ſcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonſtrate a Propoſition, than aſſent to it, when demonſtrated. And few Mathematicians will be forward to believe, That all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of thoſe Innate Characters which Nature had ingraven upon their Minds.

The Argument of Aſſenting on firſt hearing, is upon a falſe Suppoſition of no precedent Teaching

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakneſs in the foregoing Argument, which would perſuade us, that therefore thoſe Maxims are to be thought Innate, which Men admit at firſt hearing, becauſe they aſſent to Propoſitions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument, or Demonſtration, but a bare Explication or underſtanding of the Terms. Under which, there ſeems to me to lie this Fallacy; That Men are ſuppoſed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing *de novo*; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn ſomething they were ignorant of before. For firſt it is evident, they have learned the Terms, and their Signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired Knowledge in the caſe: The *Ideas* themſelves, about which the Propoſition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So that in all Propoſitions that are aſſented to at firſt hearing, the Terms

Terms of the Propoſition, their ſtanding for ſuch *Ideas*, and the *Ideas* themſelves that they ſtand for, being neither of them Innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in ſuch Propoſitions, that is Innate. For I would gladly have any one name that Propoſition, whoſe Terms or *Ideas* were either of them Innate. We by degrees get *Ideas* and Names, and learn their appropriated Connexion one with another; and then to Propoſitions, made in ſuch Terms, whoſe Signification we have learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Diſagreement we can perceive in our *Ideas*, when put together, is expreſſed, we at firſt hearing aſſent; though to other Propoſitions, in themſelves as certain and evident, but which are concerning *Ideas*, not ſo ſoon or ſo eaſily got, we are at the ſame time no way capable of aſſenting. For though a Child quickly aſſents to this Propoſition, *That an Apple is not Fire*, when, by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the *Ideas* of thoſe two different things diſtinctly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names *Apple* and *Fire* ſtand for them; yet it will be ſome Years after, perhaps, before the ſame Child will aſſent to this Propoſition, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; becauſe, that though, perhaps, the Words are as eaſy to be learnt, yet the ſignification of them, being more large, comprehenſive, and abſtract than of the Names annexed to thoſe ſenſible things the Child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their preciſe meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind thoſe general *Ideas* they ſtand for. 'Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child aſſent to a Propoſition made up of ſuch general Terms: But as ſoon as ever he has got thoſe *Ideas*, and learn'd their Names, he forwardly cloſes with the one, as well as the other of the fore-mentioned Propoſitions, and with both for the ſame Reaſon; (*viz.*) becauſe he finds the *Ideas* he has in his Mind, to agree or diſagree, according as the Words ſtanding for them, are affirmed or denied one of another in the Propoſition. But if Propoſitions be brought to him in Words, which ſtand for *Ideas* he has not yet in his Mind; to ſuch Propoſitions, however evidently true or falſe in themſelves, he affords neither Aſſent nor Diſſent, but is ignorant. For Words being but empty Sounds, any farther than they are ſigns of our *Ideas*, we cannot but aſſent to them, as they correſpond to thoſe *Ideas* we have, but no farther than that. But the ſhewing by what ſteps and ways Knowledge comes into our Minds, and the Grounds of ſeveral degrees of Aſſent, being the Buſineſs of the following Diſcourſe, it may ſuffice to have only touched on it here,

here, as one Reaſon, that made me doubt of thoſe Innate Principles.

Not Innate, becauſe not univerſally aſſented to.

§. 24. To conclude this Argument of *Univerſal Conſent*, I agree with theſe Defenders of Innate Principles, That if they are Innate, they muſt needs have *Univerſal Aſſent*. For that a Truth ſhould be Innate, and yet not aſſented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the ſame time. But then, by theſe Men's own Confeſſion, they cannot be Innate; ſince they are not aſſented to by thoſe who underſtand not the Terms, nor by a great part of thoſe who do underſtand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of thoſe Propoſitions; which, I think, is at leaſt one half of Mankind. But were the Number far leſs, it would be enough to deſtroy *Univerſal Aſſent*, and thereby ſhew theſe Propoſitions not to be Innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

Theſe Maxims not the firſt known.

§. 25. But that I may not be accuſed, to argue from the Thoughts of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what paſſes in their Underſtandings before they expreſs it; I ſay next, That theſe two general Propoſitions are not the Truths that firſt poſſeſs the Minds of Children; nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious Notions; which if they were Innate, they muſt needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a Time when Children begin to think, and their Words and Actions do aſſure us that they do ſo. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledge, of Aſſent, can it rationally be ſuppoſed, they can be ignorant of thoſe Notions that Nature has imprinted, were there any ſuch? Can it be imagin'd, with any Appearance of Reaſon, That they perceive the Impreſſions from things without; and be at the ſame time ignorant of thoſe Characters, which Nature it ſelf has taken care to ſtamp within? Can they receive and aſſent to adventitious Notions, and be ignorant of thoſe which are ſuppoſed woven into the very Principles of their Being, and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation and Guide of all their acquired Knowledge, and future Reaſonings? This would be, to make Nature take pains to no purpoſe; or, at leaſt, to write very ill; ſince its Characters could not be read by thoſe Eyes, which ſaw other things very well; and thoſe are very ill ſuppoſed the cleareſt Parts of Truth, and the Foundations of all our Knowledge, which are not firſt known, and without

out which, the undoubted Knowledge of ſeveral other Things may be had. The Child certainly knows, that the *Nurſe* that feeds it, is neither the *Cat* it plays with, nor the *Blackmoor* it is afraid of; that the *Wormſeed* or *Muſtard* it refuſes, is not the *Apple* or *Sugar* it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly aſſured of: But will any one ſay, it is by virtue of this Principle, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*, that it ſo firmly aſſents to theſe, and other parts of its Knowledge? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehenſion of that Propoſition at an Age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other Truths? He that will ſay, Children join theſe general abſtract Speculations with their Sucking-Bottles, and their Rattles, may, perhaps, with Juſtice be thought to have more Paſſion and Zeal for his Opinion, but leſs Sincerity and Truth, than one of that Age.

And ſo not Innate.

§. 26. Though therefore there be ſeveral general Propoſitions, that meet with conſtant and ready Aſſent, as ſoon as propoſed to Men grown up, who have attained the Uſe of more general and abſtract *Idea's*, and Names ſtanding for them; yet they not being to be found in thoſe of tender Years, who nevertheleſs know other things, they cannot pretend to univerſal Aſſent of intelligent Perſons, and ſo by no means can be ſuppoſed Innate: It being impoſſible, than any Truth which is Innate (if there were any ſuch) ſhould be unknown, at leaſt to any one who knows any thing elſe. Since, if they are Innate Truths, they muſt be Innate Thoughts; there being nothing a Truth in the Mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any *Innate Truths in the Mind, they muſt neceſſarily be the firſt of any thought on*; the firſt that appear there.

Not Innate, becauſe they appear leaſt, where what is Innate ſhews it ſelf cleareſt.

§. 27. That the general Maxims, we are diſcourſing of, are not known to *Children*, *Ideots*, and a great part of *Mankind*, we have already ſufficiently proved; whereby it is evident, they have not an univerſal Aſſent, nor are general Impreſſions. But there is this farther Argument in it, againſt their being Innate: That theſe Characters, if they were native and original Impreſſions, ſhould appear faireſt and cleareſt in thoſe Perſons, in whom yet we find no Footſteps of them: And, 'tis, in my Opinion, a ſtrong Preſumption, that they are not Innate; ſince they are leaſt known to thoſe, in whom, if they were Innate, they muſt needs exert themſelves with moſt Force and Vigour. For *Children*, *Ideots*, *Savages*, and

Illiterate

Illiterate People, being of all others the leaſt corrupted by Cuſtom, or borrowed Opinions; Learning and Education, having not caſt their native Thoughts into new Molds, nor by ſuperinducing foreign and ſtudied Doctrines, confounded thoſe fair Characters Nature had written there; one might reaſonably imagine, that in their Minds theſe Innate Notions ſhould lie open fairly to every one's view, as 'tis certain the Thoughts of Children do. It might very well be expected, that theſe Principles ſhould be perfectly known to Naturals, which being ſtamped immediately on the Soul (as theſe Men ſuppoſe) can have no dependance on the Conſtitutions or Organs of the Body, the only confeſſed difference between them and others. One would think, according to theſe Men's Principles, that all theſe native Beams of Light (were there any ſuch) ſhould in thoſe, who have no Reſerves, no Arts of Concealment, ſhine out in their full Luſtre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their Love of Pleaſure, and Abhorrence of Pain. But alas, amongſt *Children*, *Idects*, *Savages*, and the groſly *Illiterate*, what general Maxims are to be found? What univerſal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from thoſe Objects they have had moſt to do with, and which have made upon their Senſes the frequenteſt and ſtrongeſt Impreſſions. A Child knows his Nurſe and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-things of a little more advanced Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the Faſhion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect theſe abſtract Maxims and reputed Principles of Sciences, will, I fear, find himſelf miſtaken. Such kind of general Propoſitions are ſeldom mentioned in the Huts of *Indians*, much leſs are they to be found in the Thoughts of *Children*, or any Impreſſions of them on the Minds of *Naturals*. They are the Language and Buſineſs of the Schools and Academies of learned Nations, accuſtomed to that ſort of Converſation, or Learning, where Diſputes are frequent: Theſe Maxims being ſuited to artificial Argumentation, and uſeful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the diſcovery of Truth, or advancement of Knowledge. But of their ſmall Uſe for the Improvement of Knowledge, I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak more at large, *l.* 4. *c.* 7.

Recapitulation.

§. 28. I know not how abſurd this may ſeem to the Maſters of Demonſtration: And probably, it will hardly down with any body at firſt hearing. I muſt therefore beg a little Truce with Prejudice,

judice, and the forbearance of Cenſure, 'till I have been heard out in the Sequel of this Diſcourſe, being very willing to ſubmit to better Judgments. And ſince I impartially ſearch after Truth, I ſhall not be ſorry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own Notions; which I confeſs we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warmed our Heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot ſee any ground to think theſe two famed ſpeculative Maxims Innate; ſince they are not univerſally aſſented to; and the Aſſent they ſo generally find, is no other, than what ſeveral Propoſitions, not allowed to be Innate, equally partake in with them: And ſince the Aſſent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural Inſcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Diſcourſe. And if *theſe firſt Principles of* Knowledge *and* Science, *are found not to be Innate, no other ſpeculative Maxims can* (I ſuppoſe) *with better Right pretend to be ſo.*

CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

No moral Principles ſo clear and ſo generally received as the forementioned ſpeculative Maxims.

§. 1. IF thoſe ſpeculative Maxims, whereof we diſcourſed in the foregoing Chapter, have not an actual univerſal Aſſent from all Mankind, as we there proved, it is much more viſible concerning *Practical Principles*, that they *come ſhort of an univerſal Reception:* And I think it will be hard to inſtance any one moral Rule which can pretend to ſo general and ready an Aſſent as, *What is, is*; or to be ſo manifeſt a Truth as this, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be.* Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be Innate; and the doubt of their being native Impreſſions on the Mind, is ſtronger againſt theſe moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their Truth at all in queſtion: They are equally true, though not equally evident. Thoſe ſpeculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But moral Principles require Reaſoning, Diſcourſe, and ſome Exerciſe of the Mind, to diſcover the Certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters graven on the Mind; which, if any ſuch

were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own Light be certain and known to every body. But this is no Derogation to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or Certainty of the three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two right ones, because it is not so evident, as *the Whole is bigger than a Part*; nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice, that these moral Rules are capable of Demonstration: And therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain Knowledge of them. But the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the Slowness of Assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest Proofs, that they are not Innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.

Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all Men.

§. 2. Whether there be any such moral Principles, wherein all Men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately conversant in the History of Mankind, and look'd abroad beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys. Where is that practical Truth, that is universally received without doubt or question, as it must be, if Innate? *Justice*, and keeping of Contracts, is that which *most Men seem to agree in.* This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it self to the Den of Thieves, and the Confederacies of the greatest Villains; and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off Humanity it self, keep Faith and Rules of Justice one with another. I grant that Out-laws themselves do this one amongst another; but 'tis without receiving these as the Innate Laws of Nature. They practise them as Rules of Convenience within their own Communities: But it is impossible to conceive, that he embraces Justice as a Practical Principle, who acts fairly with his fellow Highwaymen, and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest Man he meets with. Justice and Truth are the common Ties of Society; and therefore, even Out-laws and Robbers, who break with all the World besides, must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, That those that live by Fraud and Rapine, have Innate Principles of Truth and Justice which they allow and assent to?

Object. *Though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, answered.*

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urged, That the *tacit Assent of their Minds agrees to what their Practice contradicts.* I answer, *First*, I have always thought the Actions of Men the best Interpreters of their

Thoughts.

Thoughts. But since it is certain, that most Men's Practice, and some Men's open Professions have either questioned or denied these Principles, it is impossible to establish an universal Consent, (though we should look for it only amongst grown Men) without which, it is impossible to conclude them Innate. *Secondly*, 'Tis very strange and unreasonable, to suppose Innate Practical Principles, that terminate only in Contemplation. Practical Principles derived from Nature, are there for Operation, and must produce Conformity of Action, not barely speculative Assent to their Truth, or else they are in vain distinguish'd from speculative Maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into Man a desire of Happiness, and an aversion to Misery: These indeed are Innate Practical Principles, which (as Practical Principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions without ceasing: These may be observed in all Persons and all Ages, steady and universal; but these are Inclinations of the Appetite to Good, not Impressions of Truth on the Understanding. I deny not, that there are natural Tendencies imprinted on the Minds of Men; and that, from the very first Instances of Sense and Perception, there are some things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for Innate Characters on the Mind, which are to be the Principles of Knowledge, regulating our Practice. Such natural Impressions on the Understanding, are so far from being confirm'd hereby, that this is an Argument against them; since if there were certain Characters, imprinted by Nature on the Understanding, as the Principles of Knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our Knowledge, as we do those others on the Will and Appetite; which never cease to be the constant Springs and Motives of all our Actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo, not Innate.

§. 4. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any Innate Practical Principles, is, That I think, *there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason:* Which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were Innate; or so much as Self-evident; which every Innate Principle must needs be, and not need any Proof to ascertain its Truth, nor want any Reason to gain its Approbation. He would be thought void of common Sense, who asked, on the one side or on the other side, to give a Reason, *Why it is impossible for*

the same thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other Proof: He that understands the Terms, assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all Social Virtue, *That one should do as he would be done unto*, be propos'd to one who never heard it before, but yet is of Capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any Absurdity ask a Reason why? And were not he that propos'd it bound to make out the Truth and Reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shews it not to be Innate; for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any Proof; but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and understood) be received and assented to, as an unquestionable Truth, which a Man can by no means doubt of. So that the Truth of all these moral Rules, plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be, if either they were Innate, or so much as self-evident.

Instance in keeping Compacts.

§. 5. That Men should keep their Compacts, is certainly a great undeniable Rule in Morality. But yet, if a Christian, who has the view of Happiness and Misery in another Life, be asked why a Man must keep his Word, he will give this as a Reason: Because God, who has the Power of Eternal Life and Death, requires it of us. But if an *Hobbist* be asked why, he will answer, because the Publick requires it, and the *Leviathan* will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old *Heathen* Philosophers had been asked, he would have answer'd, because it was dishonest, below the Dignity of a Man, and opposite to Virtue, the highest Perfection of human Nature, to do otherwise.

Virtue generally approved, not because Innate, but because profitable.

§. 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions concerning the moral Rules, which are to be found among Men, according to the different sorts of Happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves: Which could not be if Practical Principles were Innate, and imprinted in our Minds immediately by the Hand of God. I grant the Existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the Obedience we owe him so congruous to the Light of Reason, that a great part of Mankind give testimony to the Law of Nature; but yet I think it must be allowed, that several moral Rules may receive from Mankind a very general Approbation,

probation, without either knowing or admitting the true Ground of Morality; which can only be the Will and Law of a God, who ſees Men in the Dark, has in his Hand Rewards and Puniſhments, and Power enough to call to Account the proudeſt Offender. For God having, by an inſeparable Connexion, joined *Virtue* and *Publick Happineſs* together; and made the Practice thereof neceſſary to the Preſervation of Society, and viſibly beneficial to all with whom the Virtuous Man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one ſhould, not only allow, but recommend, and magnify thoſe Rules to others, from whoſe obſervance of them, he is ſure to reap Advantage to himſelf. He may, out of Intereſt, as well as Conviction, cry up that for Sacred, which if once trampled on, and prophaned, he himſelf cannot be ſafe nor ſecure. This, though it takes nothing from the Moral and Eternal Obligation which theſe Rules evidently have; yet it ſhews that the outward Acknowledgment Men pay them in their Words, proves not that they are Innate Principles: Nay, it proves not ſo much, that Men aſſent to them inwardly in their own Minds, as the inviolable Rules of their own Practice; ſince we find that Self-Intereſt and the Conveniences of this Life, make many Men own an outward Profeſſion and Approbation of them, whoſe Actions ſufficiently prove, that they very little conſider the Lawgiver that preſcribed theſe Rules, nor the Hell he has order'd for the Puniſhment of thoſe that tranſgreſs them.

Men's Actions convince us, that the Rule of Virtue is not their internal Principle.

§. 7. For, if we will not in Civility allow too much Sincerity to the Profeſſions of moſt Men, but think their Actions to be the Interpreters of their Thoughts, we ſhall find, that they have no ſuch internal Veneration for theſe Rules, nor ſo full a Perſuaſion of their Certainty and Obligation. The great Principle of Morality, *To do as one would be done to*, is more commended than practiſed. But the Breach of this Rule cannot be a greater Vice, than to teach others, That it is no moral Rule, nor Obligatory, would be thought Madneſs, and contrary to that Intereſt Men ſacrifice to, when they break it themſelves. Perhaps Conſcience will be urged as checking us for ſuch Breaches, and ſo the internal Obligation and Eſtabliſhment of the Rule be preſerved.

Conſcience no Proof of any Innate Moral Rule.

§. 8. To which I anſwer, That I doubt not, but without being written on their Hearts, many Men may, by the ſame way that they come to the Knowledge of other Things, come to aſſent to ſe-

veral Moral Rules, and be convinced of their Obligation. Others alſo may come to be of the ſame Mind, from their Education, Company, and Cuſtoms of their Country; which *Perſuaſion, however got, will ſerve to ſet Conſcience on work*, which is nothing elſe, but our own Opinion or Judgment of the Moral Rectitude or Pravity of our own Actions. And if Conſcience be a Proof of Innate Principles, Contraries may be Innate Principles: ſince ſome Men, with the ſame bent of Conſcience, proſecute what others avoid.

Inſtances of Enormities practiſed without Remorſe.

§. 9. But I cannot ſee how any Men ſhould ever tranſgreſs thoſe *Moral Rules*, with *Confidence*, and *Serenity*, were they Innate, and ſtamped upon their Mind. View but an Army at the ſacking of a Town, and ſee what Obſervation, or Senſe of Moral Principles, or what Touch of Conſcience for all the Outrages they do. *Robberies, Murders, Rapes*, are the Sports of Men ſet at liberty from Puniſhment and Cenſure. Have there not been whole Nations, and thoſe of the moſt civilized People, amongſt whom, the expoſing their Children, and leaving them in the Fields, to periſh by Want or wild Beaſts, has been the Practice, as little condemned or ſcrupled as the begetting them? Do they not ſtill, in ſome Countries, put them into the ſame Graves with their Mothers, if they die in Child-birth; or diſpatch them, if a pretended Aſtrologer declares them to have unhappy Stars? And are there not Places, where, at a certain Age they kill, or expoſe their Parents without any remorſe at all? In a part of *Aſia*, the Sick, when their Caſe comes to be thought deſperate, are carried out and laid on the Earth, before they are dead; and left there, expoſed to Wind and Weather, to periſh without Aſſiſtance or Pity. (*a*) It is familiar among the *Mengrelians*, a People profeſſing Chriſtianity, to bury their Children alive without ſcruple. (*b*) There are Places where they eat their own Children. (*c*) The *Caribbes* were wont to geld their Children, on purpoſe to fat and eat them. (*d*) And *Garcilaſſo de la Vega* tells us of a People in *Peru*, which were wont to fat and eat the Children they got on their Female Captives, whom they kept as Concubines for that purpoſe; and when they were paſt breeding, the Mothers themſelves were kill'd too and eaten. (*e*) The Virtues, whereby the *Tououpinambos* believed they merited Paradiſe, were Revenge,

(*a*) *Gruber* apud *Thevenot*, *part* 4. *p.* 13.
(*b*) *Lambert* apud *Thevenot*, *p.* 38.
(*c*) *Voſſius* de Nili Origine, *c.* 18, 19.
(*d*) *P. Mart. Deo.*
(*e*) Hiſt. des Incas, *l.* 1. *c.* 12.

Revenge, and eating abundance of their Enemies. They have not so much as the Name for God, *(f)* no Acknowledgement of any God, no Religion, no Worship, *pag.* 231. The Saints, who are canonized amongst the *Turks*, lead lives, which one cannot with Modesty relate. A remarkable Passage to this purpose, out of the Voyages of *Baumgarten*, which is a Book not every day to be met with, I shall set down at large, in the Language it is published in. *Ibi (sc. prope* Belbes *in* Ægypto) *vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didicimus,* Mahometistis, *ut eos qui amentes, & sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis colant & venerentur. Insuper & eos qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam, voluntariam demum pœnitentiam & paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejusmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effrænem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, & quod majus est, concumbendi, ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac sepelire maximæ fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta & dicenda per interpretem à Mucrelo nostro. Insuper sanctum illum, quem eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprimè commendari, eum esse Hominem sanctum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec fœminarum unquam esset, nec puerorum, sed tantummodo asellarum concubitus atque mularum.* Peregr. Baumgarten, l. 2. c. 1. p. 73. More of the same kind, concerning these precious Saints among the *Turks*, may be seen in *Pietro della Valle*, in his Letter of the 25th of *January*, 1616. Where then are those Innate Principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, Chastity? Or, where is that universal Consent, that assures us there are such inbred Rules? Murders in Duels, when Fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of Conscience: Nay, in many Places, Innocence in this Case is the greatest Ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a view of Men, as they are, we shall find, that they have Remorse in one place, for doing or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

(f) *Lery*, c. 16.

§. 10. He that will carefully peruse the History of Mankind, and look abroad into the several Tribes of Men, and with indifferency survey their Actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that Principle of Morality to be nam'd, or *Rules* of *Virtue* to be thought on (those only excepted

Men have contrary Practical Principles.

that are abſolutely neceſſary to hold Society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt diſtinct Societies) which is not, ſomewhere or other, ſlighted and condemned by the general Faſhion of whole Societies of Men, governed by Practical Opinions, and Rules of Living, quite oppoſite to others.

Whole Nations reject ſeveral Moral Rules.

§. 11. Here, perhaps, 'twill be objected, That it is no Argument, that the *Rule is not known, becauſe* it is *broken.* I grant the Objection good, where Men, though they tranſgreſs, yet diſown not the Law; where fear of Shame, Cenſure, or Puniſhment, carries the Mark of ſome Awe it has upon them. But it is impoſſible to conceive, that a *whole Nation* of Men ſhould all *publickly reject* and renounce, what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a Law: For ſo they muſt, who have it naturally imprinted on their Minds. 'Tis poſſible, Men may ſometimes own *Rules of Morality*, which, in their private Thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themſelves in Reputation and Eſteem amongſt thoſe, who are perſuaded of their Obligation. But 'tis not to be imagin'd, that a whole Society of Men, ſhould publickly and profeſſedly diſown, and caſt off a Rule, which they could not, in their own Minds, but be infallibly certain, was a Law; nor be ignorant, that all Men they ſhould have to do with, knew it to be ſuch: And therefore muſt every one of them apprehend from others, all the Contempt and Abhorrence due to one, who profeſſes himſelf void of Humanity; and one, who confounding the known and natural Meaſures of Right and Wrong, cannot but be look'd on, as the profeſs'd Enemy of their Peace and Happineſs. Whatever Practical Principle is Innate, cannot but be known to every one, to be juſt and good. It is therefore little leſs than a Contradiction, to ſuppoſe, That whole Nations of Men ſhould, both in their Profeſſions and Practice, unanimouſly and univerſally give the lye to what, by the moſt invincible Evidence, every one of them knew to be True, Right, and Good. This is enough to ſatisfy us, That no Practical Rule, which is any where univerſally, and with publick Approbation, or Allowance, tranſgreſſed, can be ſuppoſed Innate. But I have ſomething farther to add, in anſwer to this Objection.

§. 12. The breaking of a Rule, ſay you, is no Argument that it is unknown. I grant it: But the *generally allowed Breach of it any where*, I ſay, *is a Proof that it is not Innate.* For Example, Let us take any of theſe Rules, which being the moſt obvious Deductions of Human Reaſon, and conformable to the natu-

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ral Inclination of the greateſt Part of Men, fewest People have had the Impudence to deny, or Inconſideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer Pretence to be Innate, than this; *Parents, preſerve and cheriſh your Children.* When therefore you ſay, That this is an Innate Rule, what do you mean? Either, that it is an Innate Principle, which upon all Occaſions excites and directs the Actions of all Men: Or elſe, that it is a Truth, which all Men have imprinted on their Minds, and which therefore they know and aſſent to. But in neither of theſe Senſes is it Innate. *Firſt*, That it is not a Principle, which influences all Men's Actions, is what I have proved by the Examples before cited: Nor need we ſeek ſo far as *Mengrelia* or *Peru*, to find Inſtances of ſuch as neglect, abuſe, nay, and deſtroy their Children; or look on it only as the more than Brutality of ſome Savage and Barbarous Nations, when we remember, that it was a familiar and uncondemned Practice among the *Greeks* and *Romans*, to expoſe, without Pity or Remorſe, their innocent Infants. *Secondly*, That it is an Innate Truth, known to all Men, is alſo falſe. For, *Parents, preſerve your Children*, is ſo far from an Innate Truth, that it is no Truth at all; it being a Command, and not a Propoſition, and ſo not capable of Truth or Falſhood. To make it capable of being aſſented to as true, it muſt be reduced to ſome ſuch Propoſition as this: *It is the Duty of Parents to preſerve their Children.* But what Duty is, cannot be underſtood without a Law; nor a Law be known, or ſuppoſed without a Law-maker, or without Reward and Puniſhment: So that it is impoſſible that this, or any other Practical Principle ſhould be Innate; *i. e.* be imprinted on the Mind as a Duty, without ſuppoſing the *Ideas* of God, of Law, of Obligation, of Puniſhment, of a Life after this, Innate. For that Puniſhment follows not, in this Life, the Breach of this Rule; and conſequently, that it has not the Force of a Law in Countries, where the generally allow'd Practice runs counter to it, is in it ſelf evident. But theſe *Ideas* (which muſt be all of them Innate, if any thing as a Duty be ſo) are ſo far from being Innate, that 'tis not every ſtudious or thinking Man, much leſs every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and diſtinct: And that one of them, which of all others ſeems moſt likely to be Innate, is not ſo, (I mean the *Idea* of God) I think, in the next Chapter, will appear very evident to any conſidering Man.

§. 13. From what has been ſaid, I think we may ſafely conclude, That, *whatever Practical Rule is, in any Place, generally*

and with Allowance broken, cannot be supposed Innate; it being impossible, that Men should, without Shame or Fear, confidently and serenely break a Rule, which they could not but evidently know, that God had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of (which they must, if it were Innate) to a degree, to make it a very ill bargain to the Transgressor. Without such a Knowledge as this, a Man can never be certain, that any thing is his Duty. Ignorance or Doubt of the Law; Hopes to escape the Knowledge or Power of the Lawmaker, or the like, may make Men give way to a present Appetite: But let any one see the Fault, and the Rod by it, and with the Transgression, a Fire ready to punish it; a Pleasure tempting, and the Hand of the Almighty visibly held up, and prepared to take Vengeance, (for this must be the Case, where any Duty is imprinted on the Mind) and then tell me, whether it be possible, for People, with such a Prospect, such a certain Knowledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to offend against a Law, which they carry about them in indelible Characters, and that stares them in the face, whilst they are breaking it? Whether Men at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted Edicts of an Omnipotent Law-maker, can with Assurance and Gaiety, slight and trample under foot his most sacred Injunctions? And lastly, Whether it be possible, that whilst a Man thus openly bids defiance to this Innate Law, and supreme Law-giver, all the By-standers, yea, even the Governors and Rulers of the People, full of the same Sense, both of the Law and Law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their dislike, or laying the least blame on it: Principles of Actions indeed there are lodged in Men's Appetites, but these are so far from being Innate Moral Principles, that if they were left to their full swing, they would carry Men to the over-turning of all Morality. Moral Laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant Desires, which they cannot be but by Rewards and Punishments, that will over-balance the Satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the Law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the Mind of all Men as a Law, all Men must have a certain and unavoidable Knowledge, that certain and unavoidable Punishments will attend the breach of it. For if Men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is Innate, Innate Principles are insisted on, and urged to no purpose; Truth and Certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured by them: But Men are in the same uncertain, floating Estate with, as without them. An evident indubitable Knowledge of unavoidable

unavoidable Punishment, great enough to make the Transgression very uneligible, must accompany an Innate Law; unless with an Innate Law, they can suppose an Innate Gospel too. I would not be here mistaken, as if, because I deny an Innate Law, I thought there were none but positive Laws. There is a great deal of difference between an Innate Law, and a Law of Nature; between something imprinted on our Minds in this very Original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the Knowledge of, by the Use and due Application of our natural Faculties. And I think they equally forsake the Truth, who running into the contrary Extremes, either affirm an Innate Law, or deny that there is a Law, knowable by the Light of Nature; *i. e.* without the help of positive Revelation.

Those who maintain Innate Practical Principles, tell us not what they are.

§. 14. The Difference there is amongst Men in their Practical Principles, is so evident, that, I think, I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find any Innate Moral Rules, by this mark of general Assent: And 'tis enough to make one suspect, that the Supposition of such Innate Principles, is but an Opinion taken up at pleasure; since those who talk so confidently of them, are so sparing to tell us which they are. This might with justice be expected from those Men who lay stress upon this Opinion: And it gives occasion to distrust either their Knowledge or Charity, who declaring, That God has imprinted on the Minds of Men, the Foundations of Knowledge, and the Rules of Living, are yet so little favourable to the Information of their Neighbours, or the Quiet of Mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety Men are distracted with. But in truth, were there any such Innate Principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did Men find such Innate Propositions stamped on their Minds, they would easily be able to distinguish them from other Truths, that they afterwards learned, and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more easy, than to know what, and how many they were. There could be no more doubt about their Number, than there is about the Number of our Fingers; and 'tis like then, every System would be ready to give them us by Tale. But since no body, that I know, has ventured yet to give a Catalogue of them, they cannot blame those who doubt of the Innate Principles; since even they who require Men to believe, that there are such Innate Propositions, do not tell us what they are. 'Tis easy to foresee, that if different Men of different Sects should go about to

give us a List of those Innate Practical Principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct Hypothesis, and were fit to support the Doctrines of their particular Schools or Churches: A plain Evidence, that there are no such Innate Truths. Nay, a great part of Men are so far from finding any such Innate Moral Principles in themselves, that by denying Freedom to Mankind, and thereby making Men no other than bare Machines, they take away not only Innate, but all Moral Rules whatsoever, and leave not a Possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive, how any Thing can be capable of a Law, that is not a free Agent: And upon that Ground, they must necessarily reject all Principles of Virtue, who cannot put *Morality and Mechanism together*; which are not very easy to be reconciled, or made consistent.

Lord Herbert's *Innate Principles examined.*

§. 15. When I had writ this, being informed, that my Lord *Herbert* had, in his Books *de Veritate*, assigned these Innate Principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find, in a Man of so great Parts, something that might satisfy me in this Point, and put an end to my Enquiry. In his Chapter *de Instinctu Naturali*, *p.* 76. *edit.* 1656. I met with these six Marks of his *Notitiæ Communes*. 1. *Prioritas*. 2. *Independentia*. 3. *Universalitas*. 4. *Certitudo*. 5. *Necessitas*, i. e. as he explains it, *faciunt ad hominis conversationem*. 6. *Modus conformationis*, i. e. *Assensus nullâ interpositâ morâ*. And at the latter end of his little Treatise, *De Religione Laici*, he says this of these Innate Principles; *Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis Religionis confinio arctentur quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsâ mente cœlitùs descriptæ nulliusque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxiæ*, p. 3. And, *Veritates nostræ Catholicæ, quæ tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descripta*. Thus having given the Marks of the Innate Principles or Common Notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the Minds of Men by the Hand of God, he proceeds to set them down; and they are these: 1. *Esse aliquod supremum numen*. 2. *Numen illud coli debere*. 3. *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultûs divini*. 4. *Resipiscendum esse à peccatis*. 5. *Dari præmium vel pœnam post hanc vitam transactam*. Though I allow these to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to; yet I think he is far from proving them Innate Impressions *in foro interiori descriptæ*. For I must take leave to observe,

§. 16.

§. 16. *First*, That these five Propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common Notions writ on our Minds by the Finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other Propositions, which, even by his own Rules, have as just a Pretence to such an Original, and may be as well admitted for Innate Principles, as, at least, some of these five he enumerates, *viz.* *Do as thou wouldest be done unto:* And perhaps, some hundreds of others, when well considered.

§. 17. *Secondly*, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propositions, *viz.* his first, second, and third Marks, agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks, agree but ill to his third, fourth and fifth Propositions. For, besides that we are assured from History, of many Men, nay, whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them; I cannot see how the third, *viz.* *That Virtue join'd with Piety, is the best Worship of God*, can be an Innate Principle, when the Name, or Sound, *Virtue*, is so hard to be understood; liable to so much Uncertainty in its Signification; and the Thing it stands for, so much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain Rule of Human Practice, and serve but very little to the Conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an Innate Practical Principle.

§. 18. For let us consider this Proposition as to its Meaning, (for it is the Sense, and not Sound, that is and must be the Principle and common Notion) *viz.* *Virtue is the best Worship of God*; *i. e.* is most acceptable to him; which, if *Virtue* be taken, as most commonly it is, for those Actions, which, according to the different Opinions of several Countries, are accounted laudable, will be a Proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If *Virtue* be taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only Measure of Virtue, when Virtue is used to signify what is in its own Nature right and good; then this Proposition, *That Virtue is the best Worship of God*, will be most true and certain, but of very little use in Human Life: Since it will amount to no more than this, *viz.* *That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands*; which a Man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and so be as far from any Rule or Principles of his Actions, as he was before. And I think very few will take a Proposition which amounts to no more than this, *viz.* That God is pleased with the doing of what he himself

himſelf commands, for an Innate Moral Principle writ on the Minds of all Men, (however true and certain it may be) ſince it teaches ſo little. Whoſoever does ſo, will have reaſon to think Hundreds of Propoſitions, Innate Principles; ſince there are many, which have as good a Title as this, to be received for ſuch, which no body yet ever put into that Rank of Innate Principles.

§. 19. Nor is the fourth Propoſition *(viz. Men muſt repent of their Sins)* much more inſtructive, till what thoſe Actions are, that are meant by Sins, be ſet down. For the Word *Peccata*, or *Sins*, being put, as it uſually is, to ſignify in general ill Actions, that will draw on Puniſhment upon the Doers; what great Principle of Morality can that be, to tell us we ſhould be ſorry, and ceaſe to do that which will bring miſchief upon us, without knowing what thoſe particular Actions are, that will do ſo? Indeed, this is a very true Expoſition, and fit to be inculcated on, and received by thoſe, who are ſuppoſed to have been taught, what Actions in all kinds are *Sins*; but neither this, nor the former, can be imagined to be Innate Principles, nor to be of any uſe, if they were Innate, unleſs the particular Meaſures and Bounds of all Virtues and Vices, were engraven in Men's Minds, and were Innate Principles alſo, which I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will ſcarce ſeem poſſible, that God ſhould engrave Principles in Men's Minds, in Words of uncertain Signification, ſuch as *Virtues* and *Sins*, which, amongſt different Men, ſtand for different Things: Nay, it cannot be ſuppoſed to be in Words at all; which, being in moſt of theſe Principles very general Names, cannot be underſtood, but by knowing the Particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical Inſtances, the Meaſures muſt be taken from the Knowledge of the Actions themſelves, and the Rules of them abſtracted from Words, and antecedent to the Knowledge of Names, which Rules a Man muſt know, what Language ſoever he chance to learn, whether *Engliſh* or *Japan*, or if he ſhould learn no Language at all, or never ſhould underſtand the uſe of Words, as happens in the caſe of dumb and deaf Men. When it ſhall be made out, that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Cuſtoms of their Country, know that it is part of the Worſhip of God, Not to kill another Man; Not to know more Women than one; Not to procure Abortion; Not to expoſe their Children; Not to take from another what is his, though we want it our ſelves, but on the contrary, relieve and ſupply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we

we ought to repent, be ſorry, and reſolve to do ſo no more: When, I ſay, all Men ſhall be proved actually to know and allow all theſe and a thouſand other ſuch Rules, all which come under theſe two general Words made uſe of above, *viz. Virtutes & Peccata, Virtues and Sins*, there will be more reaſon for admitting theſe and the like, for common Notions, and Practical Principles; yet after all, univerſal Conſent (were there any in Moral Principles) to Truths, the Knowledge whereof may be attained otherwiſe, would ſcarce prove them to be Innate; which is all I contend for.

Obj. *Innate Principles may be corrupted, anſwered.*

§. 20. Nor will it be of much moment here, to offer that very ready, but not very material Anſwer, *(viz.)* That the *Innate Principles* of Morality, *may, by Education and Cuſtom*, and the general Opinion of thoſe amongſt whom we converſe, *be darkned*, and at laſt *quite worn out* of the Minds of Men. Which Aſſertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the Argument of univerſal Conſent, by which this Opinion of Innate Principles is endeavoured to be proved: unleſs thoſe Men will think it reaſonable, that their private Perſuaſions, or that of their Party, ſhould paſs for univerſal Conſent; a thing not unfrequently done, when Men, preſuming themſelves to be the only Maſters of right Reaſon, caſt by the Votes and Opinions of the reſt of Mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their Argument ſtands thus: The Principles which all Mankind allow for true, are Innate; thoſe that Men of right Reaſon admit, are the Principles allowed by all Mankind; we, and thoſe of our Mind, are Men of Reaſon; therefore we agreeing, our Principles are Innate; which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a ſhort Cut to Infallibility. For otherwiſe it will be very hard to underſtand, how there be ſome Principles, which all Men do acknowledge and agree in; and yet there are none of thoſe *Principles*, which are *not* by *depraved Cuſtom, and ill Education, blotted out* of the Minds of many Men: Which is to ſay, That all Men admit, but yet many Men do deny, and diſſent from them. And indeed the Suppoſition of ſuch firſt Principles, will ſerve us to very little purpoſe; and we ſhall be as much at a loſs with, as without them, if they may by any Human Power, ſuch as is the Will of our Teachers, or Opinions of our Companions, be altered or loſt in us: And notwithſtanding all this Boaſt of firſt Principles, and Innate Light, we ſhall be as much in the Dark and Uncertainty, as if there were no ſuch thing at all: It being all one, to have no Rule, and one that will warp any way, or amongſt

amongſt various and contrary Rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning Innate Principles, I deſire theſe Men to ſay, whether they can, or cannot, by Education and Cuſtom, be blurr'd and blotted out: If they cannot, we muſt find them in all Mankind alike, and they muſt be clear in every body: And if they may ſuffer Variation from adventitious Notions, we muſt then find them cleareſt and moſt perſpicuous neareſt the Fountain, in Children and Illiterate People, who have received leaſt Impreſſion from foreign Opinions. Let them take which Side they pleaſe, they will certainly find it inconſiſtent with viſible Matter of Fact, and daily Obſervation.

Contrary Principles in the World.

§. 21. I eaſily grant, that there are great Numbers of *Opinions*, which, by Men of different Countries, Educations, and Tempers, are received and *embraced as firſt and unqueſtionable Principles*; *many whereof*, both for their Abſurdity, as well as Oppoſitions one to another, *it is impoſſible ſhould be true*. But yet all thoſe Propoſitions, how remote ſoever from Reaſon, are ſo ſacred ſomewhere or other, that Men even of good Underſtanding in other Matters, will ſooner part with their Lives, and whatever is deareſt to them, than ſuffer themſelves to doubt, or others to queſtion, the Truth of them.

How Men commonly come by their Principles.

§. 22. This, however ſtrange it may ſeem, is that which every day's Experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear ſo wonderful, if we conſider the *Ways and Steps by which* it is brought about; and how really it may come to paſs, that *Doctrines*, that have been derived from no better Original, than the Superſtition of a Nurſe, or the Authority of an old Woman, may, by Length of Time, and Conſent of Neighbours, *grow up to the Dignity of Principles* in Religion or Morality. For ſuch, who are careful (as they call it) to principle Children well, (and few there be who have not a Set of thoſe Principles for them, which they believe in) inſtil into the unwary, and, as yet, unprejudiced Underſtanding, (for white Paper receives any Characters) thoſe Doctrines they wou'd have them retain and profeſs. Theſe being taught them as ſoon as they have any Apprehenſion; and ſtill as they grow up, confirmed to them, either by the open Profeſſion, or tacit Conſent, of all they have to do with; or at leaſt by thoſe, of whoſe Wiſdom, Knowledge, and Piety, they have an Opinion, who never ſuffer thoſe Propoſitions to be otherwiſe mentioned, but as the Baſis and

and Foundation, on which they build their Religion or Manners, come, by these Means, to have the Reputation of Unquestionable, Self-evident, and Innate Truths.

§. 23. To which we may add, That when Men, so instructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own Minds, they cannot find any thing more ancient there, than those Opinions which were taught them before their Memory began to keep a Register of their Actions, or date the Time when any new Thing appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, *That those Propositions, of whose Knowledge they can find in themselves no Original, were certainly the Impress of God and Nature upon their Minds*; and not taught them by any one else. These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their Parents, with Veneration; not because it is natural; nor do Children do it, where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this Respect, they think it is natural.

§. 24. This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the Nature of Mankind, and the Constitution of Human Affairs; wherein *most Men cannot live, without employing their Time in the daily Labours of their Calling; nor be at quiet in their Minds, without some Foundation or Principles to rest their Thoughts on.* There is scarce any one so floating and superficial in his Understanding, who hath not some reverenced Propositions, which are to him the Principles on which he bottoms his Reasonings; and by which he judgeth of Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong; which some, wanting Skill and Leisure, and others the Inclination; and some being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found, who are not exposed by their Ignorance, Laziness, Education, or Precipitancy, to take them upon Trust.

§. 25. This is evidently the Case of all Children and Young Folk; and Custom, a greater Power than Nature, seldom failing to make them worship for Divine, what she hath inured them to bow their Minds, and submit their Understandings to, it is no wonder, that grown Men, either perplexed in the necessary Affairs of Life, or hot in the pursuit of Pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own Tenets; especially when one of their Principles is, That Principles ought not to be questioned. And had Men Leisure, Parts, and Will, who is there almost, that dare shake the Foundation of all his past Thoughts and Actions, and endure to bring upon himself the Shame of having been a long time wholly in Mistake and Error? Who

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is there, hardy enough to contend with the Reproach, which is every where prepared for thefe who dare venture to diffent from the received Opinions of their Country or Party? And where is the Man to be found, that can patiently prepare himfelf to bear the Name of Whimfical, Sceptical, or Atheift, which he is fure to meet with, who does in the leaft fcruple any of the common Opinions? And he will be much more afraid to queftion thofe Principles, when he fhall think them, as moft Men do, the Standards fet up by God in his Mind, to be the Rule and Touchftone of all other Opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them Sacred, when he finds them the earlieft of all his own Thoughts, and the moft reverenced by others?

§. 26. It is eafy to imagine, how by thefe means it comes to pafs, that Men worfhip the Idols that have been fet up in their Minds; grow fond of the Notions they have been long acquainted with there; and ftamp the *Characters of Divinity upon Abfurdities and Errors*, become zealous Votaries to Bulls and Monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their Opinions. *Dum fibi credit habendos effe Deos, quos ipfe colit.* For fince the reafoning Faculties of the Soul, which are almoft conftantly, though not always warily nor wifely, employ'd, would not know how to move, for want of a Foundation and footing, in moft Men, who, through Lazinefs or Avocation, do not; or for want of Time, or true Helps, or for other Caufes, cannot, penetrate into the Principles of Knowledge, and trace Truth to its Fountain and Original, 'tis natural for them, and almoft unavoidable, to take up with fome borrowed Principles; which being reputed and prefumed to be the evident Proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other Proofs themfelves. Whoever fhall receive any of thefe into his Mind, and entertain them there, with the reverence uftually paid to Principles, never venturing to examine them; but accuftoming himfelf to believe them, becaufe they are to be believed, may take up from his Education, and the Fafhions of his Country, any Abfurdity for Innate Principles; and by long poring on the fame Objects, fo dim his Sight, as to take Monfters lodged in his own Brain, for the Images of the Deity, and the Workmanfhip of his Hands.

Principles muft be examined.

§. 27. By this Progrefs, how many there are who arrive at Principles, which they believe Innate, may be eafily obferved in the variety of oppofite Principles held, and contended for, by all forts and degrees of Men. And he that fhall deny this

this to be the method, wherein moſt Men proceed to the Aſſurance they have of the Truth and Evidence of their Principles, will, perhaps, find it a hard matter, any other way to account for the contrary Tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently aſſerted, and which great Numbers are ready at any time to ſeal with their Blood. And indeed, if it be the privilege of Innate Principles, to be received upon their own Authority, without Examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's Principles can be queſtioned. If they may, and ought to be examined, and tried; I deſire to know how firſt any Innate Principles can be tried; or at leaſt it is reaſonable to demand the Marks and Characters, whereby the genuine, Innate Principles, may be diſtinguiſhed from others; that ſo, amidſt the great variety of Pretenders, I may be kept from Miſtakes, in ſo material a Point as this. When this is done, I ſhall be ready to embrace ſuch welcome and uſeful Propoſitions; and till then I may with Modeſty doubt, ſince I fear univerſal Conſent, which is the only one produced, will ſcarce prove a ſufficient Mark to direct my Choice, and aſſure me of any Innate Principles. From what has been ſaid, I think it paſt doubt, that there are no Practical Principles wherein all Men agree; and therefore none Innate.

CHAP. IV.

Other Conſiderations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

§. 1. HAD thoſe, who would perſuade us, that there are Innate Principles, not taken them together in groſs; but conſidered, ſeparately, the Parts out of which thoſe Propoſitions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been ſo forward to believe they were Innate. Since, if the *Ideas*, which made up thoſe Truths, were not, it was impoſſible, that the Propoſitions, made up of them, ſhould be Innate, or our Knowledge of them be born with us. For if the *Ideas* be not Innate, there was a time when the Mind was without thoſe Principles; and then, they will not be Innate, but be derived from ſome other Original. For, where the *Ideas* themſelves

Principles not Innate, unleſs their Ideas *be Innate.*

ſelves are not, there can be no Knowledge, no Aſſent, no Mental or Verbal Propoſitions about them.

Ideas, eſpecially thoſe belonging to Principles, not born with Children.

§. 2. If we will attentively conſider new-born Children, we ſhall have little Reaſon to think, that they bring many *Ideas* into the World with them. For, bating, perhaps, ſome faint *Ideas*, of Hunger, and Thirſt, and Warmth, and ſome Pains, which they may have felt in the Womb, there is not the leaſt Appearance of any ſettled *Ideas* at all in them; eſpecially of *Ideas*, *anſwering the Terms which make up thoſe univerſal Propoſitions*, that are eſteemed Innate Principles. One may perceive how, by Degrees, afterwards *Ideas* come into their Minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what Experience, and the Obſervation of Things, that come in their Way, furniſh them with; which might be enough to ſatisfy us, that they are not Original Characters, ſtamped on the Mind.

§. 3. *It is impoſſible for the ſame Thing to be, and not to be*; is certainly (if there be any ſuch) an Innate Principle. But can any one think, or will any one ſay, that *Impoſſibility* and *Identity*, are two Innate *Ideas?* Are they ſuch as all Mankind have, and bring into the World with them? And are they thoſe that are the firſt in Children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are Innate, they muſt needs be ſo. Hath a Child an *Idea* of *Impoſſibility* and *Identity*, before it has of *White* or *Black*, *Sweet* or *Bitter?* And is it from the Knowledge of this Principle, that it concludes, that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple, hath not the ſame Taſte that it uſed to receive from thence? Is it the actual Knowledge of *Impoſſibile eſt idem eſſe, & non eſſe*, that makes a Child diſtinguiſh between its Mother and a Stranger: or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the Mind regulate it ſelf, and its Aſſent, by *Ideas* that it never yet had? Or the Underſtanding draw Concluſions from Principles, which it never yet knew or underſtood? The Names *Impoſſibility* and *Identity*, ſtand for two *Ideas*, ſo far from being Innate, or Born with us, that I think it requires great Care and Attention to form them right in our Underſtanding. They are ſo far from being brought into the World with us; ſo remote from the Thoughts of Infancy and Childhood, that I believe, upon Examination, it will be found, that many grown Men want them.

Identity, and Idea, not Innate.

§. 4. If *Identity* (to inſtance in that alone) be a native Impreſſion; and conſequently ſo clear and

and obvious to us, that we must needs know it even from our Cradles; I would gladly be resolved, by one of Seven, or Seventy Years old, Whether a Man, being a Creature, consisting of Soul and Body, be the same Man, when his Body is changed? Whether *Euphorbus* and *Pythagoras*, having had the same Soul, were the same Man, though they lived in several Ages asunder? Nay, Whether the Cock too, which had the same Soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our *Idea of Sameness* is *not* so settled and clear, as to deserve to be thought *Innate* in us. For if those Innate *Ideas* are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be Subjects of universal and undoubted Truths; but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty. For, I suppose, every one's *Idea* of *Identity*, will not be the same that *Pythagoras* and Thousands others of his Followers have: And which then shall be the true? Which Innate? Or are there two different *Ideas* of *Identity*, both Innate?

§. 5. Nor let any one think, that the Questions I have here proposed, about the *Identity* of Man, are bare, empty Speculations; which if they were, would be enough to shew, that there was in the Understandings of Men *no Innate* Idea *of* Identity. He that shall, with a little Attention, reflect on the Resurrection, and consider, that Divine Justice shall bring to Judgment, at the last Day, the very same Persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this Life, will find it, perhaps, not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same Man, or wherein *Identity* consists: And will not be forward to think he, and every one, even Children themselves, have naturally a clear *Idea* of it.

§. 6. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks, *viz. That the Whole is bigger than a Part.* This, I take it, is reckon'd amongst Innate Principles. I am sure it has as good a Title, as any, to be thought so; which yet, no body can think it to be, when he considers the *Ideas* it comprehends in it, *Whole* and *Part*, are perfectly Relative; but the positive *Ideas*, to which they properly and immediately belong, are Extension and Number, of which alone, *Whole* and *Part* are Relations. So that if *Whole* and *Part* are Innate *Ideas*, Extension and Number must be so too, it being impossible to have an *Idea* of a Relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the Minds of Men have naturally imprinted on them the *Ideas* of Extension and Number,

Whole and Part not Innate Ideas.

I leave to be considered by those, who are the Patrons of Innate Principles.

Idea *of Worship not Innate.*

§. 7. That *God is to be Worshipped*, is, without doubt, as great a Truth as any can enter into the Mind of Man, and deserves the first Place amongst all Practical Principles. But yet, it can by no means be thought Innate, unless the *Ideas* of *God*, and *Worship*, are Innate. That the *Idea*, the Term *Worship* stands for, is not in the Understanding of Children, and a Character stamped on the Mind in its first Original, I think, will be easily granted by any one, that considers how few there be amongst grown Men, who have a clear distinct Notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say, that Children have this Practical Principle Innate, *That God is to be Worshipped*; and yet, that they know not what that Worship of God is, which is their Duty. But to pass by this,

Idea *of God not Innate.*

§. 8. If any *Idea* can be imagin'd *Innate*, the *Idea of God* may, of all others, for many Reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be Innate Moral Principles, without an Innate *Idea* of a *Deity*. Without a Notion of a Law-maker, it is impossible to have a Notion of a Law, and an Obligation to observe it. Besides the Atheists taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation discovered, in these later Ages, whole Nations at the Bay of *Soldania*, (*a*) in *Brasil*, (*b*) in *Boranday*, (*c*) and the *Caribee* Islands, &c. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God, no Religion. *Nicholaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conversione*, has these Words (*d*), *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum, & Hominis animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla Idola.* These are Instances of Nations where uncultivated Nature has been left to it self, without the help of Letters, and Discipline, and the Improvements of Arts and Sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoy'd these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due Application of their Thoughts this way, want the *Idea*, and Knowledge of God. 'Twill, I doubt not, be a Surprise to others, as it was to me, to find the *Siamites* of this Number. But for this, let them consult the King of *France*'s late Envoy thither,

(*a*) Rhoe apud *Thevenot*, *pag.* 2.
(*b*) *Jo. de Lery*, *c.* 16.
(*c*) *Martiniere* 201 328 *Terry* 17 343, & 21 343 *Ovington* 489 525.
(*d*) Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum 43 55.

thither, (*e*) who gives no better Account of the *Chineſes* themſelves. (*f*) And if we will not believe *La Loubere*, the Miſſionaries of *China*, even the Jeſuits themſelves, the great Encomiaſts of the *Chineſes*, do all to a Man agree, and will convince us that the Sect of the *Litterati*, or *Learned*, keeping to the old Religion of *China*, and the ruling Party there, are all of them *Atheiſts*. [Vid. *Navarette* in the Collection of Voyages, Vol. I. and *Hiſtoria cultus Sinenſium.*] And perhaps, if we ſhould with Attention, mind the Lives and Diſcourſes of People not ſo far off, we ſhould have too much reaſon to fear, that many, in more civilized Countries, have no very ſtrong and clear Impreſſions of a Deity upon their Minds; and that the Complaints of Atheiſm, made from the Pulpit, are not without reaſon. And though only ſome profligate Wretches own it too bare-facedly now; yet, perhaps, we ſhould hear more than we do, of it, from others, did not the fear of the Magiſtrate's Sword, or their Neighbour's Cenſure, tie up Peoples Tongues; which, were the Apprehenſions of Puniſhment or Shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their *Atheiſm*, as their Lives do. (2)

(*e*) La Loubere du Royaume de Siam. T. 1. *c.* 9. §. 15. &c. 20. §. 22. &c. 22. §. 6.

(*f*) *Ib. Tom.* 1. *c.* 20. §. 4. &c. 23.

(2) On this Reaſoning of the Author againſt Innate *Ideas*, great Blame hath been laid; becauſe it ſeems to invalidate an Argument commonly uſed to prove the Being of a God, *viz. Univerſal Conſent*: To which our Author † anſwers, *I think that the* Univerſal Conſent *of Mankind, as to the Being of a God, amounts to thus much, That the vaſtly greater Majority of Mankind, have in all Ages of the World actually believed a God; that the Majority of the remaining Part, have not actually disbelieved it; and conſequently thoſe who have actually oppoſed the Belief of a God, have truly been very few.* So that comparing thoſe that have actually disbelieved, with thoſe who have actually believed a God, their Number is ſo inconſiderable, that in reſpect of this incomparably greater Majority, of thoſe who have owned the Belief of a God, it may be ſaid to be the *Univerſal Conſent* of Mankind.

† *In his Third Letter to the Biſhop of* Worceſter, *pag.* 147, &c.

This is all the *Univerſal Conſent* which Truth or Matter of Fact will allow; and therefore all that can be made uſe of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and ſpeak deceitfully for God: If this Univerſality ſhould be urged in a ſtrict Senſe, not for much the Majority, but for a general *Conſent* of every one, even to a Man, in all Ages and Countries; this would make it either no Argument, or a perfectly uſeleſs and unneceſſary one. For if any one deny a God, ſuch a perfectly Univerſality of

§. 9. But had all Mankind, every where, a *Notion of God*, (whereof yet Hiſtory tells us the contrary) it would *not* from thence follow, that the *Idea* of him was *Innate*. For, though no Nation were to be found without a Name, and ſome few dark Notions of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural Impreſſions on the Mind, no more than the Names of Fire, or the Sun, Heat, or Number, do prove the *Ideas* they ſtand for to be Innate; becauſe the Names of thoſe Things, and the *Ideas* of them, are ſo univerſally received and known amongſt Mankind. Nor on the contrary, is the want of ſuch a Name, or the Abſence of ſuch a Notion out of Mens Mind, any Argument againſt the Being of God, any more, than it would be a Proof that there was no Loadſtone in the World, becauſe a great part of Mankind had neither a Notion of any ſuch thing, nor a Name for it; or be any ſhew of Argument to prove, that there are no diſtinct and various Species of Angels, or intelligent Beings above us, becauſe we have no *Ideas* of ſuch diſtinct Species,

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Conſent is deſtroy'd; and if no body does deny a God, what need of Arguments to convince *Atheiſts?*

I would crave leave to ask your Lordſhip, Were there ever in the World any *Atheiſts* or no? If there were not, what need is there of raiſing a Queſtion about the Being of a God, when no body queſtions it? What need of proviſional Arguments againſt a Fault, from which Mankind are ſo wholly free; and which by an *Univerſal Conſent*, they may be preſumed to be ſecure from? If you ſay, (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been *Atheiſts* in the World, then your Lordſhip's *Univerſal Conſent*, reduces itſelf to only a great Majority; and then make that Majority as great as you will, what I have ſaid in the Place quoted by your Lordſhip, leaves it in its full Force; and I have not ſaid one Word that does in the leaſt *invalidate this Argument* for a God. The Argument I was upon there, was to ſhew, that the *Idea* of God was not Innate; and to my Purpoſe it was ſufficient, if there were but a leſs Number found in the World, who had no *Idea* of God, than your Lordſhip will allow there have been of profeſſed *Atheiſts*; for whatſoever is Innate, muſt be Univerſal in the ſtricteſt Senſe. One Exception is a ſufficient Proof againſt it. So that all that I ſaid, and which was quite to another Purpoſe, did not at all tend, nor can be made uſe of, to *invalidate the Argument* for a Deity, grounded on ſuch *Univerſal Conſent*, as your Lordſhip, and all that build on it, muſt own; which is only a very diſproportioned Majority: Such an *Univerſal Conſent* my Argument there, neither affirms nor requires to be leſs than you will be pleaſed to allow it. Your Lordſhip therefore might, without any Prejudice to thoſe Declarations of Good-will and Favour you have for the Author of the *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, have ſpared the mentioning his quoting Authors that

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or Names for them: For Men being furniſhed with Words, by the common Language of their own Countries, can ſcarce avoid having ſome kind of *Ideas* of thoſe things, whoſe Names, thoſe they converſe with, have occaſion frequently to mention to them. And if it carry with it the Notion of Excellency, Greatneſs, or ſomething extraordinary; if Apprehenſion and Concernment accompany it; if the Fear of abſolute and irreſiſtible Power ſet it on upon the Mind, the *Idea* is likely to ſink the deeper, and ſpread the farther; eſpecially if it be ſuch an *Idea*, as is agreeable to the common Light of Reaſon, and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledge, as that of a God is. For the viſible Marks of extraordinary Wiſdom and Power, appear ſo plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but ſeriouſly reflect on them, cannot miſs the Diſcovery of a *Deity:* And the Influence that the Diſcovery of ſuch a Being muſt neceſſarily have on the Minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is ſo great, and carries ſuch a Weight of Thought

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are in Print, for Matters of Fact to quite another Purpoſe, *as going about to invalidate the Argument for a* Deity, *from the Univerſal Conſent of Mankind*, ſince he leaves that *Univerſal Conſent* as entire and as large as you your ſelf do, or can own, or ſuppoſe it. But here I *have no Reaſon to be ſorry that* your Lordſhip *has given me this Occaſion for the Vindication of this Paſſage of my Book*; if there ſhould be any one beſides your Lordſhip, who ſhould ſo far miſtake it, as to think it in the leaſt *invalidates the Argument* for a God, *from the Univerſal Conſent of Mankind.*

But becauſe you queſtion the Credibility of thoſe Authors I have quoted, which you ſay *were very ill choſen:* I will crave leave to ſay, That he whom I relied on for his Teſtimony concerning the *Hotentots* of *Soldania*, was no leſs a Man than an Ambaſſador from the King of *England* to the *Great Mogul*. Of whoſe Relation, Monſieur *Thevenot*, no ill Judge in the Caſe, had ſo great an Eſteem, that he was at the pains to tranſlate it into *French*, and publiſh it in his (which is counted no injudicious) Collection of *Travels*. But to intercede with your Lordſhip, for a little more favourable Allowance of Credit to Sir *Thomas Roe*'s Relation; *Coore*, an Inhabitant of the Country, who could ſpeak *Engliſh*, aſſured * Mr. *Terry*, That they of *Soldania* had no God. But if he too have the ill luck to find no Credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a Divine of the Church of *England* now living, and admit of his Teſtimony in confirmation of Sir *Tho. Roe*'s. This worthy Gentleman, in the Relation of his Voyage to *Surat*, printed but two Years ſince, ſpeaking of the ſame People, has theſe Words, † *They are ſunk even below Idolatry, are deſtitute of both Prieſt and Temple, and ſaving a little ſhew of Rejoicing, which is made at the Full*

* Terry's *Voyage*, *p.* 17, *and* 23.

† *M.* Ovington, *p.* 489.

and Communication with it, that it ſeems ſtranger to me, that a whole Nation of Men ſhould be any where found ſo Brutiſh, as to want the Notion of a God, than that they ſhould be without any Notion of Numbers, or Fire.

§. 10. The Name of God being once mentioned in any part of the World, to expreſs a ſuperior, powerful, wiſe, inviſible Being, the Suitableneſs of ſuch a Notion to the Principles of common Reaſon, and the Intereſt Men will always have to mention it often, muſt neceſſarily ſpread it far and wide; and continue it down to all Generations: though yet the general *Reception of this Name, and ſome imperfect and unſteady Notions, conveyed thereby,* to the unthinking Part of Mankind, *prove not the* Idea *to be Innate*; but only that they, who made the Diſcovery, had made a right Uſe of their Reaſon, thought maturely of the Cauſes of Things, and traced them to their Original; from whom other leſs conſidering People, having once received ſo important a Notion, it could not eaſily be loſt again.

§. 11. This

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and New Moon, have loſt all kind of Religious Devotion. Nature has ſo richly provided for their Convenience in this Life, that they have drowned all Senſe of the God of it, and are grown quite careleſs of the next.

But to provide againſt the cleareſt Evidence of *Atheiſm* in theſe People, you ſay, *That the Account given of them, makes them not fit to be a Standard for the Senſe of Mankind.* This, I think, may paſs for nothing, till ſome body may be found *that makes them to be a Standard for the Senſe of Mankind.* All the Uſe I have made of them was to ſhew, That there were Men in the World that had no Innate *Idea* of God. But to keep ſomething like an Argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying theſe *Cafers* to be Men. What elſe do theſe Words ſignify? *A People ſo ſtrangely bereft of common Senſe, that they can hardly be reckon'd among Mankind, as appears by the beſt Accounts of the* Cafers *of* Soldania, *&c.* I hope if any of them were called *Peter*, *James*, or *John*, it would be paſt ſcruple that they were Men: However, *Courwee*, *Wewena*, and *Couſheda*, and thoſe others who had Names, that had no Places in your *Nomenclator*, would hardly paſs Muſter with your Lordſhip.

My Lord, I ſhould not mention this, but that what you your ſelf ſay here, may be a Motive to you to conſider, That what you have laid ſuch a Streſs on concerning the *general Nature of Man*, as a *real Being, and the Subject of Properties*, amounts to nothing for the diſtinguiſhing of *Species*, ſince you your ſelf own that there may be *Individuals wherein there is a common Nature with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them*, wherein you are ſo little able to know of which of the *Ranks or Sorts* they are, into which you ſay, *God has order'd Beings*, and which he *hath diſtinguiſh'd by eſſential Properties*, that you are in doubt whether *they ought to be reckon'd among Mankind or no.*

§. 11. This is all could be inferr'd from the Notion of a GOD, were it to be found univerſally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally acknowledged by Men grown to Maturity in all Countries. For the Generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be ſufficient to prove the *Idea of God*, *Innate*, will as well prove the *Idea* of Fire, Innate; ſince, I think, it may be truly ſaid, That there is not a Perſon in the World who has a Notion of a *God*, who has not alſo the *Idea* of Fire. I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children ſhould be placed in an Iſland where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of ſuch a Thing, nor Name for it, how generally ſoever it were received, and known in all the World beſides; and perhaps too, their Apprehenſions would be as far removed from any Name, or Notion of a God, 'till ſome one amongſt them had employed his Thoughts, to enquire into the Conſtitution and Cauſes of Things, which would eaſily lead him to the Notion of a *God*; which having once taught to others, Reaſon, and the natural Propenſity of their own Thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongſt them.

§. 12. Indeed it is urged, that it is *ſuitable to the Goodneſs of God, to imprint, upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of himſelf*, and not to leave them in the Dark, and Doubt, in ſo grand a Concernment; and alſo by that means, to ſecure to himſelf the Homage and Veneration, due from ſo intelligent a Creature as Man; and therefore he has done it.

Suitable to GOD's *Goodneſs, that all Men ſhould have an* Idea *of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him, anſwer'd.*

This Argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than thoſe, who uſe it in this Caſe, expect from it. For if we may conclude, that *God* hath done for Men, all that Men ſhall judge is beſt for them, becauſe it is ſuitable to his Goodneſs ſo to do, it will prove not only, that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men an *Idea* of himſelf; but that he hath plainly ſtamped there, in fair Characters, all that Men ought to know, or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think it better for Men, than that they ſhould, in the Dark, grope after Knowledge, as St. *Paul* tells us all Nations did after God, *Acts* xvii. 27. than that their Wills ſhould claſh with their Underſtandings, and their Appetites croſs their Duty. The *Romaniſts* ſay, 'Tis beſt for Men, and ſo ſuitable to the

Goodneſs of God, that there ſhould be an Infallible Judge of Controverſies on Earth; and therefore there is one: And I, by the ſame Reaſon, ſay, 'Tis better for Men, that every Man himſelf ſhould be infallible, I leave them to conſider, whether by the force of this Argument they ſhall think, that every Man is ſo. I think it a very good Argument, to ſay, the infinitely wiſe God hath made it ſo: And therefore it is beſt. But it *ſeems to me a little too much Confidence of our own Wiſdom, to ſay, I think it beſt, and therefore God hath made it ſo.* And in the Matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from ſuch a Topick, that God hath done ſo, when certain Experience ſhews us that he hath not. But the Goodneſs of God hath not been wanting to Men without ſuch original Impreſſions of Knowledge, or *Ideas* ſtamped on the Mind: Since he hath furniſhed Man with thoſe Faculties, which will ſerve for the ſufficient Diſcovery of all things requiſite to the End of ſuch a Being; and I doubt not but to ſhew, that a Man by the right Uſe of his natural Abilities, may, without any Innate Principles, attain the Knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued Man with thoſe Faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more obliged by his Goodneſs, to implant thoſe Innate Notions in his Mind, than that having giving him Reaſon, Hands, and Materials, he ſhould build him Bridges, or Houſes, which ſome People in the World, however of good Parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without *Ideas of God*, and Principles of Morality; or at leaſt have but very ill ones. The Reaſon in both Caſes being, That they never employ'd their Parts, Faculties, and Powers, induſtriouſly that Way, but contented themſelves with the Opinions, Fashions, and Things of their Country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the Bay of *Soldania*, poſſibly our Thoughts and Notions had not exceeded thoſe brutiſh ones of the *Hotentots* that inhabit there: And had the *Virginia* King *Apochancana*, been educated in *England*, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a Divine, and as good a Mathematician, as any in it: The Difference between him and a more improved *Engliſhman*, lying barely in this, that the Exerciſe of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own Country, and never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any *Idea* of a God, it was only becauſe he purſued not thoſe Thoughts that would have led him to it.

§. 13.

§. 13. I grant, That if there were any *Idea* to be found *imprinted* on the Minds of Men, we have Reaſon to expect *it ſhould be the Notion of his Maker*, as a Mark GOD ſet on his own Workmanſhip, to mind Man of his Dependance and Duty; and that herein ſhould appear the firſt Inſtances of human Knowledge. But how late is it before any ſuch Notion is diſcoverable in Children? And when we find it there, how much more does it reſemble the Opinion and Notion of the Teacher, than repreſent the true God? He that ſhall obſerve in Children the Progreſs, whereby their Minds attain the Knowledge they have, will think that the Objects they do firſt, and moſt familiarly converſe with, are thoſe that make the firſt Impreſſions on their Underſtanding: Nor will he find the leaſt Footſteps of any other. It is eaſy to take notice how their Thoughts enlarge themſelves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of ſenſible Objects, to retain the *Ideas* of them in their Memories; and to get the Skill to compound and enlarge them, and ſeveral ways put them together. How by theſe means they come to frame in their Minds an *Idea* Men have of a Deity, I ſhall hereafter ſhew. Ideas *of* GOD *various in different Men.*

§. 14. Can it be thought that the *Ideas* Men have of God, are the Characters, and Marks of himſelf, engraven in their Minds by his own Finger, when we ſee that in the ſame Country, under one and the ſame Name, *Men have far different*, nay, often *contrary and inconſiſtent Ideas* and Conceptions *of him?* Their agreeing in a Name, or Sound, will ſcarce prove an Innate Notion of him.

§. 15. What true or tolerable Notion of a *Deity* could they have, who acknowledged and worſhipped Hundreds? Every Deity, that they owned above one, was an infallible Evidence of their Ignorance of him, and a Proof that they had no true Notion of God, where Unity, Infinity, and Eternity, were excluded. To which if we add their groſs Conceptions of Corporeity, expreſſed in their Images, and Repreſentations of their Deities; the Amours, Marriages, Copulations, Luſts, Quarrels, and other mean Qualities attributed by them to their Gods; we ſhall have little reaſon to think that the Heathen World, *i. e.* the greateſt Part of Mankind, had ſuch *Ideas* of God in their Minds, as he himſelf, out of Care that they ſhould not be miſtaken about him, was Author of. And this Univerſality of Conſent, ſo much urged, if it prove any native Impreſſions, 'twill be only this: That God imprinted on the Minds of all Men, ſpeaking the ſame Language, a Name for himſelf,

himſelf, but not any *Idea*: Since thoſe People, who agreed in the Name, at the ſame time, had far different Apprehenſions about the Thing ſignified. If they ſay, That the Variety of Deities, worſhipped by the Heathen World, were but figurative Ways of expreſſing the ſeveral Attributes of that incomprehenſible Being, or ſeveral Parts of his Providence: I anſwer, what they might be in their Original, I will not here enquire; but that they were ſo in the Thoughts of the Vulgar, I think no body will affirm: And he that will conſult the Voyage of the Biſhop of *Beryte*, *c.* 13. (not to mention other Teſtimonies) will find, that the Theology of the *Siamites*, profeſſedly owns a Plurality of Gods: Or, as the *Abbe de Choiſy* more judiciouſly remarks, in his Journal *du Voiage de Siam*, $\frac{107}{177}$, it conſiſts properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§. 15. If it be ſaid, That *Wiſe Men* of all Nations came to *have true Conceptions* of the Unity and Infinity *of the Deity*, I grant it. But then this,

Firſt, Excludes Univerſality of Conſent in any Thing, but the Name; for thoſe Wiſe Men being very few, perhaps one of a Thouſand, this Univerſality is very narrow.

Secondly, It ſeems to me plainly to prove, that the trueſt and beſt Notions Men had of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by Thought and Meditation, and a right Uſe of their Faculties: Since the wiſe and conſiderate Men of the World, by a right and careful Employment of their Thoughts and Reaſon, attained true Notions in this, as well as other Things; whilſt the lazy and inconſiderate Part of Men, making the far greater Number, took up their Notions, by chance, from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions, without much beating their Heads about them. And if it be a Reaſon to think *the Notion of God Innate*, becauſe all wiſe Men had it, Virtue too muſt be thought Innate, for That alſo wiſe Men have always had.

§. 16. This was evidently the Caſe of all *Gentiliſm:* Nor hath even amongſt *Jews*, *Chriſtians*, and *Mahometans*, who acknowledge but one God, this Doctrine, and the care is taken in thoſe Nations to teach Men to have true Notions of a GOD, prevailed ſo far as to make Men to have the ſame, and true *Ideas* of him. How many, even amongſt us, will be found upon Enquiry, to fancy him in the ſhape of a Man ſitting in Heaven; and to have many other abſurd and unfit Conceptions of him? *Chriſtians*, as well as *Turks*, have had whole Sects owning, and contending earneſtly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human Shape: And though we find

few

few amongſt us, who profeſs themſelves *Anthropomorphites*, (though ſome I have met with, that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his buſineſs, may find amongſt the ignorant and uninſtructed Chriſtians, many of that Opinion. Talk but with Country-People, almoſt of any Age; or young People, almoſt of any Condition; and you ſhall find, that though the Name of GOD be frequently in their Mouths, yet the Notions they apply this Name to, are ſo odd, low, and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational Man; much leſs that they were Characters writ by the Finger of God himſelf. Nor do I ſee how it derogates more from the Goodneſs of God, that he has given us Minds unfurniſhed with theſe *Ideas* of himſelf, than that he hath ſent us into the World with Bodies uncloathed; and that there is no Art or Skill born with us. For being fitted with Faculties to attain theſe, it is want of Induſtry and Conſideration in us, and not of Bounty in Him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the oppoſite Angles, made by the Interſection of two ſtraight Lines, are equal. There was never any rational Creature that ſet himſelf ſincerely to examine the Truth of theſe Propoſitions, that could fail to aſſent to them: Though yet it be paſt doubt that there are many Men, who, having not applied their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmoſt of its Extent) Univerſal Conſent, ſuch an one I eaſily allow: But ſuch an Univerſal Conſent as this, proves not the *Idea* of *God*, no more than it does the *Idea* of ſuch Angles, *Innate*.

If the Idea *of* God *be not Innate, no other can be ſuppoſed Innate.*

§. 17. Since then, though the Knowledge of a GOD be the moſt natural Diſcovery of human Reaſon, yet *the Idea of Him*, is *not Innate*, as, I think, is evident from what has been ſaid; I imagine there will be ſcarce any other *Idea* found, that can pretend to it: Since if God had ſet any Impreſſion, any Character on the Underſtanding of Men, it is moſt reaſonable to expect it ſhould have been ſome clear and uniform *Idea* of himſelf, as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive ſo incomprehenſible and infinite an Object. But our Minds being, at firſt, void of that *Idea*, which we are moſt concerned to have, it *is a ſtrong Preſumption againſt all other Innate Characters*. I muſt own, as far as I can obſerve, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

Idea *of Subſtance not Innate.*

§. 18. I confeſs, there is another *Idea* which would be of general Uſe for Mankind to have,

as

as it is of general Talk, as if they had it; and that is the *Idea of Subſtance*, which we neither have, nor can have, by *Senſation or Reflection*. If Nature took care to provide us any *Idea*, we might well expect it ſhould be ſuch, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to our ſelves: But we ſee on the contrary, that ſince by thoſe Ways, whereby other *Ideas* are brought into our Minds, this is not, we have no ſuch *clear Idea* at all, and therefore ſignify nothing by the word *Subſtance*, but only an uncertain Suppoſition of we know not what (*i. e.* of ſome thing whereof we have no particular diſtinct poſitive) *Idea*, which we take to be the *Subſtratum*, or Support of thoſe *Ideas* we do know.

§. 19. Whatever then we talk of Innate, either *Speculative* or *Practical Principles*, it may, with as much Probability, be ſaid, that a Man hath 100*l. Sterling* in his Pocket, and yet denied that he hath either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of which the Sum is to be made up; as to think, that certain Propoſitions are Innate, when the *Ideas* about which they are, can by no means be ſuppoſed to be ſo. The general Reception and Aſſent that is given, doth not at all prove, that the *Ideas* expreſſed in them are *Innate:* For in many Caſes, however the *Ideas* came there, the Aſſent to Words expreſſing the Agreement, or Diſagreement of ſuch *Ideas*, will neceſſarily follow. Every one that hath a true *Idea* of *God*, and *Worſhip*, will aſſent to this Propoſition, that God is to be worſhipped, when expreſſed in a Language he underſtands: And every rational Man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to aſſent to this Propoſition to-morrow; and yet Millions of Men may be well ſuppoſed to want one, or both thoſe *Ideas* to-day. For if we will allow Savages, and moſt Country-People, to have *Ideas* of *God* and *Worſhip* (which Converſation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few Children can be ſuppoſed to have thoſe *Ideas*; which, therefore, they muſt begin to have ſome time or other; and when they will alſo begin to aſſent to that Propoſition, and make very little queſtion of it ever after. But ſuch an aſſent upon Hearing, no more proves the *Ideas* to be Innate, than it does, that one born Blind (with Cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the Innate *Ideas* of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or Yellow; becauſe when his Sight is cleared, he will certainly aſſent to this Propoſition, That the Sun is Lucid, or that Saffron is Yellow. And therefore if ſuch Aſſent upon Hearing, cannot prove

No Propoſitions can be Innate, ſince no Ideas *are Innate.*

prove the *Ideas* Innate, it can much leſs the Propoſitions made up of thoſe *Ideas*. If they have any Innate *Ideas*, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No Innate Ideas in the Memory.

§. 20. To which let me add: If there be any Innate *Ideas*, any *Ideas* in the Mind, which the Mind does not actually think on; they muſt be lodg'd in the Memory, and from thence muſt be brought into View by Remembrance; *i. e.* muſt be known, when they are remembred, to have been Perceptions in the Mind before, unleſs Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember, is to perceive any thing with Memory, or with a Conſciouſneſs that it was known or perceived before: Without this, whatever *Idea* comes into the Mind, is new, and not remembred: This Conſciouſneſs of its having been in the Mind before, being that which diſtinguiſhes Remembring from all other ways of Thinking. Whatever *Idea* was never perceived by the Mind, was never in the Mind. Whatever *Idea* is in the Mind, is either an actual Perception, or elſe having been an actual Perception, is ſo in the Mind, that by the Memory it can be made an actual Perception again. Whenever there is the actual Perception of an *Idea* without Memory, the *Idea* appears perfectly new and unknown before to the Underſtanding. Whenever the Memory brings any *Idea* into actual View, it is with a Conſciouſneſs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a Stranger to the Mind. Whether this be not ſo, I appeal to every one's Obſervation: And then I deſire an Inſtance of an *Idea*, pretended to be Innate, which (before any Impreſſion of it, by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an *Idea* he had formerly known; without which Conſciouſneſs of a former Perception, there is no Remembrance; and whatever *Idea* comes into the Mind without that Conſciouſneſs, is not remembred, or comes not out of the Memory, nor can be ſaid to be in the Mind before that Appearance. For what is not either actually in View, or in the Memory, is in the Mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppoſe a Child had the uſe of his Eyes till he knows and diſtinguiſhes Colours; but then Cataracts ſhut the Windows, and he is forty or fifty Years perfectly in the Dark; and in that time perfectly loſes all Memory of the *Ideas* of Colours he once had. This was the Caſe of a Blind Man I once talked with, who loſt his Sight by the Small-Pox, when he was a Child, and had no more Notion of Colours, than one born Blind. I ask whether any one can ſay this

this Man had then any *Ideas* of Colours in his Mind, any more than one born Blind? And I think no body will say, that either of them had in his Mind any *Idea* of Colours at all. His Cataracts are couch'd, and then he has the *Ideas* (which he remembers not) of Colours, *de novo*, by his restor'd Sight, convey'd to his Mind, and that without any Consciousness of a former Acquaintance. And these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this Case all these *Ideas* of Colours, which when out of view can be reviv'd with a Consciousness of a former Acquaintance, being thus in the Memory, are said to be in the Mind. The use I make of this is, that whatever *Idea* being not actually in view, is in the Mind, is there only by being in the Memory; and if it be not in the Memory, it is not in the Mind; and if it be in the Memory, it cannot by the Memory be brought into actual view, without a Perception that it comes out of the Memory, which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembred. If therefore there be any Innate *Ideas*, they must be in the Memory, or else no where in the Mind; and if they be in the Memory, they can be reviv'd without any Impression from without, and whenever they are brought into the Mind, they are remembred, *i. e.* they bring with them a Perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing Difference between what is, and what is not in the Memory, or in the Mind; That what is not in the Memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new, and unknown before; and what is in the Memory, or in the Mind, whenever it is suggested by the Memory, appears not to be new, but the Mind finds it in its self, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any Innate *Ideas* in the Mind, before Impression from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. I would fain meet with the Man, who when he came to the Use of Reason, or at any other time, remembred any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are *Ideas* in the Mind, that are not in the Memory; I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

Principles not Innate, because of little Use, or little Certainty.

§. 21. Besides what I have already said, there is another Reason, why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other Principles are Innate. I that am fully perswaded, that the infinitely wise GOD made all Things in perfect Wisdom, cannot satisfy my self, why he should be supposed to print, upon the Minds of Men, some Universal *Principles*;

ples; whereof thoſe *that* are pretended Innate, and *concern Speculation, are of no great uſe; and thoſe that concern Practice, not Self-evident; and neither of them diſtinguiſhable from ſome other Truths, not allowed to be Innate.* For to what purpoſe ſhould Characters be graven on the Mind, by the Finger of God, which are not clearer there than thoſe which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be diſtinguiſhed from them? If any one thinks there are ſuch Innate *Ideas* and Propoſitions, which, by their Clearneſs and Uſefulneſs, are diſtinguiſhable from all that is adventitious in the Mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are; and then every one will be a fit Judge whether they be ſo or no. Since, if there be ſuch Innate *Ideas* and Impreſſions, plainly different from all other Perceptions and Knowledge, every one will find it true in himſelf. Of the Evidence of theſe ſuppoſed Innate Maxims, I have ſpoken already; of their Uſefulneſs I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more hereafter.

Difference of Men's Diſcoveries depends upon the different Application of their Faculties.

§. 22. To conclude: Some *Ideas* forwardly offer themſelves to all Men's Underſtandings; ſome ſorts of Truths reſult from any *Ideas*, as ſoon as the Mind puts them into Propoſitions: Other Truths require a Train of *Ideas* placed in order, a due comparing of them, and Deductions made with attention, before they can be diſcovered and aſſented to. Some of the firſt Sort, becauſe of their general and eaſy Reception, have been miſtaken for Innate: But the Truth is, *Ideas* and Notions are no more born with us than Arts and Sciences, though ſome of them, indeed, offer themſelves to our Faculties, more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received; though that too, be according as the Organs of our Bodies, and Powers of our Minds, happen to be employ'd; *God having fitted Men with Faculties and Means to diſcover, receive, and retain Truths, accordingly as they are employ'd.* The great Difference that is to be found in the Notions of Mankind, is, from the different uſe they put their Faculties to, whilſt ſome (and thoſe the moſt) taking Things upon truſt, miſ-employ their Power of Aſſent, by lazily enſlaving their Minds to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines which it is their Duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit Faith, to ſwallow: Others employing their Thoughts only about ſome few Things, grow acquainted ſufficiently with them, attain great Degrees of Knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their Thoughts looſe in their ſearch

of

of other Enquiries. Thus, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is a Truth as certain as any thing can be; and I think more evident than many of thoſe Propoſitions that go for Principles; and yet there are Millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, becauſe they never ſet their Thoughts on work about ſuch Angles: And he that certainly knows this Propoſition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the Truth of other Propoſitions in Mathematicks it ſelf, which are as clear and evident as this; becauſe, in his ſearch of thoſe Mathematical Truths, he ſtopp'd his Thoughts ſhort, and went not ſo far. The ſame may happen concerning the Notions we have of the Being of a Deity; for though there be no Truth, which a Man may more evidently make out to himſelf, than the Exiſtence of a God, yet he that ſhall content himſelf with things, as he finds them in this World, as they miniſter to his Pleaſures and Paſſions, and not make Enquiry a little farther into their Cauſes, Ends, and admirable Contrivances, and purſue the Thought thereof with Diligence and Attention, may live long without any Notion of ſuch a Being. And if any Perſon hath by Talk, put ſuch a Notion into his Head, he may, perhaps, believe it: But if he hath never *examined* it, his Knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, takes it upon truſt, without examining the Demonſtration; and may yield his Aſſent as a probable Opinion, but hath no Knowledge of the Truth of it; which yet his Faculties, if carefully employ'd, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the bye, to ſhew how much our *Knowledge depends upon the right uſe of thoſe Powers Nature hath beſtowed upon us*, and how little upon ſuch Innate Principles, as are in vain ſuppoſed to be in all Mankind for their Direction; which all Men could not but know, if they were there, or elſe they would be there to no purpoſe: And which, ſince all Men do not know, nor can diſtinguiſh from other adventitious Truths, we may well conclude there are no ſuch.

Men muſt think and know for themſelves.

§. 23. What Cenſure, doubting thus of Innate Principles may deſerve from Men, who will be apt to call it, pulling up the old Foundations of Knowledge and Certainty, I cannot tell: I perſuade my ſelf, at leaſt, that the way I have purſued, being conformable to Truth, lays thoſe Foundations ſurer. This, I am certain, I have not made it my Buſineſs, either to quit or follow any Authority in the enſuing Diſcourſe: Truth has

has been my only Aim; and where-ever that has appeared to lead, my Thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the Footsteps of any other lay that way, or no. Not that I want a due Respect to other Men's Opinions; but after all, the *greatest Reverence is due to Truth*; and I hope it will not be thought Arrogance to say, That perhaps we should make greater Progress in the Discovery of rational and contemplative *Knowledge*, if we *sought* it in the Fountain, *in the Consideration of Things themselves*; and made use rather of our own Thoughts than other Mens to find it. For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other Men's Eyes, as to know by other Men's Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of real and true Knowledge. The floating of other Men's Opinions in our Brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is in us but Opiniatrety, whilst we give up our Assent only to reverend Names, and do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to *understand* those *Truths* which gave them Reputation. *Aristotle* was certainly a knowing Man, but no body ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the Opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's Principles, without examining them, made not him a Philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the Sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but Shreads; which, however, well in the whole Piece, make no considerable Addition to his Stock who gathers them. Such borrowed Wealth, like Fairy-Money, though it were Gold in the Hand from which he received it, will be but Leaves and Dust when it comes to use.

Whence the Opinion of Innate Principles.

§. 24. When Men have found some general Propositions that could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, *a short and easy way to conclude them Innate*. This being once received, it eased the Lazy from the pains of Search, and stopt the Enquiry of the Doubtful, concerning all that was once stiled Innate: And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be Masters and Teachers, to make this the Principle of *Principles*, That Principles must not be questioned: For having once established this Tenet, That there are Innate Principles, it put their Followers upon a necessity of receiving some Doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put

them upon believing and taking them upon truſt, without farther Examination: In which Poſture of blind Credulity, they might be more eaſily governed by, and made uſeful to ſome ſort of Men, who had the Skill and Office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a ſmall Power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of unqueſtionable Truths; and to make a Man ſwallow that for an Innate Principle, which may ſerve to his purpoſe, who teacheth them. Whereas, had they examined the Ways whereby Men came to the Knowledge of many univerſal *Truths*, they would have found them to reſult in the Minds of Men, from the Being of things themſelves, when duly conſidered; and that they were diſcovered by the Application of thoſe Faculties, that were fitted by Nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employ'd about them.

Concluſion.

§. 25. *To ſhew how the Underſtanding proceeds herein, is the Deſign of the following Diſcourſe*; which I ſhall proceed to, when I have firſt premiſed, that hitherto to clear my Way to thoſe Foundations, which I conceive are the only true ones, whereon to eſtabliſh thoſe Notions we can have of our own Knowledge, it hath been neceſſary for me to give an Account of the Reaſons I had to doubt of Innate Principles: And ſince the Arguments which are againſt them, do ſome of them riſe from common received Opinions, I have been forced to take ſeveral Things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whoſe Task it is to ſhew the Falſhood, or Improbability, of any Tenet; it happening in Controverſial Diſcourſes, as it does in aſſaulting of Towns; where, if the Ground be but firm, whereon the Batteries are erected, there is no farther Enquiry of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, ſo it affords but a fit Riſe for the preſent Purpoſe. But in the future Part of this Diſcourſe, deſigning to raiſe an Edifice uniform, and conſiſtent with it ſelf, as far as my own Experience and Obſervation will aſſiſt me, I hope to erect it on ſuch a Baſis, that I ſhall not need to ſhore it up with Props and Buttreſſes, leaning on borrowed or begg'd Foundations: Or at leaſt, if mine prove a Caſtle in the Air, I will endeavour it ſhall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the Reader, not to expect undeniable cogent Demonſtrations, unleſs I may be allow'd the Privilege, not ſeldom aſſumed by others, to take my Principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonſtrate too. All that I ſhall ſay for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only *appeal* to Men's own unprejudiced *Experience*,

Experience and Obſervation, whether they be true or no; and this is enough for a Man who profeſſes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own Conjectures concerning a Subject lying ſomewhat in the dark, without any other deſign than an unbiaſs'd Enquiry after Truth.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas, *in General, and their Original.*

§. 1. EVery Man being conſcious to himſelf, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is apply'd about, whilſt thinking, being the *Ideas* that are there, 'tis paſt doubt, that Men have in their Minds ſeveral *Ideas*, ſuch as are thoſe expreſſed in the words, *Whiteneſs*, *Hardneſs*, *Sweetneſs*, *Thinking*, *Motion*, *Man*, *Elephant*, *Army*, *Drunkenneſs*, and others: It is in the firſt place then to be enquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received Doctrine, That Men have native *Ideas*, and original Characters ſtamped upon their Minds, in their very firſt Being. This Opinion I have at large examined already; and, I ſuppoſe, what I have ſaid in the foregoing Book, will be much more eaſily admitted, when I have ſhewn, whence the Underſtanding may get all the *Ideas* it has, and by what Ways and Degrees they come into the Mind, for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own Obſervation and Experience.

Idea *is the Object of Thinking.*

§. 2. Let us then ſuppoſe the Mind to be, as we ſay, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; How comes it to be furniſhed? Whence comes it by that vaſt Store, which the buſy and boundleſs Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almoſt endleſs Variety? Whence has it all the Materials of Reaſon and Knowledge? To this I anſwer, in a word, from *Experience*: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and

All Ideas *come from Senſation or Reflection.*

and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about *External sensible Objects*, *or about the Internal Operations of our Minds*, *perceived and reflected on by our selves*, *is that*, *which supplies our Understandings with all the Materials of Thinking*. These Two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring,

The Objects of Sensation one Source of Ideas.

§. 3. First, *Our Senses*, conversant about particular sensible Objects, do *convey into the Mind* several distinct *Perceptions* of Things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them: And thus we come by those *Ideas* we have, of *Yellow*, *White*, *Heat*, *Cold*, *Soft*, *Hard*, *Bitter*, *Sweet*, and all those which we call sensible Qualities, which when I say the Senses convey into the Mind, I mean, they from External Objects convey into the Mind what produces there those *Perceptions*. This great Source, of most of the *Ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I call SENSATION.

The Operations of our Minds the other Source of them.

§. 4. *Secondly*. The other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with *Ideas*, is the *Perception of the Operations of our own Minds* within us, as it is employ'd about the *Ideas* it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another Set of *Ideas*, which could not be had from things without; and such are, *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Believing*, *Reasoning*, *Knowing*, *Willing*, and all the different Actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understandings, as distinct *Ideas*, as we do from Bodies affecting our Senses. This Source of *Ideas*, every Man has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with External Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd Internal Sense. But as I call the other *Sensation*, so I call this REFLECTION; the *Ideas* it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By REFLECTION then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood to mean, that Notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the Manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be *Ideas* of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, *viz.* External, material Things, as the Objects of SENSATION, and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of REFLECTION, are,

are to me, the only Originals from whence all our *Ideas* take their Beginnings. The Term *Operations* here, I uſe in a large Senſe, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its *Ideas*, but ſome ſort of Paſſions ariſing ſometimes from them, ſuch as is the Satisfaction or Uneaſineſs ariſing from any Thought.

All our Ideas *are of the one or the other of theſe.*

§. 5. The Underſtanding ſeems to me not to have the leaſt Glimmering of any *Ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two. *External Objects, furniſh the Mind with the* Ideas *of ſenſible Qualities.* which are all thoſe different Perceptions they produce in us: And the *Mind furniſhes the Underſtanding with* Ideas *of its own Operations.*

Theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them and their ſeveral Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we ſhall find to contain all our whole Stock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of theſe two Ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and thoroughly ſearch into his Underſtanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the Original *Ideas* he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his *Senſes*; or of the Operations of his Mind, conſidered as Objects of his *Reflection:* And how great a Maſs of Knowledge ſoever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a ſtrict View, ſee that he has *not any* Idea *in his Mind but what one of theſe two have imprinted*; though, perhaps, with infinite Variety compounded and enlarged by the Underſtanding, as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Obſervable in Children.

§. 6. He that attentively conſiders the State of a *Child*, at his firſt coming into the World, will have little reaſon to think him ſtored with plenty of *Ideas*, that are to be the Matter of his future Knowledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furniſhed with them: And though the *Ideas* of obvious and familiar Qualities, imprint themſelves before the Memory begins to keep a Regiſter of Time and Order, yet 'tis often ſo late, before ſome unuſual Qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their Acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be ſo ordered, as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary *Ideas*, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that are born into the World being ſurrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diverſly affect them, Variety of *Ideas*, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. *Light* and *Colours* are buſy at hand every where, when the Eye is but open; *Sounds*, and

some *tangible Qualities* fail not to solicite their proper Senses, and force an Entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a Place, where he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man, he would have no more *Ideas* of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never tasted an Oyster, or a Pine-Apple, has of those particular Relishes.

Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.

§. 7. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple *Ideas* from without, according as the *Objects*, they converse with, afford greater or less Variety; and from the Operation of their Minds within, according as they more or less *reflect* on them. For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear *Ideas* of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them *attentively*, he will no more have clear and distinct *Ideas* of all the *Operations of his Mind*, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular *Ideas* of any Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with Attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock, may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused *Idea* of all the Parts they are made up of, till he *applies himself with Attention*, to consider them each in particular.

Ideas *of Reflection later, because they need Attention.*

§. 8. And hence we see the reason, why 'tis pretty late before most Children get *Ideas* of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect *Ideas* of the greatest Part of them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough, to leave in the Mind clear, distinct, lasting *Ideas*, till the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, *reflects* on its own *Operations*, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new Things, which, by a constant Solicitation of their Senses, draw the Mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first Years are usually employ'd and diverted in looking abroad. Men's Business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so growing up in a constant Attention to outward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection

flection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and some scarce ever at all.

§. 9. To ask, *at what Time a Man has first any* Ideas; is to ask when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception, being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, That the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of *Ideas* in it self constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual Thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body: which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man's *Ideas*, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and its *Ideas*, as Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same Time.

The Soul begins to have Ideas, *when it begins to perceive.*

§. 10. But whether the Soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the first Rudiments or Organisation, or the Beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that Matter. I confess my self to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate *Ideas*, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the *Soul always to think*, than for the Body always to move; the Perception of *Ideas*, being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to the Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations: And therefore, though Thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of the Soul; yet it is not necessary to suppose, that it should be always Thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of Things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*; but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is something in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us. For to say, that actual Thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a Self-evident Proposition. But whether this, *That the Soul always thinks*, be a Self-evident Proposition, that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind. 'Tis doubted whether I thought all last Night, or no; the Question being about a Matter of Fact, 'tis begging it, to bring, as a Proof for it, an Hypothesis, which is the very Thing in dispute; by which way

The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.

one may prove any thing, and 'tis but ſuppoſing that all Watches, whilſt the Balance beats, think, and 'tis ſufficiently proved, and paſt doubt, that my Watch thought all laſt Night. But he, that would not deceive himſelf, ought to build his Hypotheſis on Matter of Fact, and make it out by ſenſible Experience, and not preſume on Matter of Fact becauſe of his Hypotheſis, that is, becauſe he ſuppoſes it to be ſo; which way of proving amounts to this, that I muſt neceſſarily think all laſt Night, becauſe another ſuppoſes I always think, though I my ſelf cannot perceive that I always do ſo.

But Men in love with their Opinions, may not only ſuppoſe what is in queſtion, but alledge wrong Matter of Fact. How elſe could any one make it an *Inference* of mine, *that a Thing is not, becauſe we are not ſenſible of it in our Sleep?* I do not ſay there is no Soul in a Man, becauſe he is not ſenſible of it in his Sleep: But I do ſay, he cannot think at any time, waking or ſleeping, without being ſenſible of it. Our being ſenſible of it, is not neceſſary to any Thing, but to our Thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be neceſſary, till we can think without being conſcious of it.

It is not always conſcious of it.

§. 11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without Thought, becauſe it is the Condition of being awake: But whether Sleeping without Dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Conſideration; it being hard to conceive that any thing ſhould think, and not be conſcious of it. If the *Soul* doth *think in a ſleeping Man*, without being conſcious of it, I ask, whether, during ſuch Thinking, it has any Pleaſure or Pain, or be capable of Happineſs or Miſery? I am ſure the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be Happy or Miſerable, without being conſcious of it, ſeems to me utterly inconſiſtent and impoſſible; or if it be poſſible that the Soul can, whilſt the Body is ſleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoyments, and Concerns, its Pleaſure or Pain apart, which the Man is not conſcious of, nor partakes in: It is certain, that *Socrates* aſleep, and *Socrates* awake, is not the ſame Perſon: But his Soul when he ſleeps, and *Socrates* the Man, conſiſting of Body and Soul when he is waking, are two Perſons; ſince waking *Socrates* has no Knowledge of, or Concernment for that Happineſs or Miſery of his Soul, which it enjoys alone by it ſelf whilſt he ſleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happineſs or Miſery of a Man in the *Indies*, whom he knows not.

not. For, if we take wholly away all Conſciouſneſs of our Actions and Senſations, eſpecially of Pleaſure and Pain, and the Concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place Perſonal Identity.

If a ſleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the ſleeping and waking Man are two Perſons.

§. 12. The Soul, during ſound Sleep, thinks, ſay theſe Men. *Whilſt it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of thoſe of Delight or Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and *it muſt neceſſarily be conſcious of its own Perceptions.* But it has all this apart: The ſleeping Man, 'tis plain, is conſcious of nothing of all this. Let us ſuppoſe then the Soul of *Caſtor*, whilſt he is ſleeping, retired from his Body, which is no impoſſible Suppoſition for the Men I have here to do with, who ſo liberally allow Life without a thinking Soul to all other Animals. Theſe Men cannot then judge it impoſſible, or a Contradiction, That the Body ſhould live without the Soul; nor that the Soul ſhould ſubſiſt and think, or have Perception, even Perception of Happineſs or Miſery, without the Body. Let us then, as I ſay, ſuppoſe the Soul of *Caſtor* ſeparated, during his Sleep, from his Body, to think apart: Let us ſuppoſe too, that it chuſes, for its Scene of Thinking, the Body of another Man, *v. g. Pollux*, who is ſleeping without a Soul: For if *Caſtor*'s Soul can think whilſt *Caſtor* is aſleep, what *Caſtor* is never conſcious of, 'tis no matter what Place it chuſes to think it. We have here then, the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which we will ſuppoſe to ſleep and wake by turns; and the Soul ſtill thinking in the waking Man, whereof the ſleeping Man is never conſcious, has never the leaſt Perception. I ask then, Whether *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, thus, with only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one, what the other is never conſcious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as diſtinct Perſons, as *Caſtor* and *Hercules*; or, as *Socrates* and *Plato* were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miſerable? Juſt by the ſame reaſon, they make the Soul and the Man two Perſons, who make the Soul think apart, what the Man is not conſcious of. For I ſuppoſe, no body will make Identity of Perſons, to conſiſt in the Soul's being united to the very ſame numerical Particles of Matter: For if that be neceſſary to Identity, 'twill be impoſſible, in that conſtant Flux of the Particles of our Bodies, that any Man ſhould be the ſame Perſon two Days, or two Moments together,

§. 13.

Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.

§. 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time *sleep without dreaming*, can never be convinced, that their Thoughts are sometimes for four Hours busy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very Act, waked in the middle of that sleeping Contemplation, can give no manner of Account of it.

That Men dream without remembring it, in vain urged.

§. 14. 'Twill perhaps be said, That the *Soul thinks*, even in the soundest *Sleep*, *but the Memory retains it not.* That the Soul in a sleeping Man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking Man not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better Proof than bare Assertion, to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men do, during all their Lives, for several Hours every Day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their Sleep without Dreaming. I once knew a Man that was bred a Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life till he had that Fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples enough of such, as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

Upon this Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.

§. 15. *To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking:* And the Soul in such a State of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass, which constantly receives Variety of Images, or *Ideas*, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remains no Footsteps of them: The Looking-glass is never the better for such *Ideas*, nor the Soul for such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man, the Materials of the Body are employ'd and made use of in Thinking; and that the Memory of Thoughts is retained by the Impressions that are made on the Brain, and the Traces there left after such Thinking; but

but that in the *Thinking of the Soul*, which is not perceived *in a ſleeping Man*, there the Soul thinks apart, and *making no uſe* of the Organs of *the Body*, *leaves no Impreſſions on it*, *and conſequently no Memory* of ſuch Thoughts. Not to mention again the Abſurdity of two diſtinct Perſons, which follows from this Suppoſition, I anſwer farther, That whatever *Ideas* the Mind can receive, and contemplate without the help of the Body, it is reaſonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the Body too, or elſe the Soul, or any ſeparate Spirit will have but little Advantage by Thinking. If it has no Memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its Uſe, and be able to recall them upon Occaſion; if it cannot reflect upon what is paſt, and make uſe of its former Experiences, Reaſonings, and Contemplations, to what Purpoſe does it think? They, who make the Soul a thinking Thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble Being, than thoſe do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the ſubtileſt Parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Duſt, that the firſt Breath of Wind effaces; or Impreſſions made on a Heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as uſeful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that periſh in Thinking; that once out of Sight, are gone for ever, and leave no Memory of themſelves behind them. Nature never makes excellent Things for mean or no Uſes: And it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinite wiſe Creator, ſhould make ſo admirable a Faculty, as the Power of Thinking, that Faculty which comes neareſt the Excellency of his own incomprehenſible Being, to be ſo idly and uſeleſly employ'd, at leaſt $\frac{1}{4}$ part of its Time here, as to think conſtantly without remembring any of thoſe Thoughts, without doing any Good to it ſelf or others, or being any way uſeful to any other Part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we ſhall not find, I ſuppoſe, the Motion of dull and ſenſleſs Matter, any where in the Univerſe, made ſo little uſe of, and ſo wholly thrown away.

On this Hypotheſis the Soul muſt have Ideas *not derived from Senſation or Reflection, of which there is no Appearance.*

§. 16. 'Tis true, we have ſometimes Inſtances of Perception, whilſt we are *aſleep*, and retain the Memory of thoſe *Thoughts:* But how *extravagant* and incoherent for the moſt part they are; how little conformable to the Perception and Order of a rational Being, thoſe who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I would willingly be ſatisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were ſeparate from the Body, acts leſs rationally than when conjointly with it, or no.

If

If its ſeparate Thoughts be leſs rational, then theſe Men muſt ſay, That the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams ſhould be, for the moſt part, ſo frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul ſhould retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

If I think when I know it not, no body elſe can know it.

§. 17. Thoſe who ſo confidently tell us, That the Soul always actually thinks, I would they would alſo tell us, what thoſe *Ideas* are, that are in the Soul of a Child, before, or juſt at the Union with the Body, before it hath received any by *Senſation*. The *Dreams* of ſleeping Men, *are*, as I take it, all *made up of the waking Man's* Ideas, though for the moſt part oddly put together. 'Tis ſtrange if the Soul has *Ideas* of its own, that it derived not from *Senſation* or *Reflection*, (as it muſt have, if it thought before it received any Impreſſion from the Body) that it ſhould never, in its private Thinking, (ſo private that the Man himſelf perceives it not) retain any of them, the very Moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new Diſcoveries. Who can find it reaſonable that the Soul ſhould, in its Retirement, during Sleep, have ſo many Hours Thoughts, and yet never light on any of thoſe *Ideas* it borrowed not from *Senſation* or *Reflection*; or at leaſt preſerve the Memory of none but ſuch, which being occaſioned from the Body, muſt needs be leſs natural to a Spirit? 'Tis ſtrange, the Soul ſhould never once in a Man's whole Life, recall over any of its pure native Thoughts, and thoſe *Ideas* it had before it borrowed any thing from the Body; never bring into the waking Man's view, any other *Ideas* but what have a Tang of the Cask, and manifeſtly derive their Original from that Union. If it always thinks, and ſo had *Ideas* before it was united, or before it received any from the Body, 'tis not to be ſuppoſed, but that, during Sleep, it recollects its native *Ideas*, and during that Retirement from communicating with the Body, whilſt it thinks by it ſelf, the *Ideas* it is buſied about, ſhould be, ſometimes at leaſt, thoſe more natural and congenial ones which it had in it ſelf, underived from the Body, or its own Operations about them: Which ſince the waking Man never remembers, we muſt from this Hypotheſis conclude, either that the Soul remembers ſomething that the Man does not, or elſe that Memory belongs only to ſuch *Ideas* as are derived from the Body, or the Mind's Operations about them.

§. 18. I

§. 18. I would be glad also to learn from these Men, who so confidently pronounce, that the human Soul, or which is all one, that a Man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, *how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it.* This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without Proofs; and to know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect; a confused Notion, taken up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths, that either their own Evidence forces us to admit, or common Experience makes it Impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always retain it in Memory: And I say, it is as possible, that the Soul may not always think; and much more probable, that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to it self the next Moment, that it had thought.

How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a Self-evident Proposition, it needs Proof.

§. 19. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two Persons in one Man: And if one considers well these Men's way of speaking, one should be led into a Suspicion, that they do so. For they who tell us, that the Soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a Man always thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? Or a Man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of *Jargon* in others. If they say, The Man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, his Body is extended without having Parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a Body is extended without Parts, as that any thing *thinks without being conscious of it*, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus, may, with as much Reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis, say, That a Man is always Hungry, but that he does not always feel it: Whereas, Hunger consists in that very Sensation, as Thinking consists in being conscious to himself of Thinking; I ask, How they know it? Consciousness is the Perception of what passes in a Man's own Mind. Can another Man perceive that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not of my self? No Man's Knowledge, here, can go beyond his Experience. Wake a Man out of a sound Sleep, and ask him, What he was that Moment thinking on? If he himself be conscious of nothing, he then thought

That a Man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next Moment, very improbable.

thought on, he must be a notable Diviner of Thoughts, that can assure him, that he was thinking: May he not with more Reason assure him, he was not asleep? This is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be less than Revelation, that discovers, to another, Thoughts in my Mind, when I can find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating Sight, who can certainly see that I think, when I cannot perceive it my self, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can see, that Dogs or Elephants do not think, when they give all the Demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This some may suspect to be a Step beyond the *Rosicrucians*; it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others, than to make another's Thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But 'tis but defining the Soul to be a Substance, that always thinks, and the Business is done. If such Definition be of any Authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many Men suspect, that they have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass away without Thinking. For no Definitions that I know, no Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant Experience; and perhaps, 'tis the Affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes so much useless Dispute and Noise in the World.

No Ideas *but from Sensation or Reflection, evident, if we observe Children.*

§. 20. I see no reason therefore to believe, that the *Soul thinks before the Senses have furnish'd it with Ideas* to think on; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its Faculty of Thinking in the several Parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those *Ideas*, and reflecting on its own Operations, it increases its Stock, as well as Facility, in Remembring, Imagining, Reasoning, and other Modes of Thinking.

§. 21. He that will suffer himself to be informed by Observation and Experience, and not make his own Hypothesis the Rule of Nature, will find few Signs of a Soul accustomed to much Thinking in a new-born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul should think so much, and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that Infants, newly come into the World, spend the greatest part of their Time in Sleep, and are seldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or some Pain, (the most importunate of all Sensations) or some other violent Impression on the Body, forces the Mind to perceive and attend

tend to it: He, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find reason to imagine, That a *Fœtus in the Mother's Womb, differs not much from the State of a Vegetable*; but passes the greatest Part of its Time without Perception or Thought, doing very little, but sleep in a Place where it needs not seek for Food, and is surrounded with Liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same Temper; where the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears, so shut up, are not very susceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no Variety, or Change of Objects, to move the Senses.

§. 22. Follow a *Child* from its Birth, and observe the Alterations that Time makes, and you shall find, as the Mind by the Senses comes more and more to be furnished with *Ideas*, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has Matter to think on. After some Time, it begins to know the Objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting Impressions. Thus it comes, by Degrees, to know the Persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from Strangers; which are Instances and Effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the *Ideas* the Senses convey to it: And so we may observe, how the Mind, *by Degrees*, improves in these, and *advances* to the Exercise of those other Faculties of *Enlarging*, *Compounding*, and *Abstracting* its *Ideas*, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these, of which I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§. 23. If it shall be demanded then, *When a Man begins to have any Ideas?* I think the true Answer is, When he first has any *Sensation*. For since there appear not to be any *Ideas* in the Mind, before the Senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that *Ideas* in the Understanding are coeval with *Sensation*; which is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding. 'Tis about these Impressions made on our Senses by outward Objects, that the Mind seems first to employ it self in such Operations as we call *Perception*, *Remembring*, *Consideration*, *Reasoning*, &c.

The Original of all our Knowledge.

§. 24. In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own *Operations*, about the *Ideas* got by *Sensation*, and thereby stores it self with a new Set of *Ideas*, which I call *Ideas* of *Reflection*. These are the *Impressions* that are made on our *Senses* by outward Objects, that are extrinsical to the Mind; and *its own Operations*, proceeding from Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, which when reflected on by it self, become also

Objects of its Contemplation, are, as I have said, *The Original of all Knowledge.* Thus the first Capacity of Human Intellect, is, that the Mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it; either through the *Senses*, by outward Objects, or by its own Operations, when it *reflects* on them. This is the first Step a Man makes towards the Discovery of any Thing, and the Ground-work whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have naturally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts which tower above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self, take their rise and footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the Mind wanders, in those remote Speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those *Ideas*, which *Sense* or *Reflection* have offered for its Contemplation.

In the Reception of simple Ideas the Understanding is for the most part passive.

§. 25. In this Part, the *Understanding* is meerly *passive*; and whether or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were Materials of Knowledge, is not in its own power. For the Objects of our Senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular *Ideas* upon our Minds, whether we will or no: And the Operations of our Minds will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These *simple Ideas*, when offered to the Mind, *the Understanding can* no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones it self, than a Mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or *Ideas*, which the Objects set before it do therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us do diversly affect our Organs, the Mind is forced to receive the Impressions, and cannot avoid the Perceptions of those *Ideas* that are annexed to them.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple IDEAS.

Uncompounded Appearances.

§. 1. THE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concerning the *Ideas* we have; and that is, that *some* of them are *simple*, and *some complex.*

Though

Though the Qualities that affect our Senſes, are, in the Things themſelves ſo united and blended, that there is no Separation, no Diſtance between them; yet 'tis plain, the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senſes ſimple and unmixed. For though the Sight and Touch often take in from the ſame Object, at the ſame time, different *Ideas*; as a Man ſees at once Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softneſs and Warmth in the ſame Piece of Wax: Yet the ſimple *Ideas*, thus united in the ſame Subject, are as perfectly diſtinct as thoſe that come in by different Senſes. The Coldneſs and Hardneſs which a Man feels in a Piece of *Ice*, being as diſtinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteneſs of a Lilly, or as the Taſte of Sugar, and Smell of a Roſe: And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man than the clear and diſtinct Perceptions he has of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*; which being each in it ſelf uncompounded, contains in it nothing *but one uniform Appearance* or Conception in the Mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different *Ideas*.

§. 2. Theſe ſimple *Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the Mind only by theſe two Ways above-mentioned, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*. (1) When the Underſtanding is once ſtored with theſe ſimple *Ideas*, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almoſt infinite Variety, and ſo can make at pleaſure new complex *Ideas*. But it is not in the power of the

The Mind can neither make nor deſtroy them.

(1) Againſt this, that the Materials of all our Knowledge are ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the Mind only by Senſation and Reflection, the Biſhop of *Worceſter* makes Uſe of the Idea of *Subſtance* in theſe Words: *If the Idea of Subſtance be grounded upon plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an Idea of Subſtance, which comes not in by Senſation or Reflection; ſo we may be certain of ſomething which we have not by theſe* Ideas.

To which our Author (*) anſwers: Theſe Words of your Lordſhip's contain nothing that I ſee in them againſt me: For I ne'er ſaid that *the general* Idea *of Subſtance comes in by* Senſation *and* Reflection, that it is a ſimple *Idea* of Senſation or Reflection, tho' it be ultimately founded in them; for it is a complex *Idea*, made up of the general *Idea* of *Something*, *i. e. Being*, with the Relation of a Support to Accidents. For general *Ideas* come not into the Mind by Senſation or Reflection, but are the Creatures or Inventions of the Underſtanding, as I think, I have ſhewn; and alſo, how the Mind makes them from *Ideas*, which it has got by Senſation and Reflection; and as to the *Ideas* of

(*) *In his firſt Letter to the Biſhop of* Worceſter, p. 35, &c.

B. 3. *c.* 3. *§.* 2. *c.* 25. &c. *c.* 28. *§.* 18.

moſt exalted Wit, or enlarged Underſtanding, by any Quickneſs or Variety of Thoughts, to *invent or frame one new ſimple* Idea in the Mind, not taken in by the Ways before mentioned: Nor can any Force of the Underſtanding *deſtroy* thoſe that are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Underſtanding, being much what the ſame, as it is in the great World of viſible Things; wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the Materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the leaſt Particle of new Matter, or deſtroying one Atom of what is already in Being. The ſame Inability will every one find in himſelf, who ſhould go about to faſhion in his Underſtanding any ſimple *Idea* not received in by his Senſes, from external Objects; or by Reflection from the Operations of his own Mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any Taſte, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the *Idea* of a Scent, he had never ſmelt: And when he can do this, I will alſo conclude, that a blind Man hath *Ideas* of Colours, and a deaf Man true diſtinct Notions of Sounds.

Relation, how the Mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, I have likewiſe ſhewn.

But that I may not be miſtaken what I mean, when I ſpeak of *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, as the Materials of all our Knowledge; give me leave, my Lord, to ſet down here a
B. 2. c. 1. §. 5. Place or two, out of my Book, to explain my ſelf; as, I thus ſpeak of *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection.

'That theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their 'ſeveral Modes, and the Compoſitions made out of them, we ſhall 'find to contain all our whole Stock of *Ideas*, and we have nothing in 'our Minds, which did not come in one of theſe two
B. 2. c. 7. §. 10. 'Ways. This Thought, in another Place, I expreſs thus.
'Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of thoſe two
B. 2. c. 21. §. 73. 'Ideas which the Mind has, and out of which is made 'all its other Knowledge; all which it receives by 'the two fore-mentioned Ways of Senſation and Reflection. And, 'Thus I have in a ſhort Draught given a View of our Original 'Ideas, from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they 'are made up.'

This, and the like, ſaid in other Places, is what I have thought concerning *Ideas* of Senſation and Reflection, as the Foundation and Materials of all our *Ideas*, and conſequently of all our Knowledge: I have ſet down theſe Particulars out of my Book, that the Reader having a full View of my Opinion herein, may the better ſee what in it is liable to your Lordſhip's Reprehenſion. For that your

§. 3. This is the Reaſon why, though we cannot believe it impoſſible to God to make a Creature with other Organs, and more Ways to convey into the Underſtanding, the Notice of corporeal Things, than thoſe five, as they are uſually counted, which he has given to Man: Yet I think, it is *not poſſible*, for any one to *imagine* any other *Qualities* in Bodies, howſoever conſtituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, beſides Sounds, Taſtes, Smells, viſible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senſes, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the fifth Senſe, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination, and Conception, as now any *belonging to a ſixth, ſeventh, or eighth Senſe*, can poſſibly be: Which, whether yet ſome other Creatures, in ſome other Parts of this vaſt and ſtupendous Univerſe, may not have, will be a great Preſumption to deny. He that will not ſet

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your Lordſhip is not very well ſatisfied with it, appears not only by the Words under Conſideration, but by theſe alſo: *But we are ſtill told, that our Underſtanding can have no other* Ideas, *but either from Senſation or Reflection.*

Your Lordſhip's Argument, in the Paſſage we are upon, ſtands thus: *If the general* Idea *of Subſtance be grounded upon plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an* Idea *of Subſtance, which comes not in by Senſation or Reflection.* This is a Conſequence which, with Submiſſion, I think will not hold, becauſe it is founded upon a Suppoſition, which I think will not hold, *viz.* That Reaſon and Ideas are inconſiſtent; for if that Suppoſition be not true, then the general *Idea* of Subſtance may be grounded on plain and evident Reaſon; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from Ideas *which come in by Senſation or Reflection*, and ſo cannot be ſaid to come in by Senſation or Reflection.

To explain my ſelf, and clear my Meaning in this Matter. All the *Ideas* of all the ſenſible Qualities of a Cherry, come into my Mind by Senſation; the *Ideas* of *Perceiving, Thinking, Reaſoning, Knowing, &c.* come into my Mind by Reflection. The *Ideas* of theſe Qualities and Actions, or Powers, are perceived by the Mind, to be by themſelves inconſiſtent with Exiſtence; or, as your Lordſhip well expreſſes it, *we find that we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum, *or Subject, wherein they are, i. e.* That they cannot Exiſt or Subſiſt of themſelves. Hence the Mind perceives their neceſſary Connection with inherence or being ſupported, which being a relative *Idea*, ſuperadded to the *Red Colour* in a Cherry, or to Thinking in a Man, the Mind frames the correlative *Idea* of *a Support*. For I never denied, that the Mind could frame to it ſelf *Ideas* of Relation, but have ſhewed the quite contrary in my Chapters about *Relation*. But becauſe a Relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the Relation of nothing, and the thing

himſelf proudly at the top of all Things; but will conſider the Immenſity of this Fabrick, and the great Variety that is to be found in this little and inconſiderable Part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Manſions of it, there may be other, and different intelligent Beings, of whoſe Faculties he has as little Knowledge or Apprehenſion, as a Worm ſhut up in one Drawer of a Cabinet hath of the Senſes or Underſtanding of a Man; ſuch Variety and Excellency being ſuitable to the Wiſdom and Power of the Maker. I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senſes, though, perhaps, there may be juſtly counted more; but either Suppoſition ſerves equally to my preſent Purpoſe.

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here related as a *Supporter*, or a *Support*, is not repreſented to the Mind, by any clear and diſtinct *Idea*; therefore the obſcure, indiſtinct, vague *Idea* of *Thing*, or *Something*, is all that is left to be the poſitive *Idea*, which has the Relation of a *Support*, or *Subſtratum*, to Modes or Accidents; and that general, indetermined *Idea* of *Something*, is, by the Abſtraction of the Mind, derived alſo from the ſimple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection: And thus the Mind, from the poſitive, ſimple Ideas got by Senſation and Reflection, comes to the general, relative Idea of Subſtance, which without theſe poſitive, ſimple Ideas, it would never have.

This your Lordſhip (without giving by retail all the particular Steps of the Mind in this Buſineſs) has well expreſſed in this more familiar Way: *We find we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we muſt conceive a* Subſtratum, *or Subject, wherein they are; ſince it is a Repugnancy to our Conception of Things, that Modes or Accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves.*

Hence your Lordſhip calls it the *Rational* Idea *of Subſtance:* And ſays, *I grant that by Senſation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves:* So that if this be that which your Lordſhip means *by the Rational* Idea of *Subſtance*, I ſee nothing there is in it againſt what I have ſaid, that it is founded on ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation or Reflection, and that it is a very obſcure *Idea*.

Your Lordſhip's Concluſion from your foregoing Words, is, *And ſo we may be certain of ſome things which we have not by thoſe Ideas*; which is a Propoſition, whoſe preciſe Meaning your Lordſhip will forgive me, if I profeſs, as it ſtands there, I do not underſtand. For it is uncertain to me whether your Lordſhip means, we may certainly know the Exiſtence of ſomething which we have not by thoſe *Ideas*, or certainly know the diſtinct Properties of ſomething which we have *not by thoſe Ideas*; or certainly know the Truth of ſome Propoſition *which we have not by thoſe Ideas*; for to be certain of *ſomething* may ſignify either of theſe: But in which ſoever of theſe it be meant, I do not ſee how I am concerned in it. CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of IDEAS *of one Senſe.*

Diviſion of Simple Ideas.

§. 1. THE better to conceive the *Ideas* we receive from Senſation, it may not be amiſs for us to conſider them, in reference to the different Ways, whereby they make their Approaches to our Minds, and make themſelves perceivable by us.

Firſt, Then, there are ſome, which come into our Minds *by one Senſe* only.

Secondly, There are others, that convey themſelves into the Mind *by more Senſes than one.*

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly. There are ſome that make themſelves way, and are ſuggeſted to the Mind, *by all the Ways of Senſation and Reflection.*

We ſhall conſider them apart under theſe ſeveral Heads.

Firſt, There are *ſome* Ideas *which have Admittance only through one Senſe*, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Colours, as White, Red, Yellow, Blue, with their ſeveral Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the reſt, come in only by the Eyes: All kind of Noiſes, Sounds and Tones, only by the Ears: The ſeveral Taſtes and Smells, by the Noſe and Palate. And if theſe Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the Mind's Preſence-room (as I may ſo call it) are any of them ſo diſordered, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Poſtern to be admitted by; no other Way to bring themſelves into View, and be perceived by the Underſtanding.

The moſt conſiderable of thoſe, belonging to the Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity; all the reſt, conſiſting almoſt wholly in the ſenſible Configuration, as Smooth and Rough; or elſe more or leſs firm Adheſion of the Parts, as hard and ſoft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§. 2. I think it will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular *ſimple Ideas*, belonging to each Senſe: Nor indeed is it poſ-

ſible, if we would, there being a great many *more* of them belonging to moſt of the Senſes *than we have Names for.* The Variety of Smells, which are as many almoſt, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do moſt of them want Names. *Sweet* and *Stinking* commonly ſerve our turn for theſe *Ideas*, which, in effect, is little more than to call them pleaſing or diſpleaſing; though the Smell of a Roſe, and Violet, both ſweet, are certainly very diſtinct *Ideas*. Nor are the different Taſtes, that by our Palates we receive *Ideas* of, much better provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sour, Harſh, and Salt, are almoſt all the Epithets we have to denominate that numberleſs Variety of Reliſhes, which are to be found diſtinct, not only in almoſt every ſort of Creatures, but in the different Parts of the ſame Plant, Fruit, or Animal. The ſame may be ſaid of Colours and Sounds. I ſhall therefore in the Account of ſimple *Ideas*, I am here giving, content my ſelf to ſet down only ſuch as are moſt material to our preſent Purpoſe, or are in themſelves leſs apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex *Ideas*; amongſt which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I ſhall treat of in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

We receive this Idea *from Touch.*

§. 1. THE *Idea* of *Solidity* we receive by our Touch; and it ariſes from the Reſiſtance which we find in Body, to the Entrance of any other Body into the Place it poſſeſſes, till it has left it. There is no *Idea*, which we receive more conſtantly from Senſation, than *Solidity*. Whether we move, or reſt, in what Poſture ſoever we are, we always feel ſomething under us, that ſupports us, and hinders our farther ſinking downwards; and the Bodies, which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilſt they remain between them, they do, by an inſurmountable force, hinder the Approach of the Parts of our Hands that preſs them. That which thus hinders the Approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call *Solidity*. I will not diſpute, whether this Acceptation

tation of the World *Solid* be nearer to its original Signification, than that which Mathematicians uſe it in: It ſuffices, that I think the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not juſtify, this Uſe of it; but if any one think it better to call it *Impenetrability*, he has my Conſent. Only I have thought the Term *Solidity* the more proper to expreſs this *Idea*, not only becauſe of its vulgar Uſe in that Senſe, but alſo, becauſe it carries ſomething more of poſitive in it, than *Impenetrability*, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a Conſequence of *Solidity*, than *Solidity* it ſelf. This, of all other, ſeems the *Idea* moſt intimately connected with, and eſſential to Body, ſo as no where elſe to be found or imagined, but only in Matter: And though our Senſes take no notice of it, but in Maſſes of Matter, of a Bulk ſufficient to cauſe a Senſation in us; yet the Mind, having once got this *Idea* from ſuch groſſer ſenſible Bodies, traces it farther, and conſiders it, as well as Figure, in the minuteſt Particle of Matter, that can exiſt; and finds it inſeparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified,

Solidity fills Space.

§. 2. This is the *Idea* belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it *to fill Space*. The *Idea* of which filling of Space, is, That where we imagine any Space taken up by a ſolid Subſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid Subſtances; and will for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another in a ſtrait Line, from coming to touch one another, unleſs it removes from between them in a Line, not parallel to that which they move in. This *Idea* of it, the Bodies, which we ordinarily handle, ſufficiently furniſh us with.

Diſtinct from Space.

§. 3. This Reſiſtance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the Space which it poſſeſſes, is ſo great, that no Force, how great ſoever, can ſurmount it. All the Bodies in the World, preſſing a Drop of Water on all Sides, will never be able to overcome the Reſiſtance which it will make, as ſoft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their Way: Whereby our *Idea* of *Solidity* is *diſtinguiſhed* both *from pure Space*, which is capable neither of Reſiſtance nor Motion; and from the ordinary *Idea* of *Hardneſs*. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a Diſtance, ſo as they may approach one another, without touching or diſplacing any ſolid Thing, till their Superficies come to meet: Whereby, I think, we have the clear *Idea* of Space without *Solidity*. For (not to go ſo far as Annihilations of any particular Body) I ask, whether a Man cannot have the *Idea* of

the Motion of one ſingle Body alone, without any other ſucceeding immediately into its Place? I think 'tis evident he can: The *Idea* of Motion in one Body, no more including the *Idea* of Motion in another, than the *Idea* of a ſquare Figure in one Body, includes the *Idea* of a ſquare Figure in another. I do not ask, whether Bodies do ſo exiſt, that the Motion of one Body cannot really be without the Motion of another. To determine this either Way, is to beg the Queſtion for or againſt a *Vacuum*. But my Queſtion is, whether one cannot have the *Idea* of one Body moved, whilſt others are at reſt? And, I think, this no one will deny: If ſo, then the Place it deſerted gives us the *Idea* of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto another Body may enter, without either Reſiſtance or Protruſion of any Thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the Space it filled in the Tube is certainly the ſame, whether any other Body follows the Motion of the Sucker or no: Nor does it imply a Contradiction, that upon the Motion of one Body, another, that is only contiguous to it, ſhould not follow it. The Neceſſity of ſuch a Motion is built only on the Suppoſition, that the World is full; but not on the diſtinct *Ideas* of Space and Solidity: Which are as different as Reſiſtance and not Reſiſtance, Protruſion and not Protruſion. And that Men have *Ideas* of Space without Body, their very Diſputes about a *Vacuum* plainly demonſtrate, as is ſhewed in another Place. As,

From Hardneſs.

§. 4. *Solidity* is hereby alſo *differenced from Hardneſs*, in that Solidity conſiſts in Repletion, an utter Excluſion of other Bodies out of the Space it poſſeſſes; but Hardneſs, in a firm Cohesion of the Parts of Matter, making up Maſſes of a ſenſible Bulk, ſo that the whole does not eaſily change its Figure. And indeed Hard and Soft are Names that we give to Things, only in relation to the Conſtitutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, ſooner than change Figure by the Preſſure of any Part of our Bodies; and that on the contrary, ſoft, which changes the Situation of its Parts upon an eaſy and unpainful Touch.

But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the ſenſible Parts amongſt themſelves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more Solidity to the hardeſt Body in the World, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an Adamant one jot more ſolid than Water. For though the two flat Sides of two Pieces of Marble, will more eaſily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be a Diamond between them: Yet

it

it is not, that the Parts of the Diamond are more ſolid than thoſe of Water, or reſiſt more; but becauſe the Parts of Water, being more eaſily ſeparable from each other, they will by a ſide Motion be more eaſily removed, and give way to the Approach of the two Pieces of Marble: But if they could be kept from making Place by that ſide Motion, they would eternally hinder the Approach of theſe two Pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impoſſible by any Force, to ſurmount their Reſiſtance, as to ſurmount the Reſiſtance of the Parts of a Diamond. The ſofteſt Body in the World will as invincibly reſiſt the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the Way, but remain between them, as the hardeſt that can be found or imagin'd. He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft Body well with Air or Water, will quickly find its Reſiſtance: And he that thinks, that nothing but Bodies, that are hard, can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleaſed to make a Trial with the Air incloſed in a Foot-Ball. The Experiment I have been told was made at *Florence*, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with Water, and exactly cloſed, farther ſhews the Solidity of ſo ſoft a Body as Water: For the Golden Globe thus filled, being put into a Preſs, which was driven by the extreme Force of Skrews, the Water made it ſelf Way through the Pores of that very cloſe Metal, and finding no room for a nearer Approach of its Particles within, got to the outſide, where it roſe like a Dew, and ſo fell in Drops, before the Sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent Compreſſion of the Engine that ſqueezed it.

On Solidity depends Impulſe, Reſiſtance and Protruſion.

§. 5. By this *Idea* of Solidity, is the Extenſion of Body diſtinguiſhed from the Extenſion of Space. The Extenſion of Body being nothing, but the Coheſion or Continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, moveable Parts; and the Extenſion of Space, the Continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immoveable Parts. *Upon the Solidity of Bodies* alſo *depends their mutual Impulſe, Reſiſtance, and Protruſion.* Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are ſeveral (amongſt which I confeſs my ſelf one) who perſuade themſelves, they have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it that reſiſts, or is protruded by Body. This is the *Idea* of pure Space, which they think they have as clear as any *Idea* they can have of the Extenſion of Body; the *Idea* of the Diſtance, between the oppoſite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear without, as with the *Idea* of any ſolid Parts between;

between; and on the other Side, they perſuade themſelves, That they have, diſtinct from that of pure Space, the *Idea* of ſomething that fills Space, that can be protruded by the Impulſe of other Bodies, or reſiſt their Motion. If there be others, that have not theſe two *Ideas* diſtinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not, how Men, who have the ſame *Idea* under different Names, or different *Ideas* under the ſame Name, can, in that Caſe, talk with one another, any more than a Man, who, not being Blind or Deaf, has diſtinct *Ideas* of the Colour of Scarlet, and the Sound of a Trumpet, could diſcourſe concerning Scarlet-Colour with the Blind Man, I mention in another Place, who fancied that the *Idea* of Scarlet was like the Sound of a Trumpet.

What it is.

§. 6. If any one asks me, *What this Solidity is*, I ſend him to his Senſes to inform him: Let him put a Flint, or a Foot-Ball between his Hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a ſufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it conſiſts; I promiſe to tell him, what it is, and wherein it conſiſts, when he tells me, what Thinking is, or wherein it conſiſts; or explains to me what Extenſion or Motion is, which perhaps, ſeems much eaſier. The ſimple *Ideas* we have are ſuch, as Experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour, by Words, to make them clearer in the Mind, we ſhall ſucceed no better, than if we went about to clear up the Darkneſs of a Blind Man's Mind by talking; and to diſcourſe into him the *Ideas* of Light and Colours. The Reaſon of this I ſhall ſhew in another Place.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple IDEAS *of divers Senſes.*

THE *Ideas* we get by more than one Senſe, are of *Space* or *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Reſt*, and *Motion*: For theſe make perceivable Impreſſions both on the Eyes and Touch; and we can receive and convey into our Minds the *Ideas* of our Extenſion, Figure, Motion, and Reſt of Bodies, both by Seeing and Feeling. But having Occaſion to ſpeak more at large of theſe in another Place, I here only enumetate them.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple IDEAS *of Reflection.*

§. 1. THE Mind receiving the *Ideas*, mentioned in the foregoing Chapters, from without, when it turns its View inward upon it ſelf, and obſerves its own Actions about thoſe *Ideas* it has, takes from thence other *Ideas*, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of thoſe it received from foreign Things.

Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas.

§. 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are moſt frequently conſidered, and which are ſo frequent, that every one that pleaſes, may take notice of 'em in himſelf, are theſe two:

Perception, or *Thinking*; and
Volition, or *Willing*.

The Idea *of Perception, and* Idea *of Willing, we have from Reflection.*

The Power of Thinking is called the *Underſtanding*, and the Power of Volition is called the *Will*, and theſe two Powers or Abilities in the Mind are denominated *Faculties*. Of ſome of the Modes of theſe ſimple *Ideas* of Reflection, ſuch as are *Remembrance*, *Diſcerning*, *Reaſoning*, *Judging*, *Knowledge*, *Faith*, &c. I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple IDEAS *of both Senſation and Reflection.*

§. 1. THere be other ſimple *Ideas*, which convey themſelves into the Mind, by all the Ways of Senſation and Reflection, *viz.*

Pleaſure and Pain.

Pleaſure, or *Delight*, and its Oppoſite *Pain*, or *Uneaſineſs*.
Power.
Exiſtence.
Unity.

§. 2. *Delight*,

§. 2. *Delight*, or *Uneaſineſs*, one or other of them join themſelves to almoſt all our *Ideas*, both of Senſation and Reflection: And there is ſcarce any Affection of our Senſes from without, and retired Thought of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us *Pleaſure* or *Pain*. By *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, I would be underſtood to ſignify whatſoever delights or moleſts us; whether it ariſes from the Thoughts of our Minds, or any thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleaſure, Happineſs, *&c.* on the one ſide; or Uneaſineſs, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguiſh, Miſery, *&c.* on the other, they are ſtill but different Degrees of the ſame Thing, and belong to the *Ideas* of *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, Delight, or Uneaſineſs; which are the Names I ſhall moſt commonly uſe for thoſe two ſorts of *Ideas*.

§. 3. The infinite wiſe Author of our Being, having given us the Power over ſeveral Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at reſt, as we think fit; and alſo by the Motion of them, to move our ſelves, and our contiguous Bodies, in which conſiſts all the Actions of our Body: Having alſo given a Power to our Minds in ſeveral Inſtances, to chuſe amongſt its *Ideas*, which it will think on, and to purſue the Enquiry of this or that Subject with Conſideration and Attention, to excite us to theſe Actions of Thinking and Motion, that we are capable of, has been pleaſed to join to ſeveral Thoughts, and ſeveral Senſations, a *Perception* of *Delight*. If this were wholly ſeparated from all our outward Senſations, and inward Thoughts, we ſhould have no reaſon to preſer one Thought or Action to another; Negligence to Attention; or Motion to Reſt. And ſo we ſhould neither ſtir our Bodies, nor employ our Minds; but let our Thoughts (if I may ſo call it) run adrift, without any Direction or Deſign; and ſuffer the *Ideas* of our Minds, like unregarded Shadows, to make their Appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them. In which State, Man, however, furniſhed with the Faculties of Underſtanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature, and paſs his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore pleaſed our wiſe Creator, to annex to ſeveral Objects, and to the *Ideas* which we receive from them, as alſo to ſeveral of our Thoughts, a concomitant Pleaſure, and that in ſeveral Objects, to ſeveral Degrees, that thoſe Faculties which he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us.

§. 4. *Pain* has the ſame Efficacy and Uſe to ſet us on work that Pleaſure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid

avoid that, as to purſue this: Only this is worth our Conſideration, That *Pain is often produced by the ſame Objects and* Ideas, *that produce Pleaſure* in us. This their near Conjunction, which makes us often feel Pain in the Senſations where we expected Pleaſure, gives us new Occaſion of admiring the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of our Maker, who, deſigning the Preſervation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the Application of many Things to our Bodies, to warn us of the Harm that they will do; and as Advices to withdraw from them. But he not deſigning our Preſervation barely, but the Preſervation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath, in many Caſes, annexed Pain to thoſe very *Ideas* which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater Increaſe of it, proves no ordinary Torment; and the moſt pleaſant of all ſenſible Objects, Light it ſelf, if there be too much of it, if increaſed beyond a due Proportion to our Eyes, cauſes a very painful Senſation: Which is wiſely and favourably ſo ordered by Nature, that when any Object does, by the Vehemency of its Operation, diſorder the Inſtruments of Senſation, whoſe Structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the Pain be warned to withdraw, before the Organ be quite put out of order, and ſo be unfitted for its proper Functions for the future. The Conſideration of thoſe Objects that produce it, may well perſuade us, that this is the End or Uſe of Pain. For though great Light be inſufferable to our Eyes, yet the higheſt Degree of Darkneſs does not at all diſeaſe them: Becauſe the cauſing no diſorderly Motion in it, leaves that curious Organ unharm'd, in its natural State. But yet Exceſs of Cold, as well as Heat, pains us; becauſe it is equally deſtructive to that Temper, which is neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life, and the Exerciſe of the ſeveral Functions of the Body, and which conſiſts in a moderate Degree of Warmth; or, if you pleaſe, a Motion of the inſenſible Parts of our Bodies, confin'd within certain Bounds.

§. 5. Beyond all this, we may find another Reaſon *why* God hath ſcattered up and down *ſeveral Degrees of Pleaſure and Pain in all the Things that environ and affect us*; and blended them together, in almoſt all that our Thoughts and Senſes have to do with; that we finding Imperfection, Diſatisfaction, and want of compleat Happineſs, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to ſeek it in the Enjoyment of him, *with whom there is fulneſs of Joy, and at whoſe Right Hand are Pleaſures for evermore.*

§. 6. Though what I have here ſaid, may not, perhaps, make the *Ideas of Pleaſure and Pain* clearer to us, than our own Experience does, which is the only Way that we are capable of having them; yet the Conſideration of the Reaſon, why they are annex'd to ſo many other *Ideas*, ſerving to give us due Sentiments of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Sovereign Diſpoſer of all Things, may not be unſuitable to the main End of theſe Enquiries: The Knowledge and Veneration of Him, being the chief End of all our Thoughts, and the proper Buſineſs of all Underſtandings.

Pleaſure and Pain.

§. 7. *Exiſtence* and *Unity*, are two other *Ideas*, that are ſuggeſted to the Underſtanding, by every Object without, and every *Idea* within. When *Ideas* are in our Minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider Things to be actually without us; which is, that they Exiſt, or have *Exiſtence*: And whatever we can conſider as one Thing, whether a real Being, or *Idea*, ſuggeſts to the Underſtanding the *Idea* of *Unity*.

Exiſtence and Unity.

§. 8. *Power* alſo is another of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which we receive from *Senſation and Reflection*. For obſerving in our ſelves, that we can, at pleaſure, move ſeveral Parts of our Bodies which were at Reſt; the Effects alſo, that natural Bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every Moment to our Senſes, we both theſe Ways get the *Idea* of *Power*.

Power.

§. 9. Beſides theſe, there is another *Idea*, which though ſuggeſted by our Senſes, yet is more conſtantly offered us, by what paſſes in our own Minds; and that is the *Idea* of *Succeſſion*. For if we look immediately into our ſelves, and reflect on what is obſervable there, we ſhall find our *Ideas* always, whilſt we are awake, or have any Thought, paſſing in Train, one going, and another coming, without Intermiſſion.

Succeſſion.

§. 10. Theſe, if they are not all, are at leaſt (as I think) the moſt conſiderable of thoſe *ſimple Ideas* which the Mind has, and out of which is made all its other Knowledge; all which it receives only by the two fore-mentioned Ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

Simple Ideas *the Materials of all our Knowledge.*

Nor let any one think theſe too narrow Bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confined by the Limits of the World; that extends its Thoughts often, even beyond the utmoſt Expanſion of Matter, and makes Excurſions into that incompre-

comprehenſible *Inane*. I grant all this, but deſire any one to aſſign any *ſimple Idea*, which is not *received from* one of *thoſe Inlets* before-mentioned, or any *complex Idea* not *made out of thoſe ſimple Ones*. Nor will it be ſo ſtrange, to think theſe few ſimple *Ideas* ſufficient to employ the quickeſt Thought, or largeſt Capacities; and to furniſh the Materials of all that various Knowledge, and more various Fancies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we conſider how many Words may be made out of the various Compoſition of Twenty Four Letters; or if going one Step farther, we will but reflect on the Variety of Combinations may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned *Ideas*, *viz.* Number, whoſe Stock is inexhauſtible, and truly infinite: And what a large and immenſe Field, doth Extenſion alone afford the Mathematicians?

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning our ſimple IDEAS.

Poſitive Ideas *from privative Cauſes.*

§. 1. CONcerning the ſimple *Ideas* of Senſation 'tis to be conſidered, That whatſoever is ſo conſtituted in Nature, as to be able, by affecting our Senſes, to cauſe any Perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Underſtanding a ſimple *Idea*; which, whatever be the external Cauſe of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our diſcerning Faculty, it is by the Mind looked on and conſidered there, to be a real *poſitive Idea* in the Underſtanding, as much as any other whatſoever; though, perhaps, the Cauſe of it be but a Privation in the Subject.

§. 2. Thus the *Idea* of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkneſs, White and Black, Motion and Reſt, are equally clear and *poſitive Ideas* in the Mind; though perhaps, ſome of the *Cauſes* which produce them, are barely *Privations* in thoſe Subjects from whence our Senſes derive thoſe *Ideas*. Theſe the Underſtanding, in its View of them, conſiders all as diſtinct poſitive *Ideas*, without taking notice of the Cauſes that produce them; which is an Enquiry not belonging to the *Idea*, as it is in the Underſtanding; but to the Nature of the Things exiſting without

out us. Theſe are two very different Things, and carefully to be diſtinguiſhed; it being one Thing to perceive and know the *Idea* of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind of Particles they muſt be, and how ranged in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White or Black.

§. 3. A Painter or Dyer, who never enquired into their Cauſes, hath the *Ideas* of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and diſtinctly in his Underſtanding, and perhaps more diſtinctly than the Philoſopher who hath buſied himſelf in conſidering their Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its Cauſe poſitive or privative; and the *Idea of Black* is no leſs *poſitive* in his Mind than that of White, *however the Cauſe* of that Colour in the external Object may *be only a Privation.*

§. 4. If it were the Deſign of my preſent Undertaking to enquire into the natural Cauſes and Manner of Perception, I ſhould offer this as a Reaſon *why a privative Cauſe might*, in ſome Caſes at leaſt, *produce a poſitive Idea, viz.* That all Senſation being produced in us, only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variouſly agitated by external Objects, the Abatement of my former Motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new Senſation, as the Variation or Increaſe of it; and ſo introduce a new *Idea*, which depends only on a different Motion of the animal Spirits in that Organ.

§. 5. But whether this be ſo, or no, I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the Shadow of a Man, though it conſiſts of nothing but the Abſence of Light (and the more the Abſence of Light is, the more diſcernible is the Shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cauſe as clear and poſitive an *Idea* in the Mind, as a Man himſelf, though covered over with clear Sun-ſhine? And the Picture of a Shadow is a poſitive Thing. Indeed, we have *negative Names*, which ſtand not directly for poſitive *Ideas*, but for their Abſence, ſuch as *Inſipid*, *Silence*, *Nihil*, &c. which Words denote poſitive *Ideas*; *v. g. Taſte*, *Sound*, *Being*, with a Signification of their Abſence.

Poſitive Ideas *from privative Cauſes.*

§. 6. And thus one may truly be ſaid to ſee Darkneſs. For ſuppoſing a Hole perfectly Dark, from whence no Light is reflected, 'tis certain one may ſee the Figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the Ink I write with, makes any other *Idea*, is a Queſtion. The privative Cauſes I have here aſſigned of poſitive *Ideas*, are according to the common Opinion; but in truth

Truth it will be hard to determine whether there be really any *Ideas* from a privative Cauſe, 'till it be determined, *Whether Reſt be any more a Privation than Motion.*

§. 7. To diſcover the Nature of our *Ideas* the better, and to diſcourſe of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to diſtinguiſh them, as they are *Ideas* or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are Modifications of Matters in the Bodies that cauſe ſuch Perceptions in us; that ſo we *may not* think (as perhaps uſually is done) that they are exactly the Images and *Reſemblances* of ſomething inherent in the Subject; moſt of thoſe of Senſation being in the Mind no more the Likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the Names, that ſtand for them, are the Likeneſs of our *Ideas*, which yet, upon Hearing, they are apt to excite in us. Ideas *in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.*

§. 8. Whatſoever the Mind perceives in it ſelf, or is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Underſtanding, that I call *Idea*; and the Power to produce any *Idea* in our Mind, I call *Quality* of the Subject wherein that Power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the Power to produce in us the *Ideas* of *White*, *Cold*, and *Round*, the Powers to produce thoſe *Ideas* in us, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call *Qualities*; and as they are Senſations or Perceptions in our Underſtandings, I call them *Ideas*; which *Ideas*, if I ſpeak of them ſometimes, as in the Things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.

§. 9. Qualities thus conſidered in Bodies, are, *Firſt*, ſuch as are utterly inſeparable from the Body, in what Eſtate ſoever it be; ſuch as in all the Alterations and Changes it ſuffers, all the Force can be uſed upon it, it conſtantly keeps; and ſuch as Senſe conſtantly finds in every Particle of Matter, which has Bulk enough to be perceived, and the Mind finds inſeparable from every Particle of Matter, though leſs than to make it ſelf ſingly be perceived by our Senſes: *v. g.* Take a Grain of Wheat, divide it into two Parts, each Part has ſtill *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, and *Mobility*; divide it again, and it retains ſtill the ſame Qualities; and ſo divide it on, till the Parts become inſenſible, they muſt retain ſtill each of them all thoſe Qualities. For Diviſion (which is all that a Mill, or Peſtle, or any other Body does upon another, in reducing it to inſenſible Parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, or Mobility from any Body, but only makes two or more diſtinct ſeparate Maſſes of Matter, of that which was but one before; all which diſtinct Maſſes, reckon'd *Primary Qualities.*

kon'd as so many distinct Bodies, after Division make a certain Number. These I call *original* or *primary Qualities* of Body, which I think we may observe to produce simple *Ideas* in us, *viz.* Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number.

§. 10. *2dly*, Such *Qualities*, which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their *primary Qualities*, *i. e.* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible Parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tastes, *&c.* These I call *secondary Qualities.* To these might be added a third Sort, which are allowed to be barely Powers, though they are as much real Qualities in the Subject, as those which I, to comply with the common Way of Speaking, call *Qualities*, but for Distinction, *secondary Qualities.* For the Power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or Consistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a Quality in Fire, as the Power it has to produce in me a new *Idea* or Sensation of Warmth or Burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary Qualities, *&c.* the Bulk, Texture and Motion of its insensible Parts.

How primary Qualities produce their Ideas.

§. 11. The next Thing to be consider'd is, how *Bodies* produce *Ideas* in us, and that is manifestly *by Impulse*, the only Way which we can conceive Bodies operate in.

§. 12. If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce *Ideas* in it; and yet we perceive *these original Qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident, that some Motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits, by some Parts of our Bodies, to the Brain, or the Seat of Sensation, there to *produce in our Minds the particular* Ideas *we have of them.* And since the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an observable Bigness, may be perceived at a distance *by* the Sight; 'tis evident, some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some *Motion*, which produces these *Ideas* which we have of them in us.

How Secondary.

§. 13. After the same Manner that the *Ideas* of these original Qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the *Ideas of secondary Qualities* are also *produced*, viz. *by the Operation of insensible Particles on our Senses.* For it being manifest that there are Bodies, and good store of Bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our Senses, discover either their Bulk, Figure, or Motion, as is evident in the Particles of the Air and

Water;

Water; and other extremely ſmaller than thoſe, perhaps, as much ſmaller than the Particles of Air or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water are ſmaller than Peaſe, or Hail-ſtones: Let us ſuppoſe at preſent, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk and Number of ſuch Particles, affecting the ſeveral Organs of our Senſes, produce in us thoſe different Senſations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies, *v. g.* that a Violet, by the Impulſe of ſuch inſenſible Particles of Matter of peculiar Figures, and Bulks, and in different Degrees and Modifications of their Motions, cauſes the *Ideas* of the Blue Colour, and ſweet Scent of that Flower, to be produced in our Minds. It being no more impoſſible to conceive, that God ſhould annex ſuch *Idea* to ſuch Motions, with which they have no Similitude, than that he ſhould annex the *Idea* of Pain to the Motion of a Piece of Steel dividing our Fleſh, with which that *Idea* hath no Reſemblance.

§. 14. What I have ſaid concerning *Colours* and *Smells*, may be underſtood alſo of *Taſtes*, and *Sounds*, *and other the like ſenſible Qualities*; which, whatever Reality we by Miſtake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themſelves, but Powers to produce various Senſations in us, and depend *on thoſe primary Qualities*, *viz.* Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of Parts; as I have ſaid.

§. 15. From whence I think it is eaſy to draw this Obſervation, that the *Ideas of primary Qualities* of Bodies, *are Reſemblances* of them, and their Patterns do really exiſt in the Bodies themſelves; but the *Ideas*, *produced* in us *by* theſe *ſecondary Qualities*, *have no Reſemblance* of them at all. There is nothing like our *Ideas* exiſting in the Bodies themſelves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only a Power to produce thoſe Senſations in us: And what is Sweet, Blue, or Warm in *Idea*, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the inſenſible Parts in the Bodies themſelves, which we call ſo.

Ideas *of primary Qualities, are Reſemblances; of ſecondary, not.*

§. 16. *Flame* is denominated *Hot* and *Light*; *Snow*, *White* and *Cold*; and *Manna*, *White* and *Sweet*, from the *Ideas* they produce in us: Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the ſame in thoſe Bodies that thoſe *Ideas* are in us, the one the perfect Reſemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by moſt Men be judged very extravagant, if one ſhould ſay otherwiſe. And yet he, that will conſider, that the ſame *Fire*, that in one Diſtance *produces* in us the Senſation of *Warmth*, does at a nearer Approach produce in us the far

different Senſation of *Pain*, ought to bethink himſelf, what Reaſon he has to ſay, That his *Idea* of *Warmth*, which was produced in him by the Fire, is actually *in the Fire*; and his *Idea* of *Pain*, which the ſame Fire produced in him the ſame Way, is *not* in the *Fire*. Why is Whiteneſs and Coldneſs in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one and the other *Idea* in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and Motion of its ſolid Parts?

§. 17. The particular *Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the Parts of Fire, or Snow, are really in them*, whether any one's Senſes perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called *real Qualities*, becauſe they really exiſt in thoſe Bodies. But *Light, Heat, Whiteneſs*, or *Coldneſs, are no more really in them, than Sickneſs or Pain is in* Manna. Take away the Senſation of them; let not the Eyes ſee Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not Taſte, nor the Noſe Smell, and all Colours, Taſtes, Odours, and Sounds, as they are ſuch particular *Ideas*, vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduced to their Cauſes, *i. e.* Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts.

§. 18. A Piece of *Manna* of a ſenſible Bulk, is able to produce in us the *Idea* of a round or ſquare Figure; and, by being removed from one Place to another, the *Idea* of Motion. this *Idea* of Motion repreſents it, as it really is in the *Manna* moving: A Circle or Square at the ſame, whether in *Idea* or Exiſtence; in the Mind, or in the *Manna*: And this, both *Motion and Figure are really in the Manna*, whether we take notice of them or no: This every Body is ready to agree to. Beſides, *Manna* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Senſations of Sickneſs, and ſometimes of acute Pains, or Gripings in us. That theſe *Ideas* of *Sickneſs and Pain are not in the* Manna, but Effects of its Operations on us, and are no where when we feel them not: This alſo every one readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, that *Sweetneſs and Whiteneſs are not really in Manna*; which are but the Effects of the Operations of *Manna*, by the Motion, Size, and Figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate, as the Pain and Sickneſs cauſed by *Manna*, are confeſſedly nothing but the Effects of its Operations on the Stomach and Guts, by the Size, Motion and Figure of its inſenſible Parts; (for by nothing elſe can a Body operate, as has been proved:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and thereby produce in the Mind particular diſtinct *Ideas*, which in it ſelf it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and Stomach, and there-

by produce distinct *Ideas*, which in it self it has not. These *Ideas* being all Effects of the Operations of *Manna*, on several Parts of our Bodies, by the Size, Figure, Number, and Motion of its Parts, why those produced by the Eyes and Palate, should rather be thought to be really in the *Manna*, than those produced by the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickness, *Ideas* that are the Effects of *Manna*, should be thought to be no where, when they are not felt; and yet the Sweetness and Whiteness, Effects of the same *Manna* on other Parts of the Body, by Ways equally as unknown, should be thought to exist in the *Manna*, when they are not seen nor tasted, would need some Reason to explain.

Ideas *of primary Qualities are Resemblances, of secondary, not.*

§. 19. Let us consider the red and white Colours in *Porphyre:* Hinder Light but from striking on it, and its Colours vanish, it no longer produces any such *Ideas* in us: Upon the Return of Light, it produces these Appearances on us again. Can any one think any real Alterations are made in the *Porphyre*, by the Presence or Absence of Light; and that those *Ideas* of Whiteness and Redness, are really in *Porphyre* in the Light, when 'tis plain *it has no Colour in the Dark.* It has indeed such a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from some Parts of that hard Stone, to produce in us the *Idea* of Redness, and from others the *Idea* of Whiteness: But Whiteness or Redness are not in it at any time; but such a Texture, that hath the Power to produce such a Sensation in us.

§. 20. Pound an Almond, and the clear white *Colour* will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet *Taste* into an oily one. What real Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an Alteration of the *Texture* of it?

§. 21. *Ideas* being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an Account, how the same Water, at the same Time, may produce the *Idea* of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other: Whereas, it is impossible, that the same Water, if those *Ideas* were really in it, should at the same Time be both Hot and Cold. For if we imagine *Warmth*, as it is *in our Hands*, to be *nothing but a certain Sort and Degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or animal Spirits*, we may understand how it is possible, that the same Water may at the same Time produce the Sensation of Heat in one Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that never producing the *Idea* of a Square by one Hand, which has produced

the *Ideas* of a Globe by another. But if the Senſation of Heat and Cold, be nothing but the Increaſe or Diminution of the Motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies, cauſed by the Corpuſcles of any other Body, it is eaſy to be underſtood, that if that Motion be greater in one Hand, than in the other; if a Body be applied to the two Hands, which has in its minute Particles a greater Motion, than in thoſe of one of the Hands, and a leſs, than in thoſe of the other, it will increaſe the Motion of the one Hand, and leſſen it in the other, and ſo cauſe the different Senſation of Heat and Cold, that depend thereon.

§. 22. I have, in what juſt goes before, been engaged in Phyſical Enquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being neceſſary, to make the Name of Senſation a little underſtood, and to make the *Difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the* Ideas *produced by them in the Mind*, to be diſtinctly conceived, without which it were impoſſible to diſcourſe intelligibly of them; I hope I ſhall be pardoned this little Excurſion into Natural Philoſophy, it being neceſſary in our preſent Enquiry, to diſtinguiſh the *primary* and *real Qualities* of Bodies, which are always in them, (*viz.* Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Reſt; and are ſometimes perceived by us, *viz.* when the Bodies, they are in, are big enough ſingly to be diſcerned) from thoſe *ſecondary* and *imputed Qualities*, which are but the Powers of ſeveral Combinations of thoſe primary ones, when they operate without being diſtinctly diſcerned; whereby we may alſo come to know what *Ideas* are, and what are not Reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the Bodies we denominate from them.

Three ſorts of Qualities in Bodies.

§. 23. The *Qualities* then that are in *Bodies*, rightly conſidered, are of *Three Sorts*.

Firſt, The *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Number*, *Situation*, and *Motion*, or *Reſt* of their ſolid Parts; thoſe are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that Size, that we can diſcover them, we have by theſe an *Idea* of the Thing, as it is in it ſelf; as is plain in Artificial Things: Theſe I call *primary Qualities*.

Secondly, The *Power* that is in any Body, by reaſon of *its* inſenſible *primary Qualities*, to operate after a peculiar Manner on any of our Senſes, and thereby *produce in us* the *different Ideas* of ſeveral Colours, Sounds, Smells, Taſtes, *&c.* theſe are uſually called ſenſible Qualities.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, The *Power* that is in any Body, *by* reaſon of the particular Conſtitution of *its primary Qualities*, *to* make ſuch a *Change* in the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, *and Motion of another Body*, as to make it operate on our Senſes, differently from what it did before. Thus the Sun has a Power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid. Theſe are uſually called Powers.

The firſt of theſe, as has been ſaid, I think may be properly called *real*, *original*, or *primary Qualities*, becauſe they are in the Things themſelves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different Modifications it is, that the ſecondary Qualities depend.

The other two are only Powers to act differently upon other Things, which Powers reſult from the different Modifications of thoſe primary Qualities.

The 1ſt are Reſemblances. The 2d thought Reſemblances, but are not. The 3d neither are, nor are thought ſo.

§. 24. But though *theſe two latter Sorts of Qualities are Powers barely*, and nothing but Powers relating to ſeveral other Bodies, and reſulting from the different Modifications of the original Qualities; yet they are generally otherwiſe thought of. For *the ſecond Sort*, *viz.* The Powers to produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes, *are looked upon as real Qualities*, *in the Things* thus affecting us: But *the third Sort are call'd and eſteem'd barely Powers*, *v. g.* the *Idea* of Heat or Light, which we receive by our Eye or Touch from the Sun, are commonly thought *real Qualities*, exiſting in the Sun, and ſomething more than mere Powers in it. But when we conſider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look upon the Whiteneſs and Softneſs produced in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but Effects produced by *Powers* in it: Whereas, if rightly conſidered, theſe Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightned by the Sun, are no otherwiſe in the Sun, than the Changes made in the Wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the Sun: They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun, depending on its primary Qualities; whereby it is able in the one Caſe, ſo to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of ſome of the inſenſible Parts of my Eyes or Hands, as thereby to produce in me the *Idea* of Light or Heat; and in the other, it is able ſo to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the inſenſible Parts of the Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the diſtinct *Ideas* of White and Fluid.

§. 25. The Reason, *Why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities, and the other only for bare Powers,* seems to be, because the *Ideas* we have of distinct Colours, Sounds, *&c.* containing nothing at all in them of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the Effects of these primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senses, to operate in their Production; and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is, that we are so forward to imagine, that those *Ideas* are the Resemblances of something really existing in the Objects themselves: Since Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure, or Motion of Parts in their Production; nor can Reason shew, how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, and Motion, should produce in the Mind the *Ideas* of Blue or Yellow, *&c.* But in the other Case, in the Operations of Bodies, changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the Quality produced hath commonly no Resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power. For though receiving the *Idea* of Heat, or Light, from the Sun, we are apt to think, 'tis a Perception and Resemblance of such a Quality in the Sun; yet when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive Change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine that to be the Reception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we find not those different Colours in the Sun it self. For our Senses being able to observe a Likeness, or Unlikeness of sensible Qualities in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any sensible Quality in any Subject, to be an Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality, which was really in the Efficient, when we find no such sensible Quality in the thing that produced it. But our Senses not being able to discover any Unlikeness between the *Idea* produced in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our *Ideas* are Resemblances of something in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers, placed in the Modification of their Primary Qualities, with which Primary Qualities the *Ideas* produced in us have no Resemblance.

Secondary Qualities, two-fold; 1st, Immediately perceivable; 2dly, Mediately perceivable.

§. 26. To conclude; besides those before-mentioned *Primary Qualities* in Bodies, *viz.* Bulk, Figure, Extension, Number, and Motion of their solid Parts; all the rest, whereby we take Notice of Bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else but several Powers in them, depending on those Primary Qualities; whereby they

they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our Bodies, to produce several different *Ideas* in us; or else by operating on other Bodies, so to change their Primary Qualities, as to render them capable of producing *Ideas* in us, different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called *Secondary Qualities, immediately perceivable:* the latter, *Secondary Qualities, mediately perceivable.*

CHAP. IX.

Of PERCEPTION.

§. 1. PERception, as it is the first Faculty of the Mind exercised about our *Ideas*; so it is the first and simplest *Idea* we have from Reflection, and is by some called Thinking in general. Though Thinking, in the Propriety of the *English* Tongue, signifies that Sort of Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, wherein the Mind is active; where it, with some Degree of voluntary Attention, considers any Thing. For in bare, naked *Perception*, the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

It is the first simple Idea *of Reflection.*

§. 2. *What Perception is*, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any Discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the Words in the World cannot make him have any Notion of it.

Perception is only when the Mind receives the Impression.

§. 3. This is certain, That whatever Alterations are made in the Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever Impressions are made on the outward Parts, if they are not taken Notice of within, there is no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other Effect, than it does a Billet, unless the Motion be continued to the Brain, and there the Sense of Heat, or *Idea* of Pain, be produced in the Mind, wherein consists *actual Perception.*

§. 4. How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his Mind is intently employ'd in the Contemplation of some Objects; and curiously surveying some *Ideas* that are there, it takes

takes no notice of Impreſſions of ſounding Bodies, made upon the Organ of Hearing, with the ſame Alteration, that uſes to be for the producing the *Idea* of Sound? A ſufficient Impulſe there may be on the Organ; but it not reaching the Obſervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: And though the Motion, that uſes to produce the *Idea* of Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no Sound is heard. Want of Senſation, in this Caſe, is not through any Defect in the Organ, or that the Man's Ears are leſs affected than at other Times, when he does hear: But that which uſes to produce the *Idea*, though convey'd in by the uſual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Underſtanding, and ſo imprinting no *Idea* on the Mind, there follows no Senſation. *So that where-ever there is Senſe*, or *Perception*, *there ſome* Idea *is actually produced, and preſent in the Underſtanding.*

Children, tho' they have Ideas *in the Womb, have none Innate.*

§. 5. Therefore I doubt not but *Children*, by the Exerciſe of their Senſes about Objects that affect them *in the Womb*, *receive ſome few* Ideas before they are born, as the unavoidable Effects either of the Bodies that environ them, or elſe of thoſe Wants or Diſeaſes they ſuffer; amongſt which (if one may conjecture concerning Things not very capable of Examination) I think the *Ideas* of Hunger and Warmth are two; which probably are ſome of the firſt that Children have, and which they ſcarce ever part with again.

§. 6. But though it be reaſonable to imagine, that *Children* receive ſome *Ideas* before they come into the World, yet theſe ſimple *Ideas* are *far from* thoſe *Innate Principles* which ſome contend for, and we above have rejected. Theſe here mentioned, being the Effects of Senſation, are only from ſome Affections of the Body, which happen to them there, and ſo depend on ſomething exterior to the Mind; no otherwiſe differing in their Manner of Production from other *Ideas* deriv'd from Senſe, but only in the Precedency of Time: Whereas, thoſe Innate Principles are ſuppoſed to be quite of another Nature; not coming into the Mind by any accidental Alterations in, or Operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters impreſſed upon it in the very firſt Moment of its Being and Conſtitution.

Which Ideas *firſt, is not evident.*

§. 7. As there are ſome *Ideas* which we may reaſonably ſuppoſe may be introduced into the Minds of Children in the Womb, ſubſervient to the Neceſſities of their Life and Being there; ſo after they are born, *thoſe* Ideas are the *earlieſt imprinted, which happen to be the ſenſible Qualities which firſt occur* to them;

them; amongſt which, Light is not the leaſt conſiderable, nor of the weakeſt Efficacy. And how covetous the Mind is, to be furniſhed with all ſuch *Ideas*, as have no Pain accompanying them, may be a little gueſs'd, by what is obſervable in Children new-born, who alſo turn their Eyes to that Part from whence the Light comes, lay them how you pleaſe. But the *Ideas* that are moſt familiar at firſt, being various, according to the divers Circumſtances of Childrens firſt Entertainment in the Word, the Order, wherein the ſeveral *Ideas* come at firſt into the Mind, is very various, and uncertain alſo; neither is it much material to know it.

Ideas *of Senſation often changed by the Judgment.*

§. 8. We are farther to conſider concerning Perception, that the *Ideas we receive by Senſation are often* in grown People *alter'd by the Judgment*, without our taking notice of it. When we ſet before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform Colour, *v. g.* Gold, Alabaſter, or Jet, 'tis certain, that the *Idea*, thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle, variouſly ſhadow'd, with ſeveral Degrees of Light and Brightneſs coming to our Eyes. But we having by Uſe been accuſtomed to perceive, what kind of Appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us; what Alterations are made in the Reflections of Light, by the difference of the ſenſible Figures of Bodies; the Judgment preſently, by an habitual Cuſtom, alters the Appearances into their Cauſes: So that from that, which truly is Variety of Shadow or Colour, collecting the Figure, it makes it paſs for a Mark of Figure, and frames to it ſelf the Perception of a convex Figure, and an uniform Colour; when the *Idea* we receive from thence, is only a Plane variouſly colour'd; as is evident in Painting. To which purpoſe, I ſhall here inſert a Problem of that very Ingenious and Studious Promoter of real Knowledge, the Learned and Worthy Mr. *Molineux*, which he was pleaſed to ſend me in a Letter ſome Months ſince; and it is this: *Suppoſe a Man born Blind, and now Adult, and taught by his Touch to diſtinguiſh between a Cube and a Sphere of the ſame Metal, and nighly of the ſame Bigneſs, ſo as to tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppoſe then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the blind Man to be made to ſee:* Quære, *Whether by his Sight, before he touch'd them, he could now diſtinguiſh, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube.* To which the acute and judicious Propoſer anſwers, *Not. For though he has obtain'd the Experience of, how a Globe, how a Cube affects his Touch: yet he has not yet attain'd the Experience, that what affects his Touch*

ſo

ſo or ſo, muſt affect his Sight ſo or ſo: Or that a protuberant Angle in the Cube, that preſſed his Hand unequally, ſhall appear to his Eye, as it does in the Cube. I agree with this thinking Gentleman, whom I am proud to call my Friend, in his Anſwer to this his Problem; and am of Opinion, that the blind Man, at firſt Sight, would not be able with Certainty to ſay, which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilſt he only ſaw them; though he could unerringly name them by his Touch, and certainly diſtinguiſh them by the Difference of their Figures felt. This I have ſet down, and leave with my Reader, as an Occaſion for him to conſider, how much he may be beholden to Experience, Improvement, and acquired Notions, where he thinks he has not the leaſt Uſe of, or Help from them: And the rather, becauſe this obſerving *Gentleman* farther adds, that *having, upon the Occaſion of my Book, propoſed this to divers very ingenious Men, he hardly ever met with one, that at firſt gave the Anſwer to it, which he thinks true, till by hearing his Reaſons they were convinced.*

§. 9. But this is not, I think, uſually in any of our *Ideas*, but thoſe received by *Sight*: Becauſe Sight, the moſt comprehenſive of all our Senſes, conveying to our Minds the *Ideas* of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Senſe; and alſo the far different *Ideas* of Space, Figure, or Motion, the ſeveral Varieties whereof change the Appearances of its proper Object, *viz.* Light and Colours, we bring our ſelves by Uſe, to judge of the one by the other. This, in many Caſes, by a ſettled Habit, in Things whereof we have frequent Experience, is performed ſo conſtantly, and ſo quick, that we take that for the Perception of our Senſation, which is an *Idea* formed by our Judgment; ſo that one, *viz.* that of Senſation, ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of it ſelf; as a Man who reads or hears with Attention and Underſtanding, takes little notice of the Characters or Sounds, but of the *Ideas*, that are excited in him by them.

§. 10. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with ſo little Notice, if we conſider how very *quick* the *Actions of the Mind* are performed: For as it ſelf is thought to take up no Space, to have no Extenſion; ſo its Actions ſeem to require no Time, but many of them ſeem to be crouded into an Inſtant. I ſpeak this in compariſon to the Actions of the Body. Any one may eaſily obſerve this in his own Thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an Inſtant, do our Minds, with one Glance, ſee all the Parts of a Demonſtration, which may very well be called a long one, if we conſider the Time it will

will require to put it into Words, and Step by Step ſhew it another? *Secondly*, We ſhall not be ſo much ſurprized, that this is done in us with ſo little Notice, if we conſider, how the Facility which we get of doing Things, by a Cuſtom of doing, makes them often paſs in us without our Notice. *Habits*, eſpecially ſuch as are begun very early, come, at laſt, to *produce Actions in us, which often eſcape our Obſervations.* How frequently do we, in a Day, cover our Eyes with our Eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the Dark? Men, that by Cuſtom have got the Uſe of a By-word, do almoſt in every Sentence, pronounce Sounds, which though taken notice of by others, they themſelves neither hear nor obſerve. And therefore, 'tis not ſo ſtrange, that our Mind ſhould often change the *Idea* of its Senſation into that of its Judgment, and make one ſerve only to excite the other, without our taking Notice of it.

Perception puts the Difference between Animals and inferior Beings.

§. 11. This Faculty of *Perception*, ſeems to me to be that, which *puts the Diſtinction betwixt the animal Kingdom, and the inferior Parts of Nature.* For however Vegetables have, many of them, ſome Degrees of Motion, and upon the different Application of other Bodies to them, do very briskly alter their Figure and Motion, and ſo have obtained the Name of Senſitive Plants, from a Motion, which has ſome Reſemblance to that, which in Animals follows upon Senſation: Yet, I ſuppoſe, it is all bare Mechaniſm, and no otherwiſe produced, than the turning of a wild Oat-beard, by the Inſinuation of the Particles of Moiſture; or the ſhort'ning of a Rope, by the Affuſion of Water. All which is done without any Senſation in the Subject, or the having or receiving any *Ideas*.

§. 12. *Perception*, I believe, is, in ſome degree, *in all Sorts of Animals*; though in ſome, poſſibly, the Avenues, provided by Nature for the Reception of Senſations, are ſo few, and the Perception, they are received with, ſo obſcure and dull, that it comes extremely ſhort of the Quickneſs and Variety of Senſations, which is in other Animals: But yet it is ſufficient for, and wiſely adapted to, the State and Condition of that Sort of Animals who are thus made: So that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Maker plainly appears in all the Parts of this ſtupendous Fabrick, and all the ſeveral Degrees and Ranks of Creatures in it.

§. 13. We may, I think, from the Make of an *Oyſter* or *Cockle*, reaſonably conclude, that it has not ſo many, nor ſo quick Senſes, as a Man, or ſeveral other Animals; nor if it had, would it in that State and Incapacity of transferring it ſelf from

one

one Place to another, be better'd by them. What Good would Sight and Hearing do to a Creature, that cannot move it ſelf to or from the Objects, wherein at a Diſtance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not Quickneſs of Senſation be an Inconvenience to an Animal, that muſt lie ſtill, where Chance has once placed it; and there receive the Afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it?

§. 14. But yet, I cannot but think, there is ſome ſmall dull Perception, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed from perfect Inſenſibility. And that this may be ſo, we have plain Inſtances even in Mankind it ſelf. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his paſt Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the *Ideas* his Mind was formerly ſtored with, and has, by deſtroying his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taſte to a great Degree, ſtopp'd up almoſt all the Paſſages for new ones to enter; or, if there be ſome of the Inlets yet half open, the Impreſſions made are ſcarce perceived, or not at all retained: How far ſuch an one (notwithſtanding all that is boaſted of Innate Principles) is in his Knowledge, and intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a *Cockle*, or an *Oyſter*, I leave to be conſidered. And if a Man had paſſed Sixty Years in ſuch a State, as 'tis poſſible he might, as well as Three Days, I wonder what Difference there would have been, in any intellectual Perfections, between him and the loweſt Degree of Animals.

Perception, the Inlets of Knowledge.

§. 15. *Perception* then being *the firſt Step and Degree towards Knowledge, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it*, the fewer Senſes any Man, as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the Impreſſions are, that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties are, that are employed about them, the more remote are they from that Knowledge, which is to be found in ſome Men. But this being in great Variety of Degrees (as may be perceived amongſt Men) cannot certainly be diſcovered in the ſeveral Species of Animals, much leſs in their particular Individuals. It ſuffices me only to have remarked here, that Perception is the firſt Operation of all our intellectual Faculties, and the Inlet of all Knowledge into our Minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is Perception in the loweſt Degree of it, which puts the Boundaries between Animals and the Inferior Ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my Conjecture by the bye, it being indifferent to the Matter in hand, which way the Learned ſhall determine of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of RETENTION.

§. 1. THE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther Progreſs towards Knowledge, is that which I call *Retention*, or the keeping of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which from Senſation or Reflection it hath received. This is done two Ways. *Firſt*, by keeping the *Idea*, which is brought into it, for ſome time actually in view, which is called *Contemplation.* *Contemplation.*

§. 2. The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in our Minds thoſe *Ideas*, which after imprinting have diſappeared, or have been as it were laid aſide out of ſight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being removed. This is *Memory*, which is as it were the Store-Houſe of our *Ideas.* For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many *Ideas* under View and Conſideration at once, it was neceſſary to have a Repoſitory, to lay up thoſe *Ideas*, which at another Time it might have uſe of. But our *Ideas* being nothing, but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no Perception of them, this *laying up* of our *Ideas* in the Repoſitory of the Memory, ſignifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many Caſes, to revive Perceptions which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this Senſe it is, that our *Ideas* are ſaid to be in our Memories, when indeed they are actually no where; but only there is an Ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again, and as it were paint them anew on it ſelf, though ſome with more, ſome with leſs Difficulty; ſome more lively, and others more obſcurely. And thus it is, by the Aſſiſtance of this Faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe *Ideas* in our Underſtandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in ſight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the Help of thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which firſt imprinted them there. *Memory.*

§. 3. *Attention*

Attention, Repetition, Pleasure, and Pain, fix Ideas.

§. 3. *Attention* and *Repetition help* much to the fixing any *Ideas* in *the Memory:* But those, which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting Impression, are those which are accompanied with *Pleasure* or *Pain.* The great Business of the Senses, being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the Body, it is wisely ordered by Nature (as has been shewn) that Pain should accompany the Reception of several *Ideas*; which supplying the Place of Consideration and Reasoning in Children, and acting quicker than Consideration in grown Men, makes both the Young and Old avoid painful Objects, with that Haste, which is necessary for their Preservation; and in both settles in the Memory a Caution for the future.

Ideas *fade in the Memory.*

§. 4. Concerning the several *Degrees of* lasting, wherewith *Ideas* are imprinted on the *Memory*, we may observe, that some of them have been produced in the Understanding, by an Object affecting the Senses once only, and no more than once: Others, that have more than once offer'd themselves to the Senses, have yet been little taken notice of; the Mind, either heedless, as in Children, or otherwise employ'd, as in Men, intent only on one thing, not setting the Stamp deep into it self. And in some, where they are set on with Care and repeated Impressions, either through the Temper of the Body, or some other Default, the Memory is very weak: In all these Cases, *Ideas* in the Mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the Understanding, leaving no more Footsteps, or remaining Characters of themselves, than Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

§. 5. Thus many of those *Ideas*, which were produced in the Minds of Children, in the Beginning of their Sensation (some of which, perhaps, as of some Pleasures and Pains, were before they were born, and others in their Infancy) if in the future Course of their Lives, they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least Glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those, who by some Mischance have lost their Sight when they were very Young, in whom the *Ideas* of Colours, having been but slightly taken Notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some Years after, there is no more Notion nor Memory of Colours left in their Minds, than in those of People born Blind. The Memory in some Men, 'tis true, is very tenacious, even to a Miracle: But yet there seems

ſeems to be a conſtant Decay of all our *Ideas*, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt, and in Minds the moſt retentive; ſo that if they be not ſometimes renewed by repeated Exerciſe of the Senſes, or Reflection on thoſe kind of Objects, which at firſt occaſion'd them, the Print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thus the *Ideas*, as well as Children of our Youth, often die before us: And our Minds repreſent to us thoſe Tombs, to which we are approaching; where, though the Braſs and Marble remain, yet the Inſcriptions are effaced by Time, and the Imagery moulders away. *The Pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours*, and if not ſometimes refreſhed, vaniſh and diſappear. How much the Conſtitution of our Bodies, and the Make of our Animal Spirits are concerned in this, and whether the Temper of the Brain make this Difference, that in ſome, it retains the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others, like Free-ſtone, and in others, little better than Sand, I ſhall not here enquire; though it may ſeem probable, that the Conſtitution of the Body does ſometimes influence the Memory; ſince we ſometimes find a Diſeaſe quite ſtrip the Mind of all its *Ideas*, and the Flames of a Fever, in a few Days calcine all thoſe Images to Duſt and Confuſion, which ſeem'd to be as laſting, as if graved in Marble.

Conſtantly repeated Ideas *can ſcarce be loſt.*

§. 6. But concerning the *Ideas* themſelves, it is eaſy to remark, That thoſe that are *oftneſt refreſhed* (amongſt which are thoſe that are conveyed into the Mind by more Ways than one) by a frequent Return of the Objects or Actions that produced them, *fix themſelves beſt in the Memory*, and remain cleareſt and longeſt there; and therefore thoſe which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, *viz. Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Motion*, and *Reſt*, and thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect our Bodies, as *Heat* and *Cold*; and thoſe which are the Affections of all Kinds of Beings, as *Exiſtence*, *Duration*, and *Number*, which almoſt every Object that affects our Senſes, every Thought which employs our Minds, bring along with them: Theſe, I ſay, and the like *Ideas*, are ſeldom quite loſt, whilſt the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In remembring, the Mind is often active.

§. 7. In this ſecondary Perception, as I may ſo call it, or viewing again the *Ideas* that are lodg'd *in* the *Memory*, *the Mind is oftentimes more than barely paſſive*, the Appearances of thoſe dormant Pictures, depending ſometimes on the Will. The Mind very often ſets it ſelf on work in ſearch of ſome hidden

Idea, and turns, as it were, the Eye of the Soul upon it; though ſometimes too they ſtart up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themſelves to the Underſtanding; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark Cells, into open Daylight, by ſome turbulent and tempeſtuous Paſſion; our Affections bringing *Ideas* to our Memory, which had otherwiſe lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be obſerved, concerning *Ideas* lodg'd in the Memory, and upon Occaſion revived by the Mind, that they are not only (as the Word *revive* imports) none of them new ones; but alſo that the Mind takes Notice of them, as of a former Impreſſion, and renews its Acquaintance with them, as with *Ideas* it had known before. So that though *Ideas* formerly imprinted, are not all conſtantly in View, yet in Remembrance, they are conſtantly known to be ſuch as have been formerly imprinted, *i. e.* in View, and taken Notice of before by the Underſtanding.

Two Defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowneſs.

§. 8. *Memory*, in an intellectual Creature, is neceſſary in the next Degree to Perception. It is of ſo great Moment, that where it is wanting, all the reſt of our Faculties are in a great meaſure uſeleſs: And we in our Thoughts, Reaſonings, and Knowledge, could not proceed beyond preſent Objects, were it not for the Aſſiſtance of our Memories, wherein there may be *Two Defects*.

Firſt, That it *loſes the Idea* quite, and ſo far it produces perfect Ignorance. For ſince we can know nothing farther than we have the *Idea* of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect *Ignorance*.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and *retrieves not the Ideas* that it has, and are laid up in ſtore, *quick enough* to ſerve the Mind upon Occaſions. This, if it be to a great Degree, is *Stupidity*; and he, who, through this Default in his Memory, has not the *Ideas* that are really preſerved there ready at hand, when Need and Occaſion calls for them, were almoſt as good be without them quite, ſince they ſerve him to little Purpoſe. The dull Man, who loſes the Opportunity, whilſt he is ſeeking in his Mind for thoſe *Ideas* that ſhould ſerve his Turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledge, than one that is perfectly ignorant. 'Tis the Buſineſs therefore of the Memory to furniſh to the Mind thoſe dormant *Ideas*, which it has preſent Occaſion for; in the having them ready at hand on all Occaſions, conſiſts that which we call *Invention*, *Fancy*, and Quickneſs of Parts.

§. 9. Theſe

§. 9. These are Defects we may observe in the Memory of one Man, compared with another. There is another Defect, which we may conceive to be in the Memory of Man in general, compared with some superior created intellectual Beings, which, in this Faculty, may so far excel Man, that they may have constantly in View the whole Sense of all their former Actions, wherein no one of the Thoughts they have ever had, may slip out of their Sight. The Omniscience of God, who knows all Things, past, present, and to come, and to whom the Thoughts of Men's Hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the Possibility of this. For who can doubt, but God may communicate to those glorious Spirits, his immediate Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what Proportion he pleases, as far as created finite Beings can be capable? 'Tis reported of that Prodigy of Parts, Monsieur *Paschal*, that till the Decay of his Health had impaired his Memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought in any Part of his rational Age. This is a Privilege so little known to most Men, that it seems almost incredible to those, who, after the ordinary Way, measure all others by themselves: But yet when considered, may help us to enlarge our Thoughts towards greater Perfections of it in superior Ranks of Spirits. For this of Mr. *Paschal*, was still with the Narrowness that human Minds are confin'd to here, of having great Variety of *Ideas* only by Succession, not all at once: Whereas the several Degrees of Angels may probably have larger Views, and some of them be endowed with Capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one Picture, all their past Knowledge at once. This we may conceive, would be no small Advantage to the Knowledge of a thinking Man; if all his past Thoughts and Reasonings could be always present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of those Ways, wherein the Knowledge of separate Spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

Brutes have Memory.

§. 10. This Faculty of laying up, and retaining the *Ideas*, that are brought into the Mind, several *other Animals* seem to have, to a great Degree, as well as Man. For to pass by other Instances, Birds learning of Tunes, and the Endeavours one may observe in them, to hit the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have Perception, and retain *Ideas* in their Memories, and use them for Patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they had no *Ideas*. For though I should grant

Sound may mechanically cauſe a certain Motion of the animal Spirits in the Brains of thoſe Birds, whilſt the Tune is actually playing; and that Motion may be continued on to the Muſcles of the Wings, and ſo the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain Noiſes, becauſe this may tend to the Bird's Preſervation: Yet that can never be ſuppoſed a Reaſon, why it ſhould cauſe mechanically, either whilſt the Tune was playing, much leſs after it is ceaſed, ſuch a Motion in the Organs of the Bird's Voice, as ſhould conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound, which Imitation can be of no Uſe to the Bird's Preſervation: But which is more, it cannot with any Appearance of Reaſon, be ſuppoſed (much leſs proved) that Birds, without Senſe and Memory, can approach their Notes, nearer and nearer by Degrees, to a Tune play'd Yeſterday, which if they have no *Idea* of in their Memory, is now no where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Eſſays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no Reaſon why the Sound of a Pipe ſhould leave Traces in their Brains, which not at firſt, but by their after-endeavours, ſhould produce the like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themſelves, ſhould not make Traces which they ſhould follow, as well as thoſe of the Pipe, is impoſſible to conceive.

CHAP. XI.

Of DISCERNING, *and other Operations of the Mind.*

No Knowledge without it. §. 1. ANother Faculty we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of *Diſcerning* and diſtinguiſhing between the ſeveral *Ideas* it has. It is not enough to have a confuſed Perception of ſomething in general: Unleſs the Mind had a diſtinct Perception of different Objects, and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledge; though the Bodies, that affect us, were as buſy about us, as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in Thinking. On this Faculty of diſtinguiſhing one Thing from another, depends the *Evidence and Certainty* of ſeveral, even very general Propoſitions, which have paſſed for Innate Truths; becauſe Men over-looking the true Cauſe, why thoſe Propoſitions find univerſal Aſſent, impute it

it wholly to native uniform Impreſſions; whereas it in truth *depends upon this clear diſcerning Faculty* of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the ſame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

The Difference of Wit and Judgment.

§. 2. How much the Imperfection of accurately diſcriminating *Ideas* one from another lies, either in the Dulneſs, or Faults of the Organs of Senſe; or want of Acuteneſs, Exerciſe, or Attention in the Underſtanding; or Haſtineſs and Precipitancy, natural to ſome Tempers, I will not here examine: It ſuffices to take notice, that this is one of the Operations that the Mind may reflect on, and obſerve in it ſelf. It is of that Conſequence to its other Knowledge, that ſo far as this Faculty is in it ſelf dull, or not rightly made uſe of, for the diſtinguiſhing one Thing from another; ſo far our Notions are confuſed, and our Reaſon and Judgment diſturbed or miſled. If in having our *Ideas* in the Memory ready at hand, conſiſts Quickneſs of Parts; in this of having them unconfuſed, and being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one Thing from another, where there is but the leaſt Difference, conſiſts, in a great meaſure, the Exactneſs of Judgment, and Clearneſs of Reaſon, which is to be obſerved in one Man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given ſome Reaſon of that common Obſervation, That Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the cleareſt Judgment, or deepeſt Reaſon. For *Wit* lying moſt in the Aſſemblage of *Ideas*, and putting thoſe together with Quickneſs and Variety, wherein can be found any Reſemblance or Congruity, thereby to make up pleaſant Pictures, and agreeable Viſions in the Fancy: *Judgment* on the contrary, lies quite on the other Side, in ſeparating carefully, one from another, *Ideas* wherein can be found the leaſt Difference, thereby to avoid being miſled by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one Thing for another. This is a Way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Alluſion, wherein for the moſt part, lies that Entertainment and Pleaſantry of Wit, which ſtrikes ſo lively on the Fancy, and therefore ſo acceptable to all People; becauſe its Beauty appears at firſt Sight, and there is required no Labour of Thought, to examine what Truth or Reaſon there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, reſts ſatisfied with the Agreeableneſs of the Picture, and the Gaiety of the Fancy: And it is a Kind of an Affront to go about to examine it by the ſevere Rules of Truth and good Reaſon; whereby it appears, that it conſiſts in ſomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

Clearneſs alone hinders Confuſion.

§. 3. To the well diſtinguiſhing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes, they be *clear and determinate:* And when they are ſo, *it will not breed any Confuſion* or Miſtake about them, though the Senſes ſhould (as ſometimes they do) convey them from the ſame Object differently, on different Occaſions, and ſo ſeem to err. For though a Man in a Fever ſhould from Sugar have a bitter Taſte, which at another Time would produce a ſweet one; yet the *Idea* of Bitter in that Man's Mind, would be as clear and diſtinct from the *Idea* of Sweet, as if he had taſted only Gall. Nor does it make any more Confuſion between the two *Ideas* of Sweet and Bitter, that the ſame Sort of Body produces at one Time one, and at another Time another *Idea*, by the Taſte, than it makes a Confuſion in two *Ideas* of White and Sweet, or White and Round, that the ſame Piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the ſame Time. And the *Ideas* of Orange-colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind, by the ſame Parcel of the Infuſion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, are no leſs diſtinct *Ideas*, than thoſe of the ſame Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

Comparing.

§. 4. The *COMPARING* them one with another, in reſpect of Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumſtances, is another Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, and is that upon which depends all that large Tribe of *Ideas*, comprehended under *Relation*; which of how vaſt an Extent it is, I ſhall have Occaſion to conſider hereafter.

Brutes compare, but imperfectly.

§. 5. How far Brutes partake in this Faculty, is not eaſy to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great Degree: For though they probably have ſeveral *Ideas* diſtinct enough, yet it ſeems to me to be the Prerogative of Human Underſtanding, when it has ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed any *Ideas*, ſo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and ſo conſequently two, to caſt about and conſider in what Circumſtances they are capable to be compared. And therefore, I think, *Beaſts compare* not their *Ideas*, farther than ſome ſenſible Circumſtances annexed to the Objects themſelves. The other Power of comparing, which may be obſerved in Men, belonging to general *Ideas*, and uſeful only to abſtract Reaſonings, we may probably conjecture they have not.

Compounding.

§. 6. The next Operation we may obſerve in the Mind about its *Ideas*, is *COMPOSITION*;

TION; whereby it puts together ſeveral of thoſe ſimple ones it has received from Senſation and Reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this, of Compoſition, may be reckon'd alſo, that of *ENLARGING*; wherein, though the Compoſition does not ſo much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheleſs a putting ſeveral *Ideas* together, though of the ſame Kind. Thus by adding ſeveral Units together, we make the *Idea* of a Dozen; and putting together the repeated *Ideas* of ſeveral Perches, we frame that of a Furlong.

§. 7. In this alſo, I ſuppoſe, *Brutes* come far ſhort of Men. For though they take in, and retain together ſeveral Combinations, or ſimple *Ideas*, as poſſibly the Shape, Smell, and Voice of his Maſter, make up the complex *Idea* a Dog has of him; or rather are ſo many diſtinct Marks whereby he knows him: yet I *do not* think they do of themſelves ever compound them, and *make complex* Ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex *Ideas*, 'tis only one ſimple one that directs them in the Knowledge of ſeveral Things, which poſſibly they diſtinguiſh leſs by their Sight than we imagine. For I have been credibly informed, that a Bitch will nurſe, play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of her Puppies, if you can but get them once to ſuck her, ſo long that her Milk may go through them. And thoſe Animals which have a numerous Brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any Knowledge of their Number; for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young, that are taken from them whilſt they are in Sight or Hearing, yet if one or two of them be ſtolen from them in their Abſence, or without Noiſe, they appear not to miſs them, or to have any Senſe that their Number is leſſen'd. *Brutes compound but little.*

§. 8. When Children have, by repeated Senſations, got *Ideas* fixed in their Memories, they begin, by Degrees, to learn the Uſe of Signs. And when they have got the Skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make *uſe of Words* to ſignify their *Ideas* to others: Theſe verbal Signs they ſometimes borrow from others, and ſometimes make themſelves, as one may obſerve among the new and unuſual Names Children often give to Things in their firſt Uſe of Language. *Naming.*

§. 9. The Uſe of Words then being to ſtand as outward Marks of our internal *Ideas*, and thoſe *Ideas* being taken from particular Things, if every particular *Abſtracting.*

Idea that we take in, ſhould have a diſtinct Name, Names muſt be endleſs. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular *Ideas*, received from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch Appearances, ſeparate from all other Exiſtences, and the Circumſtances of real Exiſtence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant *Ideas*. This is called *ABSTRACTION*, whereby *Ideas* taken from particular Beings, become general Repreſentatives of all of the ſame Kind; and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *Ideas*. Such preciſe, naked Appearances in the Mind, without conſidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Underſtanding lays up (with Names commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to rank real Exiſtences into Sorts, as they agree with theſe Patterns, and to *denominate* them accordingly. Thus the ſame Colour being obſerved to-day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yeſterday received from Milk, it conſiders that Appearance alone makes it a Repreſentative of all of that Kind; and having given it the Name *Whiteneſs*, it by that Sound ſignifies the ſame Qualities whereſoever to be imagin'd or met with; and thus Univerſals, whether *Ideas* or Terms, are made.

Brutes abſtract not.

§. 10. If it may be doubted, whether *Beaſts* compound and enlarge their *Ideas* that Way, to any Degree: This, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the Power of *Abſtracting* is not at all in them; and that the having of general *Ideas*, is that which puts a perfect Diſtinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident, we obſerve no Footſteps in them, of making uſe of general Signs for univerſal *Ideas*; from which we have Reaſon to imagine, that they have not the Faculty of abſtracting, or making general *Ideas*, ſince they have no Uſe of Words, or any other general Signs.

§. 11. Nor can it be imputed to their Want of fit Organs to frame articulate Sounds, that they have no Uſe or Knowledge of general Words; ſince many of them, we find, can faſhion ſuch Sounds, and pronounce Words diſtinctly enough, but never with any ſuch Application. And on the other Side, Men, who through ſome Defect in the Organs, want Words, yet fail not to expreſs their univerſal *Ideas* by Signs, which ſerve them inſtead of general Words; a Faculty which we ſee Beaſts come ſhort in. And therefore, I think, we may ſuppoſe, that 'tis in this, that the Species of *Brutes* are diſcriminated from Man; and

and 'tis that proper Difference wherein they are wholly ſeparated, and which at laſt widens to ſo vaſt a Diſtance. For if they have any *Ideas* at all, and are not bare Machines (as ſome would have them) we cannot deny them to have ſome Reaſon. It ſeems as evident to me, that they do ſome of them in certain Inſtances reaſon, as that they have Senſe; but it is only in particular *Ideas*, juſt as they received them from their Senſes. They are the beſt of them tied up within thoſe narrow Bounds, and *have not* (as I think) the Faculty to enlarge them by any kind of *Abſtraction*.

Idiots and Mad Men.

§. 12. How far *Idiots* are concerned in the Want or Weakneſs of any, or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact Obſervation of their ſeveral Ways of faltering, would no doubt diſcover. For thoſe who either perceive but dully, or retain the *Ideas* that come into their Minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little Matter to think on. Thoſe who cannot diſtinguiſh, compare, and abſtract, would hardly be able to underſtand, and make uſe of Language, or judge, or reaſon, to any tolerable degree: But only a little, and imperfectly, about Things preſent, and very familiar to their Senſes. And indeed, any of the fore-mentioned Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce ſuitable Defects in Men's Underſtandings and Knowledge.

§. 13. In fine, the Defect in *Naturals* ſeems to proceed from Want of Quickneſs, Activity, and Motion in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reaſon: Whereas *mad Men*, on the other ſide, ſeem to ſuffer by the other Extreme. For they do not appear to me to have loſt the Faculty of Reaſoning; but having joined together ſome *Ideas* very wrongly, they miſtake them for Truths; and they err as Men do that argue right from wrong Principles: For by the Violence of their Imaginations, having taking their Fancies for Realities, they make right Deductions from them. Thus you ſhall find a diſtracted Man fancying himſelf a King, with a right Inference, require ſuitable Attendance, Reſpect, and Obedience: Others, who have thought themſelves made of Glaſs, have uſed the Caution neceſſary to preſerve ſuch brittle Bodies. Hence it comes to paſs that a Man, who is very ſober, and of a right Underſtanding in all other Things, may in one particular be as frantick as any in *Bedlam*; if either by any ſudden very ſtrong Impreſſion, or long fixing his Fancy upon one Sort of Thoughts, incoherent *Ideas* have been cemented together ſo powerfully, as to remain united. But there

there are Degrees of Madneſs, as of Folly; the diſorderly jumbling *Ideas* together, is in ſome more, and ſome leſs. In ſhort, herein ſeems to lie the Difference between Idiots and mad Men, that mad Men put wrong *Ideas* together, and ſo make wrong Propoſitions, but argue and reaſon right from them: But Idiots make very few or no Propoſitions, and reaſon ſcarce at all.

Method.

§. 14. Theſe, I think, are the firſt Faculties and Operations of the Mind, which it makes uſe of in Underſtanding; and though they are exerciſed about all its *Ideas* in general; yet the Inſtances, I have hitherto given, have been chiefly in ſimple *Ideas*, and I have ſubjoined the Explication of theſe Faculties of the Mind, to that of ſimple *Ideas*, before I come to what I have to ſay, concerning complex ones, for theſe following Reaſons:

Firſt, Becauſe ſeveral of theſe Faculties being exerciſed at firſt principally about ſimple *Ideas*, we might, by following Nature in its ordinary Method, trace and diſcover them in their Riſe, Progreſs, and gradual Improvements.

Secondly, Becauſe obſerving the Faculties of the Mind, how they operate about ſimple *Ideas*, which are uſually in moſt Men's Minds much more clear, preciſe, and diſtinct, than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the Mind abſtracts, denominates, compares, and exerciſes its other Operations, about thoſe which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to Miſtake.

Thirdly, Becauſe theſe very Operations of the Mind about *Ideas*, receiv'd from *Senſation*, are themſelves, when reflected on, another Set of *Ideas*, deriv'd from that other Source of our Knowledge, which I call *Reflection*; and therefore fit to be conſidered in this Place, after the ſimple *Ideas* of *Senſation*. Of Compounding, Comparing, Abſtracting, &c. I have but juſt ſpoken, having Occaſion to treat of them more at large in other Places.

Theſe are the Beginnings of Human Knowledge.

§. 15. And thus I have given a ſhort, and, I think, true *Hiſtory of the firſt Beginnings of Human Knowledge*; whence the Mind has its firſt Objects, and by what Steps it makes its Progreſs to the laying in, and ſtoring up thoſe *Ideas*, out of which is to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable of; wherein I muſt appeal to Experience and Obſervation, whether I am in the right: The beſt Way

Way to come to Truth, being to examine Things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of our ſelves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

§. 16. To deal truly, *this is the only Way*, that I can diſcover, *whereby the Ideas* of Things *are brought into the Underſtanding:* If other Men have either Innate *Ideas*, or infuſed Principles, they have Reaſon to enjoy them; and if they are ſure of it, it is impoſſible for others to deny them the Privilege that they have above their Neighbours. I can ſpeak but of what I find in my ſelf, and is agreeable to thoſe Notions; which, if we will examine the whole Courſe of Men in their ſeveral Ages, Countries, and Educations, ſeem to depend on thoſe Foundations which I have laid, and to correſpond with this Method, in all the Parts and Degrees thereof. *Appeal to Experience.*

§. 17. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire; and therefore cannot but confeſs here again, That external and internal Senſation, are the only Paſſages, that I can find, of Knowledge, to the Underſtanding. Theſe alone, as far as I can diſcover, are the Windows by which Light is let into this *Dark Room.* For, methinks the *Underſtanding* is not much unlike a Cloſet, wholly ſhut from Light, with only ſome little Opening left, to let in external viſible Reſemblances, or *Ideas* of Things without; would the Pictures coming into ſuch a dark Room but ſtay there, and lye ſo orderly as to be found upon Occaſion, it would very much reſemble the Underſtanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of Sight, and the *Ideas* of them. *Dark Room.*

Theſe are my Gueſſes concerning the Means whereby the Underſtanding comes to have, and retain ſimple *Ideas*, and the Modes of them, with ſome other Operations about them. I proceed now to examine ſome of theſe ſimple *Ideas* and their Modes, a little more particularly.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex IDEAS.

§. 1. WE have hitherto conſidered thoſe *Ideas*, in the Reception whereof, the Mind is only paſſive, which are thoſe ſimple ones received from *Senſation* and *Reflection* before mentioned, *Made by the Mind out of ſimple ones.*

mentioned, whereof the Mind cannot make one to it ſelf, nor have any *Idea* which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But as the Mind is wholly paſſive in the Reception of all its ſimple *Ideas*, ſo it exerts ſeveral Acts of its own, whereby out of its ſimple *Ideas*, as the Materials and Foundations of the reſt, the other are framed. The Acts of the Mind wherein it exerts its Power over its ſimple *Ideas*, are chiefly theſe three; 1. Combining ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* into one compound one, and thus all the complex *Ideas* are made. 2. The ſecond, is bringing two *Ideas*, whether ſimple or complex, together; and ſetting them by one another, ſo as to take a View of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which Way it gets all its *Ideas* of Relations. The Third, is ſeparating them from all other *Ideas* that accompany them in their real Exiſtence; this is called *Abſtraction*: And thus all its general *Ideas* are made. This ſhews Man's Power, and its Way of Operation, to be much-what the ſame in the Material and Intellectual World: For the Materials in both being ſuch as he has no Power over, either to make or deſtroy, all that Man can do, is either to unite them together, or to ſet them by one another, or wholly ſeparate them. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe, in the Conſideration of complex *Ideas*, and come to the other two in their due Places. As ſimple *Ideas* are obſerved to exiſt in ſeveral Combinations united together; ſo the Mind has a Power to conſider ſeveral of them united together, as one *Idea*; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it ſelf has join'd them. *Ideas* thus made up of ſeveral ſimple ones put together, I call *Complex*; ſuch as are *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, *a Man*, *an Army*, *the Univerſe*; which though complicated of various ſimple *Ideas*, or *complex Ideas* made up of ſimple ones, yet are, when the Mind pleaſes, conſidered each by it ſelf, as one entire Thing, and ſignified by one Name.

Made voluntarily.

§. 2. In this Faculty of repeating and joining together its *Ideas*, the Mind has great Power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what *Senſation* or *Reflection* furniſhed it with: But all this ſtill confined to thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which it received from thoſe two Sources, and which are the ultimate Materials of all its Compoſitions. For ſimple *Ideas* are all from Things themſelves; and of theſe *the Mind can* have no more, nor other than what are ſuggeſted to it. It can have no other *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities than what come from without, by the Senſes, nor any *Ideas* of other

Kind

Kind of Operations of a thinking Substance, than what it finds in it self: But when it has once got these simple *Ideas*, it is not confined barely to Observation, and what offers it self from without; it can, by its own Power, put together those *Ideas* it has, and *make new Complex ones*, which it never received so united.

Are either Modes, Substances, or Relations.

§. 3. *Complex Ideas*, however compounded and decompounded, though their Number be infinite, and the Variety endless, wherewith they fill, and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three Heads.

1. *Modes.*
2. *Substances.*
3. *Relations.*

Modes.

§. 4. First, *Modes* I call such complex *Ideas*, which however compounded, contain not in them the Supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or Affections of Substances; such are the *Ideas* signified by the Words *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murther*, &c. And if in this, I use the Word *Mode* in somewhat a different Sense from its ordinary Signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in Discourses differing from the ordinary received Notions, either to make new Words, or to use old Words in somewhat a new Signification, the latter whereof, in our present Case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

Simple and mixed Modes.

§. 5. Of these *Modes*, there are two Sorts, which deserve distinct Consideration. *First*, There are some which are only Variations, or different Combinations of the same simple *Idea*, without the Mixture of any other, as a Dozen, or Score; which are nothing but the *Ideas* of so many distinct Units added together, and these I call *simple Modes*, as being contained within the Bounds of one simple *Idea*. *Secondly*, There are others compounded of simple *Ideas* of several Kinds, put together, to make one Complex one; *v. g. Beauty*, consisting of a certain Composition of Colour and Figure, causing Delight in the Beholder; *Theft*, which being the concealed Change of the Possession of any Thing, without the Consent of the Proprietor, contains, as is visible, a Combination of several *Ideas* of several Kinds; and these I call *mixed Modes*.

Substances single or collective

§. 6. Secondly, The *Ideas* of *Substances* are such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are taken

to

to repreſent diſtinct particular Things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the ſuppoſed, or confuſed *Idea* of Subſtance, ſuch as it is, is always the firſt and chief. Thus, if to Subſtance be joined the ſimple *Idea* of a certain dull whitiſh Colour, with certain Degrees of Weight, Hardneſs, Ductility, and Fuſibility, we have the *Idea* of *Lead*; and a Combination of the *Ideas* of a certain Sort of Figure, with the Powers of Motion, Thought, and Reaſoning, joined to Subſtance, make the ordinary *Idea* of *a Man*. Now, of Subſtances alſo, there are two Sorts of *Ideas*; one of ſingle Subſtances, as they exiſt ſeparately, as of *a Man*, or *a Sheep*; the other of ſeveral of thoſe put together, as an *Army* of Men, or *Flock* of Sheep; which *collective* Ideas *of* ſeveral *Subſtances*, thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle *Idea*, as that of a Man, or an Unit.

Relation.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, The laſt Sort of complex *Ideas*, is that we call *Relation*, which conſiſts in the Conſideration, and comparing one *Idea* with another: Of theſe ſeveral Kinds, we ſhall treat in their Order.

The abſtruſeſt Ideas *from the two Sources.*

§. 8. If we will trace the Progreſs of our Minds, and with Attention obſerve how it repeats, adds together, and unites its ſimple *Ideas* received from Senſation and Reflection, it will lead us farther than at firſt, perhaps, we ſhould have imagined. And, I believe, we ſhall find, if we warily obſerve the Originals of our Notions, that even *the moſt abſtruſe* Ideas, how remote ſoever they may ſeem from Senſe, or from any Operation of our own Minds, are yet only ſuch as the Underſtanding frames to it ſelf, by repeating and joining together *Ideas*, that it had either from Objects of Senſe, or from it own Operations about them: So that thoſe even large *and abſtract* Ideas, *are derived from Senſation, or Reflection*, being no other than what the Mind, by the ordinary Uſe of its own Faculties, employed about *Ideas* received from Objects of Senſe, or from the Operations it obſerves in it ſelf about them, may, and does attain unto. This I ſhall endeavour to ſhew in the *Ideas* we have of *Space*, *Time*, and *Infinity*, and ſome few other, that ſeem the moſt remote from thoſe Originals.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of simple Modes; and first, of the Simple Modes of Space.

§. 1. THough in the foregoing Part, I have often mentioned simple *Ideas*, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the Way that they come into the Mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be, perhaps, amiss to take a View of some of them again under this Consideration, and examine those different *Modifications of the same* Idea; which the Mind either finds in Things existing, or is able to make within it self, without the Help of any extrinsical Object, or any foreign Suggestion. *Simple Modes.*

Those *Modifications of any one simple* Idea, (which, as has been said, I call *simple Modes*,) are as perfectly different and distinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as those of the greatest Distance or Contrariety. For the *Idea* of *Two*, is as distinct from that of *One*, as *Blueness* from *Heat*, or either of them from any Number: And yet it is made up only of that simple *Idea* of an Unit repeated; and Repetitions of this Kind, joined together, make those distinct *simple Modes*, of a *Dozen*, a *Gross*, a *Million*.

§. 2. I shall begin with the *simple Idea* of *Space*. I have shewed above, *c.* 4. that we get the *Idea* of Space, both by our Sight, and Touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove, that Men perceive, by their Sight, a Distance between Bodies of different Colours, or between the Parts of the same Body; as that they see Colours themselves: Nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the Dark by Feeling and Touch. Idea *of Space.*

§. 3. This Space considered barely in Length between any two Beings, without considering any Thing else between them, is called *Distance*: If considered in Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I think it may be called *Capacity*: The Term Extension is usually applied to it in what Manner soever considered. *Space and Extension.*

§. 4. Each different Distance, is a different Modification of Space, and *each* Idea *of any dif-* *Immensity.*

ferent

ferent Diſtance, or Space, is a ſimple Mode of this Idea. Men, for the Uſe, and by the Cuſtom of Meaſuring, ſettle in their Minds the *Ideas* of certain ſtated Lengths, ſuch as are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, *Fathom*, *Mile*, *Diameter of the Earth*, &c. which are ſo many diſtinct *Ideas* made up only of Space. When any ſuch ſtated Lengths or Meaſures of Space are made familiar to Men's Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the *Idea* of Body, or any Thing elſe; and frame to themſelves the *Ideas* of long, ſquare, or cubick *Feet*, *Yards*, or *Fathoms*, here amongſt the Bodies of the Univerſe, or elſe beyond the utmoſt Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding theſe ſtill one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of Space as much as they pleaſe. This Power of repeating, or doubling any *Idea* we have of any Diſtance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any Stop or Stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the *Idea* of *Immenſity*.

Figure.

§. 5. There is another Modification of this *Idea*, which is nothing but the Relation which the Parts of the Termination of Extenſion, or circumſcribed Space, have amongſt themſelves. This the Touch diſcovers in ſenſible Bodies, whoſe Extremities come within our Reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whoſe Boundaries are within its View: Where obſerving how the Extremities terminate either in ſtreight Lines, which meet at diſcernable Angles; or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceived, by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that *Idea* we call *Figure*, which affords to the Mind infinite Variety. For beſides the vaſt Number of different Figures, that do really exiſt in the coherent Maſſes of Matter, the Stock that the Mind has in its Power, by varying the *Idea* of Space; and thereby making ſtill new Compoſitions, by repeating its own *Ideas*, and joining them as it pleaſes, is perfectly inexhauſtible: And ſo it can muliply Figures *in infinitum*.

Figure.

§. 6. For the Mind having a Power to repeat the *Idea* of any Length directly ſtretched out, and join it to another in the ſame Direction, which is to double the Length of that ſtreight Line, or elſe join it to another with what Inclinations it thinks fit, and ſo make what Sort of Angles it pleaſes: And being able alſo to ſhorten any Line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what Part it pleaſes, without being able to come to an End of

any ſuch Diviſions, it can make an Angle of any Bigneſs: So alſo the Lines that are its Sides, of what Length he pleaſes; which joining again to other Lines of different Lengths, and at different Angles, 'till it has wholly incloſed any Space, it is evident, that it can multiply *Figures*, both in their Shape and Capacity, *in infinitum*; all which are but ſo many different *ſimple Modes of Space.*

The ſame that it can do with ſtrait Lines, it can do alſo with crooked, or crooked and ſtrait together; and the ſame it can do in Lines, it can do alſo in Superficies; by which we may be led into further Thoughts of the endleſs Variety of *Figures*, that the Mind has a Power to make, and thereby to multiply the *ſimple Modes of Space.*

§. 7. Another *Idea* coming under this Head, and belonging to this Tribe, is that we call *Place.* *Place.* As in ſimple Space, we conſider the Relation of Diſtance between any two Bodies or Points; ſo in our *Idea* of *Place*, we conſider the Relation of Diſtance betwixt any Thing, and any two or more Points, which are conſidered as keeping the ſame Diſtance one with another, and ſo conſidered as at Reſt: For when we find any Thing at the ſame Diſtance now, which it was yeſterday from any two or more Points, which have not ſince changed their Diſtance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we ſay it hath kept the ſame *Place:* But if it hath ſenſibly altered its Diſtance, with either of thoſe Points, we ſay it hath changed its *Place:* Though vulgarly ſpeaking, in the common Notion of *Place*, we do not always exactly obſerve the Diſtance from preciſe Points; but from larger Portions of ſenſible Objects, to which we conſider the Thing placed to bear relation, and its Diſtance from which we have ſome reaſon to obſerve.

§. 8. Thus a Company of Cheſs-men ſtanding on the ſame Square of the Cheſs-board, where we left them, we ſay, they are all in the *ſame Place*, or unmoved; though, perhaps, the Cheſs-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one Room into another, becauſe we compared them only to the Parts of the Cheſs-board, which keep the ſame Diſtance one with another. The Cheſs-board, we alſo ſay, is in the *ſame Place* it was, if it remain in the ſame Part of the Cabbin, though, perhaps, the Ship which it is in, ſails all the while: And the Ship is ſaid to be in the *ſame Place*, ſuppoſing it kept the ſame Diſtance with the Parts of the neighbouring Land; though, perhaps, the Earth hath turned round; and ſo both Cheſs-men and Board,

and Ship, have every one *changed Place*, in reſpect of remoter Bodies, which have kept the ſame Diſtance one with another. But yet the Diſtance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which determines the Place of the Chefs-men; and the Diſtance from the fixed Parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Compariſon) being that which determined the Place of the Chefs-board, and the fixed Parts of the Earth, that by which we determined the Place of the Ship, thef Things may be ſaid properly to be in the *ſame Place*, in thoſe Reſpects: Though their Diſtance from ſome other Things, which in this Matter we did not conſider, being varied, they have undoubtedly *changed Place* in that Reſpect; and we our ſelves ſhall think ſo, when we have Occaſion to compare them with thoſe other.

§. 9. But this Modification of Diſtance we call *Place*, being made by Men for their common Uſe, that by it they might be able to deſign the particular Poſition of Things, where they had Occaſion for ſuch Deſignation, Men conſider and determine of this *Place*, by reference to thoſe adjacent Things, which beſt ſerved to their preſent Purpoſe, without conſidering other Things, which to another Purpoſe would better *determine the Place* of the ſame Thing. Thus in the Chefs-board, the Uſe of the *Deſignation of* the *Place* of each Chefs-man being determined only within that chequer'd Piece of Wood, 'twould croſs that Purpoſe, to meaſure it by any Thing elſe: But when theſe very Chefs-men are put up in a Bag, if any one ſhould ask where the Black King is, it would be proper to *determinate the Place* by the Parts of the Room it was in, and not by the Chefs-board; there being another Uſe of *deſigning the Place* it is now in, than when in Play it was on the Chefs-board, and ſo muſt be determined by other Bodies. So if any one ſhould ask, in what Place are the Verſes which report the Story of *Niſus* and *Eurialus*, 'twould be very improper to determine this Place, by ſaying, they were in ſuch a Part of the Earth, or in *Bodley*'s Library: But the right Deſignation of the Place, would be by the Parts of *Virgil*'s Works; and the proper Anſwer would be, That theſe Verſes were about the middle of the Ninth Book of his *Æneids*; and that they have been always conſtantly in the ſame Place ever ſince *Virgil* was printed: Which is true, though the Book it ſelf hath moved a thouſand Times; the Uſe of the *Idea* of Place here, being to know only in what Part of the Book that Story is, that ſo upon Occaſion we may know where to find, and have recourſe to it for our Uſe.

§. 10. That

§. 10. That our *Idea* of Place is nothing else, but such a relative Position of any Thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we have no *Idea* of the Place of the Universe, though we can of all the Parts of it; because beyond that we have not the *Idea* of any fixed, distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any Relation of Distance; but all beyond it, is one uniform Space or Expansion, wherein the Mind finds no Variety, no Marks. For to say, that the World is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist: This, tho' a Phrase borrowed from Place, signifying only its Existence, not Location; and when one can find out and frame in his Mind, clearly and distinctly, the Place of the Universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable *Inane* of infinite Space; though it be true, that the Word *Place* has sometimes a more confused Sense, and stands for that Space which any Body takes up; and so the Universe is in a Place. The *Idea* therefore of *Place*, we have by the same Means that we get the *Idea* of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited Consideration,) *viz.* by our Sight and Touch; by either of which, we receive into our Minds the *Ideas* of Extension or Distance. *Place.*

§. 11. There are some that would persuade us, that *Body and Extension are the same Thing*; who either change the Signification of Words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the Philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain Meaning, or deceitful Obscurity of doubtful or insignificant Terms. If therefore they mean by *Body and Extension*, *the same* that other People do, *viz.* by *Body*, something that is solid and extended, whose Parts are inseparable and moveable different Ways; and by Extension, only the Space that lies between the Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is possessed by them, they confound very different *Ideas* one with another. For I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the *Idea* of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the *Idea* of Scarlet Colour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exist without Extension, neither can Scarlet Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct *Ideas*. Many *Ideas* require others as necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very distinct *Ideas*. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can exist without it, and they are very distinct *Ideas*; and so, I think, are *Extension and Body, not the same.*

thoſe of Space and Solidity. Solidity is ſo inſeparable an *Idea* from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact, Impulſe, and Communication of Motion upon Impulſe. And if it be a Reaſon to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, becauſe Thinking includes not the *Idea* of Extenſion in it; the ſame Reaſon will be as valid, I ſuppoſe, to prove, that *Space is not Body*, becauſe it includes not the *Idea* of Solidity in it; *Space* and *Solidity* being *as diſtinct Ideas*, as Thinking and Extenſion, and as wholly ſeparable in the Mind one from another. *Body* then and *Extenſion*, 'tis evident, are two diſtinct *Ideas*. For,

§. 12. *Firſt*, *Extenſion* includes no Solidity nor Reſiſtance to the Motion of *Body*, as Body does.

§. 13. *Secondly*, The Parts of pure Space are inſeparable one from the other; ſo that the Continuity cannot be ſeparated, neither really nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any Part of it from another, with which it is continued, even ſo much as in Thought. To divide and ſeparate actually, is, as I think, by removing the Parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and conſider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in Things conſidered by the Mind, as capable of being ſeparated; and by Separation, of acquiring new diſtinct Superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of theſe Ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure *Space*.

'Tis true, a Man may conſider ſo much of ſuch a *Space*, as is anſwerable or commenſurate to a Foot, without conſidering the reſt, which is indeed a partial Conſideration, but not ſo much as mental Separation or Diviſion; ſince a Man can no more mentally divide, without conſidering two Superficies, ſeparate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies disjoin'd one from the other: But a partial Conſideration is not ſeparating. A Man may conſider Light in the Sun, without its Heat; or Mobility in Body, without its Extenſion, without thinking of their Separation. One is only a partial Conſideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a Conſideration of both, as exiſting ſeparately.

§. 14. *Thirdly*, The Parts of pure *Space* are immoveable, which follows from their Inſeparability; *Motion* being nothing but Change of Diſtance between any two Things: But this cannot

cannot be between Parts that are inſeparable; which therefore muſt needs be at perpetual Reſt one amongſt another.

Thus the determined *Idea* of ſimple *Space*, diſtinguiſhes it plainly and ſufficiently from *Body*; ſince its Parts are inſeparable, immoveable, and without Reſiſtance to the Motion of Body.

The Definition of Extenſion explains it not.

§. 15. If any one ask me, *What* this *Space* I ſpeak of *is?* I will tell him, when he tells me what his *Extenſion* is. For to ſay, as is uſually done, that Extenſion is to have *partes extra partes*, is to ſay only, That *Extenſion* is *Extenſion:* For what am I the better informed in the Nature of *Extenſion*, when I am told, That *Extenſion is to have Parts that are extended, exterior to Parts that are extended*, i. e. *Extenſion* conſiſts of extended Parts? As if one asking what a Fibre was? I ſhould anſwer him, That it was a Thing made up of ſeveral Fibres: Would he hereby be enabled to underſtand what a Fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have Reaſon to think that my Deſign was to make ſport with him, rather than ſeriouſly to inſtruct him?

Diviſion of Beings into Bodies and Spirits, proves not Space and Body the ſame.

§. 16. Thoſe who contend, that *Space and Body are the ſame*, bring this *Dilemma:* Either this *Space* is ſomething or nothing; if nothing be between two Bodies, they muſt neceſſarily touch; if it be allowed to be ſomething, they ask, whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I anſwer, by another Queſtion, Who told them that there was or could be nothing but ſolid Beings which could not think, and thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the Terms *Body* and *Spirit*.

Subſtance which we know not, no Proof againſt Space without Body.

§. 17. If it be demanded, (as uſually it is) whether this *Space*, void of *Body*, be *Subſtance* or *Accident?* I ſhall readily anſwer, I know not; Nor ſhall be aſhamed to own my Ignorance, 'till they that ask, ſhew me a clear diſtinct *Idea* of *Subſtance*.

§. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my ſelf from thoſe Fallacies which we are apt to put upon our ſelves, by taking Words for Things. It helps not our Ignorance to feign a Knowledge, where we have none, by making a Noiſe with Sounds, without clear and diſtinct Significations. Names made at pleaſure, neither alter the Nature of Things, nor make us underſtand them, but as they are Signs of, and ſtand for determined *Ideas*. And I deſire thoſe who lay ſo much Streſs on the

Sound of these two Syllables, *Substance*, to consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible GOD, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the same Sense; and whether it stands for the same *Idea*, when each of those three so different Beings are called *Substances*? If so, whether it will not thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the same common Nature of *Substance*, differ not any otherwise, than in a bare different Modification of that *Substance*; as a Tree and a Pebble, being in the same sense Body, and agreeing in the common Nature of Body, differ only in a bare Modification of that common Matter; which will be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God, finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different Significations, and that it stands for one *Idea*, when GOD is said to be a *Substance*; for another, when the Soul is called *Substance*; and for a third, when a Body is called so: If the Name *Substance* stands for three several distinct *Ideas*, they would do well to make known those distinct *Ideas*, or at least to give three distinct Names to them, to prevent, in so important a Notion, the Confusion and Errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous Use of so doubtful a Term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary Use it has scarce one clear distinct Signification: And if they can thus make three distinct *Ideas* of *Substance*, what hinders, why another may not make a fourth.

Substance and Accidents, of little Use in Philosophy.

§. 19. They who first ran into the Notion of *Accidents*, as a Sort of real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the Word *Substance*, to support them. Had the poor *Indian* Philosopher (who imagined that the Earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this Word *Substance*, he needed not to have been at the Trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a Tortoise to support his Elephant: The Word *Substance* would have done it effectually. And he that enquired, might have taken it for as good an Answer from an *Indian* Philosopher, That *Substance* without knowing what it is, is that which supports the Earth, as we take it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine from our *European* Philosophers, That *Substance*, without knowing what it is, is that which supports *Accidents*. So that of *Substance*, we have no *Idea* of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§. 20. Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent *American*, who enquired into the Nature of Things, would scarce

ſcarce take it for a ſatisfactory Account, if deſiring to learn our Architecture, he ſhould be told, That a Pillar was a Thing ſupported by a *Baſis*, and a *Baſis* ſomething that ſupported a Pillar. Would he not think himſelf mocked, inſtead of taught, with ſuch an Account as this? And a Stranger to them would be very liberally inſtructed in the Nature of Books, and the Things they contained, if he ſhould be told, that all learned Books conſiſted of Paper and Letters, and that Letters were Things inhering in Paper, and Paper a Thing that held forth Letters; a notable Way of having clear *Ideas* of Letters and Paper! But were the *Latin* Words, *Inhærentia* and *Subſtantia*, put into the plain *Engliſh* ones that anſwer them, and were called *Sticking on*, and *Under-propping*, they would better diſcover to us the very great Clearneſs there is in the Doctrine of *Subſtance* and *Accidents*, and ſhew of what Uſe they are in deciding of Queſtions in Philoſophy.

A Vacuum *beyond the utmoſt Bounds of Body.*

§. 21. But to return to our *Idea* of *Space*: If *Body* be not ſuppoſed infinite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether, if GOD placed a Man at the Extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not ſtretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put his Arm, where there was before *Space* without *Body*; and if there he ſpread his Fingers, there would ſtill be *Space* between them without *Body*: If he could not ſtretch out his Hand, it muſt be becauſe of ſome external Hindrance; (for we ſuppoſe him alive, with ſuch a Power of moving the Parts of his Body, that he hath now, which is not in it ſelf impoſſible, if GOD ſo pleaſed to have it; or at leaſt it is not impoſſible for God ſo to move him:) And then I ask, Whether that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Subſtance or Accident, Something or Nothing? And when they have reſolved that, they will be able to reſolve themſelves what that is, which is, or may be between two Bodies at a Diſtance, that is not Body, has no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at leaſt as good, that where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmoſt Bounds of all Bodies) a *Body* put into Motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two Bodies muſt neceſſarily touch: For pure *Space* between, is ſufficient to take away the Neceſſity of mutual Contact; but bare *Space* in the Way, is not ſufficient to ſtop Motion. The truth is, theſe Men muſt either own, that they think Body infinite, though they are loth to ſpeak it out, or elſe affirm that *Space* is not *Body*. For I would fain meet with that thinking Man, that

can, in his Thoughts, ſet any Bounds to Space, more than he can to Duration; or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the End of either: And therefore, if his *Idea* of Eternity be infinite, ſo is his *Idea* of Immenſity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

The Power of Annihilation proves a Vacuum.

§. 22. Farther, thoſe who aſſert the Impoſſibility of *Space* exiſting without *Matter*, muſt not only make Body infinite, but muſt alſo deny a Power in God to annihilate any Part of Matter. No one, I ſuppoſe, will deny, that God can put an End to all Motion that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Univerſe in a perfect Quiet and Reſt, and continue them ſo as long as he pleaſes. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during ſuch a general Reſt, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, muſt neceſſarily admit the Poſſibility of a *Vacuum*: For it is evident, that the Space that was filled by the Parts of the annihilated Body, will ſtill remain, and be a Space without Body. For the circumambient Bodies being in a perfect Reſt, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that State make it a perfect Impoſſibility for any other Body to get into that Space. And indeed the neceſſary Motion of one Particle of Matter, into the Place from whence another Particle of Matter is removed, is but a Conſequence from the Suppoſition of Plenitude, which will therefore need ſome better Proof, than a ſuppoſed Matter of Fact, which Experiment can never make out; our own clear and diſtinct *Ideas* plainly ſatisfying us, that there is no neceſſary Connexion between *Space* and *Solidity*, ſince we can conceive the one without the other. And thoſe who diſpute for or againſt a *Vacuum*, do thereby confeſs they have diſtinct *Ideas* of *Vacuum* and *Plenum*, i. e. that they have an *Idea* of Extenſion void of Solidity, though they deny its Exiſtence, or elſe they diſpute about nothing at all. For they who ſo much alter the Signification of Words, as to call *Extenſion*, *Body*, and conſequently make the whole Eſſence of Body to be nothing but pure Extenſion, without Solidity, muſt talk abſurdly whenever they ſpeak of *Vacuum*, ſince it is impoſſible for Extenſion to be without Extenſion: For *Vacuum*, whether we affirm or deny its Exiſtence, ſignifies Space without Body, whoſe very Exiſtence no one can deny to be poſſible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from God a Power to annihilate any Particle of it.

Motion proves a Vacuum.

§. 23. But not to go ſo far as beyond the utmoſt Bounds of Body in the Univerſe, nor appeal to

to God's Omnipotency, to find a *Vacuum*, the *Motion* of Bodies that are in our View and Neighbourhood, ſeem to me plainly to evince it. For I deſire any one ſo to divide a ſolid Body of any Dimenſion he pleaſes, as to make it poſſible for the ſolid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the Bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void Space, as big as the leaſt Part into which he has divided the ſaid ſolid Body. And if where the leaſt Particle of the Body divided, is as big as a Muſtard-Seed, a void Space equal to the Bulk of a Muſtard-Seed, be requiſite to make room for the free Motion of the Parts of the divided Body within the Bounds of its Superficies, where the Particles of Matter are 100,000,000 leſs than a Muſtard-Seed, there muſt alſo be a Space void of ſolid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 Part of a Muſtard-Seed: For if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and ſo on *in infinitum*. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it deſtroys the Hypotheſis of *Plenitude*. For if there can be a Space void of Body, equal to the ſmalleſt ſeparate Particle of Matter now exiſting in Nature, 'tis ſtill Space without Body, and makes as great a Difference between Space and Body, as if it were Μέγα κένωμα, a Diſtance as wide as any in Nature. And therefore, if we ſuppoſe not the void Space neceſſary to Motion, equal to the leaſt Parcel of the divided ſolid Matter, but to $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{100}$ of it, the ſame Conſequence will always follow of Space, without Matter.

The Ideas *of Space and Body diſtinct.*

§. 24. But the Queſtion being here, Whether the *Idea of Space* or *Extenſion* be *the ſame with the Idea of Body*, it is not neceſſary to prove the real Exiſtence of a *Vacuum*, but the *Idea* of it; which 'tis plain Men have, when they enquire and diſpute whether there be a *Vacuum* or no? For if they had not the *Idea* of Space without Body, they could not make a Queſtion about its Exiſtence: And if their *Idea* of Body did not include in it ſomething more than the bare *Idea* of Space, they could have no doubt about the Plenitude of the World; and 'twould be as abſurd to demand, whether there were Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or Body without Body, ſince theſe were but different Names of the ſame *Idea*.

Extenſion being inſeparable from Body, proves it not the ſame.

§. 25. 'Tis true, the *Idea* of *Extenſion* joins it ſelf ſo inſeparably with all viſible, and moſt tangible Qualities, that it ſuffers us to ſee no one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in Impreſſions of Extenſion too. This Readineſs

of

of Extenſion to make it ſelf be taken Notice of ſo conſtantly with other *Ideas*, has been the Occaſion, I gueſs, that ſome have made the whole Eſſence of *Body* to conſiſt in Extenſion; which is not much to be wondered at, ſince ſome have had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch (the buſieſt of all our Senſes) ſo filled with the *Idea* of Extenſion, and as it were, wholly poſſeſſed with it, that they allowed no Exiſtence to any Things that had not Extenſion. I ſhall not now argue with thoſe Men, who take the Meaſure and Poſſibility of all Being, only from their narrow and groſs Imaginations: But having here to do only with thoſe who conclude the Eſſence of Body to be *Extenſion*, becauſe, they ſay, they cannot imagine any ſenſible Quality of any Body without Extenſion, I ſhall deſire them to conſider, That had they reflected on their *Ideas* of Taſtes and Smells, as much as on thoſe of Sight and Touch, nay, had they examined their *Ideas* of Hunger and Thirſt, and ſeveral other Pains, they would have found, that they included in them no *Idea* of Extenſion at all, which is but an Affection of Body, as well as the reſt diſcoverable by our Senſes, which are ſcarce acute enough to look into the pure Eſſences of Things.

§. 26. If thoſe *Ideas*, which are conſtantly joined to all others, muſt therefore be concluded to be the Eſſence of thoſe Things which have conſtantly thoſe *Ideas* joined to them, and are inſeparable from them; then Unity is without doubt the Eſſence of every Thing. For there is not any Object of Senſation or Reflection, which does not carry with it the *Idea* of one: But the Weakneſs of this Kind of Argument we have already ſhewn ſufficiently.

Ideas *of Space and Solidity, diſtinct.*

§. 27. To conclude, whatever Men ſhall think concerning the Exiſtence of a *Vacuum*, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an *Idea of Space diſtinct from Solidity*, as we have of Solidity diſtinct from Motion, or Motion from Space. We have not any two more diſtinct *Ideas*, and we can as eaſily conceive Space without Solidity, as we can conceive Body or Space without Motion, though it be never ſo certain, that neither Body nor Motion can exiſt without Space. But whether any one will take Space to be only a Relation reſulting from the Exiſtence of other Beings at a Diſtance, or whether they will think the Words of the moſt knowing King *Solomon*, *The Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain thee*; or thoſe more emphatical ones of the inſpired Philoſopher, St. *Paul*, *In him we live, move, and have our Beings*, are to be underſtood in a literal Senſe,

Senſe, I leave every one to conſider; only our *Idea* of *Space* is, I think, ſuch as I have mentioned, and diſtinct from that of *Body*. For whether we conſider in Matter it ſelf the Diſtance of its coherent ſolid Parts, and call it, in reſpect of thoſe ſolid Parts, *Extenſion*; or whether conſidering it as lying between the Extremities of any Body in its ſeveral Dimenſions, we call it *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickneſs*; or elſe conſidering it as lying between any two Bodies, or poſitive Beings, without any Conſideration, whether there be any Matter or no between, we call it *Diſtance*. However named or conſidered, it is always the ſame uniform ſimple *Idea* of *Space*, taken from Objects about which our Senſes have been converſant, whereof having ſettled *Ideas* in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another, as often as we will, and conſider the Space or Diſtance ſo imagined, either as filled with ſolid Parts, ſo that another Body cannot come there, without diſplacing and thruſting out the Body that was there before; or elſe as void of Solidity, ſo that a Body of equal Dimenſions to that empty or pure Space, may be placed in it without the Removing or Expulſion of any Thing that was there. But to avoid Confuſion in Diſcourſes concerning this Matter, it were poſſibly to be wiſhed, that the Name *Extenſion* were applied only to Matter, or the Diſtance of the Extremities of particular Bodies, and the Term *Expanſion* to Space in general, with or without ſolid Matter poſſeſſing it, ſo as to ſay, *Space is expanded*, and *Body extended*. But in this, every one has his Liberty; I propoſe it only for the more clear and diſtinct Way of Speaking.

Men differ little in clear ſimple Ideas.

§. 28. The knowing preciſely what our Words ſtand for, would, I imagine, in this, as well as a great many other Caſes, quickly end the Diſpute. For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to examine them, find their ſimple *Ideas* all generally to agree, though in Diſcourſe with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different Names. I imagine that *Men* who abſtract their Thoughts, and do well examine the *Ideas* of their own Minds, *cannot much differ in Thinking*; however they may perplex themſelves with Words, according to the Way of Speaking of the ſeveral Schools or Sects they have been bred up in: Though amongſt unthinking Men, who examine not ſcrupulouſly and carefully their own *Ideas*, and ſtrip them not from the Marks Men uſe for them, but confound them with Words, there muſt be endleſs Diſpute, Wrangling, and Jargon, eſpecially if they be learned bookiſh Men, devoted

to

to ſome Sect, and accuſtomed to the Language of it; and have learned to talk after others. But if it ſhould happen, that any two thinking Men ſhould really have different *Ideas*, I do not ſee how they could diſcourſe or argue one with another. Here I muſt not be miſtaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Men's Brains, is preſently of that Sort of *Ideas* I ſpeak of. 'Tis not eaſy for the Mind to put off thoſe confuſed Notions and Prejudices it has imbibed from Cuſtom, Inadvertency, and common Converſation: It requires Pains and Aſſiduity to examine its *Ideas*, 'till it reſolves them into thoſe clear and diſtinct ſimple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to ſee which, amongſt its ſimple Ones, have or have not a neceſſary Connection and Dependance one upon another. 'Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of Things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and will often find himſelf at a loſs.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its ſimple Modes.

Duration is fleeting Extenſion.

§. 1. THERE is another Sort of Diſtance or Length, the *Idea* whereof we get not from the permanent Parts of Space, but from the fleeting and perpetually periſhing Parts of Succeſſion. This we call *Duration*, the ſimple Modes whereof are any different Lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

Its Idea *from Reflection on the Train of our* Ideas.

§. 2. The Anſwer of a great Man, to one who asked what Time was, *Si non rogas intelligo*, (which amounts to this; the more I ſet my ſelf to think of it, the leſs I underſtand it,) might perhaps perſuade one, that *Time*, which reveals all other Things, is it ſelf not to be diſcovered. *Duration*, *Time*, and *Eternity*, are not without Reaſon, thought to have ſomething very abſtruſe in their Nature. But however remote theſe may ſeem from our Comprehenſion, yet if we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of thoſe Sources of all our Knowledge, *viz.* *Senſation* and *Reflection*, will be able to furniſh us with theſe *Ideas*, as clear and diſtinct as many

other, which are thought much leſs obſcure; and we ſhall find, that the *Idea* of Eternity it ſelf is derived from the ſame common Original with the reſt of our *Ideas*.

§. 3. To underſtand *Time* and *Eternity* aright, we ought with Attention to conſider what *Idea* it is we have of *Duration*, and how we came by it. 'Tis evident to any one who will but obſerve what paſſes in his own Mind, that there is a Train of *Ideas* which conſtantly ſucceed one another in his Underſtanding, as long as he is awake. *Reflection* on theſe Appearances of ſeveral *Ideas*, one after another in our Minds, is that which furniſhes us with the *Idea* of *Succeſſion*: And the Diſtance between any Parts of that Succeſſion, or between the Appearance of any two *Ideas* in our Minds, is that we call *Duration*. For whilſt we are thinking, or whilſt we receive ſucceſſively ſeveral *Ideas* in our Mind, we know that we do exiſt, and ſo we call the Exiſtence, or the Continuation of the Exiſtence of our ſelves, or any Thing elſe, commenſurate to the Succeſſion of any *Ideas* in our Minds, the *Duration* of our ſelves or any other Thing co-exiſting with our Thinking.

§. 4. That we have our Notion of *Succeſſion* and *Duration* from this Original, *viz.* from Reflection on the Train of *Ideas*, which we find to appear one after another in our own Minds, ſeems plain to me, in that we have no Perception of *Duration*, but by conſidering the Train of *Ideas* that take their Turns in our Underſtandings. When that Succeſſion of *Ideas* ceaſes, our Perception of Duration ceaſes with it; which every one clearly experiments in himſelf whilſt he ſleeps ſoundly, whether an Hour, or a Day, or a Month, or a Year; of which Duration of Things, whilſt he ſleeps, or thinks not, he has no Perception at all, but it is quite loſt to him, and the Moment wherein he leaves off to think, 'till the Moment he begins to think again, ſeems to him to have no Diſtance. And ſo I doubt not but it will be to a waking Man, if it were poſſible for him to keep only one *Idea* in his Mind, without Variation, and the Succeſſion of others. And we ſee, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently on one Thing, ſo as to take but little Notice of the Succeſſion of *Ideas* that paſs in his Mind, whilſt he is taken up with that earneſt Contemplation, lets ſlip out of his Account a good Part of that Duration, and thinks that Time ſhorter than it is. But if Sleep commonly unites the diſtant Parts of Duration, it is becauſe during that Time we have no Succeſſion of *Ideas* in our Minds. For if a Man during his Sleep, dreams, and Variety of *Ideas* make themſelves perceptible in his Mind

one

one after another, he hath then, during ſuch a Dreaming, a Senſe of *Duration*, and of the Length of it. By which it is to me very clear, that Men derive their *Ideas* of Duration from their *Reflection on the Train of the* Ideas they obſerve to ſucceed one another in their own Underſtandings, without which Obſervation they can have no Notion of *Duration*, whatever may happen in the World.

The Idea *of Duration applicable to Things whilſt we ſleep.*

§. 5. Indeed a Man having, from reflecting on the Succeſſion and Number of his own Thoughts, got the Notion or *Idea* of *Duration*, he can apply that Notion to Things, which exiſt while he does not think; as he that has got the *Idea* of Extenſion from Bodies by his Sight or Touch, can apply it to Diſtances, where no Body is ſeen or felt. And therefore, though a Man has no Perception of the Length of Duration, which paſſed whilſt he ſlept or thought not; yet having obſerved the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the Length of their Duration to be in Appearance regular and conſtant, he can, upon the Suppoſition, that that Revolution has proceeded after the ſame Manner, whilſt he was aſleep or thought not, as it uſed to do at other Times; he can, I ſay, imagine and make allowance for the Length of *Duration*, whilſt he ſlept. But if *Adam* and *Eve* (when they were alone in the World) inſtead of their ordinary Night's Sleep, had paſſed the whole twenty-four Hours in one continued Sleep, the Duration of that twenty-four Hours had been irrecoverably loſt to them, and been for ever left out of their Accompt of Time.

The Idea *of Succeſſion not from Motion.*

§. 6. Thus *by reflecting on the appearing of various* Ideas, *one after another in our Underſtandings, we get the Notion of Succeſſion*; which if any one ſhould think we did rather get from our Obſervation of Motion by our Senſes, he will, perhaps, be of my Mind, when he conſiders, that even Motion produces in his Mind an *Idea* of Succeſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continued Train of diſtinguiſhable *Ideas*. For a Man looking upon a Body really moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unleſs that Motion produces a conſtant Train *of ſucceſſive* Ideas; *v. g.* a Man becalmed at Sea, out of Sight of Land, in a fair Day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship, a whole Hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either; though it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them have moved, during that Time, a great Way: But as ſoon as he perceives either of them to have changed Diſtance with ſome other

other Body, as ſoon as this Motion produces any new *Idea* in him, then he perceives that there has been Motion. But where-ever a Man is, with all Things at reſt about him, without perceiving any Motion at all; if during this Hour of Quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various *Ideas* of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing one after another, and thereby obſerve and find Succeſſion where he could obſerve no Motion.

§. 7. And this, I think, is the Reaſon *why Motions very ſlow*, tho' they are conſtant, *are not perceived* by us; becauſe in their Remove from one ſenſible Part towards another, their Change of Diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new *Ideas* in us, but a good while one after another: And ſo not cauſing a conſtant Train of new *Ideas*, to follow one another immediately in our Minds, we have no Perception of Motion; which conſiſting in a conſtant Succeſſion, we cannot perceive that Succeſſion without a conſtant Succeſſion of varying *Ideas* ariſing from it.

§. 8. On the contrary, *Things that move* ſo ſwift, as not to affect the Senſes diſtinctly with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable Diſtances of their Motion, and ſo cauſe not any Train of *Ideas* in the Mind, *are not* alſo *perceived* to move. For any thing that moves round about in a Circle, in leſs Time than our *Ideas* are wont to ſucceed one another in our Minds, is not perceived to move; but ſeems to be a perfect, entire Circle of that Matter or Colour, and not a Part of a Circle in Motion.

The Train of Ideas has a certain Degree of Quickneſs.

§. 9. Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable, that our *Ideas* do, whilſt we are awake, ſucceed one another in our Minds at certain Diſtances, not much unlike the Images in the Inſide of a Lanthorn, turned round by the Heat of a Candle. The Appearance of theirs in Train, though, perhaps, it may be ſometimes faſter, and ſometimes ſlower; yet, I gueſs, varies not very much in a waking Man: There ſeem to be *certain Bounds to the Quickneſs and Slowneſs of the Succeſſion of* thoſe *Ideas* one to another in our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor haſten.

§. 10. The Reaſon I have for this odd Conjecture, is from obſerving that in the Impreſſions made upon any of our Senſes, we can but to a certain Degree perceive any Succeſſion; which if exceeding quick, the Senſe of Succeſſion is loſt, even in Caſes where it is evident that there is a real Succeſſion. Let a Cannon Bullet paſs through a Room, and in its Way take with it any Limb, or fleſhy Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any Demonſtration can be, that it muſt ſtrike ſucceſſively the two Sides

of

of the Room: 'Tis alſo evident, that it muſt touch one Part of the Fleſh firſt, and another after, and ſo in Succeſſion: And yet I believe no body, who ever felt the Pain of ſuch a Shot, or heard the Blow againſt the two diſtant Walls, could perceive any Succeſſion, either in the Pain or Sound of ſo ſwift a Stroke. Such a Part of Duration as this, wherein we perceive no Succeſſion, is that which we may call an *Inſtant*; and is *that which takes up the Time of only one Idea* in our Minds, without the Succeſſion of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succeſſion at all.

§. 11. This alſo happens *where the Motion is ſo ſlow*, as not to ſupply a conſtant Train of freſh *Ideas* to the Senſes, as faſt as the Mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and ſo other *Ideas* of our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between thoſe offer'd to our Senſes, by the moving Body, *there the Senſe of Motion is loſt*; and the Body, though it really moves, yet not changing perceivable Diſtance with ſome other Bodies, as faſt as the *Ideas* of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in Train, the Thing ſeems to ſtand ſtill, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks and Shadows of Sun-dials, and other conſtant, but ſlow Motions, where, though after certain Intervals, we perceive by the Change of Diſtance, that it hath moved, yet the Motion it ſelf we perceive not.

This Train the Meaſure of other Succeſſions.

§. 12. So that to me it ſeems, that *the conſtant and regular Succeſſion of Ideas* in a waking Man, *is*, as it were, *the Meaſure* and Standard *of all other Succeſſions*; whereof if any one either exceeds the Pace of our *Ideas*, as where two Sounds or Pains, *&c.* take up in their Succeſſion the Duration of but one *Idea*; or elſe where any Motion or Succeſſion is ſo ſlow, as that it keeps not pace with the *Ideas* in our Minds, or the Quickneſs in which they take their Turns; as when any one or more *Ideas*, in their ordinary Courſe, come into our Mind between thoſe which are offered to the Sight by the different perceptible Diſtances of a Body in Motion, or between Sounds or Smells following one another, there alſo the Senſe of a conſtant continued Succeſſion is loſt, and we perceive it not, but with certain Gaps of Reſt between.

The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.

§. 13. If it be ſo, that the *Ideas* of our Minds, whilſt we have any there, do conſtantly change and ſhift in a continual Succeſſion, it would be impoſſible, may any one ſay, for a Man to think long of any one Thing: By which, if it be meant that

that a Man may *have one ſelf-ſame ſingle* Idea *a long Time alone in his Mind, without any Variation at all*, I think, in Matter of Fact, it is *not poſſible*; for which (not knowing how the *Ideas* of our Minds are framed, of what Materials they are made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make their Appearances,) I can give no other Reaſon but Experience: And I would have any one try, whether he can keep one unvaried ſingle *Idea* in his Mind, without any other, for any conſiderable Time together.

§. 14. For Trial, let him take any Figure, any Degree of Light or Whiteneſs, or what other he pleaſes; and he will, I ſuppoſe, find it difficult to keep all other *Ideas* out of his Mind: But that ſome, either of another Kind, or various Conſideration of that *Idea*, (each of which Conſiderations is a new *Idea*) will conſtantly ſucceed one another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§. 15. All that is in a Man's power in this Caſe, I think, is only to mind and obſerve what the *Ideas* are, that take their Turns *in* his Underſtanding; or elſe to direct the Sort, and call in ſuch as he hath a Deſire or Uſe of: But hinder the *conſtant Succeſſion* of freſh ones, I think he cannot, though he may commonly chuſe, whether he will heedfully obſerve and conſider them.

Ideas *however made, include no Senſe of Motion.*

§. 16. Whether theſe ſeveral *Ideas* in a Man's Mind be made by certain Motions, I will not here diſpute: But this I am ſure, that they include no *Idea* of Motion in their Appearance; and if a Man had not the *Idea* of Motion otherwiſe, I think he would have none at all; which is enough to my preſent Purpoſe; and ſufficiently ſhews, that the Notice we take of the *Ideas* of our Minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the *Idea* of Succeſſion and Duration, without which we ſhould have no ſuch *Ideas* at all. 'Tis *not* then *Motion*, but the conſtant Train of *Ideas* in our Minds, whilſt we are waking, *that furniſhes us with the* Idea *of Duration*, whereof Motion no otherwiſe gives us any Perception, than as it cauſes in our Minds a conſtant Succeſſion of *Ideas*, as I have before ſhewed: And we have as clear an *Idea* of Succeſſion and Duration, by the Train of other *Ideas* ſucceeding one another in our Minds, without the *Idea* of any Motion, as by the Train of *Ideas* cauſed by the uninterrupted ſenſible Change of Diſtance between two Bodies, which we have from Motion; and therefore we ſhould as well have the *Idea* of Duration, were there no Senſe of Motion at all.

Time is Duration ſet out by Meaſures.

§. 17. Having thus got the *Idea* of Duration, the next Thing natural for the Mind to do, is, to get ſome *Meaſure of* this common *Duration*, whereby it might judge of its different Lengths, and conſider the diſtinct Order, wherein ſeveral Things exiſt, without which, a great Part of our Knowledge would be confuſed, and a great Part of Hiſtory be rendered very uſeleſs. This Conſideration of Duration, as ſet out by certain Periods, and marked by certain Meaſures or *Epochs*, is that, I think, which moſt properly we call *Time*.

A good Meaſure of Time muſt divide its whole Duration into equal Periods.

§. 18. In the Meaſuring of Extenſion, there is nothing more required, but the Application of the Standard or Meaſure we make uſe of to the Thing, of whoſe Extenſion we would be informed. But in the Meaſuring of Duration, this cannot be done, becauſe no two different Parts of Succeſſion can be put together to meaſure one another: And nothing being a *Meaſure of Duration*, but Duration, as nothing is of Extenſion, but Extenſion, we cannot keep by us any ſtanding unvarying Meaſure of Duration, which conſiſts in a conſtant fleeting Succeſſion, as we can of certain Lengths of Extenſion, as Inches, Feet, Yards, *&c.* marked out in permanent Parcels of Matter. Nothing then could ſerve well for a convenient Meaſure of Time, but what has divided the whole Length of its Duration into apparently equal Portions, by conſtantly repeated Periods. What Portions of Duration are not diſtinguiſhed, or conſidered as diſtinguiſhed and meaſured by ſuch Periods, come not ſo properly under the Notion of Time, as appears by ſuch Phraſes, as theſe, *viz. before all Time, and when Time ſhall be no more.*

The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the propereſt Meaſures of Time.

§. 19. The diurnal and annual *Revolutions of the Sun*, as having been from the Beginning of Nature, conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all Mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another, have been with Reaſon *made uſe of for the Meaſure of Duration*. But the Diſtinction of Days and Years, having depended on the Motion of the Sun, it has brought this Miſtake with it, that it has been thought, that Motion and Duration were the Meaſure one of another. For Men, in the *meaſuring of the Length of Time*, having been accuſtomed to the *Ideas* of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years, *&c.* which they found themſelves, upon any mention of Time or Duration, preſently to think on, all which Portions

Portions of Time were meaſured out by the Motion of thoſe Heavenly Bodies, they were apt to confound Time and Motion; or at leaſt to think, that they had a neceſſary Connexion one with another: Whereas any conſtant periodical Appearance, or Alteration of *Ideas* in ſeemingly equidiſtant Spaces of Duration, if conſtant and univerſally obſervable, would have as well diſtinguiſhed the Intervals of Time, as thoſe that have been made uſe of. For ſuppoſing the Sun, which ſome have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the ſame Diſtance of Time that it now every Day comes about to the ſame Meridian, and then gone out again about twelve Hours after, and that in the Space of an annual Revolution, it had ſenſibly increaſed in Brightneſs and Heat, and ſo decreaſed again; would not ſuch regular Appearances ſerve to meaſure out the Diſtances of Duration to all that could obſerve it, as well without as with Motion? For if the Appearances were conſtant, univerſally obſervable, and in equidiſtant Periods, they would ſerve Mankind for Meaſure of Time as well, were the Motion away.

But not by their Motion, but periodical Appearances.

§. 20. For the Freezing of Water, or the Blowing of a Plant, returning at equidiſtant Periods in all Parts of the Earth, would as well ſerve Men to reckon their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun: And in effect we ſee, that ſome People in *America* counted their Years by the coming of certain Birds amongſt them at their certain Seaſons, and leaving them at others. For a Fit of an Ague, the Senſe of Hunger or Thirſt, a Smell, or a Taſte, or any other *Idea* returning conſtantly at equidiſtant Periods, and making it ſelf univerſally be taken Notice of, *would* not fail to *meaſure* out the Courſe of Succeſſion, and diſtinguiſh the Diſtances of *Time*. Thus we ſee, that Men born blind count Time well enough by Years, whoſe Revolutions yet they cannot diſtinguiſh by Motions, that they perceive not: And I aſk, whether a blind Man, who diſtinguiſhed his Years either by Heat of Summer, or Cold of Winter; by the Smell of any Flower of the Spring, or Taſte of any Fruit of the Autumn, would not have a better Meaſure of Time than the *Romans* had before the Reformation of their *Calendar* by *Julius Cæſar*, or many other People, whoſe Years, notwithſtanding the Motion of the Sun, which they pretend to make uſe of, are very irregular? And it adds no ſmall Difficulty to Chronology, that the exact Length of the Years that ſeveral Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may ſay all of them, from the

preciſe Motion of the Sun: And if the Sun moved from the Creation to the Flood conſtantly in the Æquator, and ſo equally diſperſed its Light and Heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in Days all of the ſame Length, without its annual Variations to the Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author ſuppoſes, I do not think it very eaſy to imagine, that (notwithſtanding the Motion of the Sun) Men ſhould in the *Antediluvian* World, from the Beginning count by Years, or meaſure their Time by Periods, that had no ſenſible Marks very obvious to diſtinguiſh them by.

No two Parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.

§. 21. But perhaps it will be ſaid, without a regular Motion, ſuch as of the Sun, or ſome other, how could it ever be known, that ſuch Periods were equal? To which I anſwer, the Equality of any other returning Appearances might be known by the ſame Way that that of Days was known, or preſumed to be ſo at firſt, which was only by judging of them by the Train of *Ideas* had paſſed in Men's Minds in the Intervals, by which Train of *Ideas* diſcovering Inequality in the natural Days, but none in the artificial Days, the artificial Days, or Νυχθήμερα were gueſſed to be equal, which was ſufficient to make them ſerve for a Meaſure. Tho' exacter Search has ſince diſcovered Inequality in the diurnal Revolutions of the Sun, and we know not whether the annual alſo be not unequal: Theſe yet by their preſum'd and apparent Equality, ſerve as well to reckon Time by, (though not to meaſure the Parts of Duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We muſt therefore carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt Duration it ſelf, and the Meaſures we make uſe of to judge of its Length. Duration in it ſelf, is to be conſidered as going on in one conſtant, equal, uniform Courſe: But none of the Meaſures of it, which we make uſe of, can be known to do ſo: nor can we be aſſured, that their aſſigned Parts or Periods are equal in Duration one to another; for two ſucceſſive Lengths of Duration, however meaſured, can never be demonſtrated to be equal. The Motion of the Sun, which the World uſed ſo long, and ſo confidently, for an exact Meaſure of Duration, has, as I ſaid, been found in its ſeveral Parts unequal: And though Men have of late made uſe of a Pendulum, as a more ſteady and regular Motion than that of the Sun, (or to ſpeak more truly) of the Earth; yet if any one ſhould be asked how he certainly knows that the two ſucceſſive Swings of a Pendulum, are equal, it would be very hard to ſatisfy himſelf, that they are infallibly ſo:

ſo: Since we cannot be ſure that the Cauſe of that Motion, which is unknown to us, ſhall always operate equally; and we are ſure that the Medium in which the Pendulum moves, is not conſtantly the ſame: Either of which varying, may alter the Equality of ſuch Periods, and thereby deſtroy the Certainty and Exactneſs of the Meaſure by Motion, as well as any other Periods of other Appearances; the Notion of Duration ſtill remaining clear, though our Meaſures of it cannot any of them be demonſtrated to be exact. Since then no two Portions of Succeſſion can be brought together, it is impoſſible ever certainly to know their Equality. All that we can do for a Meaſure of Time, is to take ſuch as have continual ſucceſſive Appearances at ſeemingly equidiſtant Periods; *of* which *ſeeming Equality we have no other Meaſure, but* ſuch *as the Train of our own Ideas* have lodged in our Memories, with the Concurrence of other probable Reaſons, to perſuade us of their Equality.

Time not the Meaſure of Motion.

§. 22. One Thing ſeems ſtrange to me, that whilſt all Men manifeſtly meaſured Time by the Motion of the great and viſible Bodies of the World, *Time* yet ſhould be *defined* to be the *Meaſure of Motion:* Whereas 'tis obvious to every one who reflects ever ſo little on it, that to meaſure Motion, Space is as neceſſary to be conſidered as Time; and thoſe who look a little farther, will find alſo the Bulk of the Thing moved neceſſary to be taken into the Computation by any one who will eſtimate or meaſure Motion, ſo as to judge right of it. Nor, indeed, does Motion any otherwiſe conduce to the meaſuring of Duration, than as it conſtantly brings about the return of certain ſenſible *Ideas*, in ſeeming equidiſtant Periods. For if the Motion of the Sun were as unequal as of a Ship driven by unſteady Winds, ſometimes very ſlow, and at others irregularly very ſwift; or if being conſtantly equally ſwift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the ſame Appearances, it would not at all help us to meaſure Time, any more than the ſeeming unequal Motion of a Comet does.

Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years, not neceſſary Meaſures of Duration.

§. 23. *Minutes, Hours, Days and Years*, are then *no* more *neceſſary to Time* or Duration, than Inches, Feet, Yards, and Miles marked out in any Matter, are to Extenſion. For though we in this Part of the Univerſe, by the conſtant Uſe of them, as of Periods ſet out by the Revolutions of the Sun, or as known Parts of ſuch Periods, have fixed the *Ideas* of ſuch Lengths of Duration in

our Minds, which we apply to all Parts of Time, whoſe Lengths we would conſider: Yet there may be other Parts of the Univerſe, where they no more uſe theſe Meaſures of ours, than in *Japan* they do our Inches, Feet, or Miles. But yet ſomething analogous to them, there muſt be: For without ſome regular periodical Returns, we could not meaſure our ſelves, or ſignify to others, the Length of any Duration, though at the ſame time the World were as full of Motion, as it is now, but no Part of it diſpoſed into regular and apparently equidiſtant Revolutions. But the different Meaſures that may be made uſe of for the Account of Time, do not at all alter the Notion of Duration, which is the Thing to be meaſured, no more than the different Standards of a Foot and a Cubit, alter the Notion of Extenſion to thoſe who make uſe of thoſe different Meaſures.

Our Meaſures of Time applicable to Duration before Time.

§. 25. The Mind having once got ſuch a Meaſure of Time, as the annual Revolution of the Sun, can apply that Meaſure to Duration, wherein that Meaſure it ſelf did not exiſt, and with which, in the Reality of its Being, it had nothing to do: For ſhould one ſay, That *Abraham* was born in the 2712 Year of the *Julian* Period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the Beginning of the World, though there were ſo far back no Motion of the Sun, nor any other Motion at all. For though the *Julian* Period be ſuppoſed to begin ſeveral Hundred Years before there were really either Days, Nights, or Years, marked out by any Revolutions of the Sun, yet we reckon as right, and thereby meaſure Durations as well, as if really at that Time the Sun had exiſted, and kept the ſame ordinary Motion it doth now. The *Idea of Duration equal to an annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as eaſily *applicable* in our Thoughts *to Duration, where no Sun nor Motion was*, as the *Idea* of a Foot or Yard taken from Bodies here, can be applied in our Thoughts to Diſtances beyond the Confines of the World, where are no Bodies at all.

§. 26. For ſuppoſing it were 5639 Miles, or Millions of Miles, from this Place to the remoteſt Body of the Univerſe, (for being finite, it muſt be at a certain Diſtance, as we ſuppoſe it to be 5639 Years) from this Time to the firſt Exiſtence of any Body in the Beginning of the World, *we can*, in our Thoughts, *apply this Meaſure of a Year to Duration before the Creation*, or beyond the Duration of Bodies or Motion, as we can this Meaſure of a Mile to Space beyond the utmoſt Bodies; and by the one meaſure Duration, where there was no Motion, as well as

by

by the other meaſure Space in our Thoughts, where there is no Body.

§. 27. If it be objected to me here, That in this Way of explaining of Time, I have begg'd what I ſhould not, *viz.* That the World is neither Eternal nor Infinite; I anſwer, That, to my preſent Purpoſe, it is not needful, in this Place, to make uſe of Arguments to evince the World to be finite, both in Duration and Extenſion: But it being at leaſt as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the Liberty to ſuppoſe it, as well as any one hath to ſuppoſe the contrary; and I doubt not but that *every one*, that will go about it, may eaſily *conceive* in his Mind *the Beginning of Motion*, *though not of all Duration*; and ſo may come to a Stop, and *non ultra* in his Conſideration of Motion: So alſo in his Thoughts he may ſet Limits to Body, and the Extenſion belonging to it, but not to Space where no Body is, the utmoſt Bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the Reach of Thought, as well as the utmoſt Bounds of Number are beyond the largeſt Comprehenſion of the Mind, and all for the ſame Reaſon, as we ſhall ſee in another Place.

Eternity.

§. 28. By the ſame Means therefore, and from the ſame Original that we come to have *the Idea of* Time, we have alſo that *Idea* which we call *Eternity*, *viz.* having got the *Idea* of Succeſſion and Duration, by reflecting on the Train of our *Ideas*, cauſed in us either by the natural Appearances of thoſe *Ideas* coming conſtantly of themſelves into our waking Thoughts, or elſe cauſed by external Objects ſucceſſively affecting our Senſes; and having from the Revolutions of the Sun got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Duration, we can, in our Thoughts, add ſuch Lengths of Duration to one another, as often as we pleaſe, and apply them, ſo added, to Durations paſt or to come: And this we can continue to do on, without Bounds or Limits, and proceed *in infinitum*, and apply thus the Length of the annual Motion of the Sun to Duration, ſuppoſed before the Sun's, or any other Motion had its Being; which is no more difficult or abſurd, than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow, one Hour to-day on the Sun-dial, to the Duration of ſomething laſt Night; *v. g.* the Burning of a Candle, which is now abſolutely ſeparate from all actual Motion; and it is as impoſſible for the Duration of that Flame for an Hour laſt Night, to co-exiſt with any Motion that now is, or for ever ſhall be, as for any Part of Duration that was before the Beginning of the World to co-exiſt with the Motion of the Sun now: But yet this hinders not, but that having the *Idea*

of the Length of the Motion of the Shadow on a Dial between the Marks of two Hours, I can as diſtinctly meaſure in my Thoughts the Duration of that Candle-light laſt Night, as I can the Duration of any Thing that does now exiſt: And it is no more than to think, that had the Sun ſhone then on the Dial, and moved after the ſame Rate it doth now, the Shadow on the Dial would have paſſed from one Hour-line to another, whilſt the Flame of the Candle laſted.

§. 29. The Notion of an Hour, Day, or Year, being only the *Idea* I have of the Length of certain periodical regular Motions, neither of which Motions do ever all at once exiſt, but only in the *Ideas* I have of them in my Memory derived from my Senſes of Reflection, I can with the ſame Eaſe, and for the ſame Reaſon, apply it in my Thoughts to Duration antecedent to all Manner of Motion, as well as to any Thing that is but a Minute or a Day antecedent to the Motion that at this very Moment the Sun is in. All Things paſt are equally and perfectly at Reſt, and to this Way of Conſideration of them are all one, whether they were before the Beginning of the World, or but Yeſterday; *the meaſuring of* any *Duration* by ſome Motion, *depending* not at all *on* the real Co-exiſtence of that Thing to that Motion, or any other Periods of Revolution, but the having *a clear Idea of the Length of ſome* periodical known Motion, or other Intervals of *Duration* in my Mind, and *applying that to the Duration of the Thing I would meaſure.*

§. 30. Hence we ſee, that ſome Men imagine the Duration of the World from its firſt Exiſtence, to this preſent Year 1689, to have been 5639 Years, or equal to 5639 annual Revolutions of the Sun, and others a great deal more; as the *Ægyptians* of old, who in the Time of *Alexander* counted 23000 Years from the Reign of the Sun; and the *Chineſes* now, who account the World 3,269,000 Years old, or more; which longer Duration of the World, according to the Computation, though I ſhould not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly underſtand and ſay one is longer than the other, as I underſtand that *Methuſalem's* Life was longer than *Enoch's*: And if the common reckoning of 5639 ſhould be true, (as it may be, as well as any other aſſigned,) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the World 1000 Years older, ſince every one may with the ſame Facility imagine (I do not ſay believe) the World to be 50000 Years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the Duration of 50000 Years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that *to the meaſuring*

ſuring the Duration of any Thing by Time, it is not requiſite that that Thing ſhould be co-exiſtent to the Motion we meaſure by, or any other periodical Revolution; but *it ſuffices* to this Purpoſe, *that we have the Idea of the Length of any regular periodical Appearances*, which we can in our Minds apply to Duration, with which the Motion or Appearance never co-exiſted.

§. 31. For as in the Hiſtory of the Creation delivered by *Moſes*, I can imagine that Light exiſted three Days before the Sun was, or had any Motion, barely by thinking that the Duration of Light, before the Sun was created, was ſo long as (if the Sun had moved then as it doth now,) would have been equal to three of his diurnal Revolutions; ſo by the ſame Way I can have an *Idea* of the *Chaos*, or Angels being created before there was either Light or any continued Motion, a Minute, an Hour, a Day, a Year, or 1000 Years. For if I can but conſider *Duration* equal to one Minute, before either the Being or Motion of any Body, I can add one Minute more till I come to 60: And by the ſame Way of adding Minutes, Hours, or Years, (*i. e.* ſuch or ſuch Parts of the Sun's Revolution, or any other Period, whereof I have the *Idea*) proceed *in infinitum*, and ſuppoſe a Duration exceeding as many ſuch Periods as I can reckon, let me add whilſt I will; which I think is the Notion we have of *Eternity*, of whoſe Infinity we have no other Notion than we have of the Infinity of Number, to which we can add for ever without End.

§. 32. And thus I think it is plain, that *from* thoſe two Fountains of all Knowledge before-mentioned, *(viz.) Reflection and Senſation, we get the Ideas of Duration*, and the Meaſures of it.

For, *Firſt*, by obſerving what paſſes in our Minds, how our *Ideas* there in Train conſtantly ſome vaniſh, and others begin to appear, we come by the *Idea* of *Succeſſion*.

Secondly, By obſerving a Diſtance in the Parts of this Succeſſion, we get the *Idea* of *Duration*.

Thirdly, By Senſation obſerving certain Appearances at certain regular and ſeeming equidiſtant Periods, we get the *Ideas* of certain Lengths or *Meaſures of Duration*, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years, *&c.*

Fourthly, By being able to repeat thoſe Meaſures of Time, or *Ideas* of ſtated Length of Duration in our Minds, as often as we will, we can come to *imagine Duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt*; and thus we imagine To-Morrow, next Year, or ſeven Years hence.

Fifthly,

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any ſuch *Idea* of any Length of Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an Age, as often as we will in our own Thoughts, and add them one to another, without ever coming to the End of ſuch Addition, any nearer than we can to the End of Number, to which we can always add, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*, as the future eternal Duration of our Souls, as well as the Eternity of that infinite Being, which muſt neceſſarily have always exiſted.

Sixthly, By conſidering any Part of infinite Duration, as ſet out by periodical Meaſures, we come by the *Idea* of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion, conſidered together.

Both capable of greater and leſs.

§. 1. THough we have in the precedent Chapters dwelt pretty long on the Conſiderations of Space and Duration; yet they being *Ideas* of general Concernment, that have ſomething very abſtruſe and peculiar in their Nature, the Comparing them one with another, may, perhaps be of Uſe for their Illuſtration; and we may have the more clear and diſtinct Conception of them, by taking a View of them together. Diſtance or Space, in its ſimple abſtract Conception, to avoid Confuſion, I call *Expanſion*, to diſtinguiſh it from *Extenſion*, which by ſome is uſed to expreſs this Diſtance only as it is in the ſolid Parts of Matter, and ſo includes, or at leaſt intimates the *Idea* of Body: Whereas the *Idea* of pure Diſtance includes no ſuch Thing. I prefer alſo the Word *Expanſion* to *Space*, becauſe *Space* is often applied to Diſtance of fleeting ſucceſſive Parts which never exiſt together, as well as to thoſe which are permanent. In both theſe, (*viz. Expanſion* and *Duration*) the Mind has this common *Idea* of continued Lengths, capable of greater or leſs Quantities: For a Man has as clear an *Idea* of the Difference of the Length of an Hour, and a Day, as of an Inch and a Foot.

Expanſion not bounded by Matter.

§. 2. The *Mind*, having got the *Idea* of the Length of any Part of *Expanſion*, let it be a Span, or a Pace, or what Length you will, *can*, as has been

been ſaid, repeat that *Idea*; and ſo adding it to the former, *enlarge its Idea of Length*, and make it equal to two Spans, or two Paces, and ſo as often as it will, till it equal the Diſtance of any Parts of the Earth one from another, and increaſe thus, 'till it amounts to the Diſtance of the Sun, or remoteſt Star. By ſuch a Progreſſion as this, ſetting out from the Place where it is, or any other Place, it can proceed and paſs beyond all thoſe Lengths, and find nothing to ſtop its going on, either in, or without Body. 'Tis true, we can eaſily in our Thoughts come to the End of ſolid Extenſion; the Extremity and Bounds of all Body, we have no Difficulty to arrive at: But when the Mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its Progreſs into this endleſs Expanſion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any End. Nor let any one ſay, That beyond the Bounds of Body there is nothing at all, unleſs he will confine GOD within the Limits of Matter. *Solomon*, whoſe Underſtanding was filled and enlarged with Wiſdom, ſeems to have other Thoughts, when he ſays, *Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee:* And he, I think, very much magnifies to himſelf the Capacity of his own Underſtanding, who perſuades himſelf, that he can extend his Thoughts farther than GOD exiſts, or imagine any Expanſion where he is not.

Nor Duration by Motion.

§. 3. Juſt ſo is it in Duration, *The Mind, having got the* Idea *of any Length of Duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it*, not only beyond its own, but beyond the Exiſtence of all corporeal Beings, and all the Meaſures of Time, taken from the great Bodies of the World, and their Motions. But yet every one eaſily admits, That though we make Duration boundleſs, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all Being. GOD, every one eaſily allows, fills Eternity; and 'tis hard to find a Reaſon, why any one ſhould doubt that he likewiſe fills Immenſity. His infinite Being is certainly as boundleſs one way as another; and methinks it aſcribes a little too much to Matter, to ſay, where there is no Body, there is nothing.

Why Men more eaſily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expanſion.

§. 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the Reaſon, *why every one* familiarly, and without the leaſt heſitation, ſpeaks of, and ſuppoſes Eternity, and ſticks not to *aſcribe Infinity to Duration*; *but* 'tis *with more Doubting* and Reſerve, that many *admit*, or ſuppoſe *the Infinity of Space*. The Reaſon whereof ſeems to me to be this, that Duration and Extenſion being uſed as Names of Affections belonging to other Beings,

Beings, we eaſily conceive in GOD infinite Duration, and we cannot avoid doing ſo: But not attributing to him Extenſion, but only to Matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the Exiſtence of Expanſion without Matter, of which alone we commonly ſuppoſe it an Attribute. And therefore, when Men purſue their Thoughts of Space, they are apt to ſtop at the Confines of Body, as if Space were there at an End too, and reached no farther. Or if their *Ideas* upon Conſideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the Limits of the Univerſe, imaginary Space; as if it were nothing, becauſe there is no Body exiſting in it. Whereas Duration, antecedent to all Body, and to the Motion which it is meaſured by, they never term imaginary; becauſe it is never ſuppoſed void of ſome other real Exiſtence. And if the Names of Things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of Men's *Ideas* (as I am apt to think that they may very much,) one may have Occaſion to think by the Name of *Duration*, that the Continuation of Exiſtence, with a Kind of Reſiſtance to any deſtructive Force, and the Continuation of Solidity, (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we look into the minute anatomical Parts of Matter, is little different from Hardneſs,) were thought to have ſome Analogy, and gave Occaſion to Words, ſo near of kin as *Durare* and *Durum eſſe*. And that *Durare* is applied to the *Idea* of Hardneſs, as well as that of Exiſtence, we ſee in *Horace*, *Epod.* 16. *ferro duravit ſecula*. But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever purſues his own Thoughts, will find them ſometimes launch out beyond the Extent of Body, into the Infinity of Space or Expanſion; the *Idea* whereof is diſtinct and ſeparate from Body, and all other Things: Which may (to thoſe who pleaſe) be a Subject of farther Meditation.

Time to Duration, is as Place to Expanſion.

§. 5. *Time* in general is to *Duration*, as *Place* to *Expanſion*. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs Oceans of Eternity and Immenſity as is ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, as it were by Landmarks; and ſo are made uſe of, to denote the Poſition of finite real Beings, in reſpect one to another, in thoſe uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space. Theſe rightly conſidered, are nothing but *Ideas* of determinate Diſtances from certain known Points fixed in diſtinguiſhable ſenſible Things, and ſuppoſed to keep the ſame Diſtance one from another. From ſuch Points fixed in ſenſible Beings we reckon, and from them we meaſure our Portions of thoſe infinite Quantities; which ſo conſidered, are that which we call *Time* and *Place*.

Place. For Duration and Space being in themſelves uniform and boundleſs, the Order and Poſition of Things, without ſuch known ſettled Points, would be loſt in them; and all Things would lie jumbled in an incurable Confuſion.

Time and Place are taken for ſo much of either, as are ſet out by the Exiſtence and Motion of Bodies.

§. 6. *Time* and *Place* taken thus for determinate diſtinguiſhable Portions of thoſe infinite Abyſſes of Space and Duration, ſet out or ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from the reſt by Marks and known Boundaries, have each of them a twofold Acceptation.

Firſt, *Time* in general is commonly taken for ſo much of infinite Duration, as is meaſured out by, and co-exiſtent with the Exiſtence and Motions of the great Bodies of the Univerſe, as far as we know any thing of them: And in this Senſe, Time begins and ends with the Frame of this ſenſible World, as in theſe Phraſes before-mentioned, *before all Time*, or *when Time ſhall be no more*. *Place* likewiſe is taken ſometimes for that Portion of infinite Space, which is poſſeſſed by, and comprehended within the material World; and is thereby diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of Expanſion; though this may more properly be called *Extenſion* than Place. Within theſe two are confined, and by the obſervable Parts of them, are meaſured and determined the particular Time or Duration, and the particular Extenſion and Place of all corporeal Beings.

Sometimes for ſo much of either, as we deſign by Meaſures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies.

§. 7. *Secondly*, Sometimes the Word *Time* is uſed *in a larger Senſe*, and is applied to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really diſtinguiſhed and meaſured out by this real Exiſtence, and periodical Motions of Bodies that were appointed from the Beginning to be for Signs and for Seaſons, and for Days, and Years, and are accordingly our Meaſures of Time; but ſuch other Portions too of that infinite uniform Duration, which we, upon any Occaſion, do ſuppoſe equal to certain Lengths of meaſured Time; and ſo conſider them as bounded and determined. For if we ſhould ſuppoſe the Creation, or Fall of the Angels, was at the Beginning of the *Julian* Period, we ſhould ſpeak properly enough, and ſhould be underſtood, if we ſaid, 'tis a longer Time ſince the Creation of Angels, than the Creation of the World, by 764 Years: Whereby we would mark out ſo much of that undiſtinguiſhed Duration, as we ſuppoſe equal to, and would have admitted 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun moving at the Rate it now does. And thus likewiſe we ſometimes

ſpeak

ſpeak of Place, Diſtance, or Bulk in the great *Inane* beyond the Confines of the World, when we conſider ſo much of that Space as is equal to, or capable to receive a Body of any aſſigned Dimenſions, as a Cubick Foot; or do ſuppoſe a Point in it, at ſuch a certain Diſtance from any Part of the Univerſe.

They belong to all Beings.

§. 8. *Where* and *When* are Queſtions belonging to all finite Exiſtences, and are by us always reckoned from ſome known Parts of this ſenſible World, and from ſome certain Epochs marked out to us by the Motions obſervable in it. Without ſome ſuch fixed Parts or Periods, the Order of Things would be loſt, to our finite Underſtandings, in the boundleſs invariable Oceans of Duration and Expanſion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and in their full Extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do ſo often find our Thoughts at a loſs, when we would conſider them, either abſtractly in themſelves, or as any way attributed to the firſt incomprehenſible Being. But when applied to any particular finite Beings, the Extenſion of any Body is ſo much of that infinite Space, as the bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Poſition of any Body, when conſidered at a certain Diſtance from ſome other. As the *Idea* of the particular *Duration* of any Thing, is an *Idea* of that Portion of infinite *Duration*, which paſſes during the Exiſtence of that Thing; ſo the Time *when* the Thing exiſted is the *Idea* of that Space of Duration, which paſſed between ſome known and fixed Period of Duration, and the Being of that Thing. One ſhews the Diſtance of the Extremities of the Bulk, or Exiſtence of the ſame Thing, as that it is a Foot Square, or laſted two Years; the other ſhews the Diſtance of it in Place, or Exiſtence, from other fixed Points of Space or Duration; as that it was in the Middle of *Lincolns-Inn-Fields*, or the firſt Degree of *Taurus*, and in the Year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000 Year of the *Julian* Period: All which Diſtances we meaſure by preconceived *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Space and Duration, as Inches, Feet, Miles, and Degrees, and in the other Minutes, Days, and Years, &c.

All the Parts of Extenſion are Extenſion; and all the Parts of Duration, are Duration.

§. 9. There is one Thing more, wherein *Space* and *Duration* have a great Conformity, and that is, Though they are juſtly reckoned amongſt our *ſimple Ideas*, yet none of the diſtinct *Ideas* we have of either, is without all Manner

Manner of *Compoſition* * ; it is the very Nature of both of them to conſiſt of Parts: But their Parts being all of the ſame Kind, and without the Mixture of any other *Idea*, hinder them not from having a Place amongſt ſimple *Ideas*. Could the Mind, as in Number, come to ſo ſmall a Part of Extenſion or Duration, as excluded Diviſibility, that would be, as it were, the indiviſible Unit, or *Idea* ; by Repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged *Ideas* of Extenſion and Duration. But ſince the Mind is not able to frame an *Idea* of any Space without Parts ; inſtead thereof it makes uſe of the common Meaſures, which by familiar Uſe, in each Country, have imprinted themſelves on the Memory, (as Inches and Feet ; or Cubits, and Paraſangs ; and ſo Seconds, Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years in Duration:) The Mind makes uſe, I ſay, of ſuch *Ideas* as theſe, as ſimple ones; and theſe are the component Parts of larger *Ideas*, which the Mind, upon Occaſion, makes by the Addition of ſuch known Lengths, which it is acquainted with.

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* It has been objected to Mr. *Locke*, that if Space conſiſts of Parts, as 'tis confeſſed in this Place, he ſhould not have reckoned it in the Number of Simple *Ideas* ; becauſe it ſeems to be inconſiſtent with what he ſays elſewhere, That a Simple *Idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception of the Mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different* Ideas, pag. 62. 'Tis farther objected, That Mr. *Locke* hath not given in the 11th Chapter of the ſecond Book, where he begins to ſpeak of *Simple Ideas*, an exact Definition of what he underſtands by the Word *Simple Ideas*. To theſe Difficulties Mr. *Locke* anſwers thus : To begin with the laſt, he declares, That he has not treated this Subject in an Order perfectly Scholaſtick, having not had much Familiarity with thoſe ſort of Books during the writing of his, and not remembring at all the Method in which they are written ; and therefore his Readers ought not to expect Definitions regularly placed at the Beginning of each new Subject. Mr. *Locke* contents himſelf to employ the principal Terms that he uſes, ſo that from his Uſe of them the Reader may eaſily comprehend what he means by them. But with reſpect to the Term *Simple Idea*, he has had the good Luck to define that in the Place cited in the Objection ; and therefore there is no Reaſon to ſupply that Defect. The Queſtion then is to know, Whether the *Idea* of *Extenſion* agrees with this Definition ? Which will effectually agree to it, if it be underſtood in the Senſe which Mr. *Locke* had principally in his View ; for that Compoſition which he deſigned to exclude in that Definition, was a Compoſition of different *Ideas* in the Mind, and not a Compoſition of the ſame Kind in a Thing whoſe Eſſence conſiſts

with. On the other Side, the ordinary ſmalleſt Meaſure we have of either, is look'd on as an Unit in Number, when the Mind by Diviſion would reduce them into leſs Fractions. Though on both Sides, both in Addition and Diviſion, either of Space or Duration, when the *Idea* under Conſideration becomes very big, or very ſmall, its preciſe Bulk becomes very obſcure and confuſed; and it is the Number of its repeated Additions, or Diviſions, that alone remains clear and diſtinct, as will eaſily appear to any one, who will let his Thoughts looſe in the vaſt Expanſion of Space, or Diviſibility of Matter. Every Part of Duration, is Duration too; and every Part of Extenſion, is Extenſion; both of them capable of Addition or Diviſion *in infinitum*. But the leaſt Portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, may, perhaps, be fitteſt to be conſidered by us, as the ſimple *Ideas* of that Kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space, Extenſion, and Duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diſtinctly reſolved. Such a ſmall Part of Duration, may be called a *Moment*, and is the Time of one *Idea* in our Minds, in the Train of their ordinary Succeſſion there. The other

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conſiſts in having Parts of the ſame Kind, where you can never come to a Part entirely exempted from this Compoſition. So that if the *Idea* of *Extenſion* conſiſts in having *Partes extra Partes* (as the Schools ſpeak) 'tis always, in the Senſe of Mr. *Locke*, a *Simple Idea*; becauſe the *Idea* of having *Partes extra Partes*, cannot be reſolved into two other *Ideas*. For the Remainder of the Objection made to Mr. *Locke*, with reſpect to the Nature of Extenſion, Mr. *Locke* was aware of it, as may be ſeen in §. 9. Ch. 15. of the ſecond Book, where he ſays, That the leaſt Portion of Space or Extenſion, whereof we have a clear and diſtinct *Idea*, may, perhaps, be the fitteſt to be conſider'd by us as a *Simple Idea* of that Kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space and Extenſion are made up. So that according to Mr. *Locke*, it may very fitly be call'd a *Simple Idea*, ſince it is the leaſt *Idea* of Space that the Mind can form to it ſelf, and that cannot be divided by the Mind into any leſs, whereof it has in it ſelf any determined Perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the Mind one *Simple Idea*; and that is ſufficient to take away this Objection; for 'tis not the Deſign of Mr. *Locke*, in this Place, to diſcourſe of any Thing but concerning the *Ideas* of the Mind. But if this is not ſufficient to clear the Difficulty, Mr. *Locke* hath nothing more to add, but that if the *Idea* of Extenſion is ſo peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the Definition that he has given of thoſe *Simple Ideas*, ſo that it differs in ſome Manner

other, wanting a proper Name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a *ſenſible Point*, meaning thereby the leaſt Particle of Matter or Space we can diſcern, which is ordinarily about a Minute, and to the ſharpeſt Eyes ſeldom leſs than thirty Seconds of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the Centre.

§. 10. Expanſion and Duration have this farther Agreement, that though they are both conſidered by us as having Parts; yet *their Parts* are *not ſeparable* one from another, no not even in Thought: Though the Parts of Bodies, from whence we take our Meaſure of the one, and the Parts of Motion, or rather the Succeſſion of *Ideas* in our Minds, from whence we take the Meaſure of the other, may be interrupted and ſeparated; as the one is often by Reſt, and the other is by Sleep, which we call Reſt too.

Their Parts inſeparable.

§. 11. But yet there is this manifeſt Difference between them, That the *Ideas* of Length which we have of *Expanſion*, *are turned every Way*, and ſo make Figure, and Breadth, and Thickneſs; but *Duration is but as it were the Length of one ſtrait Line*, extended *in infinitum*, not capable of Multiplicity, Variation, or Figure; but is one common Meaſure of all Exiſtence whatſoever, wherein all Things, whilſt they exiſt, equally partake. For this preſent Moment is common to all Things, that are now in Being, and equally comprehends that Part of their Exiſtence, as much as if they were all but one ſingle Being; and we may truly ſay, they all exiſt in the ſame Moment of Time. Whether Angels and Spirits have any Analogy to this, in reſpect of Expanſion, is beyond my Comprehenſion: And, perhaps, for us, who have Underſtandings and Comprehenſions ſuited to our own Preſervation, and the Ends of our own Being, but not to the Reality and Extent of all other Beings, 'tis near as hard to conceive any Exiſtence, or to have an *Idea* of any real Being,

Duration is as a Line, Expanſion as a Solid.

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manner from all others of that Kind, he thinks 'tis better leave it there expos'd to this Difficulty, than to make a new Diviſion in his Favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. *Locke* that his Meaning can be underſtood. 'Tis very common to obſerve intelligible Diſcourſes ſpoiled by too much Subtilty in nice Diviſions. We ought to put Things together, as well as we can, *Doctrinæ Cauſa*; but, after all, ſeveral Things will not be bundled up together under our Terms and Ways of ſpeaking.

with a perfect Negation of all manner of Expanſion; as it is, to have the *Idea* of any real Exiſtence, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Duration. And therefore what Spirits have to do with Space, or how they communicate in it we know not. All that we know is, that Bodies do each ſingly poſſeſs its proper Portion of it, according to the Extent of its ſolid Parts; and thereby exclude all other Bodies from having any Share in that particular Portion of Space, whilſt it remains there.

Duration has never two Parts together, Expanſion all together.

§. 12. *Duration*, and Time, which is a Part of it, *is the Idea* we have *of periſhing Diſtance, of which no two Parts exiſt together*, but follow each other in Succeſſion; *as Expanſion is the* Idea *of laſting Diſtance, all whoſe Parts exiſt together*, and are not capable of Succeſſion. And therefore though we cannot conceive any Duration without Succeſſion, nor can put it together in our Thoughts, that any Being does now exiſt to-morrow, or poſſeſs at once more than the preſent Moment of Duration; yet we can conceive the eternal Duration of the Almighty, far different from that of Man, or any other finite Being: Becauſe Man comprehends not in his Knowledge, or Power, all paſt and future Things: His Thoughts are but of yeſterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once paſſed, he can never recall; and what is yet to come, he cannot make preſent. What I ſay of Man, I ſay of all finite Beings, who though they may far exceed Man in Knowledge and Power, yet are no more than the meaneſt Creature, in compariſon with God himſelf. Finite of any Magnitude, holds not any Proportion to infinite. God's infinite Duration being accompanied with infinite Knowledge, and infinite Power, he ſees all things paſt, and to come; and they are no more diſtant from his Knowledge, no farther removed from his Sight than the preſent: They all lie under the ſame View; and there is nothing which he cannot make exiſt each Moment he pleaſes. For the Exiſtence of all Things depending upon his good Pleaſure, all things exiſt every Moment, that he thinks fit to have them exiſt. To conclude, Expanſion and Duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every Part of Space being in every Part of Duration; and every Part of Duration in every Part of Expanſion. Such a Combination of two diſtinct *Ideas*, is, I ſuppoſe ſcarce to be found in all that great Variety we do or can conceive, and may afford Matter to farther Speculation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of NUMBER.

§. 1. AMongſt all the *Ideas* we have, as there is none ſuggeſted to the Mind by more Ways, ſo there is none more ſimple, than that *of Unity*, or One: It has no Shadow of Variety or Compoſition in it: Every Object our Senſes are employ'd about; every *Idea* in our Underſtandings; every Thought of our Minds brings this *Idea* along with it. And therefore it is the moſt intimate to our Thoughts, as well as it is, in its Agreement to all other Things, the moſt univerſal *Idea* we have. For Number applies it ſelf to Men, Angels, Actions, Thoughts, every Thing that either doth exiſt, or can be imagined. *Number the ſimpleſt and moſt univerſal* Idea.

§. 2. By repeating this *Idea* in our Minds, and adding the Repetitions together, we come by the *complex* Ideas *of the Modes of it*. Thus by adding One to One, we have the complex *Idea* of a Couple: By putting twelve Units together, we have the complex *Idea* of a Dozen, and a Score, or a Million, or any other Number. *Its Modes made by Addition.*

§. 3. *The ſimple Modes of Number are of all other the moſt diſtinct*; every the leaſt Variation, which is an Unit, making each Combination as clearly different from that which approacheth neareſt to it, as the moſt remote; Two being as diſtinct from One, as Two Hundred; and the *Idea* of Two, as diſtinct from the *Idea* of Three, as the Magnitude of the whole Earth is from that of a Mite. This is not ſo in other ſimple Modes, in which it is not ſo eaſy, nor, perhaps, poſſible for us to diſtinguiſh betwixt two approaching *Ideas*, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a Difference between the White of this Paper, and that of the next Degree to it? Or can form diſtinct *Ideas* of every the leaſt Exceſs in Extenſion? *Each Mode diſtinct.*

§. 4. The Clearneſs and *Diſtinctneſs of each Mode of Number* from all others, even thoſe that approach neareſt, makes me apt to think, that Demonſtrations in Number, if they are not more evident and exact than in Extenſion, yet they are more general in their Uſe, and more determinate in their *Therefore Demonſtrations in Numbers the moſt preciſe.*

Application. Becauſe the *Ideas* of Numbers are more preciſe and diſtinguiſhable than in Extenſion; where every Equality and Exceſs are not ſo eaſy to be obſerved, or meaſured; becauſe our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any determined Smallneſs, beyond which it cannot go, as an Unit: And therefore the Quantity or Proportion of any the leaſt Exceſs cannot be diſcovered; which is clear otherwiſe in Number, where, as has been ſaid, 91 is as diſtinguiſhable from 90, as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate Exceſs to 90. But it is not ſo in Extenſion, where whatſoever is more than juſt a Foot, or an Inch, is not diſtinguiſhable from the Standard of a Foot, or an Inch; and in Lines, which appear of an equal Length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable Parts: Nor can any one aſſign an Angle, which ſhall be the next biggeſt to a right one.

Names neceſſary to Numbers.

§. 5. By the repeating, as has been ſaid, of the *Idea* of an Unit, and joining it to another Unit, we make thereof one collective *Idea*, marked by the Name *Two*. And whoſoever can do this, and proceed on, ſtill adding one more to the laſt collective *Idea* which he had of any Number, and give a Name to it, may count, or have *Ideas* for ſeveral Collections of Units, diſtinguiſhed one from another, as far as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory to retain that Series, with their ſeveral Names: All *Numeration* being but ſtill the adding of one Unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one *Idea*, a new or diſtinct Name or Sign, whereby to know it from thoſe before and after, and diſtinguiſh it from every ſmaller and greater multitude of Units. So that he that can add one to one, and ſo to two, and ſo go on with his Tale, taking ſtill with him the diſtinct Names belonging to every Progreſſion; and ſo again, by ſubſtracting an Unit from each Collection, retreat and leſſen them, is capable of all the *Ideas* of Numbers, within the Compaſs of his Language, or for which he hath Names, though not, perhaps, of more. For the ſeveral ſimple Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds but ſo many Combinations of Units, which hath no Variety, nor are capable of any other Difference, but more or leſs, Names or Marks for each diſtinct Combination, ſeem more neceſſary, than in any other ſort of *Ideas*. For without ſuch Names or Marks, we can hardly well make uſe of Numbers in reckoning, eſpecially where the Combination is made up of any great Multitude of Units; which put together without a Name or Mark to diſtinguiſh that preciſe Collection, will hardly be kept from being a Heap in Confuſion.

§. 6. This

Names neceſſary to Numbers.

§. 6. This, I think, to be the Reaſon why ſome *Americans*, I have ſpoken with, (who were otherwiſe of quick and rational Parts enough,) could not, as we do, by any means, count to 1000; nor had any diſtinct *Idea* of that Number, though they could reckon very well to 20. Becauſe their Language being ſcanty, and accommodated only to the few Neceſſaries of a needy ſimple Life, unacquainted either with Trade or Mathematicks, had no Words in it to ſtand for 1000; ſo that when they were diſcourſed with of thoſe greater Numbers, they would ſhew the Hairs of their Head, to expreſs a great Multitude, which they could not number; which Inability, I ſuppoſe, proceeded from their want of Names. The *Toucupinambos* had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that, they made out by ſhewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others who were preſent: And I doubt not but we our ſelves might diſtinctly number in Words, a great deal farther than we uſually do, would we find out but ſome fit Denominations to ſignify them by; whereas in the way we take now to name them, by Millions of Millions of Millions, *&c.* it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at moſt four and twenty decimal Progreſſions, without Confuſion. But to ſhew how much *diſtinct Names conduce to our well reckoning*, or having uſeful *Ideas* of Numbers, let us ſet all theſe following Figures, as the Marks of one Number: *v. g.*

Hiſtoire d'un Voyage fait en la Terre du Braſil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20. $\frac{3}{5}\frac{0}{8}\frac{7}{4}$.

Nonilions.	*Octilions.*	*Septilions.*	*Sextilions.*	*Quintrilions.*
857324.	162486.	345896.	437916.	423147.

Quatrilions.	*Trilions.*	*Bilions.*	*Millions.*	*Units.*
248106.	235421.	261734.	368149.	623137.

The ordinary way of naming this Number in *Engliſh*, will be the often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the Denomination of the ſecond ſix Figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any diſtinguiſhing Notions of this Number: But whether, by giving every ſix Figures a new and orderly Denomination, theſe, and perhaps a great many more Figures, in Progreſſion, might not eaſily be counted diſtinctly, and *Ideas* of them both got more eaſily to our ſelves, and more plainly ſignified to others, I leave it to be conſidered. This I mention only, to ſhew how neceſſary diſtinct Names

are to Numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my Invention.

Why Children number not earlier.

§. 7. Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the ſeveral Progreſſions of Numbers, or not having yet the Faculty to collect ſcattered *Ideas* into complex ones, and range them in a regular Order, and ſo retain them in their Memories, as is neceſſary to Reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or ſteadily, 'till a good while after they are well furniſhed with good Store of other *Ideas*; and one may often obſerve them diſcourſe and reaſon pretty well, and have very clear Conceptions of ſeveral other things, before they can tell 20. And ſome, through the Default of their Memories, who cannot retain the ſeveral Combinations of Numbers, with their Names annexed in their diſtinct Orders, and the Dependance of ſo long a Train of numeral Progreſſions, and their Relation one to another, are not able all their Life-time, to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate Series of Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have any *Idea* of that Number, muſt know, that Nineteen went before, with the diſtinct Name or Sign of every one of them, as they ſtand marked in their Order; for where-ever this fails, a Gap is made, the Chain breaks, and the Progreſs in numbering can go no farther. So that *to reckon right, it is required*, 1. That the Mind diſtinguiſh carefully two *Ideas*, which are different one from another only by the Addition or Subſtraction of one Unit. 2. That it retain in Memory the Names or Marks of the ſeveral Combinations from an Unit to that Number; and that not confuſedly, and at random, but in that exact Order, that the Numbers follow one another: In either of which, if it trips, the whole Buſineſs of Numbering will be diſturbed, and there will remain only the confuſed *Idea* of Multitude, but the *Ideas* neceſſary to diſtinct Numeration, will not be attained to.

Number meaſures all Meaſurables.

§. 8. This farther is obſervable in *Number*, That it is that which the Mind makes uſe of in *meaſuring all things*, that by us are meaſurable, which principally are *Expanſion and Duration*; and our *Idea* of Infinity, even when applied to thoſe, ſeems to be nothing but the Infinity of Number. For what elſe are our *Ideas* of Eternity and Immenſity, but the repeated Additions of certain *Ideas* of imagined Parts of Duration and Expanſion, with the Infinity of Number, in which we can come to no End of Addition? For ſuch an inexhauſtible Stock, Number (of all

other our *Ideas*) moſt clearly furniſhes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a Man collect into one Sum, as great a Number as he pleaſes, this Multitude, how great ſoever, leſſens not one Jot the Power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the End of the inexhauſtible Stock of Number, where ſtill there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endleſs *Addition*, or *Addibility*, (if any one like the Word better) of Numbers, ſo apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct *Idea* of Infinity: Of which more in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

Of INFINITY.

Infinity, in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.

§. 1. HE that would know what kind of *Idea* it is, to which we give the Name of *Infinity*, cannot do it better than by conſidering to what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and then how the Mind comes to frame it.

Finite and *Infinite*, ſeem to me to be looked upon by the Mind, as the *Modes of Quantity*, and to be attributed primarily in their firſt Deſignation only to thoſe things which have Parts, and are capable of Increaſe or Diminution, by the Addition or Subtraction of any the leaſt Part: And ſuch are the *Ideas* of Space, Duration, and Number, which we have conſidered in the foregoing Chapters. 'Tis true, that we cannot but be aſſured, that the great GOD, of whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehenſibly infinite. But yet, when we apply to that firſt and ſupreme Being, our *Idea* of Infinite, in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, and other Attributes, which are properly inexhauſtible and incomprehenſible, *&c.* For when we call them infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it ſome Reflection on, and Intimation of that Number or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great, or ſo many,

which these Attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our Thoughts, as far as we can, with all the Infinity of endless Number. I do not pretend to say how these Attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the Reach of our narrow Capacities: They do, without doubt, contain in them all possible Perfection: But this, I say, is our Way of conceiving them, and these our *Ideas* of their Infinity.

The Idea *of Finite easily found.*

§. 2. Finite then, and Infinite, being by the Mind look'd on as Modifications of Expansion and Duration, the next thing to be considered, is, *How the Mind comes by* them. As for the *Idea of Finite*, there is no great Difficulty. The obvious Portions of Extension, that affect our Senses, carry with them into the Mind the *Idea* of Finite: And the ordinary Periods of Succession, whereby we measure Time and Duration, as Hours, Days, and Years, are bounded Lengths. The Difficulty is, how we come by those boundless *Ideas* of *Eternity* and *Immensity*, since the Objects, which we converse with, come so much short of any Approach or Proportion to that Largeness.

How we come by the Idea *of Infinity.*

§. 3. Every one, that has any *Idea* of any stated Lengths of Space, as a Foot, finds that he can repeat that *Idea*; and joining it to the former, make the *Idea* of two Foot; and by the Addition of a third, three Foot, and so on, without ever coming to an end of his Additions, whether of the same *Idea* of a Foot, or if he pleases of doubling it, or any other *Idea* he has of any Length, as a Mile, or Diameter of the Earth, or of the *Orbis Magnus*: For whichsoever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds, that after he has continued this doubling in his Thoughts, and enlarged his *Idea* as much as he pleases, he has no more Reason to stop, nor is one Jot nearer the End of such Addition, than he was at first setting out; the Power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space by farther Additions, remaining still the same, he hence takes *the Idea of infinite Space.*

Our Idea *of Space boundless.*

§. 4. This, I think, is the way whereby the Mind gets the *Idea of infinite Space.* 'Tis a quite different Consideration to examine, whether the Mind has the *Idea* of such a *boundless Space actually existing*, since our *Ideas* are not always Proofs of the Existence of Things; but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think,

that Space in it self is actually boundless, to which Imagination the *Idea* of Space and Expansion of it self naturally leads us. For it being considered by us, either as the Extension of Body, or as existing by it self, without any solid Matter taking it up, (for of such a void Space we have not only the *Idea*, but I have proved, as I think, from the Motion of Bodies, its necessary Existence) it is impossible the Mind should be ever able to find or suppose any End of it, or be stopp'd any where in its Progress in this Space, how far soever it extends its Thoughts. Any Bounds made with Body, even Adamantine Walls, are so far from putting a stop to the Mind in its farther Progress in Space and Extension, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it: For so far as that Body reaches, so far no one can doubt of Extension; and when we are come to the utmost Extremity of Body, what is there, that can there put a stop, and satisfy the Mind that it is at the End of Space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is satisfied that Body it self can move into it? For if it be necessary for the Motion of Body, that there should be an empty Space, though never so little, here amongst Bodies; and it be possible for Body to move in or through that empty Space; nay, it is impossible for any Particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space, the same Possibility of a Body's moving into a void Space, beyond the utmost Bounds of Body, as well as into a void Space, interspersed amongst Bodies, will always remain clear and evident; the *Idea* of empty pure Space, whether within, or beyond the Confines of all Bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in Nature, though in Bulk; and there being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it; so that wherever the Mind places it self by any Thought, either amongst, or remote from all Bodies, it can, in this uniform *Idea* of Space, no where find any Bounds, any Ends; and so must necessarily conclude it by the very Nature and *Idea* of each Part of it, to be actually infinite.

And so of Duration.

§. 5. As by the Power we find in our selves of repeating, as often as we will, any *Idea* of Space, we get the *Idea* of Immensity; so, by being able to repeat the *Idea* of any Length of Duration we have in our Minds, with all the endless Addition of Number, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*. For we find in our selves, we can no more come to an End of such repeated *Ideas*, than we can come to the End of Number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again, 'tis another Question, quite different from our having an *Idea* of Eternity, to know whether there were

any

any real Being, whose Duration has been *eternal*. And as to this, I say, He that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something Eternal. But having spoke of this in another Place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed on to some other Considerations of our *Idea* of Infinity.

Why other Ideas *are not capable of Infinity.*

§. 6. If it be so, that our *Idea* of Infinity be got from the Power, we observe in our selves, of repeating without End our own *Ideas*, it may be demanded, *Why we do not attribute Infinity to other* Ideas, *as well as those of Space and Duration*; since they may be as easily, and as often repeated in our Minds as the other; and yet no body ever thinks of infinite Sweetness, or infinite Whiteness, though he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White, as frequently as those of a Yard, or a Day? To which I answer, all the *Ideas* that are considered as having Parts, and are capable of Increase by the Addition of any equal or less Parts, afford us by their Repetition the *Idea* of Infinity; because with this endless Repetition, there is continued an Enlargement, of which there can be no End. But in other *Ideas* it is not so; for to the largest *Idea* of Extension or Duration that I at present have, the Addition of any the least Part makes an Increase; but to the perfectest *Idea* I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another of a less or equal Whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the *Idea*,) it makes no Increase, and enlarges not my *Idea* at all; and therefore the different *Ideas* of Whiteness, *&c.* are called Degrees. For those *Ideas* that consist of Parts, are capable of being augmented by every Addition of the least Part; but if you take the *Idea* of White, which one Parcel of Snow yielded yesterday to your Sight, and another *Idea* of White to another Parcel of Snow you see to-day, and put them together in your Mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the *Idea* of Whiteness is not at all increased; and if we add a less Degree of Whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those *Ideas* that consist not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what Proportion Men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their Senses; but Space, Duration, and Number, being capable of Increase by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endless Room for more; nor can we conceive any where a Stop to a farther Addition and Progression, and for those *Ideas* alone lead our Mind towards the Thought of Infinity.

§. 7. Though

§. 7. Though our *Idea* of Infinity arise from the Contemplation of Quantity, and the endless Increase the Mind is able to make in Quantity, by the repeated Additions of what Portions thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great Confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed *Idea* of Quantity the Mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite Quantity, (*viz.*) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: For *our Idea of Infinity* being, as I think, *an endless growing Idea*, but the *Idea* of any Quantity the Mind has, being at that Time terminated in that *Idea*, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join Infinity to it, is to adjust a standing Measure to a growing Bulk; and therefore I think it is not an insignificant Subtilty, if I say, that we are carefully to distinguish between the *Idea* of the Infinity of Space, and the *Idea* of a Space infinite: The first is nothing but a supposed endless Progression of the Mind, over what repeated *Ideas* of Space it pleases; but to have actually in the Mind the *Idea* of a Space infinite, is to suppose the Mind already passed over, and actually to have a View of all those repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endless Repetition can never totally represent to it: Which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

Difference between Infinity of Space, and Space Infinite.

§. 8. This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in Numbers. The Infinity of Numbers, to the End of whose Addition every one perceives there is no Approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear soever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the Absurdity of the actual *Idea* of an infinite Number. Whatsoever positive *Ideas* we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible Remainder, from which we remove all Bounds, and wherein we allow the Mind an endless Progression of Thoughts, without ever compleating the *Idea*, there we have our *Idea* of Infinity; which though it seems to be pretty clear, when we consider nothing else in it but the Negation of an End, yet when we would frame in our Minds the *Idea* of an infinite Space or Duration, that *Idea* is very obscure, and confused, because it is made up of two Parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For let a Man frame in his Mind an *Idea* of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain, the Mind rests and terminates in that *Idea*; which is contrary to the *Idea of Infinity*,

We have no Idea *of infinite Space.*

nity, which *consists in a supposed endless Progression.* And therefore, I think it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue, and reason about infinite Space or Duration, *&c.* Because the Parts of such an *Idea*, not being perceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one Side or other always perplexes, whatever Consequences we draw from the other; as an *Idea* of Motion not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such an *Idea*, which is not better than an *Idea* of Motion or Rest; and such another seems to me to be the *Idea* of a Space, or (which is the same Thing) a Number infinite, *i. e.* of a Space or Number, which the Mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a Space or Number, which in a constant and endless Enlarging, and Progression, it can in Thought never attain to. For how large soever an *Idea* of Space I have in my Mind, it is no larger than it is that Instant that I have it, though I be capable the next Instant to double it; and so on *in infinitum*: For that alone is infinite, which has no Bounds; and that the *Idea* of Infinity, in which our Thoughts can find none.

Number affords us the clearest Idea *of Infinity.*

§. 9. But of all other *Ideas*, it is *Number*, as I have said, which, I think, *furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct* Idea *of Infinity*, we are capable of. For even in Space and Duration, when the Mind pursues the *Idea* of Infinity, it there makes use of the *Ideas* and Repetitions of Numbers, as of Millions of Millions of Miles, or Years, which are so many distinct *Ideas*, kept best by Number from running into a confused Heap, wherein the Mind loses it self; and when it has added together as many Millions, *&c.* as it pleases, of known Lengths, of Space or Duration, the clearest *Idea* it can get of Infinity, is the confused incomprehensible Remainder of endless addible Numbers, which affords no Prospect of Stop or Boundary.

Our different Conception of the Infinity of Number, Duration, and Expansion.

§. 10. It will, perhaps, give us a little farther Light into the *Idea* we have *of Infinity*, and discover to us, that it *is nothing but the Infinity of Number applied to determinate Parts*, of which we have in our Minds the distinct *Ideas*, if we consider, that Number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas Duration and Extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence, that in Number, we are at one End as it were. For there being in Number nothing less than an Unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in Addition, or Increase of Number, we can set no Bounds. And

And so it is like a Line, whereof one End terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in Space and Duration it is otherwise. For in Duration we consider it, as if this Line of Number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite Length, which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on what Consideration he hath of Eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else but the turning this Infinity of Number both ways, *à parte ante*, and *à parte post*, as they speak. For when we would consider Eternity, *à parte ante*, what do we but, beginning from our selves, and the present Time we are in, repeat in our Minds the *Ideas* of Years, or Ages, or any other assignable Portion of Duration past, with a Prospect of proceeding, in such Addition, with all the Infinity of Number: And when we would consider Eternity, *à parte post*, we just after the same rate begin from our selves, and reckon by multiplied Periods yet to come, still extending that Line of Number as before; and these two being put together, are that infinite Duration we call *Eternity*; which, as we turn our View either way, forwards or backwards, appears infinite, because we still turn that way that infinite End of Number, *i. e.* the Power still of adding more.

§. 11. The same happens also in Space, wherein conceiving our selves to be as it were in the Centre, we do on all Sides pursue those indeterminable Lines of Number; and reckoning any way from our selves, a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, or *Orbis Magnus*, by the Infinity of Number, we add others to them, as often as we will; and having no more Reason to set Bounds to those repeated *Ideas*, than we have to set Bounds to Number, we have that indeterminable *Idea of Immensity*.

Infinite Divisibility.

§. 12. And since in any Bulk of Matter, our Thoughts can never arrive at the utmost *Divisibility*, therefore there is an apparent Infinity to us also in that, which has the Infinity also of Number, but with this Difference, That in the former Considerations of the Infinity of Space and Duration, we only use Addition of Numbers; whereas this is like the Division of an Unit into its Fractions, wherein the Mind also can proceed *in infinitum*, as well as in the former Additions, it being indeed but the Addition still of new Numbers: Though in the Addition of the one, we can have no more the positive *Idea* of a Space infinitely great, than in the Division of the other, we can have the *Idea* of a Body infinitely little; our *Idea* of Infinity being, as I may

so

ſo ſay, a growing and fugitive *Idea*, ſtill in a boundleſs Progreſſion, that can ſtop no where.

No poſitive Idea of Infinite.

§. 13. Though it be hard, I think, to find any one ſo abſurd, as to ſay, he has the poſitive *Idea* of an actual infinite Number; the Infinity whereof lies only in a Power ſtill of adding any Combination of Units to any former Number, and that as long, and as much as one will; the like alſo being in the Infinity of Space and Duration, which Power leaves always to the Mind room for endleſs Additions; yet there be thoſe, who imagine they have *poſitive* Ideas *of infinite* Duration and Space. It would, I think, be enough to deſtroy any ſuch poſitive *Idea* of Infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he could add to it or no; which would eaſily ſhew the Miſtake of ſuch a poſitive *Idea*. We can, I think, have no poſitive *Idea* of any Space or Duration, which is not made up of, and commenſurate to repeated Numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years, which are the common Meaſures, whereof we have the *Ideas* in our Minds, and whereby we judge of the Greatneſs of theſe Sort of Quantities. And therefore, ſince an *Idea* of infinite Space or Duration muſt needs be made up of infinite Parts, it can have no other Infinity than that of Number, capable ſtill of farther Addition; but not an actual poſitive *Idea* of a Number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the Addition of finite Things together, (as are all Lengths, whereof we have the poſitive *Ideas*) can never otherwiſe produce the *Idea* of infinite, than as Number does; which conſiſting of Additions of finite Units one to another, ſuggeſts the *Idea* of Infinite, only by a Power we find we have of ſtill increaſing the Sum, and adding more of the ſame Kind; without coming one jot nearer the End of ſuch Progreſſion.

§. 14. They, who would prove their *Idea of Infinite to be poſitive*, ſeem to me to do it by a pleaſant Argument, taken from the Negation of an End; which being negative, the Negation of it is poſitive. He that conſiders, that the End is in Body, but the Extremity or Superficies of that Body, will not, perhaps, be forward to grant, that the End is a bare Negative: And he that perceives the End of his Pen is black or white, will be apt to think, that the End is ſomething more than a pure Negation. Nor is it, when applied to Duration, the bare Negation of Exiſtence, but more properly the laſt Moment of it. But if they will have the End to be nothing but the bare Negation of Exiſtence, I am ſure they cannot deny, but that the Beginning is the firſt Inſtant of Being, and is not by any body

body conceived to be a bare Negation; and therefore by their own Argument, the *Idea* of Eternal, *à parte ante*, or of a Duration without a Beginning, is but a negative *Idea*.

What is positive, what negative, in our Idea *of Infinite.*

§. 15. The *Idea* of Infinite, has, I confeſs, ſomething of poſitive in all thoſe Things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite Space or Duration, we at firſt Step, uſually make ſome very large *Idea*, as, perhaps, of Millions of Ages, or Miles, which poſſibly we double and multiply ſeveral Times. All that we thus amaſs together in our Thoughts, is poſitive, and the Aſſemblage of a great Number of poſitive *Ideas* of Space or Duration. But what ſtill remains beyond this, we have no more a poſitive diſtinct Notion of, than a Mariner has of the Depth of the Sea, where having let down a large Portion of his Sounding-Line, he reaches no Bottom: Whereby he knows the Depth to be ſo many Fathoms and more; but how much that more is, he hath no diſtinct Notion at all: And could he always ſupply new Line, and find the Plummet always ſink, without ever ſtopping, he would be ſomething in the Poſture of the Mind reaching after a compleat and poſitive *Idea* of Infinity. In which caſe, let this Line be 10, or 10000 Fathoms long, it equally diſcovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confuſed and comparative *Idea*, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the Mind comprehends of any Space, it has a poſitive *Idea* of: But in endeavouring to make it Infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the *Idea* is ſtill imperfect and incompleat. So much Space as the Mind takes a view of in its Contemplation of Greatneſs, is a clear Picture, and poſitive in the Underſtanding: But Infinite is ſtill greater. 1. Then *the* Idea *of ſo much*, *is poſitive* and clear. 2. *The* Idea *of Greater*, *is alſo clear*, *but it is* but a *comparative* Idea. 3. *The* Idea *of ſo much greater*, *as cannot be comprehended*; and this is *plain Negative*, not Poſitive. For he has no poſitive clear *Idea* of the Largeneſs of any Extenſion (which is that ſought for in the *Idea* of Infinite) that has not a comprehenſive *Idea* of the Dimenſions of it: And ſuch, no body, I think, pretends to, in what is Infinite. For to ſay a Man has a poſitive clear *Idea* of any Quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reaſonable as to ſay, He has the poſitive clear *Idea* of the Number of the Sands on the Sea-ſhore, who knows not how many they be; but only that they are more than Twenty. For juſt ſuch a perfect and poſitive *Idea* has he of an infinite Space or Duration, who

ſays

ſays it is larger than the Extent or Duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any other Number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have a poſitive *Idea*; which is all the *Idea*, I think, we have of Infinite. So that what lies beyond our poſitive *Idea* towards Infinity, lies in Obſcurity; and has the indeterminate Confuſion of a Negative *Idea*, wherein, I know, I neither do, nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow Capacity: And that cannot but be very far from a poſitive compleat *Idea*, wherein the greateſt Part of what I would comprehend, is left out, under the undeterminate Intimation of being ſtill greater. For to ſay, that having in any Quantity meaſured ſo much, or gone ſo far, you are not yet at the End, is only to ſay, that that Quantity is greater. So that the Negation of an End in any Quantity, is, in other Words, only to ſay, that it is bigger: And a total Negation of an End, is but the carrying this Bigger ſtill with you, in all the Progreſſions your Thoughts ſhall make in Quantity; and adding this *Idea* of ſtill greater, to all the *Ideas* you have, or can be ſuppoſed to have of Quantity. Now, whether ſuch an *Idea* as that be poſitive, I leave any one to conſider.

We have no poſitive Idea *of an infinite Duration.*

§. 16. I ask thoſe, who ſay they have a *poſitive* Idea *of Eternity*, whether their *Idea* of Duration includes in it Succeſſion, or not? If it does not, they ought to ſhew the Difference of their Notion of Duration, when applied to an eternal Being, and to a finite: Since, perhaps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their Weakneſs of Underſtanding in this Point; and acknowledge, That the Notion they have of Duration, forces them to conceive, that whatever has Duration, is of a longer Continuance to-day than it was yeſterday. If to avoid Succeſſion in eternal Exiſtence, they recur to the *Punctum Stans* of the Schools, I ſuppoſe they will thereby very little mend the Matter, or help us to a more clear and poſitive *Idea* of infinite Duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me, than Duration without Succeſſion. Beſides, that *Punctum Stans*, if it ſignify any thing, being not *Quantum*, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak Apprehenſions cannot ſeparate Succeſſion from any Duration whatſoever, our *Idea* of Eternity can be nothing but of infinite Succeſſion of Moments, of Duration, wherein any thing does exiſt; and whether any one has, or can have, a poſitive *Idea* of an actual infinite Number, I leave him to conſider, till his infinite Number be ſo great, that he himſelf can add no more

to

to it; and as long as he can increaſe it, I doubt he himſelf will think the *Idea* he hath of it, a little too ſcanty for poſitive Infinity.

§. 17. I think it unavoidable for every conſidering rational Creature, that will but examine his own, or any other Exiſtence, to have the Notion of an eternal wiſe Being, who had no Beginning: And ſuch an *Idea* of infinite Duration, I am ſure I have. But this *Negation of a Beginning*, being but the Negation of a poſitive Thing, *ſcarce gives* me *a poſitive* Idea *of Infinity*; which whenever I endeavour to extend my Thoughts to, I confeſs my ſelf at a Loſs, and find I cannot attain any clear Comprehenſion of it.

§. 18. He that thinks he has a poſitive *Idea* of infinite Space, will, when he conſiders it, find that he can *no* more have a *poſitive Idea* of the greateſt, than he has *of the leaſt Space*: For in this latter, which ſeems the eaſier of the two, and more within our Comprehenſion, we are capable only of a comparative *Idea* of Smallneſs, which will always be leſs than any one, whereof we have the poſitive *Idea*. All our poſitive *Ideas* of any Quantity, whether great or little, have always Bounds; though our comparative *Idea*, whereby we can always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no Bounds. For that which remains, either great or little, not being comprehended in that poſitive *Idea* which we have, lies in Obſcurity: And we have no other *Idea* of it, but of the Power of enlarging the one, and diminiſhing the other, without ceaſing. A Peſtle and Mortar will as ſoon bring any Particle of Matter to Indiviſibility, as the acuteſt Thought of a Mathematician; and a Surveyor may, as ſoon with his Chain, meaſure out infinite *Space*, as a Philoſopher, by the quickeſt flight of Mind, reach it; or by thinking, comprehend it, which is to have a poſitive *Idea* of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an Inch Diameter, as a clear and poſitive *Idea* of it in his Mind, and ſo can frame one of $\frac{1}{2}$ a $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$, and ſo on, 'till he has the *Idea* in his Thoughts of ſomething very little: But yet reaches not the *Idea* of that incompreſible Littleneſs, which Diviſion can produce. What remains of Smallneſs, is as far from his Thoughts, as when he firſt began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and poſitive *Idea* of that Smallneſs, which is conſequent to infinite Diviſibility.

No poſitive Idea of infinite Space.

§. 19. Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have ſaid, at firſt Glance make ſome very large *Idea* of that which he applies it to, let it be Space, or Duration; and poſſibly he wearies

What is poſitive, what negative, in our Idea of infinite.

his Thoughts, by multiplying in his Mind that firſt large *Idea*: But yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a *poſitive clear Idea* of what remains, to make up a poſitive Infinite, than the Country-fellow had of the Water, which was yet to come, and paſs the Channel of the River where he ſtood.

Ruſticus expectat dum tranſeat amnis, at ille
Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

Some think they have a poſitive Idea *of Eternity, and not Space.*

§. 20. There are ſome I have met with, that put ſo much Difference between infinite Duration, and infinite Space, that they perſuade themſelves, that they have *a poſitive* Idea *of Eternity*; *but* that they *have not*, nor can have any *Idea of infinite Space*. The Reaſon of which Miſtake, I ſuppoſe to be this, That finding by a due Contemplation of Cauſes and Effects, that it is neceſſary to admit ſome eternal Being, and ſo to conſider the real Exiſtence of that Being, as taking up, and commenſurate to their *Idea* of Eternity: But on the other Side, not finding it neceſſary, but on the contrary apparently abſurd, that Body ſhould be infinite, they forwardly conclude, they can have no *Idea* of infinite Space, becauſe they can have no *Idea* of infinite Matter. Which Conſequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; becauſe the Exiſtence of Matter is no ways neceſſary to the Exiſtence of Space, no more than the Exiſtence of Motion or the Sun, is neceſſary to Duration, though Duration uſes to be meaſured by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the *Idea* of 10000 Miles ſquare, without any Body ſo big, as well as the *Idea* of 10000 Years, without any Body ſo old. It ſeems as eaſy to me to have the *Idea* of Space empty of Body, as to think of the Capacity of a Buſhel without Corn, or the Hollow of a Nutſhel without a Kernel in it: It being more neceſſary, that there ſhould be exiſting a ſolid Body infinitely extended, becauſe we have an *Idea* of the Infinity of Space, than it is neceſſary that the World ſhould be eternal, becauſe we have an *Idea* of infinite Duration: And why ſhould we think our *Idea* of infinite Space, requires the real Exiſtence of Matter to ſupport it, when we find, that we have as clear an *Idea* of infinite Duration to come, as we have of infinite Duration paſt? Though, I ſuppoſe, no Body thinks it conceivable, that any Thing does, or has exiſted in that future Duration. Nor is it poſſible to join our *Idea* of future Duration with preſent or paſt Exiſtence, any more than it is poſſible to make the *Ideas* of Yeſterday, to Day, and to Morrow, to be the ſame; or bring

Ages

Ages paſt, and future together, and make them contemporary. But if theſe Men are of the Mind, that they have clearer *Ideas* of infinite Duration, than of infinite Space, becauſe it is paſt doubt, that GOD has exiſted from all Eternity, but there is no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space: Yet thoſe Philoſophers who are of Opinion, That infinite Space is poſſeſſed by GOD's infinite Omnipreſence, as well as infinite Duration by his external Exiſtence, muſt be allowed to have as clear an *Idea* of infinite Space, as of infinite Duration; though neither of them, I think, has any *poſitive* Idea *of Infinity* in either Caſe. For whatſoever poſitive *Ideas* a Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former, as eaſy as he can add together the *Ideas* of two Days, or two Paces, which are poſitive *Ideas* of Lengths he has in his Mind, and ſo on, as long as he pleaſes: Whereby, if a Man had a poſitive *Idea* of infinite, either Duration or Space, he could add two Infinites together; nay, make one Infinite infinitely bigger than another, Abſurdities too groſs to be confuted.

Suppoſed poſitive Ideas *of Infinity, Cauſe of Miſtakes.*

§. 21. But yet, if after all this, there be Men who perſuade themſelves, that they have clear poſitive comprehenſive *Ideas* of Infinity, 'tis fit they enjoy their Privilege: And I ſhould be very glad (with ſome others that I know, who acknowledge they have none ſuch) to be better informed by their Communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and *inextricable Difficulties*, which perpetually involve all Diſcourſes *concerning Infinity*, whether of Space, Duration, or Diviſibility, have been the certain *Marks of a Defect in our* Ideas *of Infinity*, and the Diſproportion the Nature thereof has to the Comprehenſion of our narrow Capacities. For whilſt Men talk and diſpute of infinite Space or Duration, or if they had as compleat and poſitive *Ideas* of them, as they have of the Names they uſe for them, oras they have of a Yard, or an Hour, or any other determinate Quantity, it is no Wonder, if the incomprehenſible Nature of the Thing they diſcourſe of, or reaſon about, leads them into Perplexities and Contradictions; and their Minds be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty to be ſurveyed and managed by them.

All theſe Ideas *from Senſation and Reflection.*

§. 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the Conſiderations of Duration, Space, and Number; and what ariſes from the Contemplation of them, Infinity, 'tis poſſibly no more than the Matter requires, there being few ſimple *Ideas*, whoſe Modes give more Exerciſe to the Thoughts of Men, than theſe do. I pretend not

not to treat of them in their full Latitude: It ſuffices to my Deſign, to ſhew how the Mind receives them, ſuch as they are, from *Senſation* and *Reflection*; and how, even the *Idea* we have of *Infinity*, how remote ſoever it may ſeem to be from any Object of Senſe, or Operation of our Mind, has nevertheleſs, as all our other *Ideas*, its Original there. Some Mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced Speculations, may have other Ways to introduce into their Minds *Ideas* of *Infinity*: But this hinders not, but that they themſelves, as well as all other Men, got the firſt *Ideas*, which they had of *Infinity*, from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, in the Method we have here ſet down.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the other Simple Modes.

Modes of Motion.

§. 1. THough I have, in the foregoing Chapters, ſhewn how from ſimple *Ideas* taken in by *Senſation*, the Mind comes to extend it ſelf even to Infinity. Which however it may, of all others, ſeem moſt remote from any ſenſible Perception, yet at laſt hath nothing in it, but what is made out of ſimple *Ideas* received into the Mind by the Senſes, and afterwards there put together, by the Faculty of the Mind, as to repeat its own *Ideas*. Though, I ſay, theſe might be Inſtances enough of ſimple Modes of the ſimple *Ideas* of *Senſation*; and ſuffice to ſhew how the Mind comes by them: Yet I ſhall for Method's ſake, though briefly, give an Account of ſome few more, and then proceed to more complex *Ideas*.

§. 2. To *ſlide*, *roll*, *tumble*, *walk*, *creep*, *run*, *dance*, *leap*, *skip*, and abundance of others that might be named, are Words, which are no ſooner heard, but every one, who underſtands *Engliſh*, has preſently in his Mind diſtinct *Ideas*, which are all but the different Modifications of Motion. *Modes of Motion* anſwer thoſe of Extention: *Swift* and *Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the Meaſures whereof are made of the Diſtances of Time and Space put together, ſo they are complex *Ideas* comprehending Time and Space with Motion.

Modes of Sounds.

§. 3. The like Variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate Word is a different *Modification of Sound*: By which we ſee, that from the Senſe of

of Hearing by such Modifications, the Mind may be furnished with distinct *Ideas*, to almost an infinite Number. Sounds also, besides the distinct Cries of Birds and Beasts, are modified by Diversity of Notes of different Length put together, which make that complex *Idea* call'd a *Tune*, which a Musician may have in his Mind, when he hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the *Ideas* of those Sounds, so put together silently in his own Fancy.

Modes of Colours.

§. 4. Those of Colours are also very various: Some we take notice of, as the different Degrees, or as they are termed, *Shades of the same Colour*. But since we very seldom make Assemblages of Colours, either for Use or Delight, but Figure is taken in also, and has its Part in it, as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-works, *&c.* those which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed Modes, as being made up of *Ideas* of divers Kinds, *viz.* Figure and Colour, such as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

Modes of Tastes.

§. 5. All *compounded Tastes and Smells*, are also Modes made up of these simple *Ideas* of those Senses. But they being such, as generally we have no Names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in Writing; and therefore must be left without Enumeration, to the Thoughts and Experience of my Reader.

§. 6. In general it may be observed, that those *simple Modes, which are considered but as different Degrees of the same simple* Idea, though they are in themselves many of them very distinct *Ideas*; yet *have ordinarily no distinct Names*, nor are much taken notice of, as distinct *Ideas*, where the Difference is but very small between them. Whether Men have neglected these Modes, and given no Names to them, as wanting Measures nicely to distinguish them; or because when they were so distinguished, that Knowledge would not be of general or necessary Use, I leave it to the Thoughts of others; it is sufficient to my Purpose to shew, that all our simple *Ideas* come to our Minds only by Sensation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex *Ideas*. But though White, Red, or Sweet, *&c.* have not been modified, or made into complex *Ideas*, by several Combinations, so as to be named, and thereby ranked into Species; yet some others of the simple *Ideas*, *viz.* those of Unity, Duration, Motion, *&c.* above instanced in, as also Power and Thinking have been thus modified to a great Variety of complex *Ideas*, with Names belonging to them.

Why some Modes have, and others have not Names.

§. 7. *The Reason whereof*, I suppose, has been this, That the great Concernment of Men being with Men one amongst another, the Knowledge of Men and their Actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary; and therefore they made *Ideas* of Actions very nicely modified, and gave those complex *Ideas* Names, that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those Things, they were daily conversant in, without long Ambages and Circumlocutions; and that the Things they were continually to give and receive Information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that Men in framing different complex *Ideas*, and giving them Names, have been much governed by the End of Speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite Way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the Names, which in several Arts have been found out, and applied to several complex *Ideas* of modified Actions, belonging to their several Trades, for Dispatch sake, in their Direction or Discourses about them. Which *Ideas* are not generally framed in the Minds of Men not conversant about these Operations. And thence the Words that stand for them, by the greatest Part of Men of the same Language, are not understood. *v. g. Colshire*, *Drilling*, *Filtration*, *Cohobation*, are Words standing for certain complex *Ideas*, which being seldom in the Minds of any but those few, whose particular Employment do at every Turn suggest them to their Thoughts, those Names of them are not generally understood but by Smiths, and Chymists; who having framed the complex *Ideas*, which these Words stand for, and having given Names to them, or received them from others, upon hearing of these Names in Communication, readily conceive those *Ideas* in their Minds; as by *Cohobation* all the simple *Ideas* of Distilling, and the pouring the Liquor, distilled from any Thing, back upon the remaining Matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see, that there are great Varieties of simple *Ideas*, as of Tastes and Smells, which have no Names; and of Modes many more: Which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great Use to be taken Notice of in the Affairs and Converse of Men, they have not had Names given to them, and so pass not for Species. This we shall have Occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of Words.

CHAP

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.

§. 1. WHEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon it self, and contemplates its own Actions, *Thinking* is the first that occurs. In it the Mind observes a great Variety of Modifications, and from thence receives distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception, which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any Impression on the Body, made by an external Object, being distinct from all other Modifications of *Thinking*, furnishes the Mind with a distinct *Idea*, which we call *Sensation*; which is, as it were, the actual Entrance of an *Idea* into the Understanding by the Senses. The same *Idea*, when it again recurs without the Operation of the like Object on the external Sensory, is *Remembrance:* If it be sought after by the Mind, and with Pain and Endeavour found, and brought again in View, 'tis *Recollection:* If it be held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis *Contemplation:* When *Ideas* float in our Mind, without any Reflection or Regard of the Understanding, it is that, which the *French* call *Reſverie*; our Language has scarce a Name for it: When the *Ideas* that offer themselves, (for as I have observed in another Place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a Train of *Ideas* succeeding one another in our Minds,) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is *Attention:* When the Mind with great Earnestness, and of Choice, fixes its View on any *Idea*, considers it on all Sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary Solicitation of other *Ideas*, it is that we call *Intention*, or *Study:* Sleep, without Dreaming, is Rest from all these: And *Dreaming* it self, is the having of *Ideas* (whilst the outward Senses are stopp'd, so that they receive not outward Objects with their usual Quickness,) in the Mind, not suggested by any external Objects, or known Occasion; nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding at all: And whether that, which we call *Extasy*, be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§. 2. These are some few Instances of those various *Modes of Thinking*, which the Mind may observe in it self, and so have as distinct *Ideas* of, as it hath of *White* and *Red*, a *Square* or

a *Circle*. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this Set of *Ideas*, which are got from *Reflection*: That would be to make a Volume: It ſuffices to my preſent Purpoſe, to have ſhewn here, by ſome few Examples, of what Sort theſe *Ideas* are, and how the Mind comes by them; eſpecially, ſince I ſhall have Occaſion hereafter to treat more at large of *Reaſoning*, *Judging*, *Volition*, and *Knowledge*, which are ſome of the moſt conſiderable Operations of the Mind, and *Modes of Thinking*.

The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking

§. 3. But, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable Digreſſion, nor wholly impertinent to our preſent Deſign, if we reflect here upon *the different State of the Mind in Thinking*, which thoſe Inſtances of Attention, *Reſverie*, and Dreaming, *&c.* before-mentioned, naturally enough ſuggeſt. That there are *Ideas*, ſome or other, always preſent in the Mind of a waking Man, every one's Experience convinces him; though the Mind employs it ſelf about them with ſeveral Degrees of Attention. Sometimes the Mind fixes it ſelf with ſo much Earneſtneſs on the Contemplation of ſome Objects, that it turns their *Ideas* on all Sides; remarks their Relations and Circumſtances; and views every Part ſo nicely, and with ſuch Intention, that it ſhuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no Notice of the ordinary Impreſſions made then on the Senſes, which at another Seaſon would produce very ſenſible Perceptions: At other Times, it barely obſerves the Train of *Ideas* that ſucceed in the Underſtanding, without directing and purſuing any of them: And at other Times, it lets them paſs almoſt quite unregarded, as ſaint Shadows, that make no Impreſſion.

Hence 'tis probable that Thinking is the Action, not Eſſence of the Soul.

§. 4. This Difference of *Intention*, and *Remiſſion* of the Mind in thinking, with a great Variety of Degrees, between earneſt Study, and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himſelf. Trace it a little farther, and you find the Mind aſleep, retired as it were from the Senſes, and out of the Reach of thoſe Motions made on the Organs of Senſe, which at other Times produce very vivid and ſenſible *Ideas*. I need not, for this, inſtance in thoſe, who ſleep out whole ſtormy Nights, without hearing the Thunder, or ſeeing the Lightning, or feeling the ſhaking of the Houſe, which are ſenſible enough to thoſe, who are waking. But in this Retirement of the Mind from the Senſes, it often retains a yet more looſe and incoherent manner of *Thinking*, which we call *Dreaming*: And laſt

last of all, sound Sleep closes the Scene quite, and puts an End to all Appearances. This, I think, almost every one has Experience of in himself, and his own Observation without Difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, That since the Mind can sensibly put on, at several Times, several Degrees of *Thinking*; and be sometimes even in a waking Man so remiss, as to have Thoughts dim and obscure to that Degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last in the dark Retirements of sound Sleep, loses the Sight perfectly of all *Ideas* whatsoever: Since, I say, this is evidently so in Matter of Fact, and constant Experience, I ask, whether it be not probable, that *Thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul?* Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of Intention and Remission; but the Essences of Things, are not conceived capable of any such Variation. But this by the bye.

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

§. 1. *Pleasure and Pain simple Ideas.*

AMongst the simple *Ideas*, which we receive both from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, *Pain* and *Pleasure* are two very considerable ones. For as in the Body, there is Sensation barely in its self, or accompanied with *Pain* or *Pleasure*, so the Thought, or Perception of the Mind, is simply so, or else accompanied also with *Pleasure* or *Pain*, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple *Ideas*, cannot be described, nor their Names defined; the Way of knowing them, is, as of the simple *Ideas* of the Senses, only by Experience. For to define them by the Presence of Good or Evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves, upon the several and various Operations of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently applied to, or considered by us.

§. 2. *Good and Evil, what.* Things then are Good or Evil, only in Reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call *Good*, which *is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the Possession of any other Good, or Absence of any Evil.*

Evil. And, on the contrary, we name that *Evil* which *is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good.* By Pleasure and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in Truth, they be only different Constitutions of the Mind, sometimes occasioned by Disorder in the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.

Our Passions moved by Good and Evil.

§. 3. *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the Hinges on which our *Passions* turn: And if we reflect on our selves, and observe how these, under various Considerations, operate in us; what Modifications or Tempers of Mind, what internal Sensations, (if I may so call them,) they produce in us, we may thence form to our selves the *Ideas* of our *Passion*.

Love.

§. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the Thought he has of the Delight, which any present or absent Thing is apt to produce in him, has the *Idea* we call *Love*. For when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he *loves* Grapes, it is no more, but that the Taste of Grapes delights him; let an Alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the Delight of their Taste, and he then can be said to *love* Grapes no longer.

Hatred.

§. 5. On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain which any Thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call *Hatred*. Were it my Business here, to enquire any farther than into the bare *Ideas* of our Passions, as they depend on different Modifications of Pleasure and Pain, I should remark, that our *Love* and *Hatred* of inanimate insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure and Pain which we receive from their Use and Application any Way to our Senses, though with their Destruction: But *Hatred* or *Love*, to Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or Delight, which we find in our selves, arising from a Consideration of their very Being, or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing constant Delight in him, he is said constantly to *love* them. But it suffices to Note, that our *Ideas* of *Love* and *Hatred*, are but the Dispositions of the Mind, in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caused in us.

Desire.

§. 6. The Uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the Absence of any Thing, whose present Enjoyment carries the *Idea* of Delight with it,

is,

is that we call *Desire*, which is greater or less, as that Uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the bye, it may perhaps be of some Use to remark, that the chief, if not only Spur to Human Industry and Action, is Uneasiness. For whatever Good is propos'd, if its Absence carries no Displeasure nor Pain with it; if a Man be easy and content without it, there is no Desire of it, nor Endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare *Velleity*, the Term used to signify the lowest Degree of Desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little Uneasiness in the Absence of any Thing, that it carries a Man no farther than some faint Wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous Use of the Means to attain it. *Desire* also is stopp'd or abated by the Opinion of the Impossibility or Unattainableness of the Good propos'd, as far as the Uneasiness is cured or allay'd by that Consideration. This might carry our Thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this Place.

§. 7. *Joy* is a Delight of the Mind, from the Consideration of the present or assured approaching Possession of a Good; and we are then possessed of any Good, when we have it so in our Power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a Man almost starved, has *Joy* at the Arrival of Relief, even before he has the Pleasure of using it: And a Father, in whom the very Well-being of his Children causes Delight, is always, as long as his Children are in such a State, in the Possession of that Good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that Pleasure. *Joy.*

§. 8. *Sorrow* is Uneasiness in the Mind, upon the Thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the Sense of a present Evil. *Sorrow.*

§. 9. *Hope* is that Pleasure in the Mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the Thought of a profitable future Enjoyment of a Thing, which is apt to delight him. *Hope.*

§. 10. *Fear* is an Uneasiness of the Mind, upon the Thought of future Evil likely to befal us. *Fear.*

§. 11. *Despair* is the Thought of the Unattainableness of any Good, which works differently in Mens Minds, sometimes producing Uneasiness or Pain, sometimes Rest and Indolency. *Despair.*

§. 12. *Anger* is Uneasiness or Discomposure of the Mind, upon the Receipt of any Injury, with a present Purpose of Revenge. *Anger.*

§. 13. *Envy* is an Uneasiness of Mind, caused by the Consideration of a Good we de- *Envy.*

sire,

sire, obtained by one, we think should not have had it before us.

What Passions all Men have.

§. 14. These two last, *Envy* and *Anger*, not being caused by Pain and Pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed Considerations of our selves and others, are not therefore to be found in all Men, because those other Parts of valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge, is wanting in them: But all the rest terminated purely in Pain and Pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all Men. For we *love*, *desire*, *rejoice*, and *hope*, only in respect of Pleasure; we *hate*, *fear*, and *grieve*, only in respect of Pain ultimately: In fine, all these Passions are moved by Things, only as they appear to be the Causes of Pleasure and Pain, or to have Pleasure or Pain some Way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our Hatred usually to the Subject, (at least if a sensible or voluntary Agent) which has produced Pain in us, because the Fear it leaves, is a constant Pain: But we do not so constantly love what has done us Good, because Pleasure operates not so strongly on us, as Pain; and because we are not so ready to have Hope, it will do so again. But this by the bye.

Pleasure and Pain, what.

§. 15. By *Pleasure and Pain*, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean, not only bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever *Delight* or *Uneasiness* is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful, or unacceptable Sensation or Reflection.

§. 16. 'Tis farther to be considered, That in Reference to the Passions, the Removal or *Lessening of a Pain is* considered, and operates as a *Pleasure*: And the Loss or Diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain.

Shame.

§. 17. The Passions too have most of them in most Persons Operations on the Body, and cause various Changes in it: Which not being always sensible, do not make a necessary Part of the *Idea* of each Passion. For *Shame*, which is an Uneasiness of the Mind, upon the Thought of having done something, which is indecent, or will lessen the valued Esteem which others have for us, has not always Blushing accompanying it.

Those Instances do shew how our Ideas *of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflection.*

§. 18. I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the *Passions*; they are *many more than those* I have here named: And those I have taken Notice of, would each of them require a much larger and more accurate Discourse, I have only mentioned these here,

here, as so many Instances of Modes of Pleasure and Pain resulting in our Minds, from various Considerations of Good and Evil. I might, perhaps have instanced in other Modes of Pleasure and Pain more simple than these, as the Pain of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking to remove them; the Pain of tender Eyes, and the Pleasure of Musick; Pain from captious uninstructive Wrangling, and the Pleasure of rational Conversation with a Friend, or of well directed Study in the Search and Discovery of Truth. But the Passions being of much more Concernment to us, I rather made Choice to instance in them, and shew how the *Ideas* we have of them, are derived from *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP. XXI.

Of POWER.

§. 1. THE Mind being every Day informed by the Senses, of the Alteration of those simple *Ideas* it observes in Things without; and taking Notice how one comes to an End and ceases to be, and another begins to exist, which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within it self, and observing a constant Change of its *Ideas*, sometimes by the Impression of the outward Objects of the Senses, and sometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made in the same Things, by like Agents, and by the like Ways, considers in one Thing the Possibility of having any of its simple *Ideas* changed, and in another Possibility of making that Change; and so comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we say, Fire has a *Power* to melt Gold, *i. e.* to destroy the Consistency of its insensible Parts, and consequently its Hardness, and make it fluid; and Gold has a *Power* to be melted: That the Sun has a *Power* to blanch Wax, and Wax a *Power* to be blanched by the Sun, whereby the Yellowness is destroy'd, and Whiteness made to exist in its Room. In which, and the like Cases, the *Power* we consider, is in reference to the Change of perceivable *Ideas*. For we cannot observe any Alteration to be made in, or Operation upon any Thing, but by the observable Change of *This* Idea *how got.*

of its ſenſible *Ideas*; nor conceive any Alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of ſome of its *Ideas*.

Power Active and Paſſive.

§. 2. *Power* thus conſidered, is two-fold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any Change: The one may be call'd *Active*, and the other *Paſſive Power*. Whether Matter be not wholly deſtitute of *Active Power*: as its Author GOD is truly above all *Paſſive Power*; and whether the intermediate State of created Spirits be not that alone, which is capable of both *active* and *paſſive Power*, may be worth Conſideration. I ſhall not now enter into that Enquiry, my preſent Buſineſs being not to ſearch into the Original of Power, but how we come by the *Idea* of it. But ſince *active Powers* make ſo great a Part of our complex *Ideas* of natural Subſtances, (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) and I mention them as ſuch, according to common Apprehenſion; yet they being not, perhaps, ſo truly *active Powers*, as our haſty Thoughts are apt to repreſent them, I judge it not amiſs, by this Intimation, to direct our Minds to the Conſideration of GOD and Spirits, for the cleareſt *Idea* of *active Power*.

Power includes Relation.

§. 3. I confeſs, *Power includes in it ſome Kind of Relation*, (a Relatoin to Action or Change) as indeed which of our *Ideas*, of what Kind ſoever, when attentively conſidered, does not? For our *Ideas* of Extenſion, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them a ſecret Relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have ſomething relative in them much more viſibly: And ſenſible Qualities, as Colours and Smells, *&c.* what are they but the *Powers* of different Bodies, in relation to our Perception? *&c.* And if conſidered in the Things themſelves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts? All which conclude ſome kind of Relation in them. Our *Idea* therefore of *Power*, I think, may well have a Place amongſt other ſimple *Ideas*, and be conſidered as one of them, being one of thoſe that make a principal Ingredient in our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, as we ſhall hereafter have Occaſion to obſerve.

The cleareſt Idea *of active Power had from Spirit.*

§. 4. We are abundanty furniſhed with the *Idea* of *paſſive Power*, by almoſt all Sorts of ſenſible things. In moſt of them we cannot avoid obſerving their ſenſible Qualities, nay, their very Subſtances to be in a continual Flux: And therefore with Reaſon we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame Change. Nor have we of *active Power* (which is the more proper Signification of the Word *Power*) fewer In-

ſtances,

ſtances. Since what ever Change is obſerved, the Mind muſt collect a Power ſomewhere, able to make that Change, as well as a Poſſibility in the Thing it ſelf to receive it. But yet, if we will conſider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senſes, do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an *Idea* of *active Power*, as we have from Reflection of the Operation of our Minds. For all *Power* relating to Action, and there being but two Sorts of Action, whereof we have any *Idea*, *viz.* Thinking and Motion, let us conſider whence we have the cleareſt *Ideas* of the *Powers*, which produce theſe Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no *Idea* at all; it is only from Reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from Body any *Idea* of the Beginning of Motion. A Body at Reſt affords us no *Idea* of any *active Power* to move; and when it is ſet in Motion it ſelf, that Motion is rather a Paſſion, than an Action in it. For when the Ball obeys the Stroke of a Billiard-ſtick, it is not any Action of the Ball, but bare Paſſion: Alſo when by Impulſe it ſets another Ball in Motion, that lay in its Way, it only communicates the Motion it had received from another, and loſes in it ſelf ſo much as the other received; which gives us but a very obſcure *Idea* of an *active Power* of moving in Body, whilſt we obſerve it only to transfer, but not produce any Motion. For it is but a very obſcure *Idea* of *Power*, which reaches not the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Paſſion. For ſo is Motion in a Body impelled by another: The Continuation of the Alteration made in it from Reſt to Motion being little more an Action, than the Continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the ſame Blow is an Action. The *Idea* of the Beginning of Motion, we have only from Reflection on what paſſes in our ſelves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at Reſt: So that it ſeems to me, we have from the Obſervation of the Operation of Bodies by our Senſes, but a very imperfect obſcure *Idea* of *active Power*, ſince they afford us not any *Idea* in themſelves of the *Power* to begin any Action, either Motion or Thought. But if, from the Impulſe Bodies are obſerved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear *Idea* of *Power*, it ſerves as well to my Purpoſe, *Senſation* being one of thoſe Ways, whereby the Mind comes by its *Ideas*: Only I thought it worth while to conſider here by the Way, whether the Mind doth not receive its *Idea* of *active Power* clearer from Reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any external Senſation.

§. 5. This

Will and Understanding, two Powers.

§. 5. This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or end several Actions of our Minds, and Motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular Action. This *Power* which the Mind has, thus to order the Consideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the Motion of any Part of the Body to its Rest, and *vice versa*, in any particular Instance, is that which we call the *Will*. The actual exercise of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*. The Forbearance of that Action, consequent to such Order or Command of the Mind, is called *Voluntary*. And whatsoever Action is performed without such a Thought of the Mind, is called *Involuntary*. The *Power* of Perception is that which we call the *Understanding*. Perception, which we make the Act of the Understanding, is of three Sorts: 1. Perception of *Ideas* in our Minds. 2. The Perception of the Signification of Signs. 3. The Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Disagreement, that there is between any of our *Ideas*. All these are attributed to the *Understanding*, or perceptive Power, though it be the two latter only that Use allows us to say we understand.

Faculties.

§. 6. These Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of *Perceiving*, and of *Preferring*, are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary Way of Speaking is, That the *Understanding* and *Will* are two *Faculties* of the Mind; a Word proper enough, if it be used as all Words should be, so as not to breed any Confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul, that performed those Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we say, the *Will* is the commanding and superior Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the *Understanding*, *&c.* though these, and the like Expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own *Ideas*, and conduct their Thoughts more by the Evidence of Things than the Sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and distinct Sense: Yet I suspect, I say, that this Way of Speaking of *Faculties*, has misled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been

been no small Occasion of Wrangling, Obscurity, and Uncertainty in Questions relating to them.

Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.

§. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or put an End to several Actions in himself. From the Consideration of the Extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the *Ideas* of *Liberty* and *Necessity*.

Liberty, what.

§. 8. All the Actions that we have any *Idea* of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, *viz.* Thinking and Motion, so far as a Man has a Power to think, or not to think; to move or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, so far is a Man *free*. Where-ever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power; where-ever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind directing it, there he is not *free*, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the *Idea* of *Liberty*, is the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is prefer'd to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him according to his *Volition*, there he is not at *Liberty*, that Agent is under *Necessity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*. A little Consideration of an obvious Instance or two, may make this clear.

Supposes the Understanding, and Will.

§. 9. A Tennis-Ball, whether in Motion by the stroke of a Racket, or lying still at Rest, is not by any taken to be a *free Agent*. If we enquire into the Reason, we should find it is, because we conceive not a Tennis-Ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition, or Preference of Motion to Rest, or *vice versa*; and therefore has not *Liberty*, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Rest, come under our *Idea* of *Necessary*, and are so call'd. Likewise a Man falling into the Water, (a Bridge breaking under him) has not herein Liberty, is not a free Agent. For though he has Volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the Forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the Stop or Cessation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not *free*. So a Man striking himself, or his Friend, by a Convulsive Motion of his Arm, which it is not in his Power

by Volition or the Direction of his Mind to ſtop, or forbear; no Body thinks he has in this *Liberty*; every one pities him, as acting by Neceſſity and Conſtraint.

Belongs not to Volition.

§. 10. Again, ſuppoſe a Man be carried, whilſt faſt aſleep, into a Room, where is a Perſon he longs to ſee and ſpeak with; and be there locked faſt in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himſelf in ſo deſirable Company, which he ſtays willingly in, *i. e.* prefers his Stay to going away. I ask, is not this Stay voluntary? I think, no Body will doubt it; and yet being locked faſt in, 'tis evident he is not at Liberty not to ſtay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty is not an* Idea *belonging to Volition*, or preferring, but to the Perſon having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind ſhall chuſe or direct. Our *Idea* of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For wherever Reſtraint comes to check that Power, or Compulſion takes away that Indifferency of Ability on either Side to act, or to forbear acting, there *Liberty*, and our Notion of it, preſently ceaſes.

Voluntary oppoſed to Involuntary, not to Neceſſary.

§. 11. We have Inſtances enough, and often more than enough in our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'tis not in his Power by any Thought or Volition to ſtop; and therefore in reſpect of theſe Motions, where Reſt depends not on his Choice, nor would follow the Determination of his Mind, if it ſhould prefer it, he is not a *free Agent*. Convulſive Motions agitate his Legs, ſo that though he *wills* it never ſo much, he cannot by any Power of his Mind ſtop their Motion, (as in that odd Diſeaſe called *Chorea Sancti Viti*,) but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at liberty in this Action, but under as much Neceſſity of moving, as a Stone that falls, or a Tennis-Ball ſtruck with a Racket. On the other ſide, a Palſie or the Stocks hinder his Legs from obeying the Determination of his Mind, if it would thereby tranſfer his Body to another Place. In all theſe there is Want of *Freedom*, though the ſitting ſtill even of a Paralytick, whilſt he prefers it to a Removal, is truly voluntary. *Voluntary* then *is not oppoſed to Neceſſary, but to Involuntary*. For a Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its Abſence or Change, though Neceſſity has made it in it ſelf unalterable.

Liberty, what.

§. 12. As it is in the Motions of the Body, ſo it is in the Thoughts of our Minds; where any one is ſuch, that we have Power to take it up or

or lay it by, according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are *at Liberty*. A waking Man being under the Neceſſity of having ſome *Ideas* conſtantly in his Mind, is not at *Liberty* to think, or not to Think; no more than he is at *Liberty*, whether his Body ſhould touch any other, or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one *Idea* to another, is many times in his Choice; and then he is, in reſpect of his *Ideas*, as much at *Liberty*, as he is in reſpect of Bodies he reſts on: He can at Pleaſure remove himſelf from one to another. But yet ſome *Ideas* to the Mind, like ſome Motions to the Body, are ſuch, as in certain Circumſtances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their Abſence by the utmoſt Effort it can uſe. A Man on the Rack, is not at *Liberty* to lay by the *Idea* of Pain, and divert himſelf with other Contemplations: and ſometimes a boiſterous Paſſion hurries our Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the Liberty of thinking on other Things which we would rather chuſe. But as ſoon as the Mind regains the Power to ſtop or continue, begin to forbear any of theſe Motions of the Body without, or Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then conſider the Man as a *free Agent* again.

§. 13. Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or forbear according to the Direction of Thought, there *Neceſſity* takes Place. This an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to that preference of his Mind, is called *Compulſion*; when the hindring or ſtopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Reſtraint*. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing *neceſſary* Agents. *Neceſſity, what.*

§. 14. If this be ſo (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be conſidered, whether it may not help to put an End to that long agitated, and, I think, unreaſonable, becauſe unintelligible Queſtion, *viz. Whether Man's Will be free or no?* For if I miſtake not, it follows from what I have ſaid, that the Queſtion it ſelf is altogether improper; and it is as inſignificant to ask, whether Man's *Will* be free, as to ask, whether his Sleep be ſwift, or his Virtue ſquare: *Liberty* being as little applicable to the *Will*, as Swiftneſs of Motion is to Sleep, or Squareneſs to Virtue. Every one would laugh at the Abſurdity of ſuch a Queſtion as either of theſe; becauſe it is obvious, that the Modifications of Motion belong not to Sleep, nor the Difference of Figure to Virtue: And when any one well conſiders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that *Liberty*, which is but a Power, belongs only to A- *Liberty belongs not to the Will.*

gent, and cannot be an Attribute or Modification of the *Will*, which is also but a *Power*.

Volition. §. 15. Such is the Difficulty of explaining, and giving clear Notions of internal Actions by Sounds, that I must here warn my Reader, that *Ordering*, *Directing*, *Chusing*, *Preferring*, &c. which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express *Volition*, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he *wills*. For Example, *Preferring*, which seems perhaps best to express the Act of *Volition*, does it not precisely. For though a Man would prefer Flying to Walking, yet who can say he ever *Wills* it? *Volition*, 'tis plain, is an Act of the Mind, knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes to it self to have over any Part of the Man, by imploying it in, or withholding it from any particular Action. And what is the *Will*, but the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any Thing more in Effect than a Power, the Power of the Mind to determine its Thought, to the producing, continuing, or stopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be denied, that whatever Agent has a Power to think on its own Actions, and to prefer their Doing or Omission either to other, has that Faculty called *Will*? *Will* then is nothing but such a Power. *Liberty*, on the other Side, is the Power a Man has to do or forbear doing any particular Action, according as its Doing or Forbearance has the actual Preference in the Mind, which is the same Thing as to say, according as he himself *wills* it.

Powers belong to Agents. §. 16. 'Tis plain then, That the *Will* is nothing but one Power, or Ability, and *Freedom* another Power and Ability: So that to ask whether the *Will has Freedom*, is to ask, to whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question, at first Sight, too grosly absurd to make a Dispute, or need an Answer. For who is it that sees not, that *Powers* belong only to *Agents*, and *are Attributes only of Substances, and not of Powers* themselves? So that this Way of putting the Question, *viz.* Whether the *Will be free?* is in Effect to ask, whether the *Will* be a Substance, an Agent? Or at least to suppose it, since Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else. If Freedom can with any Propriety of Speech be applied to Power, it may be atributed to the Power that is in a Man to produce, or forbear producing Motion in Parts of his Body, by Choice or Preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom it self. But if any one should ask, whether Freedom were free, he would be suspected not to understand well what he said; and he would be thought to deserve

ſerve *Midas*'s Ears, who knowing that Rich was a Denomination from the Poſſeſſion of Riches, ſhould demand whether Riches themſelves were rich.

§. 17. However the *Name Faculty*, which Men have given to this Power called the *Will*, and whereby they have been led into a Way of talking of the *Will* as acting, may, by an Appropriation that diſguiſes its true Senſe, ſerve a little to palliate the Abſurdity; yet the *Will* in truth, ſignifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or chuſe: And when the *Will*, under the Name of a *Faculty*, is conſidered, as it is, barely as an Ability to do ſomething, the Abſurdity, in ſaying it is free, or not free, will eaſily diſcover it ſelf. For if it be reaſonable to ſuppoſe and talk of *Faculties*, as diſtinct Beings, that can act (as we do, when we ſay the *Will* orders, and the *Will* is free) 'tis fit that we ſhould make a ſpeaking *Faculty*, and a walking *Faculty*, and a dancing *Faculty*, by which thoſe Actions are produced, which are but ſeveral Modes of Motion, as well as we make the *Will* and *Underſtanding* to be *Faculties*, by which the Actions of Chuſing and Perceiving are produced, which are but ſeveral Modes of Thinking: And we may as properly ſay, that 'tis the ſinging *Faculty* ſings, and the dancing *Faculty* dances; as that the *Will* chuſes, or that the Underſtanding conceives; or, as is uſual, that the *Will* directs the Underſtanding, or the Underſtanding obeys or obeys not the Will: It being altogether as proper and intelligible to ſay, that the Power of Speaking directs the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing obeys or diſobeys the Power of Speaking.

§. 18. This Way of talking, nevertheleſs, has prevailed, and as I gueſs, produced great Confuſion. For theſe being all different Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do ſeveral Actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: But the Power to do one Action, is not operated on by the Power of doing another Action. For the Power of Thinking operates not on the Power of Chuſing, nor the Power of Chuſing on the Power of Thinking; no more than the Power of Dancing operates on the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing on the Power of Dancing, as any one, who reflects on it, will eaſily perceive: And yet thisis it, which we ſay, when we thus ſpeak, that *the Will operates on the Underſtanding, or the Underſtanding on the Will*

§. 19. I grant, that this or that actual Thought, may be the Occaſion of Volition, or exerciſing the Power a Man has to chuſe; or the actual Choice of the Mind, the Cauſe of actual Thinking on this or that Thing: As the actual Singing of ſuch

a Tune, may be the Occaſion of Dancing ſuch a Dance, and the actual Dancing of ſuch a Dance, the Occaſion of Singing ſuch a Tune. But in all theſe, it is not one *Power* that operates on another: But it is the Mind that operates, and exerts theſe Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, it is the Agent that has Power, or is able to do. For *Powers* are Relations, not Agents: And *that which has the Power, or not the Power to operate, is that alone, which is, or is not free*, and not the Power it ſelf: For Freedom, or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not a Power to act.

Liberty belongs not to the Will.

§. 20. The attributing to *Faculties* that which belonged not to them, has given Occaſion to this Way of Talking: But the introducing into Diſcourſes concerning the Mind, with the Name of *Faculties*, a Notion of their operating, has, I ſuppoſe, as little advanced our Knowledge in that Part of our ſelves, as the great Uſe and Mention of the like Invention of *Faculties*, in the Operations of the Body, has helped us in the Knowledge of Phyſick. Not that I deny there are *Faculties*, both in the Body and Mind: They both of them have their *Powers* of operating, elſe neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no *Power* to operate. Nor do I deny, that thoſe Words, and the like, are to have their Place in the common Uſe of Languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much Affectation wholly to lay them by: And Philoſophy it ſelf, though it likes not a gaudy Dreſs, yet when it appears in Publick, muſt have ſo much Complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary Faſhion and Language of the Country, ſo far as it can conſiſt with Truth and Perſpicuity. But the Fault has been, that Faculties have been ſpoken of, and repreſented, as ſo many diſtinct Agents. For it being asked, what it was that digeſted the Meat in our Stomachs? It was a ready, and very ſatisfactory Anſwer, to ſay, That it was the *digeſtive Faculty*. What was it that made any Thing come out of the Body? The *expulſive Faculty*. What moved? The *motive Faculty*: And ſo in the Mind, the *intellectual Faculty*, or the Underſtanding, underſtood; and the *elective Faculty*, or the Will, willed or commanded: Which is in ſhort to ſay, That the Ability to digeſt, digeſted; and the Ability to move, moved; and the Ability to underſtand, underſtood. For *Faculty*, *Ability*, and *Power*, I think, are but different Names of the ſame Things: Which Ways of Speaking, when put into more intelligible Words, will, I think, amount to thus much: That Digeſtion is performed by ſomething that is able to digeſt;

geſt; Motion by ſomething able to move; and Underſtanding by ſomething able to underſtand. And in truth it would be very ſtrange, if it ſhould be otherwiſe; as ſtrange as it would be for a Man to be free without being able to be free.

§. 21. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think *the Queſtion is not proper, whether the Will be free, but whether a Man be free.* Thus, I think, *But to the Agent or Man.*

1. That ſo far as any one can, by the Direction or Choice of his Mind, preferring the Exiſtence of any Action, to the Non-exiſtence of that Action, and *vice verſa*, make it to exiſt, or not exiſt, ſo far he is *free*. For if I can, by a Thought, directing the Motion of my Finger, make it move, when it was at Reſt, or *vice verſa*, 'tis evident, that in reſpect of that, I am free; and if I can, by a like Thought of my Mind, preferring one to the other, produce either Words, or Silence, I am at Liberty to ſpeak, or hold my Peace; and as *far as this Power reaches, of Acting, or not Acting, by the Determination of his own Thought preferring either, ſo far is a Man free.* For how can we think any one freer, than to have the Power to do what he will? And ſo far as any one can, by preferring any Action to its not Being, or Reſt to any Action, produce that Action or Reſt, ſo far can he do what he will. For ſuch a preferring of Action to its Abſence, is the willing of it; and we can ſcarce tell how to imagine any *Being* freer, than to be able to do what he *wills*. So that in reſpect of Actions, within the Reach of ſuch a Power in him, a Man ſeems as free, as 'tis poſſible for Freedom to make him.

§. 22. But the inquiſitive Mind of Man, willing to ſhift off from himſelf, as far as he can, all Thoughts of Guilt, though it be by putting himſelf into a worſe State, than that of fatal Neceſſity, is not content with this: Freedom, unleſs it reaches farther than this, will not ſerve the Turn: And it paſſes for a good Plea, that a Man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act, what he wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty, there yet therefore is raiſed this farther Queſtion, *Whether a Man be free to will?* Which, I think, is what is meant, when it is diſputed, Whether the *Will* be free. And as to that I imagine, *In reſpect of Willing, a Man is not free.*

§. 23. 2. That *Willing*, or *Volition*, being an Action, and Freedom conſiſting in a Power of acting, or not acting, *A Man in reſpect of Willing, or the Act of Volition, when any Action in his Power is once propoſed to his Thoughts, as preſently to be done, cannot be free.* The Reaſon whereof is very manifeſt

feſt: For it being unavoidable that the Action depending on his *Will*, ſhould exiſt, or not exiſt; and its Exiſtence, or not Exiſtence, following perfectly the Determination and Preference of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the Exiſtence, or not Exiſtence of that Action; it is abſolutely neceſſary that he *will* the one, or the other, *i. e. prefer* the one to the other, ſince one of them muſt neceſſarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the Choice and Determination of his Mind, that is, by his *Willing* it: for if he did not *will* it, it would not be. So that in reſpect of the Act of *Willing*, a Man in ſuch a Caſe is not free: Liberty conſiſting in a Power to act, or not to act, which, in regard of Volition, a Man, upon ſuch a Propoſal, has not. For it is unavoidably neceſſary to prefer the Doing, or Forbearance, of an Action in a Man's Power, which is once ſo propoſed to his Thoughts; a Man muſt neceſſarily *will* the one, or the other of them, upon which Preference, or Volition, the Action, or its Forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly voluntary: But the Act of Volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a Man in reſpect of that Act of *Willing*, is under a Neceſſity, and ſo cannot be free; unleſs Neceſſity and Freedom can conſiſt together, and a Man can be free and bound at once.

§. 24 This then is evident, That in all Propoſals of preſent Action, *A Man is not at Liberty to will, or not to will, becauſe he can forbear Willing:* Liberty conſiſting in a Power to Act, or to forbear Acting, and in that only. For a Man that ſits ſtill, is ſaid yet to be at Liberty, becauſe he can walk if he *wills* it. But if a Man ſitting ſtill has not a Power to remove himſelf, is not at Liberty; ſo likewiſe, a Man falling down a Precipice, though in Motion, is not at Liberty, becauſe he cannot ſtop that Motion, if he would. This being ſo, 'tis plain, that a Man that is walking, to whom it is propoſed to give off walking, is not at Liberty, whether he *will* determine himſelf to walk, or give off walking, or no: He muſt neceſſarily prefer one or t'other of them, walking or not walking; and ſo it is in regard of all other Actions in our Power ſo propoſed, which are the far greater Number. For conſidering the vaſt Number of voluntary Actions that ſucceed one another every Moment that we are awake, in the Courſe of our Lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or propoſed to the *Will*, 'till the Time they are to be done: And in all ſuch Actions, as I have ſhewn, the Mind in reſpect of *Willing*, has not a Power to act, or not to act, wherein conſiſts Liberty: The Mind in that Caſe has not a Power to forbear *Willing*; it cannot avoid ſome Determination concerning them, let the Conſideration

ſideration be as ſhort, the Thought as quick, as it will; it either leaves the Man in the State he was before Thinking, or changes it; continues the Action, or puts an End to it. Whereby it is manifeſt, that it orders and directs one in Preference to, or with Neglect of the other, and thereby either the Continuation or Change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

The Will determined by ſomething without it.

§. 25. Since then it is plain that in moſt Caſes a Man is not at Liberty, whether he will *will*, or no; the next Thing demanded is, *Whether a Man be at Liberty to will which of the two he pleaſes, Motion or Reſt.* This Queſtion carries the Abſurdity of it ſo manifeſtly in it ſelf, that one might thereby ſufficiently be convinced, that Liberty concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at Liberty to will either Motion or Reſt; Speaking or Silence, which he pleaſes, is to ask, whether a Man can *will*, what he *wills*; or be pleaſed with what he is pleaſed with. A Queſtion, which I think needs no Anſwer; and they, who can make a Queſtion of it, muſt ſuppoſe one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determine that; and ſo on *in infinitum*.

§. 26. To avoid theſe, and the like Abſurdities, nothing can be of greater Uſe, than to eſtabliſh in our Minds determined *Ideas* of the Things under Conſideration. If the *Ideas* of Libertys and Volition, were well fixed in our Underſtandings, and carried along with us in our Minds, as they ought, through all the Queſtions that are raiſed about them, I ſuppoſe, a great Part of the Difficulties, that perplex Mens Thoughts, and entangle their Underſtandings, would be much eaſier reſolved, and we ſhould perceive where the confuſed Signification of Terms, or where the Nature of the Thing cauſed the Obſcurity.

Freedom.

§. 27. *Firſt* then, it is carefully to be remembred, That *Freedom conſiſts in the Dependence of the Exiſtence, or not Exiſtence of any Action, upon our Volition of it, and not in the Dependence of any Action, or its contrary, on our Preference.* A Man ſtanding on a Cliff, is at Liberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea, not becauſe he has a Power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty Yards upwards, for that he cannot do: But he is therefore free, becauſe he has a Power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater Force than this, either holds him faſt, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that Caſe: Becauſe the Doing, or Forbearance of that particular Action, is no longer in his Power. He that is a cloſe Priſoner, in a Room twenty Foot ſquare, being at the North-ſide of his Chamber, is at Liberty to walk twenty Foot Southward, becauſe he can walk, or

not

not walk it: But is not, at the ſame Time, at Liberty, to do the contrary; *i. e.* to walk twenty Foot Northward.

In this then conſiſts Freedom, (*viz.*) in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we ſhall chuſe, or *will*.

Volition, what

§. 28. *Secondly*, We muſt remember, that *Volition*, or *Willing*, is an Act of the Mind directing its Thought, to the Production of any Action, and thereby exerting its Power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of Words, I would crave Leave here, under the Word *Action*, to comprehend the Forbearance too of any Action propoſed, *ſitting ſtill*, or *holding one's peace*, when *walking* or *ſpeaking* are propos'd, though mere Forbearances, requiring as much the Determination of the *Will*, and being often as weighty in their Conſequences, as the contrary Actions, may, on that Conſideration, well enough paſs for Actions too: But this I ſay, that I may not be miſtaken, if, for Brevity's Sake, I ſpeak thus.

What determines the Will.

§. 29. *Thirdly*, The *Will* being nothing but a Power in the Mind to direct the operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reſt, as far as they depend on ſuch Direction. To the Queſtion, what is it determines the Will? The true and proper Anſwer is, the Mind. For that which determines the general Power of directing to this or that particular Direction, is nothing but the Agent it ſelf exerciſing the Power it has that particular Way. If this Anſwer ſatisfies not, 'tis plain, the Meaning of the Queſtion, *What determines the Will?* Is this, What moves the Mind in every particular Inſtance, to determine its general Power of directing to this or that particular Motion of Reſt? And to this I anſwer, The Motive for continuing in the ſame State or Action, is only the preſent Satisfaction in it: The Motive to change, is always ſome *Uneaſineſs*: Nothing ſetting us upon the Change of State, or upon any new Action, but ſome *Uneaſineſs*. This is the great Motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for Shortneſs ſake we will call *determining of the Will*, which I ſhall more at large explain.

Will and Deſire muſt not be confounded.

§. 30. But in the Way to it, it will be neceſſary to premiſe, that though I have above endeavoured to expreſs the Act of *Volition*, by *chuſing*, *preferring*, and the like Terms, that ſignify *Deſire* as well as *Volition*, for want of other Words to mark that Act of the Mind, whoſe proper Name is *Willing* or *Volition*; yet it being a very ſimple Act, whoſoever deſires to underſtand what it is, will better find it, by reflecting

flecting on his own Mind, and obſerving what it does when it *wills*, than by any Variety of articulate Sounds whatſoever. This Caution of being careful not to be miſled by Expreſſions, that do not enough keep up the Difference between the *Will*, and ſeveral Acts of the Mind, that are quite diſtinct from it, I think the more neceſſary; becauſe I find the Will often confounded with ſeveral of the Affections, eſpecially *Deſire*; and one put for the other, and that by Men, who would not willingly be thought, not to have had very diſtinct Notions of Things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no ſmall Occaſion of Obſcurity and Miſtake in this Matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that ſhall turn his Thoughts inwards upon what paſſes in his Mind, when he *wills*, ſhall ſee that the *Will* or Power of *Volition* is converſant about nothing, but that particular Determination of the Mind, whereby, barely by a Thought, the Mind endeavours to give Riſe, Continuation, or Stop to any Action, which it takes to be in its Power. This well conſidered, plainly ſhews, that the *Will* is perfectly diſtinguiſhed from *Deſire*, which in the very ſame Action may have a quite contrary Tendency from that which our *Wills* ſet us upon. A Man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to uſe Perſuaſions to another, which at the ſame Time I am ſpeaking, I may wiſh may not prevail on him. In this Caſe, 'tis plain, the *Will* and *Deſire* run counter. I will the Action that tends one Way, whilſt my Deſire tends another, and that the direct contrary. A Man, who by a violent Fit of the Gout in his Limbs, finds a Dozineſs in his Head, or a Want of Appetite in his Stomach removed, deſires to be eaſed too of the Pain of his Feet or Hands, (for where-ever there is Pain, there is a Deſire to be rid of it) though yet, whilſt he apprehends that the Removal of the Pain may tranſlate the noxious Humour to a more vital Part, his *Will* is never determin'd to any one Action, that may ſerve to remove this Pain. Whence it is evident, that *deſiring* and *willing* are two diſtinct Acts of the Mind; and conſequently that the *Will*, which is but the Power of *Volition*, is much more diſtinct from *Deſire*.

Uneaſineſs determines the Will.

§. 31. To return then to the Enquiry, *What is it that determines the Will in regard to our Actions?* And that upon ſecond Thoughts I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally ſuppoſed, the greater Good in View; but ſome (and for the moſt part the moſt preſſing) *Uneaſineſs* a Man is at preſent under. This is that which ſucceſſively determines the *Will*, and ſets us upon thoſe Actions we perform. This *Uneaſineſs* we may call, as it is,

Deſire,

Desire, which is an *Uneasiness* of the Mind for Want of some absent Good. All Pain of the Body, of what Sort soever, and Disquiet of the Mind, is *Uneasiness*: And with this is always join'd Desire, equal to the Pain or *Uneasiness* felt; and is scarce distinguishable from it. For *Desire* being nothing but an *Uneasiness* in the Want of an absent Good, in reference to any Pain felt, Ease is that absent Good; and 'till that be attained, we may call it *Desire*, no Body feeling Pain, that he wishes not to be eased of, with a Desire equal to that Pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this Desire of Ease from Pain, there is another of absent positive Good, and here also the Desire and *Uneasiness* is equal. As much as we desire any absent Good, so much are we in Pain for it. But here all absent Good does not, according to the Greatness it has or is acknowledg'd to have, cause Pain equal to that Greatness; as all Pain causes Desire equal to it self: Because the Absence of Good is not always a Pain, as the Presence of Pain is. And therefore absent Good may be looked on, and considered without *Desire*. But so much as there is any where of *Desire*, so much there is of *Uneasiness*.

Desire is Uneasiness.

§. 32. That *Desire* is a State of *Uneasiness* every one who reflects on himself, will quickly find. Who is there, that has not felt in *Desire*, what the Wise Man says of Hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being *defer'd makes the Heart sick?* And that still proportionable to the Greatness of the *Desire*, which sometimes raises the *Uneasiness* to that Pitch, that it makes People cry out, *Give me Children*, give me the Thing desir'd, *or I die?* Life it self, and all its Enjoyments, as a Burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved Pressure of such an *Uneasiness*.

The Uneasiness of Desire determines the Will.

§. 33. Good and Evil, present and absent, 'tis true, work upon the Mind: But that which immediately determines the Will, from Time to Time, to every voluntary Action, is the *Uneasiness* of *Desire* fixed on some absent Good, either negative, as Indolency to one in Pain; or positive, as Enjoyment of Pleasure. That it is this *Uneasiness*, that determines the *Will* to the successive voluntary Actions, whereof the greatest Part of our Lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different Courses to different Ends, I shall endeavor to shew both from Experience, and the Reason of the Thing.

This the Spring of Action.

§. 34. When a Man is perfectly content with the State he is in, which is, when he is perfectly without any *Uneasiness*, what Industry,

ſtry, what Action, what *Will* is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every Man's Obſervation will ſatisfy him. And thus we ſee our All-wiſe maker, ſuitable to our Conſtitution and Frame, and knowing what it is that determines the *Will*, has put into Man the *Uneaſineſs* of Hunger and Thirſt, and other natural Deſires, that return at their Seaſons, to move and determine their *Wills*, for the Preſervation of themſelves, and the Continuation of their Species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare Contemplation of theſe good Ends, to which we are carried by theſe ſeveral *Uneaſineſſes*, had been ſufficient to determine the *Will*, and ſet us on work, we ſhould have had none of theſe natural Pains, and perhaps in this World, little or no Pain at all. *It is better to marry, than to burn*, ſays St. *Paul*; where we may ſee what it is that chiefly drives Men into the Enjoyments of a conjugal Life. A little Burning felt, puſhes us more powerfully, than greater Pleaſures in Proſpect draw or allure.

The greateſt poſitive Good determines not the Will, but Uneaſineſs.

§. 35. It ſeems ſo eſtabliſh'd and ſettled a Maxim by the general Conſent of all Mankind, that Good, the greater Good, determines the Will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I firſt publiſhed my Thoughts on this Subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine, that by a great many I ſhall be thought more excuſable, for having then done ſo, than that now I have ventur'd to recede from ſo received an Opinion. But yet upon a ſtricter Enquiry I am forced to conclude, that *Good*, the *greater Good*, though apprehended and acknowledged to be ſo, does not determine the *Will*, until our Deſire raiſed proportionably to it, makes us *uneaſy* in the Want of it. Convince a Man never ſo much, that Plenty has its Advantages over Poverty: make him ſee and own, that the handſome Conveniencies of Life are better than naſty Penury; yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no *Uneaſineſs* in it, he moves not; his *Will* never is determin'd to any Action, that ſhall bring him out of it. Let a Man be never ſo well perſuaded of the Advantages of Virtue, that it is as neceſſary to a Man, who has any great Aims in this World, or Hopes in the next, as Food to Life; Yet 'till he *hungers and thirſts after Righteouſneſs*; 'till he feels an *Uneaſineſs* in the Want of it, his *Will* will not be determin'd to any Action in Purſuit of this confeſſed greater Good; but any other *Uneaſineſs* he feels in himſelf, ſhall take Place, and carry his *Will* to other Actions. On the other Side, let a Drunkard ſee, that his Health decays, his Eſtate waſtes; Diſcredit and Diſeaſes, and the Want of all Things, even

even of his beloved Drink, attends him in the Courſe he follows. Yet the Returns of *Uneaſineſs* to miſs his Companions, the habitual Thirſt after his Cups, at the uſual Time, drives him to the Tavern, though he has in his View the Loſs of Health and Plenty, and perhaps of the Joys of another Life: The leaſt of which is no inconſiderable Good, but ſuch as he confeſſes, is far greater than the Tickling of his Palate with a Glaſs of Wine, or the idle Chat of a ſoaking Club. 'Tis not for Want of viewing the greater good; for he ſees, and acknowledges it, and in the Intervals of his drinking Hours, will take Reſolutions to purſue the greater Good; but when the *Uneaſineſs* to miſs his accuſtomed Delight returns, the greater acknowledged Good loſes its Hold, and the preſent *Uneaſineſs* determines the *Will* to the accuſtomed Action; which thereby gets ſtronger Footing to prevail againſt the next Occaſion, though he at the ſame Time makes ſecret Promiſes to himſelf, that he will do ſo no more; this is the laſt Time he will act againſt the Attainment of thoſe greater Goods. And thus he is from Time to Time, in the State of that unhappy Complainer, *Video meliora proboque, Deteriora ſequor:* Which Sentence, allowed for true, and make good by conſtant Experience, may this, and poſſibly no other Way, be eaſily made intelligible.

Becauſe the Removal of Uneaſineſs is the firſt ſtep to Happineſs.

§. 36. If we enquire into the Reaſon of what Experience makes ſo evident in Fact, and examine why 'tis *Uneaſineſs* alone operates on the *Will*, and determines it in its Choice, we ſhall find, that we being capable but of one Determination of the *Will* to one Action at once, the preſent *Uneaſineſs*, that we are under, does naturally determine the Will, in order to that Happineſs which we all aim at in all our Actions: Foraſmuch, as whilſt we are under any *Uneaſineſs*, we cannot apprehend our ſelves happy, or in the Way to it. Pain and *Uneaſineſs* being, by every one, concluded, and felt to be inconſiſtent with Happineſs; ſpoiling the Reliſh, even of thoſe good Things which we have: A little Pain ſerving to marr all the Pleaſure we rejoiced in. And therefore that, which of Courſe determines the Choice of our *Will* to the next Action, will always be the removing of Pain, as long as we have any left, as the firſt and neceſſary Step towards Happineſs.

Becauſe Uneaſineſs alone is preſent.

§. 37. Another Reaſon why 'tis *Uneaſineſs* alone determines the Will, may be this. Becauſe that alone is preſent, and 'tis againſt the Nature of Things, that what is abſent ſhould operate, where

where it is not. It may be ſaid, that abſent Good may by Contemplation be brought Home to the Mind, and made preſent. The *Idea* of it indeed may be in the Mind, and view'd as preſent there; but nothing will be in the Mind as a preſent Good, able to counter-balance the Removal of any *Uneaſineſs*, which we are under, 'till it raiſes our Deſire, and the *Uneaſineſs* of that has the Prevalency in determining the *Will*. 'Till then, the *Idea* in the Mind of whatever Good, is there only like other *Ideas*, the Object of bare unactive Speculation; but operates not on the *Will*, nor ſets us on Work: The Reaſon whereof I ſhall ſhew by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively Repreſentations ſet before their Minds of the unſpeakable Joys of Heaven, which they acknowledge both poſſible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up their Happineſs here? And ſo the prevailing *Uneaſineſſes* of their Deſires, let looſe after the Enjoyments of this Life, take their Turns in the determining their *Wills*, and all that while they take not one ſtep, are not one jot moved, towards the good Things of another Life, conſidered as ever ſo great.

Becauſe all who allow the Joys of Heaven poſſible purſue them not.

§. 38. Were the *Will* determin'd by the Views, of Good, as it appears in Contemplation greater or leſs to the Underſtanding, which is the State of all abſent Good, and that which in the received Opinion the *Will* is ſuppoſed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not ſee how it could ever get looſe from the infinite eternal Joys of Heaven, once propoſed and conſider'd as poſſible. For all abſent Good, by which alone, barely propos'd, and coming in View, the *Will* is thought to be determin'd, and ſo to ſet us on Action, being only poſſible, but not infallibly certain 'tis unavoidable, that the infinitely greater poſſible Good ſhould regularly and conſtantly determine the *Will* in all the ſucceſſive Actions it directs; and then we ſhould keep conſtantly and ſteadily in our Courſe towards Heaven, without ever ſtanding ſtill, or directing our Actions to any other End: The eternal Condition of a future State infinitely out-weighing the Expectation of Riches, or Honour, or any other worldly Pleaſure, which we can propoſe to our ſelves, though we ſhould grant theſe the more probable to be attain'd. For nothing future is yet in Poſſeſſion, and ſo the Expectation even of theſe may deceive us. If it were ſo, that the greater Good in View determines the *Will*, ſo great a Good once propos'd could not but ſeize the *Will*, and hold it faſt to the Purſuit of this infinitely greateſt Good, without ever letting it go again: For the *Will* having a Power

a Power over, and directing the Thoughts, as well as other Actions, would, if it were so, hold the Contemplation of the Mind fixed to that Good.

But any great Uneasiness is never neglected.

This would be the State of the Mind, and regular Tendency of the *Will* in all its Determinations, were it determined by that which is consider'd, and in View of the greater Good; but that it is not so, is visible in Experience. The infinitely greatest confessed Good being often neglected, to satisfy the successive *Uneasiness* of our Desires pursuing Trifles. But though the greatest allowed, even everlasting unspeakable Good, which has sometimes moved, and affected the Mind, does not stedfastly hold the *Will*, yet we see any very great and prevailing *Uneasiness*, having once laid hold on the *Will*, lets it not go; by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the *Will*. Thus any vehement Pain of the Body; the ungovernable Passion of a Man violently in Love; or the impatient Desire of Revenge, keeps the *Will* steady and intent: And the *Will* thus determin'd, never lets the Understanding lay by the Object, but all the Thoughts of the Mind, and Powers of the Body, are uninterruptedly employ'd that Way, by the Determinations of the *Will*., influenced by that topping *Uneasiness*, as long as it lasts; whereby is seems to me evident, that the *Will* or Power of setting us upon one Action in Presence to all other, is determin'd in us, by *Uneasiness*: And whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.

§. 39. I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the *Uneasiness* of Desire, as that which determines the *Will*. Because that is the chief, and most sensible; and the *Will* seldom orders any Action, nor is there any voluntary Action performed, without some *Desire* accompanying it; which I think is the Reason why the *Will* and *Desire* are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the *Uneasiness* which makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other Passions, as wholly excluded in the Case. *Aversion*, *Fear*, *Anger*, *Envy*, *Shame*, &c. have each their *Uneasiness* too, and thereby influence the *Will*. These Passions are scarce any of them in Life and Practice, simple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others; though usually in Discourse and Contemplation, that carries the Name, which operates strongest, and appears most in the present State of the Mind. Nay, there is, I think, scarce any of the Passions to be found without *Desire* join'd with it. I am sure, where-ever there is *Uneasiness*, there is *Desire*: For we constantly desire Happiness; and whatever we feel of *Uneasiness*, so much, 'tis certain,

Desire accompanies all Uneasiness.

certain, we want of Happineſs; even in our own Opinion, let our State and Condition otherwiſe be what it will. Beſides, the preſent Moment not being our Eternity, whatever our Enjoyment be, we look beyond the preſent, and Deſire goes with our Foreſight, and that ſtill carries the *Will* with it. So that even in *Joy* it ſelf, that which keeps up the Action, whereon the Enjoyment depends, is the Deſire to continue it, and Fear to loſe it: And whenever a greater *Uneaſineſs* than that takes place in the Mind, the *Will* preſently is by that determin'd to ſome new Action, and the preſent Delight neglected.

The moſt preſſing Uneaſineſs naturally determines the Will.

§. 40. But we being in this World beſet with ſundry *Uneaſineſſes*, diſtracted with different *Deſires*, the next Enquiry naturally will be, which of them has the Precedency in determining the *Will* to the next Action? And to that the Anſwer is, That ordinarily, which is the moſt preſſing of thoſe that are judged capable of being then removed. For the *Will* being the Power of directing our operative Faculties to ſome Action, for ſome End, cannot at any Time be moved towards what is judg'd at that Time unattainable: That would be to ſuppoſe an intelligent Being deſignedly to act for an End, only to loſe its Labour: For ſo it is to act for what is judg'd not attainable; and therefore very great *Uneaſineſſes* move not the *Will*, when they are judg'd not capable of a Cure: They, in that Caſe, put us not upon Endeavours. But theſe ſet a-part, the moſt important and urgent *Uneaſineſs* we at that Time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the *Will* ſucceſſively, in that Train of voluntary Actions, which make up our Lives. The greateſt preſent *Uneaſineſs* is the Spur to Action, that is conſtantly felt; and for the moſt part determines the *Will* in its Choice of the next Action. For this we muſt carry along with us, that the proper and only Object of the *Will* is ſome Action of ours, and nothing elſe. For we producing nothing, by our *willing* it, but ſome Action in our Power, 'tis there the *Will* terminates, and reaches no farther.

All deſire Happineſs.

§. 41. If it be farther asked, what 'tis moves *Deſire*? I anſwer, Happineſs, and that alone. *Happineſs* and *Miſery* are the Names of two Extreams, the utmoſt Bounds whereof we know not; 'tis what *Eye hath not ſeen, Ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the Heart of Man to conceive.* But of ſome Degrees of both, we have very lively Impreſſions, made by ſeveral Inſtances of Delight and Joy on the one Side, and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for Shortneſs ſake, I ſhall comprehend under the Names of Pleaſure and Pain, there being

ing Pleaſure and Pain of the Mind, as well as the Body: *With him is Fulneſs of Joy, and Pleaſure for evermore:* Or, to ſpeak truly, they are all of the Mind; though ſome have their Riſe in the Mind from Thought, others in the Body from certain Modifications of Motion.

Happineſs, what.

§. 42. *Happineſs* then in its full Extent is the utmoſt Pleaſure we are capable of, and *Miſery* the utmoſt Pain: And the loweſt Degree of what can be called *Happineſs*, is ſo much Eaſe from all Pain, and ſo much preſent Pleaſure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now becauſe Pleaſure and Pain are produced in us, by the Operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies; and in different Degrees; therefore what has an Aptneſs to produce Pleaſure in us, is that we call *Good*, and what is apt to produce Pain in us, we call *Evil*, for no other Reaſon, but for its Aptneſs to produce Pleaſure and Pain in us, wherein conſiſts our *Happineſs* and *Miſery*. Farther, though what is apt to produce any Degree of Pleaſure, be in it ſelf *Good*; and what is apt to produce any Degree of Pain, be *Evil*; yet it often happens, that we do not call it ſo, when it comes in Competition with a greater of its Sort; becauſe when they come in Competition, the Degrees alſo of Pleaſure and Pain have juſtly a Preference. So that if we will rightly eſtimate what we call *Good* and *Evil*, we ſhall find it lies much in Compariſon: For the Cauſe of every leſs Degree of Pain, as well as every greater Degree of Pleaſure, has the Nature of *Good*, and *vice verſa*.

What Good is deſired, what not?

§. 43. Though this be that which is called *Good* and *Evil*; and all Good be the proper Object of *Deſire* in general; yet all Good, even ſeen and confeſſed to be ſo, does not neceſſarily move every particular Man's *Deſire*; but only that Part, or ſo much of it, as is conſidered, and taken to make a neceſſary Part of his Happineſs. All other Good however great in Reality, or Appearance, excites not a Man's *Deſires*, who looks not on it to make a Part of that Happineſs, wherewith he, in his preſent Thoughts, can ſatisfy himſelf. *Happineſs*, under this View, every one conſtantly purſues, and *deſires* what makes any Part of it: Other Things, acknowledged to be Good, he can look upon without *Deſire*, paſs by, and be content without. There is no Body, I think, ſo ſenſeleſs, as to deny that there is Pleaſure in Knowledge: And for the Pleaſures of Senſe, they have too many Followers to let it be queſtion'd, whether Men are taken with them, or no. Now let one Man place his

Satisfaction

Satisfaction in ſenſual Pleaſure, another in the Delight of Knowlecge: Though each of them cannot but confeſs, there is great Pleaſure in what the other purſues; yet neither of them making the other's Delight a Part of his Happineſs, their *Deſires* are not moved, but each is ſatisfied, without what the other enjoys, and ſo his Will is not determined to the Purſuit of it. But yet as ſoon as the ſtudious Man's Hunger and Thirſt makes him *uneaſy*, he whoſe *Will* was never determined to any Purſuit of good Cheer, poinant Sauces, delicious Wine, by the pleaſant Taſte he has found in them, is, by the *Uneaſineſs* of Hunger and Thirſt, preſently determined to Eating and Drinking; though poſſibly with great Indifferency what wholeſome Food comes in his way. And on the other Side, the Epicure buckles to Study, when Shame, or the Deſire to recommend himſelf to his Miſtreſs, ſhall make him *uneaſy* in the Want of any Sort of Knowledge. Thus, how much ſo ever Men are in earneſt, and conſtant in Purſuit of Happineſs; yet they may have a clear View of Good, great and confeſſed Good, without being concern'd for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their Happineſs without it. Though as to Pain, that they are always concern'd for; they can feel no *Uneaſineſs* without being moved. And therefore being *uneaſy* in the Want of whatever is judged neceſſary to their Happineſs, as ſoon as any Good appears to make a Part of their Portion of Happineſs, they begin to *deſire* it.

Why the greateſt Good is not always deſired.

§. 14. This, I think, any one may obſerve in himſelf, and others, that the *greater viſible Good* does not always raiſe Mens *Deſires* in Proportion to the Greatneſs, it appears, and is acknowledged to have: Though every little Trouble moves us, and ſets us on Work to get rid of it. The Reaſon whereof is evident from the Nature of our *Happineſs* and *Miſery* it ſelf. All preſent Pain, whatever it be, makes a Part of our preſent *Miſery*: But all abſent Good does not at any Time make a neceſſary Part of our preſent *Happineſs*, nor the Abſence of it make a Part of our *Miſery*: If it did, we ſhould be conſtantly and infinitely miſerable; there being infinite Degrees of Happineſs, which are not in our Poſſeſſion. All *Uneaſineſs* therefore being removed, a moderate Portion of Good ſerves at preſent to content Men; and ſome few Degrees of Pleaſure in a Succeſſion of ordinary Enjoyments makes up a Happineſs, wherein they can be ſatisfied. If this were not ſo, there could be no room for thoſe indifferent and viſible trifling Actions, to which our *Wills* are ſo often determined; and wherein we voluntarily waſte ſo much of our Lives; which Remiſneſs could by no means con-

fiſt with a conſtant Determination of *Will* or *Deſire* to the greateſt apparent Good. That this is ſo, I think few People need go far from Home to be convinced. And indeed in this Life there are not many, whoſe Happineſs reaches ſo far, as to afford them a conſtant Train of moderate mean Pleaſures, without any Mixture of *Uneaſineſs*; and yet they could be content to ſtay here for ever: Though they cannot deny, but that it is poſſible there may be a State of eternal durable Joys after this Life, far ſurpaſſing all the Good that is found here: Nay, they cannot but ſee, that it is more poſſible, than the Attainment and Continuation of that Pittance of Honour, Riches, or Pleaſure, which they purſue; and for which they neglect that eternal State: But yet in full View of this Difference, ſatisfied of the Poſſibility of a perfect, ſecure, and laſting Happineſs in a future State, and under a clear Conviction, that it is not to be had here whilſt they bound their Happineſs within ſome little Enjoyment, or Aim of this Life, and exclude the Joys of Heaven from making any neceſſary Part of it, their Deſires are not moved by this greater apparent Good, nor their *Wills* determin'd to any Action, or endeavour for its Attainment.

Why not being deſired, it moves not the Will.

§. 45. The ordinary Neceſſities of our Lives, fill a great Part of them with the *Uneaſineſs* of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Heat*, *Cold*, *Wearineſs* with Labour, and *Sleepineſs* in their conſtant Returns, *&c.* To which, if beſides accidental Harms, we add the fantaſtical *Uneaſineſs* (as Itch after *Honour*, *Power*, or *Riches*, *&c.*) which acquir'd Habits by Faſhion, Example, and Education, have ſettled in us, and a thouſand other irregular Deſires, which Cuſtom has made natural to us, we ſhall find that a very little Part of our Life is ſo vacant from theſe *Uneaſineſſes*, as to leave us free to the Attraction of remoter abſent Good. We are ſeldom at Eaſe, and free enough from the Solicitation of our natural or adopted Deſires, but to a conſtant Succeſſion of *Uneaſineſſes* out of that Stock, which natural Wants, or acquired Habits have heaped up, take the *Will* in their Turns; and no ſooner is one Action diſpatch'd, which by ſuch a Determination of the *Will* we are ſet upon, but another *Uneaſineſs* is ready to ſet us on Work. For the removing of the Pains we feel, and are at preſent preſſed with, being the getting out of Miſery, and conſequently the firſt Thing to be done in order to Happineſs, abſent Good, though thought on, confeſſed, and appearing to be good, not making any Part of this Unhappineſs in its Abſence, is joſtled out, to make Way for the Removal of thoſe *Uneaſineſſes* we feel, 'till due, and repeated Contemplation has brought it near to our Mind,

Mind, given ſome Reliſh of it, and raiſed in us ſome Deſire; which then beginning to make a Part of our preſent *Uneaſineſs*, ſtands upon fair Terms with the reſt, to be ſatisfied, and ſo according to its Greatneſs, and Preſſure, comes in its Turn to determine the *Will*.

Due Conſideration rayes Deſire.

§. 46. And thus by a due Conſideration, and examining any Good propoſed, it is in our Power to raiſe our Deſires in a due Proportion to the Value of that Good, whereby in its Turn, and Place, it may come to work upon the *Will*, and be purſued. For Good, though appearing, and allowed never ſo great, yet till it has raiſed Deſires in our Minds, and thereby made us *uneaſy* in its Want, it reaches not our *Wills*; we are not within the Sphere of its Activity; our *Wills* being under the Determination only of thoſe *Uneaſineſſes* which are preſent to us, which (whilſt we have any) are always ſoliciting, and ready at hand to give the *Will* its next Determination. The balancing, when there is any in the Mind, being only which Deſire ſhall be next ſatisfied, which *Uneaſineſs* firſt removed. Whereby it came to paſs, that as long as any *Uneaſineſs*, any Deſire remains in our Mind, there is no room for *Good*, barely as ſuch, to come at the *Will*, or at all to determine it. Becauſe, as has been ſaid, the firſt Step in our Endeavours after Happineſs, being to get wholly out of the Confines of Miſery, and to feel no Part of it, the *Will* can be at Leiſure for nothing elſe, 'till every *Uneaſineſs* we feel be perfectly removed: Which in the Multitude of Wants and Deſires, we are beſet with in this imperfect State, we are not like to be ever freed from in this World.

The Power to ſuſpend the Proſecution of any Deſire, makes Way for Conſideration.

§. 47. There being in us a great many *Uneaſineſſes* always ſoliciting, and ready to determine the *Will*, it is natural, as I have ſaid, that the greateſt and moſt preſſing ſhould determine the *Will* to the next Action; and ſo it does for the moſt part, but not always. For the Mind having in moſt Caſes, as is evident in Experience, a Power to *ſuſpend* the Execution and Satisfaction of any of its Deſires, and ſo all, one after another, is at Liberty to conſider the Objects of them; examine them on all Sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the Liberty Man has; and from the not uſing of it right, comes all that Variety of Miſtakes, Errors, and Faults which we run into, in the Conduct of our Lives, and our Endeavours after Happineſs; whilſt we precipitate the Determination of our *Wills*, and engage too ſoon before due *Examination*. To prevent this, we have a Power to *ſuſpend* the

the Profecution of this or that Defire, as every one daily may experiment in himſelf. This ſeems to me the Scource of all Liberty; in this ſeems to conſiſt that which is (as I think improperly) call'd *Free-Will*. For during this *Suſpenſion* of any Defire, before the *Will* be determined to Action, and the Action (which follows that Determination) done, we have Opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the Good or Evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due *Examination*, we have judg'd, we have done our Duty, all that we can, or ought to [illegible] Happineſs; and 'tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature to deſire, will, and act according to the laſt Reſult of a fair *Examination*.

[illegible] determination no Reſtraint to Liberty.

§ 48 This is ſo far from being a Reſtraint or Diminution of *Free dom*, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it; 'tis not an [illegible] the End and Uſe of our *Liberty*, we are removed from ſuch a Deter[illegible]e nearer we are to Miſery and ſlavery. [illegible] Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by its laſt Judgment of the Good or Evil, that if thought to attend its Choice, would be ſo far from being an Advantage and Excellency of an intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an Imperfection, as the Want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, 'till determined by the *Will*, would be an Imperfection on the other Side. A Man is at Liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it reſt quiet: He is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an Imperfection in him, if he wanted that Power, if he were deprived of that Indifferency. But it would be as great an Imperfection, if he had the ſame Indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hands or its remaining in Reſt, when he would ſave his Head or Eyes from a Blow he ſees coming: *'Tis* as much *a Perfection, that Deſire, or the Power of Preferring, ſhould be determined by Good*, as that the Power of Acting would be determined by the *Will*, and the certainer ſuch Determination is, the greater is the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by any Thing but the laſt Reſult of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, we were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might attain the Good we chuſe. And therefore every Man is put under a Neceſſity by his Conſtitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determined in *willing* by his own Thought and Judgment, what is beſt for him to do: Elſe he would be under the Determination of ſome other than himſelf, which is want of *Liberty*. And to deny, that a Man's *Will*, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment,

Judgment, is to say, that a Man *wills* and acts for an End that he would not have at the Time that he *wills* and acts for it: For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless he can have, or not have it; *will* and not *will* it at the same Time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.

The free Agents are so determined.

§. 49. If we look upon those *superior Beings* above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily *determined in their Choice of Good*, than we; and yet have no Reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot chuse what is not good; the Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.

A constant Determination to a Pursuit of Happiness, no Abridgment of Liberty.

§. 50. But to give a right View of this mistaken Part of Liberty; let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined by wise Considerations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of *Freedom* to be at Liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, which keeps us from Chusing or Doing the Worse, be *Liberty*, true Liberty, Madmen and Fools are the only Free-men: But yet I think, no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such *Liberty*, but he that is mad already. The constant Desire of Happiness, and the Constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no Body, I think, accounts an Abridgment of *Liberty*, or at least an Abridgment of *Liberty* to be complain'd of. God Almighty himself is under the Necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent Being is so, the nearer is its Approach to infinite Perfection and Happiness. That in this State of Ignorance we short-sighted Creatures might not mistake true Felicity, we are endowed with Power to suspend any particular Desire, and keep it from determining the *Will*, and engaging us in Action. This is *standing still*, where we are not sufficiently assured of the Way: Examination, is *consulting a Guide*: The Determination of the *Will*, upon Enquiry, is *following the Direction of that Guide*: And he that has a Power to act, or not to act according as such Determination directs, is a *free Agent*; such Determination abridges not that Power wherein Liberty consists. He that has his Chains

knocked off, and the Prison-Doors set open to him, is perfectly at *Liberty*, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes; tho' his Preference be determined to stay, by the Darkness of the Night, or Illness of the Weather, or Want of other Lodging: He ceases not to be free, though the Desire of some Convenience to be had there, absolutely determines his Preference, and makes him stay in his Prison.

The Necessity of pursuing true Happiness, the Foundation of Liberty.

§. 51. As therefore the highest Perfection of intellectual Nature, lies in a careful and constant Pursuit of true and solid Happiness; so the Care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real Happiness, is the necessary Foundation of our *Liberty*. The stronger Ties we have to an unalterable Pursuit of Happiness in general, which is our greatest Good, and which, as such, our Desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary Determination of our *Will* to any particular Action, and from a necessary Compliance with our Desire, set upon any Particular, and then appearing preferable Good, 'till we have duly examin'd, whether it has a Tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real Happiness: And therefore 'till we are as much inform'd upon this Enquiry, as the Weight of the Matter, and the Nature of the Case demands, we are by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true Happiness, as our greatest Good, obliged to suspend the Satisfaction of our Desire in particular Cases.

The Reason of it.

§. 52. This is the Hinge on which turns the *Liberty* of intellectual Beings in their constant Endeavours after, and a steddy Prosecution of true Felicity, that they can *suspend* this Prosecution in particular Cases, 'till they have looked before them, and inform'd themselves, whether that particular Thing, which is then proposed or desired, lie in their Way to their main End, and make a real Part of that which is their greatest Good; for the Inclination and Tendency of their Nature to Happiness, is an Obligation and Motive to them, to take care not to mistake, or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon Caution, Deliberation, and Wariness, in the Direction of their particular Actions, which are the Means to obtain it. Whatever Necessity determines to the Pursuit of real Bliss, the same Necessity, with the same Force establishes *Suspence*, *Deliberation*, and Scrutiny of each successive Desire, whether the Satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happiness, and mislead us from it. This, as seems to me, is the great Privilege of finite intellectual Beings; and I desire it may be well consider'd, whether the great Inlet, and Exercise of all the *Liberty* Men have,

have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the Turn of their Actions, does not lie in this, that they can *suspend* their Desires, and stop them from determining their *Wills* to any Action, till they have duly and fairly *Examin'd* the Good and Evil of it, as far forth as the Weight of the Thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our Duty, and all that is in our Power; and indeed all that needs. For, since the *Will* supposes Knowledge to guide its Choice, all that we can do, is to hold our *Wills* undetermined, till we have *examin'd* the Good and Evil of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in a Chain of Consequences linked one to another, all depending on the last Determination of the Judgment, which whether it shall be upon a hasty and precipitate View, or upon a due and mature *Examination*, is in our Power; Experience shewing us, that in most Cases we are able to suspend the present Satisfaction of any Desire.

Government of our Passions, the right Improvement of Liberty.

§. 53. But if any extreme Disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole Mind, as when the Pain of the Rack, an impetuous *Uneasiness*, as of Love, Anger, or any other violent Passion, running away with us, allows us not the Liberty of Thought, and we are not Masters enough of our own Minds to consider throughly, and examine fairly; God, who knows our Frailty, pities our Weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was, and what was not in our Power; will judge as a kind and merciful Father. But the Forbearance of a too hasty Compliance with our Desires, the Moderation and Restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be *free* to examine, and Reason unbiassed gives its Judgment, being that whereon a right Direction of our Conduct to true Happiness depends: 'Tis in this we should employ our chief Care and Endeavours. In this we should take Pains to suit the Relish of our Minds to the true intrinsick Good or Ill that is in Things, and not permit an allow'd or suppos'd possible great and weighty Good to slip out of our Thoughts without leaving any Relish, any Desire of it self there, till by a due Consideration of its true Worth, we have formed Appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves uneasy in the Want of it, or in the Fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's Power, every one, by making Resolutions to himself, such as he may keep, is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into Action; for what he can do before a Prince, or a great

great Man, he can do alone, or in the Presence of God, if he will.

How Men come to pursue different Courses.

§. 54. From what has been said, it is easy to give Account, how it comes to pass that though all Men desire Happiness yet their *Wills carry them so contrarily*, and consequently some of them to what is Evil And to this, I say, that the various and contrary Choices that Men make in the World, do not argue that they do not all pursue Good; but that the same Thing is not good to every Man alike. This Variety of Pursuits shews, that every one does not place his Happiness in the same Thing, or chuse the same Way to it. Were all the Concerns of Men terminated in this Life, why one followed Study and Knowledge, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one chose Luxury and Debauchery, and another Sobriety and Riches, would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own Happiness; but because their *Happiness* was placed in different Things. And therefore 'twas a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient that had sore Eyes: If you have more Pleasure in the Taste of Wine, than in the Use of your Sight, Wine is good for you; but if the Pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of Drinking, Wine is naught.

§. 55. The Mind has a different Relish, as well as the Palate; and you will as fruitlesly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or Glory (which yet some Men place their Happiness in) as you would to satisfy all Mens Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which though very agreeable and delicious Fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: And many People would with Reason prefer the Griping of an hungry Belly to those Dishes, which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether *Summum bonum* consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue or Contemplation? And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plums, or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the Things themselves, but their Agreableness to this or that particular Palate, wherein there is great Variety; so the greatest Happiness consists in the having those Things which produce the greatest Pleasure; and in the Absence of those which cause any Disturbance, any Pain. Now these to different Men, are very different Things. If therefore Men in this Life only have Hope; if in this Life they can only enjoy, 'tis not strange, nor unreasonable that they would seek their Happiness, by avoiding all Things that disease them here, and pursuing all that delight

light them; wherein it will be no Wonder, to find Variety and Difference. For if there be no Proſpect beyond the Grave, the Inference is certainly right, *Let us eat and drink*, let us enjoy what we delight in, *for to Morrow we ſhall die.* This, I think, may ſerve to ſhew us the Reaſon, why, though all Mens Deſires tend to Happineſs, yet they are not moved by the ſame Object. Men may chuſe different Things, and yet all chuſe right, ſuppoſing them only like a Company of poor Inſects, whereof ſome are Bees, delighted with Flowers and their Sweetneſs; others Beetles, delighted with other Kind of Viands; which having enjoyed for a Seaſon, they ſhould ceaſe to be, and exiſt no more for ever.

How Men come to chuſe Ill.

§. 56. Theſe Things duly weigh'd, will give us, as I think, a clear View into the State of Human Liberty. Liberty, 'tis plain, conſiſts in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we *will.* This cannot be deny'd. But this ſeeming to comprehend only the Actions of a Man conſecutive to Volition, it is farther enquired, whether we be at Liberty to *will* or no? And to this it hath been anſwered, That in moſt Caſes a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the Act of Volition; he muſt exert an Act of his *Will*, whereby the Action propoſed, is made to exiſt, or not to exiſt. But yet there is a Caſe wherein a Man is at Liberty in reſpect of *Willing*, and that is the chuſing of a remote Good as an End to be purſued. Here a Man may ſuſpend the Act of his Choice from being determined for or againſt the Thing propoſed, 'till he has examined, whether it be really of a Nature in it ſelf and Conſequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once choſen it, and thereby it is become a Part of his Happineſs, it raiſes Deſire, and that proportionably gives him Uneaſineſs, which determines his *Will*, and ſets him at Work in purſuit of his Choice on all Occaſions that offer. And here we may ſee how it comes to paſs, that a Man may juſtly incur Puniſhment, tho' it be certain that in all the particular Actions that he *wills*, he does, and neceſſarily does will that which he then judges to be good. For though his *Will* be always determined by that which is judg'd good by his Underſtanding, yet it excuſes him not: Becauſe, by a too haſty Choice of his own making, he has impoſed on himſelf wrong Meaſures of Good and Evil; which however falſe and fallacious, have the ſame Influence on all his future Conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palate, and muſt be anſwerable to himſelf for the Sickneſs and Death that follows from it. The eternal Law and Nature of Things muſt not be alter'd to comply with his ill-order'd Choice. If the Neglect

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or Abuſe of the Liberty he had to examine what would really and truly make for his Happineſs, miſleads him, the Miſcarriages that follow on it, muſt be imputed to his own Election. He had a Power to ſuſpend his Determination: It was given him, that he might examine, and take Care of his own Happineſs, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived, than not, in a Matter of ſo great and near Concernment.

What has been ſaid, may alſo diſcover to us the Reaſon why Men in this World prefer different Things, and purſue Happineſs by contrary Courſes. But yet, ſince Men are always conſtant, and in earneſt, in Matters of Happineſs and Miſery, the Queſtion ſtill remains, *How Men come often to prefer the worſe to the better*; and to chuſe that which, by their own Confeſſion, has made them miſerable.

§. 57. To account for the various and contrary Ways Men take, though all aim at being happy, we muſt conſider, whence the various *Uneaſineſſes*, that determine the Will in the Preference of each voluntary Action, have their Riſe.

From bodily Pain. 1. Some of them come from Cauſes not in our Power, ſuch as are often the Pains of the Body from Want, Diſeaſe, or outward Injuries, as the Rack, *&c.* which when preſent, and violent, operate for the moſt part forcibly on the *Will*, and turn the Courſes of Mens Lives from Virtue, Piety, and Religion, and what, before they judged, to lead to Happineſs; every one not endeavouring, or through Diſuſe, not being able by the Contemplation of remote and future Good, to raiſe in himſelf Deſires of them ſtrong enough to counter-balance the Uneaſineſs he feels in thoſe bodily Torments; and to keep his *Will* ſteady in the Choice of thoſe Actions which lead to future Happineſs. A neighbour Country has been of late a Tragical Theatre, from which we might fetch Inſtances, if there neeeded any, and the World did not in all Countries and Ages furniſh Examples enough to confirm that received Obſervation, *Neceſſitas cogit ad Turpia*; and therefore there is great Reaſon for us to Pray, *Lead us not into Temptation.*

From wrong Deſires ariſing from wrong Judgment. 2. Other *Uneaſineſſes* ariſe from our Deſires of abſent Good; which Deſires always bear Proportion to, and depend on the Judgment we make, and the Reliſh we have of any abſent Good; in both which we are apt to be variouſly miſled, and that by our own Fault.

§. 58. In

§. 58. In the first Place, I shall consider the wrong Judgments Men make of future Good and Evil, whereby their Desires are misled. For as to present Happiness and Misery, when that alone comes in Consideration, and the Consequences are quite remov'd, *A Man never chuses amiss*; he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their present Enjoyment, are what they seem; the apparent and real Good are, in this Case, always the same. For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it is felt, the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self, and drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err in our Choice of Good; we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the Pains of honest Industry, and of Starving with Hunger and Cold, set together before us, no Body would be in Doubt which to chuse: Were the Satisfaction of a Lust, and the Joys of Heaven offered at once to any one's present Possession, he would not balance, or err in the Determination of his Choice.

Our Judgment of present Good or Evil always right.

§. 59. But since our voluntary Actions carry not all the Happiness and Misery, that depend on them, along with them in their present Performance, but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed and cease to be; our Desires look beyond our present Enjoyments, and carry the Mind out to absent *Good*, according to the Necessity which we think there is of it, to the Making or Increase of our Happiness. 'Tis our Opinion of such a Necessity that gives it its Attraction: Without that we are not moved by absent *Good*. For in this narrow Scantling of Capacity, which we are accustomed to, and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one Pleasure at once, which, when all Uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us think our selves happy; 'tis not all remote, and even apparent Good, that affects us. Because the Indolency and Enjoyment we have, sufficient for our present Happiness, we desire not to venture the Change: Since we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content, is happy. But as soon as any new Uneasiness comes, this Happiness is disturb'd, and we are set afresh on Work in the Pursuit of Happiness.

§. 60. Their Aptness therefore to conclude, that they may be happy without it, is one great Occasion that Men often are not raised to the Desire of the greatest absent *Good*. For whilst such Thoughts possess them, the Joys of a future State move them not; they have little Concern

Erroneous Judgment of what makes a necessary part of our Happiness.

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or Uneaſineſs about them; and the *Will*, free from the Determination of ſuch Deſires, is left to the Purſuit of nearer Satisfactions, and to the Removal of thoſe Uneaſineſſes which it then feels in its Want of, and Longings after them. Change but a Man's View of theſe Things; let him ſee, that Virtue and Religion are neceſſary to his Happineſs; let him look into the future State of Bliſs or Miſery, and ſee there God, the righteous Judge, ready to *render to every Man according to his Deeds, to them who by patient Continuance in well-doing, ſeek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality, eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth Evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguiſh:* To him, I ſay, who hath a Proſpect of the different State of perfect Happineſs or Miſery, that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the Meaſures of Good and Evil, that govern his Choice, are mightily changed. For ſince nothing of Pleaſure and Pain in this Life, can bear any Proportion to endleſs Happineſs, or exquiſite Miſery of an immortal Soul hereafter, Actions in his Power will have their Preference, not according to the tranſient Pleaſure or Pain that accompanies, or follows them here; but as they ſerve to ſecure that perfect durable Happineſs hereafter.

A more particular Account of wrong Judgments.

§. 61. But to account more particularly for the Miſery that Men often bring on themſelves, notwithſtanding that they do all in earneſt purſue Happineſs, we muſt conſider how *Things* come to be *repreſented* to our Deſires, *under deceitful Appearances:* And that is *by the Judgment* pronounced wrongly concerning them. To ſee how far this reaches, and what are the Cauſes of wrong Judgment, we muſt remember that Things are jugded good or bad in a double Senſe.

Firſt, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleaſure or Pain.

Secondly, But becauſe not only preſent Pleaſure and Pain, but that alſo which is apt by its Efficacy or Conſequences, to bring it upon us at a Diſtance, is a proper Object of our Deſires, and apt to move a Creature that has Foreſight; therefore *Things* alſo *that draw after them Pleaſure and Pain, are conſidered as Good and Evil.*

§. 26. The *wrong Judgment* that *miſleads* us, and makes the Will often faſten on the worſe Side lies in miſreporting upon the various Compariſons of theſe. The *wrong Judgment* I am here ſpeaking of, is not what one Man may think of the Determination of another; but what every Man himſelf muſt confeſs to be wrong. For ſince I lay it for a certain Ground, that every intelligent Being really ſeeks Happineſs, which conſiſts

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in the Enjoyment of Pleaſure, wirhout any conſiderable Mixture of Uneaſineſs; 'tis impoſſible any one ſhould willingly put into his own Draught any bitter Ingredient, or leave out any Thing in his Power, that would tend to his Satisfaction, and the compleating of his Happineſs, but only by *wrong Judgment*. I ſhall not here ſpeak of that Miſtake which is the Name of *wrong Judgment*; but of that *wrong Judgment* which every Man himſelf muſt confeſs to be ſo.

In comparing preſent and future.

§. 63. I. Therefore, as to preſent Pleaſure and Pain, the Mind, as has been ſaid, never miſtakes that which is really good or evil; that which is the greater Pleaſure, or the greater Pain, is really juſt as it appears. But though preſent Pleaſure and Pain ſhew their Difference and Degrees ſo plainly, as not to leave room for Miſtake; yet *when we compare preſent Pleaſure or Pain with future*, (which is uſually the Caſe in the moſt important Determinations of the Will) *we often make wrong Judgments* of them, taking our Meaſures of them in different Poſitions of Diſtance. Objects, near our View, are apt to be thought greater, than thoſe of a larger Size, that are more remote: And ſo it is with Pleaſures and Pains, the preſent are apt to carry it, and thoſe at a Diſtance have the Diſadvantage in the Compariſon. Thus moſt Men, like ſpend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in Hand, better than a great deal to come; and ſo for ſmall Matters in Poſſeſſion, part with great ones in Reverſion. But that this is a *wrong Judgment*, every one muſt allow, let his Pleaſure conſiſt in whatever it will: Since that which is future, will certainly come to be preſent; and then, having the ſame Advantage of Nearneſs, will ſhew it ſelf in its full Dimenſions, and diſcover his wilful Miſtakes, who judged of it by unequal Meaſures. Were the Pleaſure of Drinking accompanied, the very Moment a Man takes off his Glaſs, with that ſick Stomach and aking Head, which, in ſome Men, are ſure to follow not many Hours after, I think no Body, whatever Pleaſure he had in his Cups, would, on theſe Conditions, even let Wine touch his Lips; which yet he daily ſwallows, and the evil Side comes to be choſen only by the Fallacy of a little Difference in Time. But if Pleaſure or Pain can be ſo leſſened only by a few Hours Removal, how much more will it be ſo, by a farther Diſtance, to a Man that will not by a right Judgment do what Time will, *i. e.* bring it home upon himſelf, and conſider it at preſent, and there take its true Dimenſions? This is the Way we uſually impoſe on our ſelves, in reſpect of bare Pleaſure and Pain,

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of the true Degrees or Happineſs of Miſery: The future loſes its juſt Proportion, and what is preſent, obtains the Preference as the greater. I mention not here the *wrong Judgment*, whereby the abſent are not only leſſened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in preſent, and make ſure of that, concluding amiſs, that no Evil will thence follow: For that lies not in comparing the Greatneſs of future Good and Evil, which is that we are here ſpeaking of; but in another Sort of *wrong Judgment*, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is conſidered to be the Cauſe and Procurement of Pleaſure or Pain, that will follow from it.

§. 64. *The Cauſe of our judging amiſs*, when we compare our preſent Pleaſure or Pain with future, ſeems to me to be *the weak and narrow Conſtitution of our Minds:* We cannot well enjoy two Pleaſures at once, much leſs any Pleaſure almoſt, whilſt Pain poſſeſſes us. The preſent Pleaſure, if it be not very languid, and almoſt none at all, fills our narrow Souls, and ſo takes up the whole Mind, that it ſcarce leaves any Thought of Things abſent: Or if among our Pleaſures, there are ſome which are not ſtrong enough to exclude the Conſideration of things at a Diſtance: yet we have ſo great an Abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguiſhes all our Pleaſures: A little Bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no Reliſh of the Sweet. Hence it comes, that at any Rate, we deſire to be rid of the preſent Evil, which we are apt to think nothing abſent can equal; becauſe under the preſent Pain, we find not our ſelves capable of any the leaſt Degree of Happineſs. Mens daily Complaints, are a loud Proof of this: The Pain that any one actually feels, is ſtill of all other the worſt; and 'tis with Auguiſh they cry out, *Any rather than this: nothing can be ſo intolerable as what I now ſuffer.* And therefore our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent to get rid of the preſent Evil, before all Things, as the firſt neceſſary Condition to our Happineſs, let what will follow. Nothing, as we paſſionately think, can exceed, or almoſt equal, the Uneaſineſs that ſits ſo heavy upon us. And becauſe the Abſtinence from a preſent Pleaſure, that offers it ſelf, is a Pain, nay, oftentimes a very great one, the Deſire being inflamed by a near and tempting Object; 'tis no Wonder that that operates after the ſame manner Pain does, and leſſens in our Thoughts what is future; and ſo forces us, as it were, blindfold into its Embraces.

§. 65. Add to this, that abſent Good, or which is the ſame Thing, future Pleaſure, eſpecially if of a Sort which we are unacquainted with, ſeldom is able to counter-balance any Uneaſineſs,

neſs, either of Pain or Deſire, which is preſent. For its Greatneſs being no more than what ſhall be really taſted when enjoy'd, Men are apt enough to leſſen that, to make it give Place to any preſent Deſire; and conclude with themſelves, that when it comes to a Trial, it may poſſibly anſwer the Report, or Opinion, that generally paſſes of it, they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themſelves have enjoy'd with great Pleaſure and Delight at one Time, has proved inſipid or nauſeous at an another; and therefore they ſee nothing in it, for which they ſhould forego a preſent Enjoyment. But that this is a *falſe* Way of *judging*, when apply'd to the Happineſs of another Life, they muſt confeſs, unleſs they will ſay, God cannot make thoſe Happy he deſigns to be ſo. For that being intended for a State of Happineſs, it muſt certainly be agreeable to every one's Wiſh and Deſire: Could we ſuppoſe their Reliſhes as different there, as they are here, yet the Manna in Heaven will ſuit every one's Palate. Thus much of the *wrong Judgment* we make of preſent and future Pleaſure and Pain, when they are compared together, and ſo the abſent conſidered as future.

§. 66. II. *As to Things good and bad in their Conſequences*, and by the Aptneſs is in them to procure us Good or Evil in the future, *we judge amiſs ſeveral Ways.* *In Conſidering Conſequences of Actions.*

1. When we *judge* that ſo much Evil does not really depend on them, as in Truth there does.

2. When we *judge*, that though the Conſequence be of that Moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwiſe fall out; or elſe by ſome Means to be avoided, as by Induſtry, Addreſs, Change, Repentance, *&c.* That theſe are *wrong* Ways of *Judging*, were eaſy to ſhew in every Particular, if I would examine them at large ſingly: But I ſhall only mention this in general, *viz.* That it is a very wrong and irrational Way of proceeding, to venture a greater Good, for a leſs, upon uncertain Gueſſes, and before a due Examination be made, proportionable to the Weightineſs of the Matter, and the Concernment it is to us not to miſtake. This, I think, every one muſt confeſs, eſpecially if he conſiders the uſual *Cauſes* of this *wrong Judgment*, whereof theſe following are ſome.

§. 67. I. *Ignorance.* He that judges without informing himſelf to the utmoſt that he is capable, cannot acquit himſelf of *judging amiſs.* *Cauſes of this.*

II. *Inadvertency.* When a Man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and preſent Ignorance,

which misleads our Judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an Account, and determining on which Side the Odds lies. If therefore either Side be huddled up in Haste, and several of the Sums, that should have gone into the Reckoning, be overlook'd, and left out, this Precipitancy causes as *wrong* a *Judgment*, as if it were a perfect Ignorance. That which most commonly causes this, is the Prevalency of some present Pleasure or Pain, heightned by our feeble passionate Nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check this Precipitancy, our Understanding and Reason was given us, if we will make a right Use of it, to search and see, and then judge thereupon. Without Liberty, the Understanding would be to no Purpose: And without Understanding, Liberty (if it could be) would signify nothing. If a Man sees what would do him Good or Harm, what would make him happy or miserable, without being able to move himself one Step towards or from it, what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at Liberty to ramble in perfect Darkness, what is his Liberty better, than if he were drawn up and down as a Bubble by the Force of the Wind? The being acted by a blind Impulse from without, or from within, is little Odds. The first therefore, and great Use of Liberty, is to hinder blind Precipitancy; the principal Exercise of Freedom, is to stand still, open the Eyes, look about, and take a View of the Consequence of what we are going to do, as much as the Weight of the Matter requires. How much Sloth and Negligence, Heat and Passion, the Prevalency of Fashion, or acquired Indispositions, do severally contribute on Occasion, to these *wrong Judgments*, I shall not here farther enquire. I shall only add one other false Judgment, which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken Notice of, though of great Influence.

Wrong Judgment of what is necessary to our Happiness.

§. 68. All Men desire Happiness, that's past Doubt: But, as has been already observed, when they are rid of Pain, they are apt to take up with any Pleasure at hand, or that Custom has endear'd to them, to rest satisfied in that; and so being happy, 'till some new Desire, by making them easy, disturbs that Happiness, and shews them, that they are not so, they look no farther; nor is the Will determined to any Action in Pursuit of any other known or apparent Good. For since we find that we cannot enjoy all Sorts of Good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our Desires on every apparent greater Good, unless it be judged to be necessary to our Happiness: if we think we can be happy without it,

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it moves us not. This is another Occaſion to Men of *judging wrong*, when they take not that to be neceſſary to their Happineſs, which really is ſo. This Miſtake miſleads us both in the Choice of the Good we aim at, and very often in the Means to it, when it is a remote Good. But, which Way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the Means, as not neceſſary to it, when a Man miſſes his great End, Happineſs, he will acknowledge he judg'd not right. That which contributes to this Miſtake, is the real or ſuppos'd Unpleaſantneſs of the Actions, which are the way to this End, it ſeeming ſo prepoſterous a Thing to Men, to make themſelves unhappy in order to Happineſs, that they do not eaſily bring themſelves to it.

We can change the Agreeableneſs or Diſagreeableneſs in Things.

§. 69. The laſt Enquiry therefore concerning this Matter is, Whether it be in a Man's Power to change the Pleaſantneſs, and Unpleaſantneſs, that accompanies any Sort of Action? And to that, it is plain in many Caſes he can. Men may and ſhould correct their Palates, and give a Reliſh to what either has, or they ſuppoſe has none. The Reliſh of the Mind, is as various as that of the Body, and like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a Miſtake to think, that Men cannot change the Diſpleaſingneſs or Indifferency that is in Actions, into Pleaſure and Deſire, if they will do but what is in their Power. A due Conſideration will do in ſome Caſes; and Practice, Application and Cuſtom in moſt. Bread or Tobacco may be neglected, where they are ſhewn to be uſeful to Health, becauſe of an Indifferency or Diſreliſh to them; Reaſon and Conſideration at firſt recommends, and begins their Trial, and Uſe finds, or Cuſtom makes them pleaſant. That this is ſo in Vertue too, is very certain. Actions are pleaſing or diſpleaſing, either in themſelves, or conſidered as a Means to a greater and more deſirable End. The eating of a well ſeaſon'd Diſh, ſuited to a Man's Palate, may move the Mind by the Delight itſelf, that accompanies the Eating, without Reference to any other End: To which the Conſideration of the Pleaſure there is in Health and Strength, (to which that Meat is ſubſervient,) may add a new Guſto, able to make us ſwallow an ill reliſh'd Potion. In the latter of theſe, any Action is render'd more or leſs pleaſing, only by the Contemplation of the End, and the being more or leſs perſuaded of its Tendency to it, or neceſſary Connexion with it: But the Pleaſure of the Action itſelf is beſt acquir'd, or increaſed, by Uſe and Practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a Diſtance we look'd on with Averſion; and by Repetitions, wears us into a liking

king of what poſſibly, in the firſt Eſſay, diſpleaſed us. Habits have powerful Charms, and put ſo ſtrong Attractions of Eaſineſs and Pleaſure into what we accuſtom our ſelves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at leaſt be eaſy in the Omiſſion of Actions; which habitual Practice has ſuited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very viſible, and every one's Experience ſhews him he can do; yet it is a Part, in the Conduct of Men towards their Happineſs, neglected to a Degree, that it will be poſſibly entertain'd as a Paradox, if it be ſaid, that Men can make Things or Actions more or leſs pleaſing to themſelves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may juſtly impute a great deal of their Wandering. Faſhion and the common Opinion having ſettled wrong Notions, and Education and Cuſtom ill Habits, the juſt Values of Things are miſplaced, and the Palates of Men corrupted. Pains ſhould be taken to rectify theſe; and contrary Habits change our Pleaſures, and give a Reliſh to that which is neceſſary, or conducive to our Happineſs. This every one muſt confeſs he can do, and when Happineſs is loſt, and Miſery overtakes him, he will confeſs, he did amiſs in neglecting it, and condemn himſelf for it: And I ask every one, whether he has not often done ſo?

Preference of Vice to Virtue, a manifeſt wrong Judgment.

§. 70. I ſhall not enlarge any farther on the *wrong Judgments*, and Neglect of what is in their Power, whereby Men miſlead themſelves. This would make a Volume, and is not my Buſineſs. But whatever falſe Notions, or ſhameful Neglect of what is in their Power, may put Men out of their Way to Happineſs, and diſtract them, as we ſee, into ſo different Courſes of Life, this yet is certain, that Morality, eſtabliſhed upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one, that will but conſider: And he that will not be ſo far a rational Creature, as to reflect ſeriouſly upon infinite Happineſs and Miſery, muſt needs condemn himſelf, as not making that Uſe of his Underſtanding he ſhould. The Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life, which the Almighty has eſtabliſh'd, as the Enforcements of his Laws, are of Weight enough to determine the Choice, againſt what ever Pleaſure or Pain this Life can ſhew, when the eternal State is conſidered but in its bare Poſſibility, which no Body can make any Doubt of. He that will allow exquiſite and endleſs Happineſs to be but the poſſible Conſequence of a good Life here, and the contrary State, the poſſible Reward of a bad one, muſt own himſelf to judge very much amiſs, if he does not conclude, That a Virtuous Life, with the certain Expectation of everlaſting Bliſs, which may come, is to be preferred

preferred to a vicious one, with the Fear of that dreadful State of Misery, which 'tis very possible may overtake the Guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain Hope of Annihilation. This is evidently so, though the vertuous Life here had nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual Pleasure: Which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked Men have not much the Odds to brag of, even in their present Possession; nay, all Things rightly considered, have, I think, even the worst Part here. But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale, against infinite Misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that the Wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without Madness run the Venture? Who in his Wits would chuse to come within a Possibility of infinite Misery, which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that Hazard? Whereas on the other Side, the sober Man ventures nothing against infinite Happiness to be got, if his Expectation comes to pass. If the good Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other Side, if the Wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment, that does not presently see, to which Side in this Case, the Preference is to be given? I have forborn to mention any thing of the Certainty, or Probability of a future State, designing here to shew the *wrong Judgment*, that any one must allow he makes upon his own Principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the short Pleasures of a vicious Life upon any Consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future Life is at least possible.

§. 71. To conclude this Enquiry into human Liberty, which as it stood before, I my self from the Beginning fearing, and a very judicious Friend of mine, since the Publication, suspecting to have some Mistake in it, though he could not particularly shew it me, I was put upon a stricter Review of this Chapter, Wherein lighting upon a very easy, and scarce observable Slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent Word for another, that Discovery open'd to me this present View, which here, in this *second* Edition, I submit to the learned World, and which in short is this: *Liberty* is a Power to act or not to act, according as the Mind directs. A Power to direct the operative Faculties to Motion or Rest in particular Instances, is that which we call the *Will*. That which in the Train of our voluntary Actions determines the *Will* to any Change of Operations is some present Uneasiness, which is, or at least is always accompanied with that of *Desire*. De-

ſire is always moved by Evil, to fly it; becauſe a total Freedom from Pain, always makes a neceſſary Part of our Happineſs: But every *Good*, nay, every *greater Good*, does not conſtantly move *Deſire*, becauſe it may not make, or may not be taken to make any neceſſary Part of our Happineſs. For all that we deſire, is only to be happy. But though this general *Deſire* of Happineſs operates conſtantly and invariably, yet the Satisfaction of any particular *Deſire*, can be ſuſpended from determining the *Will* to any ſubſervient Action, 'till we have maturely examin'd, whether the particular apparent Good, which we then deſire, makes a Part of our real Happineſs, or be conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with it. The Reſult of our Judgment upon that Examination, is what ultimately determines the Man, who could not be *free*, if his *Will* were determin'd by any Thing, but his own *Deſire* guided by his own *Judgment*. I know that Liberty by ſome, is pleaſed in an *Indifferency* of the Man, antecedent to the Determination of his *Will*. I wiſh they, who lay ſo much Streſs on ſuch an *antecedent Indifferency*, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this ſuppoſed *Indifferency* be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Underſtanding, as well as to the Degree of the *Will*. For it is pretty hard to ſtate it between them; *i. e.* immediately after the Judgment of the Underſtanding, and before the Determination of the *Will*, becauſe the Determination of the *Will* immediately follows the Judgment of the Underſtanding; and to place Liberty in an *Indifferency*, antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Underſtanding, ſeems to me to place Liberty in a State of Darkneſs, wherein we can neither ſee nor ſay any Thing of it; at leaſt it places it in a Subject incapable of it, no Agent being allowed capable of Liberty, but in Conſequence of Thought and Judgment. I am not nice about Phraſes, and therefore conſent to ſay with thoſe that love to ſpeak ſo, that Liberty is placed in *Indifferency*; but 'tis in an *Indifferency* that remains after the Judgment of the Underſtanding; yea, even after the Determination of the *Will*: And that is an Indifferency not of the Man; (for after he has once judg'd which is beſt, *viz.* to do, or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an *Indifferency* of the operative Powers of the Man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the Degree of the *Will*, are in a State, which, if one pleaſes, may be called *Indifferency*; and as far as this *Indifferency* reaches, a Man is free, and no farther. *V. g.* I have the Ability to move my Hand, or to let it reſt, that operative Power is indifferent to move, or not to move my Hand: I am then in that reſpect perfectly free. My *Will* determines that operative

operative Power to Reſt, I am yet free, becauſe the *Indifferency* of that my operative Power to act, or not to act, ſtill remains; the Power of moving my Hand, is not at all impair'd by the Determination of my *Will*, which at preſent orders Reſt; the *Indifferency* of that Power to act, or not to act, is juſt as it was before, as will appear, if the *Will* puts it to the Trial, by ordering the contrary. But if during the Reſt of my Hand, it be ſeized with a ſudden Palſy, the *Indifferency* of that operative Power is gone, and with it my Liberty; I have no longer Freedom in that Reſpect, but am under a Neceſſity of letting my Hand reſt. On the other Side, if my Hand be put in Motion by a Convulſion, the *Indifferency* of that operative Faculty is taken away by that Motion, and my Liberty is in that Caſe loſt: For I am under a Neceſſity of having my Hand move. I have added this, to ſhew in what Sort of *Indifferency* Liberty ſeems to me to conſiſt, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§ 72. True Notions concerning the Nature and Extent of *Liberty*, are of ſo great Importance, that I hope I ſhall be pardon'd this Digreſſion, which my attempt to explain it, has led me into. The *Ideas* of *Will*, *Volition*, *Liberty*, and *Neceſſity*, in this Chapter of Power, came naturally in my Way. In a former Edition of this Treatiſe, I gave an Account of my Thoughts concerning them, according to the Light I then had: And now, as a Lover of Truth, and not a Worſhipper of my own Doctrines, I own ſome Change of my Opinion, which I think I have diſcovered Ground for. In what I firſt writ, I with an unbiaſſed Indifferentcy followed Truth, whither I thought ſhe led me. But either being ſo vain as to fancy Infallibility, nor ſo diſengenuous as to diſſemble my Miſtakes, for fear of blemiſhing my Reputation, I have, with the ſame ſincere Deſign for Truth only, not been aſhamed to publiſh what a ſeverer Enquiry has ſuggeſted. It is not impoſſible, but what ſome may think my former Notions right, and ſome (as I have already found) theſe latter, and ſome neither. I ſhall not at all wonder at this Variety of Mens Opinions: Impartial Deductions of Reaſon in controverted Points being ſo very rare, and exact ones in abſtract Notions not ſo very eaſy, eſpecially if of any Length. And therefore, I would think my ſelf not a little beholding to any one, who would upon theſe, or any other Grounds, fairly clear the Subject of *Liberty* from any Difficulties that may yet remain.

But before I cloſe this Chapter, it may, perhaps, be to our Purpoſe, and help to give us clearer Conceptions about *Power*, if we make our Thoughts take a little more exact Survey of *Action*. I have ſaid above, that we have *Ideas* but of two

Sorts or *Action*, viz. *Motion*, and *Thinking*. These, in Truth though called and counted *Actions*, yet, if nearly consider'd, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For, if I mistake not, there are Instances of both Kinds, which upon due Consideration, will be found rather *Passions* than *Actions*, and consequently so far the Effects barely of Passive Powers in those Subjects, which yet on their Account are thought Agents. For in these Instances, the Substance that hath Motion, or Thought, receives the Impression, whereby it is put into that *Action* purely from without, and so acts merely by the Capacity it has to receive such an Impression from some external Agent; and such a *Power* is not properly an *Active Power*, but a mere passive Capacity in the Subject. Sometimes the Substance, or Agent, puts it self into *Action* by its own Power, and this is properly *Active Power*. Whatsoever Modification a Substance has, whereby it produces any Effect, that is called *Action*; *v. g.* a solid Substance by Motion operates on, or alters the sensible *Ideas* of another Substance, and therefore the Modification of Motion we call Action. But yet this Motion in that solid Substance is, when rightly considered, but a Passion, if it received it only from some external Agent. So that the *Active Power* of Motion, is in no Substance which cannot begin Motion in it self, or in another Substance, when at Rest. So likewise in *Thinking*, a Power to receive *Ideas*, or Thoughts, from the Operation of any external Substance, is called a *Power* of Thinking: But this is but a *Passive Power*, or Capacity. But to be able to bring into View *Ideas* out of Sight, at one's own Choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an *active Power*. This Reflection may be of some Use to preserve us from Mistakes about *Powers* and *Actions*, which Grammar, and the common Frame of Languages, may be apt to lead us into: Since what is signified by *Verbs* that Grammarians call *Active*, does not always signify *Action*; *v. g.* this Proposition, I see the Moon, or a Star, or I feel the Heat of the Sun, though expressed by a *Verb Active*, does not signify any Action in me, whereby I operate on those Substances; but the Reception of the *Ideas* of Light, Roundness, and Heat, wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and cannot in that Position of my Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my Eyes another Way, to remove my Body out of the Sun Beams, I am properly active; because of my own Choice, by a Power within my self, I put my self into that Motion. Such an *Action*, is the Product of *active Power*.

§ 73. And thus I have, in a short Draught, given a View of our *original Ideas*, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which

which they are made up; which, if I would consider, as a Philosopher, and examine on what Causes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones, *viz.*

Extension,
Solidity,
Mobility, or the Power of being moved;

which by our Senses we receive from Body:

Perceptivity, or the Power of Perception, or Thinking;
Motivity, or the Power of Moving;

which by Reflection we receive from our Minds. I crave Leave to make use of these two Words, to avoid the Danger of being mistaken in the Use of those which are equivocal. To which if we add.

Existence,
Duration,
Number;

which belong both to the one and the other, we have, perhaps, all the Original *Ideas*, on which the rest depend. For by these, I imagine, might be explained the Nature of Colours Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and all other *Ideas* we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the several modified Extensions, and Motions of these minute Bodies, which produce those several Sensations in us. But my present Purpose being only to enquire in to the Knowledge the Mind has of Things, by these *Ideas* and Appearances, which *God* has fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that Knowledge, rather than into their Causes, or Manner of Production, I shall not, contrary to the Design of this Essay, set my self to enquire Philosophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies, and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the Power to produce in us the *Ideas* of their sensible Qualities: I shall not enter any further into that Disquisition; it sufficing to my Purpose to observe, That Gold or Saffron, has a Power to produce in us the *Idea* of Yellow; and Snow or Milk, the *Idea* of White, which we can only have by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the Parts of those Bodies, or the particular Figures, or Motion of the Particles, which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular Sensation: Though when we go beyond the bare *Ideas* of our Minds, and would enquire into their Causes, we cannot conceive any Thing else to be in any sensible Object, whereby it produces different *Ideas*

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in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and Motion of its insensible Parts.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

Mixed Modes, what.

§. 1. HAving treated of *simple Modes* in the foregoing Chapters, and given several Instances of some of the most considerable of them, to shew what they are, and how we came by them; we are now in the next Place to consider those we call *mixed Modes*, such are the complex *Ideas*, we mark by the Names *Obligation*, *Drunkenness*, a *Lye*, &c. which consisting of several Combinations of simple *Ideas* of different Kinds, I have called *mixed Modes*, to distinguish them from the more simple Modes, which consist only of simple *Ideas* of the same Kind. These mixed Modes being also such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are not looked upon to be Characteristical Marks of any real Beings that have steady Existence, but scattered and independent *Ideas*, put together by the Mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex *Ideas* of Substances.

Made by the Mind.

§. 2. That the Mind, in respect of its simple *Ideas*, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the Existence and Operation of Things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one *Idea*, Experience shews us. But if we attentively consider these *Ideas* I call *mixed Modes*, we are now speaking of, we shall find their Original quite different. *The Mind* often *exercises an active Power in making these* several Combinations: For it being once furnished with simple *Ideas*, it can put them together in several Compositions, and so make Variety of complex *Ideas*, without examining whether they exist so together in Nature. And hence, I think, it is, that these *Ideas* are called *Notions*; as if they had their Original or constant Existence, more in the Thoughts of Men, than in the Reality of Things; and to form such *Ideas*, it sufficed, that the Mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering whether they had any real Being: Though I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from Observation, and the

the Exiſtence of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* ſo combined, as they are put together in the Underſtanding. For the Man who firſt framed the *Idea* of *Hypocriſy*, might have either taken it at firſt from the Obſervation of one, who made Shew of great Qualities which he had not; or elſe have framed that *Idea* in his Mind, without having any ſuch Patern to faſhion it by. For it is evident, that in the begining of Languages and Societies of Men, ſeveral of thoſe complex *Ideas*, which were conſequent to the Conſtitutions eſtabliſhed amongſt them, muſt needs have been in the Minds of Men, before they exiſted any where elſe; and that many Names that ſtood for ſuch complex *Ideas*, were in Uſe, and ſo thoſe *Ideas* framed, before the Combinations they ſtood for, ever exiſted.

Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.

§. 3. Indeed, now that Languages are made, and abound with Words ſtanding for ſuch Combinations, *an uſual Way of getting theſe complex* Ideas, *is by the Explication of thoſe Terms that ſtand for them.* For conſiſting of a Company of ſimple *Ideas*, combined, they may by Words ſtand for thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, be repreſented to the Mind of one who underſtand thoſe Words, though that complex Combination of ſimple *Ideas* were never offered to his Mind by the real Exiſtence of Things. Thus a Man may come to have the *Idea of Sacrilege* or *Murder*, by enumerating to him the ſimple *Ideas* which theſe Words ſtand for, without ever ſeeing either of them Committed.

The Name ties the Parts of mixed Modes into one Idea.

§. 4. Every *Mixed Mode* conſiſting of many diſtinct ſimple *Ideas*, it ſeems reaſonable to enquire *whence it has its Unity*; and how ſuch a preciſe Multitude comes to make but one *Idea*, ſince that Combination does not always exiſt together in Nature? To which I anſwer, It is plain, it has its Unity from an Act of the Mind combining thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* together, and conſidering them as one complex one, conſiſting of thoſe Parts; and the Mark of this Union, or that which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one Name given to that Combination. For 'tis by their Names, that Men commonly regulate their Account of their diſtinct Species of mixed Modes, ſeldom allowing or conſidering any Number of ſimple *Ideas*, to make one complex one, but ſuch Collections as there be Names for. Thus, tho' the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into one complex *Idea*, as the killing a Man's Father; yet, there being no Name ſtanding preciſely for the one, as there is the Name of *Parricide* to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex *Idea*, nor a

diſtinct

distinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or any other Man.

The Cause of making mixed Modes.

§. 5. If we should enquire a little farther to see what it is, that *occasions Men to make several Combinations of simple* Ideas, into distinct, and as it were, settled *Modes*, and neglect others, which, in the Nature of Things themselves, have as much an Aptness to be combined, and make distinct *Ideas*, we shall find the Reason of it to be the End of Language; which being to mark, or communicate Mens Thoughts to one another with all the Dispatch that may be, they usually make such Collections of *Ideas* into complex Modes, and affix Names to them, as they have frequent Use of their Living and Conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldome an Occasion to mention, loose and without Names, that tie them together: They rather chusing to enumerate (when they have Need) such *Ideas* as make them up, by the particular Names that stand for them, than to trouble their Memories by multiplying of complex *Ideas* with Names to them, which they shall seldom or never have any Occasion to make use of.

Why Words in one Language, have none answering in another.

§. 6 This shews us *how it comes to pass that there are in every Language many particular Words, which cannot be rendred by any one single Word of another:* For the several Fashions, Customs, and Manners of one Nation, making several Combinations of *Ideas* familar and necessary in one, which another People have had never any Occasion to make, or perhaps, so much as take notice of, Names come of Course to be annexed to them, to avoid long Peraphrases in Things of daily Conversation; and so they become so many distinct complex *Ideas* in their Minds. Thus ὀσφρησιμὸς amongst the *Greeks*, and *Proscriptio* amongst the *Romans*, were Words which other Languages had no Names that exactly answered, because they stood for complex *Ideas*, which were not in the Minds of the Men of other Nations. Where there was no such Custom, there was no Notion of any such Actions; no Use of such Combinations of *Ideas*, as were united, and, as it were, tied together by those Terms: And therefore in other Countries there were no Names for them.

And Languages change.

§. 7. Hence also we may see the Reason, *why Languages constantly change*, take up new, and lay by old Terms: Because Change of Customs and Opinions bringing with it new Combinations of *Ideas*, which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new Names, to avoid long Descriptions, are annexed to them; and so

so they become new Species of complex Modes. What a Number of different *Ideas* are by this Means wrapt up in one short Sound, and how much of our Time and Breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the Pains to enumerate all the *Ideas* that either *Reprieve* or *Appeal* stand for; and instead of either of those Names, use a Periphrasis, to make any one understand their Meaning.

Mixed Modes where they exist.

§. 8. Though I have Occasion to consider this more at large, when I come to treat of Words, and their Use; yet I could not avoid to take thus much Notice here of the Names of *mixed Modes*, which being fleeting, and transient Combinations of simple *Ideas*, which have but a short Existence any where, but in the Minds of Men, and there too have no longer any Existence, than whilst they are thought on, *have not so much any where the Appearance of a constant and lasting Existence, as in their Names:* Which are therefore, in these Sort of *Ideas*, very apt to be taken for the *Ideas* themselves. For if we would enquire where the *Idea* of a *Triumph*, or *Apotheosis* exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the Things themselves, being Actions that require Time to their Performance, and so could never all exist together: And as to the Minds of Men, where the *Idea* of these Actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain Existence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the Names that excite them in us.

How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes.

§. 9. There are therefore *three Ways whereby we get the complex* Ideas *of mixed Modes* 1. By Experience and *Observation* of Things themselves. Thus by seeing two Men wrestle, or fence, we get the *Idea* of Wrestling or Fencing.

2. By *Invention*, or voluntary putting together of several simple *Ideas* in our own Minds: so he that first invented Printing, or Etching, had an *Idea* of it in his Mind, before it ever existed.

3. Which is the most usual Way, by *explaining the Names* of Actions we never saw, or Motions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting before our Imaginations all those *Ideas* which go to the making them up, and are the constituent Parts of them. For having by *Sensation* and *Reflection* stored our Minds with simple *Ideas*, and by Use got the Names that stand for them, we can by those Names represent to another any complex *Idea* we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple *Ideas* but what he knows, and has, with us, the same Name for. For all our complex *Ideas* are ultimately resolvable into simple *Ideas*, of which

which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may ſo ſay, are alſo complex *Ideas*. Thus the *mixed Mode*, which the Word *Lye* ſtands for, is made of theſe ſimple *Ideas:* 1. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker. 3. Thoſe Words the Signs of thoſe *Ideas*. 4. Thoſe Signs put together by Affirmation or Negation, otherwiſe than the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are in the Mind of the Speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the Analyſis of that complex *Idea*, we call a *Lye:* What I have ſaid is enough to ſhew, that it is made up of ſimple *Ideas:* And it could not be but an offenſive Tediouſneſs to my Reader, to trouble him with a more minute Enumeration of every particular ſimple *Idea*, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been ſaid, he cannot but be able to make out to himſelf. The ſame may be done in all our complex *Ideas* whatſoever; which, however compounded, and decompounded, may at laſt be reſolved into ſimple *Ideas*, which are all the Materials of Knowledge or Thought we have, or can have. Nor ſhall we have Reaſon to fear, that the Mind is hereby ſtinted to too ſcanty a Number of *Ideas*, if we conſider, what an inexhauſtible Stock of ſimple Modes, Number and Figure alone affords us. How far then *mixed Modes*, which admit of the various Combinations of different ſimple *Ideas*, and their infinite Modes, are from being few and ſcanty, we may eaſily imagine. So that before we have done, we ſhall ſee, that no Body need be afraid, he ſhall not have Scope and Compaſs enough for his Thoughts to range in, tho' they be, as I pretend, confined only to ſimple *Ideas* received from Senſation or Reflection, and their ſeveral Conbinations.

Motion, Thinking, and Power, have been moſt modified.

§. 10. It is worth our obſerving, *which of all our ſimple* Ideas *have been moſt modified, and had moſt mixed Modes made out of them, with Names given to them:* And thoſe have been theſe three; Thinking, and Motion, (which are the two *Ideas* which comprehend in them all Action,) and Power, from whence theſe Actions are conceived to flow. Theſe ſimple *Ideas*, I ſay, of Thinking, Motion, and Power, have been thoſe which have been moſt modified; and out of whoſe Modifications have been made moſt complex Modes, with Names to them. For Action being the great Buſineſs of Mankind, and the whole Matter about which all Laws are converſant, it is no Wonder, that the ſeveral Modes of Thinking and Motion ſhould be taken Notice of, the *Ideas* of them obſerved, and laid up in the Memory, and have Names aſſigned to them; without which, Laws could be but ill-made,

or

or Vice and Disorder repressed. Nor could any Communication be well and amongst Men, without such complex *Ideas*, with Names to them: And therefore Men have settled Names, and supposed settled *Ideas*, in their Minds, of Modes of Actions distinguished by their Causes, Means, Objects, Ends, Instruments, Time, Place, and other Circumstances; and also of their Powers fitted for those Actions, *v. g.* Boldness is the Power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without Fear or Disorder; and the *Greeks* call the Confidence of Speaking by a peculiar Name, παῤῥησία: Which Power of Ability in Man, of doing any Thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same Thing, is that *Idea* we name *Habit:* When it is forward, and ready upon every Occasion to break into Action, we *call* it *Disposition.* Thus *Testiness* is a Disposition, or Aptness, to be Angry.

To conclude, Let us examine any *Modes of Action*, v. g. *Consideration* and *Assent*, which are Actions of the Mind; *Running* and *Speaking*, which are Actions of the Body; *Revenge* and *Murder*, which are Actions of both together, and we shall find them but so many *Collections of Simple Ideas*, which together make up the complex ones signified by those Names.

Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the Effect.

§ 11. *Power* being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are called *Causes*; and the Substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple *Ideas* which are introduced into any Subject by the exerting of that Power, are called *Effects*. The *Efficacy* whereby the new Substance or *Idea* is produced, is called, in the Subject exerting that Power, *Action*; but in the Subject, wherein any simple *Idea* is changed or produced, it is called *Passion:* Which Efficacy, however various, and the Effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing else but Modification of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action, besides these, produces any Effects, I confess my self to have no Notion, nor *Idea* of; and so it is quite remote from my Thoughts, Apprehensions, and Knowledge, and as much in the Dark to me as five other Senses, or as the *Ideas* of Colours to a blind Man: And therefore *many Words, which seem to express some Action*, signify nothing of the Action or *Modus Operandi* at all, *but* barely *the Effect*, with some Circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating, *v. g.* Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no

Idea

Idea of the Action, or Manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cause, and the Thing done. And when a Country-man says the Cold freezes Water, though the Word Freezing seems to import some *Action*, yet truly it signifies nothing but the Effect, *viz.* that Water that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any *Idea* the Action whereby it is done.

Mixed Modes made also of other Ideas.

§. 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that though Power and Action make the greatest Part of mixed Modes, marked by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other simple *Ideas*, and their several Combinations are not excluded; much less, I think, will it be *necessary* for me *to enumerate all the mixed Modes*, which have been settled with Names to them. That would be to make a Dictionary of the greatest Part of the Words made Use of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and Politicks, and several other Sciences. All that is requisite to my present Design, is to shew what sort of *Ideas* those are which I call *mixed Modes*; how the Mind comes by them; and that they are Compositions made up of simple *Ideas* got from Sensation and Reflection; which I suppose, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas *of Substances.*

Ideas *of Substances, how made.*

§. 1. THE Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great Number of the simple *Ideas*, conveyed in by the *Senses*, as they are found in exteriour Things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes Notice also that as certain Numbers of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one Thing, and Words being suited to common Apprehensions, and made use of for quick Dispatch, are called, so united in one Subject, by one Name; which, by inadvertancy, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and consider as one simple *Idea*, which indeed is a Complication of many *Ideas* together: Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple *Ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves to suppose some *Substratum*, wherein they do

do ſubſiſt, from which they do reſult; which therefore we call *Subſtances.*

§. 2. So

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* This Section which was intended only to ſhew how the Individuals of diſtinct Species of Subſtances came to be look'd upon as ſimple *Ideas*, and ſo to have ſimple Names, *viz.* from the ſuppoſed ſimple *Subſtatum* or *Subſtance*, which was look'd upon as the Thing it ſelf in which inhere, and from which reſulted that Complication of *Ideas* by which it was repreſented to us, hath been miſtaken for an Account of the *Idea* of Subſtance in general; and as ſuch, hath been reprehended in theſe Words; *But how comes the general* Idea *of Subſtance to be framed in our Minds? Is this by abſtracting and inlarging ſimple* Ideas? *No*: 'But it is by 'a Complication of many ſimple *Ideas* together: Becauſe not 'imagining how theſe ſimple *Ideas* can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we 'accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum* wherein they 'do ſubſiſt, and from whence they do reſult; which therefore 'we call Subſtance. *And in this all indeed, that is to be ſaid for the Being of Subſtance*, That we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe a *Subſtratum*; *Is that Cuſtom grounded upon true Reaſon, or not? If not, then Accidents or Modes muſt ſubſiſt of themſelves; and theſe ſimple* Ideas *need no Tortoiſe to ſupport them: For Figures and Colours*, &c. *would do well enough of themſelves, but for ſome Fancies Men have accuſtomed themſelves to.*

To which Objection of the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, our Author * anſwers thus: Herein your Lordſhip ſeems to charge me with two Faults: One, *That I make the general* Idea *of Subſtance to be framed, not by abſtracting and enlarging ſimple* Ideas, *but by a Complication of many ſimple* Ideas *together*: The other, as if I had ſaid, The *Being of Subſtance* had no other Foundation but the Fancies of Men.

* *In his firſt Letter to that Biſhop*, p. 27, &c.

As to the firſt of theſe, I beg leave to remind your Lordſhip, That I ſay in more Places than one, and particularly *Book* 3. *Chap.* 3. §. 6. and *Book* 1. *Chap.* 11 §. 9. where *ex profeſſo*, I treat of Abſtraction and general *Ideas*, That they are all made by abſtracting, and therefore could not be underſtood to mean, that that of Subſtance was made any other Way; however, my Pen might have ſlipt, or the Negligence of Expreſſion, where I might have ſomething elſe than the general *Idea* of Subſtance in View, might make me ſeem to ſay ſo.

That I was not ſpeaking of the *general* Idea *of Subſtance* in the Paſſage your Lordſhip quotes, is manifeſt from the Title of that Chapter, which is, *Of the Complex* Ideas *of Subſtances*. And the

Our Idea *of Subſtance in general.*

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himſelf concerning his *Notion of pure Subſtance in general*, he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, but only a Suppoſition of he knows not what Support of ſuch Qualities, which are capable of producing ſimple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one ſhould be asked, what is the Subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to ſay, but the ſolid extended Parts: And if he were demanded what is it, that the Solidity and Extenſion inhere in, he would not be in a much better Caſe, than the *Indian* before-mentioned, who, ſaying that the World was ſupported by a great Elephant, was asked what the Elephant reſted on? To which his Anſwer was, a great Tortoiſe: But being again preſſed to know

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firſt *Section* of it, which your Lordſhip cites for thoſe Words, you have ſet down.

In which Words I do not obſerve any that deny the *general Idea of Subſtance* to be made by Abſtraction, nor any that ſay it is made *by a Complication of many ſimple* Ideas *together.* But ſpeaking in that Place of the *Ideas* of diſtinct Subſtances, ſuch as Man, Horſe, Gold, &c. I ſay they are made up of certain Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, which Combinations are looked upon each of them, as one ſimple *Idea*, though they were many; and we call it by one Name of *Subſtance*, though made up of Modes, from the Cuſtom of ſuppoſing a *Subſtratum*, wherein that Combination does ſubſiſt. So that in this Paragraph I only give an Account of the *Idea* of diſtinct Subſtances, ſuch as *Oak, Elephant, Iron*, &c. how, though they are made up of diſtinct Complications of Modes, yet they are looked on as one *Idea* called by one Name, as making diſtinct Sorts of Subſtances.

But that my Notion of *Subſtance in general*, is quite different from theſe, and has no ſuch Combination of ſimple *Ideas* in it, is evident from the immediate following Words, where I ſay: ‖ 'The *Idea* of *pure* 'Subſtance in general, is only a Suppoſition of we 'know not what Support of ſuch Qualities as 'are capable of producing ſimple *Ideas* in us.' And theſe two I plainly diſtinguiſh all along, particularly where I ſay, 'Whatever therefore be the ſecret and *abſtract* Nature of Subſtance 'in general, all the *Ideas* we have of particular diſtinct Subſtances, are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, 'co-exiſting in ſuch, tho' unknown Cauſe of their Union, as 'makes the whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf.

‖ B. II. c. 23. §. 2.

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know what gave Support to the broad-back'd Tortoiſe, replied, ſomething, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other Caſes, where we uſe Words without having clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, we talk like Children; who, being queſtioned what ſuch a Thing is, which they know not, readily give this ſatisfactory Anſwer, That it is *ſomething*; which in Truth ſignifies no more, when ſo uſed either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the Thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no diſtinct *Idea* of at all, and ſo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the Dark. The *Idea* then we have, to which we give the general Name Subſtance, being nothing but the ſuppoſed, but unknown Support of thoſe Qualities, we find exiſting, which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt *ſine re ſubſtante*, without ſomething to ſupport them, we call

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The other Thing laid to my Charge, is, as if I took the *Being of Subſtance* to be doubtful, or render'd it ſo by the imperfect and ill grounded *Idea* I have given of it. To which I beg Leave to ſay, That I ground not the *Being*, but the *Idea* of Subſtance, on our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*; for 'tis of the *Idea* alone I ſpeak there, and not of the *Being of Subſtance*. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, That a Man is a Subſtance, I cannot be ſuppoſed to queſtion or doubt of the *Being of Subſtance*, till I can queſtion or doubt of my own *Being*. Farther, I ſay, 'Senſation convinces us, that there are ſolid, extended Subſtances, and Reflections, that there are thinking ones.' So that I think the *Being of Subſtance* is not ſhaken by what I have ſaid: And if the *Idea* of it ſhould be yet (the *Being* of Things depending not on our *Ideas*) the *Being of Subſtance* would not be at all ſhaken by my ſaying, We had but an obſcure imperfect *Idea* of it, and that that *Idea* came from our accuſtoming our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*; or indeed, if I ſhould ſay, We had no *Idea* of Subſtance at all. For a great many Things may be, and are granted to have a *Being*, and be in Nature, of which we have no *Ideas*. For Example: It cannot be doubted but there are diſtinct Species of ſeparate Spirits, of which yet we have no diſtinct *Ideas* at all: It cannot be queſtioned but Spirits have Ways of communicating their Thoughts, and yet we have no *Idea* of it all. *Ib.* §. 29.

The *Being* then of *Subſtance* being ſafe and ſecure, notwithſtanding any Thing I have ſaid, let us ſee whether the *Idea* of it be not ſo too. Your Lordſhip asks, with Concern, *And is this all indeed that is to be ſaid for the Being* (if your Lordſhip pleaſe, let

call that Support *Substantia*; which, according to the true Import of the Word, is in plain *English*, *standing under*, or *upholding*. *

Of the Sorts of Substances.

§. 3. An obscure and relative *Idea* of Substance in general, being thus made, we come to have the *Ideas of particular Sorts of Substances*, by collecting such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are, by Experience and Observation of Mens Senses, taken Notice of to exist together, and are therefore supppos'd to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the *Ideas* of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, &c. of which Substances, whether any one has any other clear *Idea*, farther than of certain simple *Ideas* co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own Experience.

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it be the *Idea*) *of Substance*, that we accustom our selves to suppose a *Substratum*? *Is that Custom grounded upon true Reason, or no?* I have said that it is grounded upon this, 'That 'we cannot *conceive* how simple *Ideas* of sensi- 'ble Qualities should subsist alone; and therefore 'we suppose them to exist in, and to be support- 'ed by some common Subject; which Support, we denote by 'the Name *Substance*.' Which, I think, is a true *Reason*, because it is the same your Lordship grounds the Supposition of a *Substratum* on, in this very Page; even on the *Repugnancy to our Conceptions, that Modes and Accidents should subsist by themselves*. So that I have the good Luck to agree here with your Lordship: And consequently conclude, I have your Approbation in this, That the *Substratum* to Modes or Accidents, which is our *Idea* of Substance in general, is founded in this, 'That we cannot 'conceive how Modes or Accidents can subsist by themselves.

B. II. c. 23. §. 4.

* From this Paragraph, there hath been raised an Objection by the Bishop of *Worcester*, as if our Author's Doctrine here concerning *Ideas*, *had almost discarded Substance out of the World*. His Words in this second Paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the *Gentlemen of this new Way of Reasoning, that have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable Part of the World*. To which our Author replies: *This, my Lord, is an Accusation, which your Lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not understand what is almost *to discard Substance out of the reasonable Part of the World*. If your Lordship means by it, That I deny, or doubt, that there is in the World any such Thing as Substance,

* *In his first Letter to that Bishop*, p. 6, &c.

Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities, obſervable in Iron, or a Diamond put together, that make the true complex *Idea* of thoſe Subſtances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a Philoſopher; who, whatever ſubſtantial Forms he may talk of, has no other *Idea* of thoſe Subſtances than what is framed by a Collection of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which are to be found in them; only we muſt take notice, that our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, beſides all thoſe ſimple *Ideas* they are made up of, have always the confuſed *Idea* of *ſomething* to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt: And therefore, when we ſpeak of any Sort of Subſtance, we ſay it is a *Thing* having ſuch or ſuch Qualities, as Body is a *Thing* that is extended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit, a *Thing* capable of thinking; and ſo Hardneſs, Friability, and Power

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ſtance, that your Lordſhip will acquit me of, when your Lordſhip looks again in this 23d Chapter of the ſecond Book, which you have cited more than once: where you will find theſe Words, §. 4. '*When we talk or think of any particular Sort of corporeal Subſtances, as Horſe, Stone, &c. the* Idea *we have of either* 'of them, *be but the Complication or Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple* 'Ideas *of ſenſible Qualities, which we uſe to find united in the Thing,* 'called *Horſe or Stone; yet becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould* 'ſubſiſt *alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and ſup-* 'ported *by ſome common Subject which Support we denote by the Name* 'Subſtance; *tho' it be certain, we have no clear or diſtinct* Idea *of that* 'Thing *we ſuppoſe a Support.* And again, § 5. '*The ſame happens* 'concerning *the Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reaſoning,* 'Fearing, &c. *which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor ap-* 'prehending *how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, are apt to* 'think *thoſe the Actions of ſome other Subſtance, which we call Spirit,* 'whereby *yet it is evident, that having no other* Idea *or Notion of Matter, but ſomething wherein thoſe many ſimple Qualities, which affect* 'our *Senſes, do ſubſiſt, by ſuppoſing a Subſtance, wherein Thinking,* 'Knowing, *Doubting, and a Power of Moving, &c. do ſubſiſt. We* 'have *as clear a Notion of the Nature or Subſtance of Spirit, as we* 'have *of a Body; tho' one being ſuppoſed to be (without knowing what* 'it *is) the* Subſtratum *of thoſe ſimple* Ideas *we have from without;* 'and *the other ſuppoſed (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the* 'Subſtratum *to thoſe Operations, which we experiment in our ſelves* 'within. And again, §. 6. '*Whatever therefore be the ſecret Na-* 'ture *of Subſtance in general, all the* Ideas *we have of particular diſtinct Subſtances, are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple* Ideas 'co-exiſting *in ſuch, tho' unknown, Cauſe of their Union, as makes the*

Power to draw Iron, we ſay, are Qualities to be found in a Load-Stone. Theſe, and the like Faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, that the Subſtance is ſuppoſed always *ſomething* beſides the Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other obſervable *Ideas* though we know not what it is.

No clear Idea *of Subſtance in general.*

§. 40. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular Sort of corporeal Subſtances, as *Horſe*, *Stone*, &c. though the *Idea* we have of either of them be but the Complication or Collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* of ſenſible Qualities, which we uſe to find united in the Thing called *Horſe* or *Stone*; yet becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and ſupported by ſome common Subject; *which Support, we denote by the Name Subſtance*, though it be certain we have no clear or diſtinct *Idea* of that *Thing* we ſuppoſe a Support.

§. 5. The

' *whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf.*' And I farther ſay in the ſame Section, ' *That we ſuppoſe theſe Combinations to reſt in, and to be adherent to* ' *that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any Thing elſe.* ' *And that our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances, beſides all thoſe ſimple* ' Ideas *they are made up of, have always the confuſed* Idea *of ſome-* ' *thing to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt*; *and therefore* ' *when we ſpeak of any Sort of Subſtance, we ſay it is a Thing having* ' *ſuch and ſuch Qualities*; *a Body is a Thing that is extended, figu-* ' *red, and capable of Motion*; *a Spirit, a Thing capable of Thinking.*

Theſe, and the like Faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, That the Subſtance is ſuppoſed *always ſomething*, beſides the Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other obſervable *Idea*, though we know not what it is.

‡B. II. c. 23. §. 22.

' Our *Idea* of Body, I ſay, ‡ is an extended, ' ſolid Subſtance; and our *Idea* of our Soul, is ' of a Subſtance that thinks.' So that as long as there is any ſuch Thing as Body or Spirit in the World, I have done nothing towards the *diſcarding Subſtance out of the reaſonable Part of the World.* Nay, as long as there is any ſimple *Idea* or ſenſible Quality left, according to my Way of Arguing, Subſtance cannot be diſcarded, becauſe all ſimple, *Ideas*, all ſenſible Qualities, carry with them a Suppoſition of a *Subſtratum* to exiſt in, and of a Subſtance where they inhere; and of this that whole Chapter is ſo full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have *almoſt*, or one jot *diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable Part of the World.* And of this *Man*, *Horſe*, *Sun*, *Water*, *Iron*, *Diamond*, &c. which I have mentioned

of

As clear an Idea of Spirit, as Body.

§. 5. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz.* Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, *&c.* which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other *Substance*, which we call Spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *Idea* or Notion of Matter, but *Something* wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein *Thinking*, *Knowing*, *Doubting*, and a Power of Moving, *&c.* do subsist, *We have as clear a Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body*; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *Substratum* to those simple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the *Substratum* to those Operations which we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain then, that the *Idea* of corporeal *Substance* in

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of distinct Sorts of *Substances*, will be my Witnesses as long as any such Thing remain in Being; of which I say, * '*That the* Ideas *of Substances are such Combinations of simple* Ideas, *as are taken to represent distinct particular Things, subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused* Idea *of Substance is always the first and chief.*

* B. II. c. 12. § 6.

If by *almost discarding Substance out of the reasonable Part of the World*, your Lordship means, That I have destroyed, and *almost discarded* the true *Idea* we have of it, by calling it a *Substratum*, * *A Supposition of we know not what Support of such Qualities as are capable of producing simple* Ideas *in us, an obscure relative* Idea. † '*That without knowing what it is, it is that which supports Accidents; so that of Substance, we have no* Idea *of what it is, but only a confused, obscure one, of what it does.*

* B. II. c. 23. §. 1 §. 2. §. 3.
† B. II. c. 13. §. 19.

I must confess thus, and the like I have said of our *Idea* of Substance; and should be very glad to be convinced by your Lordship, or any Body else, that I have spoken too meanly of it. He that would shew me a more clear and distinct *Idea* of Substance, would do me a Kindness I should thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own Thoughts, or in the Books of Logicians; for their Account or *Idea* of it, is, that it is *Ens* or *Res per se Subsistens*, *& subsians Accidentibus*; which, in Effect, is no more but that Substance is a *Being* or *Thing*, or in short, *something* they know not what, or of which they

in Matter, is as remote from our Conceptions and Apprehenſions, as that of ſpiritual *Subſtance*, or *Spirit*; and therefore from our not having any Notion of the *Subſtance* of Spirit, we can no more conclude its Non-exiſtence, than we can, for the ſame Reaſon, deny the Exiſtence of Body: It being as rational to affirm, there is no Body, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the *Subſtance* of Matter, as to ſay, there is no Spirit, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the *Subſtance* of a Spirit.

Of the Sorts of Subſtances.

§. 6. Whatever therefore be the ſecret and abſtract Nature of *Subſtance* in general, all *the* Ideas *we have of particular diſtinct Sorts of Subſtances*, are nothing but ſeveral Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, co-exiſting in ſuch, though unknown, Cauſe of their Union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of it ſelf. 'Tis by ſuch Combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, and nothing elſe, that we repreſent particular Sorts of *Subſtances* to our ſelves; ſuch are the *Ideas*

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they have no clearer *Idea*, than that it is *ſomething* which ſupports Accidents, or other ſimple *Ideas* or Modes, or an Accident. So that I do not ſee but *Burgerſdicius*, *Sanderſon*, and the whole Tribe of *Logicians*, muſt be reckon'd with *the Gentlemen of this new Way of Reaſoning, who have almoſt diſcarded Subſtance out of the reaſonable Part of the World.*

But ſuppoſing, my Lord, that I, or theſe Gentlemen, Logicians of Note in the Schools ſhould own, That we have a very imperfect, obſcure inadequate *Idea* of Subſtance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with diſcarding Subſtance out of the World? For what *almoſt* diſcarding, and *reaſonable Part* of the World, ſignifies, I muſt confeſs I do not clearly comprehend: But let *almoſt*, and *reaſonable Part* ſignify here what they will, for I dare ſay, your Lordſhip meant ſomething by them; would not your Lordſhip think you were a little hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging your ſelf to have a very imperfect and inadequate *Idea* of God, or of ſeveral other Things which in this very Treatiſe you confeſs our Underſtandings come ſhort in, and cannot comprehend, you ſhould be accuſed to be one of *theſe Gentlemen that have almoſt diſcarded* God, or thoſe other myſterious Things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate *Ideas*, *out of the reaſonable World*? For I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip means by *almoſt diſcarding out of the reaſonable World*, ſomething that is blameable, for it ſeems not to be inſerted for a Commendation: And yet I think he deſerves no Blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obſcure *Ideas*, where he has

Ideas we have of their ſeveral Species in our Minds; and ſuch only do we, by their ſpecifick Names, ſignify to others, *v. g. Man, Horſe, Sun, Water, Iron*; upon hearing which Words, every one, who underſtands the Language, frames in his Mind a Combination of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, which he has uſually obſerved, or fancied to exiſt together under that Denomination; all which he ſuppoſes to reſt in, and be as it were, adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any Thing elſe. Though in the mean time it be manifeſt, and every one upon Enquiry into his own Thoughts, will find that he has no other *Idea* of any *Subſtance*, *v. g.* let it be *Gold, Horſe, Iron, Man, Vitriol, Bread*, but what he has barely of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which he ſuppoſes to inhere, with a Suppoſition of ſuch a *Subſtratum* as gives, as it were, a Support to thoſe Qualities, or ſimple *Ideas*, which he has obſerved to exiſt united together. Thus the *Idea* of the *Sun*,

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has no better: However, if it be inferr'd from thence, that either he *almoſt excludes* thoſe Things out of Being, or out of rational Diſcourſe, if that be meant by *the reaſonable World*, for the firſt of theſe will not hold, becauſe the Being of Things in the World depends not on our *Ideas*: The latter indeed is true in ſome Degree, but is no Fault; for it is certian, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confus'd, obſcure *Ideas*, we cannot diſcourſe and reaſon about thoſe Things ſo well, fully, and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear, and diſtinct *Ideas*.

Other Objections are made againſt the following Parts of this Paragraph by that Reverend Prelate, *viz.* The Repetition of the Story of the *Indian* Philoſopher, and the talking like Children about Subſtance: To which our Author replies:

Your Lordſhip, I muſt own, with great Reaſon, takes notice, that I *paralleld more than once* our *Idea* of Subſtance with the *Indian* Philoſopher's. He knew not what ſupported the Tortoiſe, &c.

This Repetition is, I confeſs, a Fault in exact Writing: But I having acknowledg'd and excus'd it in *theſe* Words in my Preface; *I am not ignorant how little I herein conſult my own Reputation, when I knowingly let my Eſſay go with a Fault ſo apt to diſguſt the* moſt judicious, who are always *the nicer Readers.* And there farther add, *That I did not publiſh my Eſſay for ſuch great Maſters of Knowledge as your Lordſhip; but fitted it to Men of my own Size, to whom Repetitions might be ſometimes uſeful.* It would not therefore have been beſide your Lordſhip's Generoſity (who were not intended to be provoked by this Repetition) to have paſſed

What is it but an Aggregate of thoſe ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, Bright, Hot, Roundiſh, having a conſtant regular Motion, at a certain Diſtance from us, and perhaps, ſome other? As he who thinks and diſcourſes of the *Sun*, has been more or leſs accurate, in obſerving thoſe ſenſible Qualities, *Ideas*, or Properties, which are in that Thing, which he calls the *Sun*.

Power a great Part of our complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

§. 7. For he has the perfecteſt *Idea* of any of the particular Sorts of *Subſtances*, who has gather'd and put together moſt of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which do exiſt in it, among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and paſſive Capacities; which though not ſimple *Ideas*, yet in this Reſpect, for Brevity's ſake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongſt them. Thus the Power of drawing Iron, is one of the *Ideas* of the complex one of that Subſtance we call

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paſſed by ſuch a Fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower Rank of Writers. But I ſee your Lordſhip would have me exact, and without any Faults; and I wiſh I could be ſo, the better to deſerve your Lordſhip's Approbation.

My Saying, '*That when we talk of Subſtance, we talk like Chil-*
'*dren; who being ask'd a Queſtion about ſomething, which they know*
'*no', readily give this ſatisfactory Anſwer,* That it is ſomething; your Lordſhip ſeems mightily to lay to Heart in theſe Words that follow; *If this be the Truth of the Caſe, we muſt ſtill talk like Children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational* Idea *of Subſtance, we can have no Principle of Certainty to go upon this Debate.*

If your Lordſhip has any better and diſtincter *Idea* of Subſtance than mine is, which I have given an Account of, your Lordſhip is not at all concern'd in what I have there ſaid. But thoſe whoſe *Idea* of *Subſtance*, whether a *rational* or not rational *Idea*, is like mine, ſomething he knows not what, muſt in that, with me, talk like Children, when they ſpeak of ſomething they know not what. For a Philoſopher that ſays, That which ſupports Accidents, is ſomething he knows not what; and a Country-man that ſays, The Foundation of the great Church at *Harlem*, is ſupported by ſomething he knows not what; and a Child that ſtands in the Dark, upon his Mother's Muff, and ſays he ſtands upon ſomething he knows not what, in this Reſpect talk all three alike. But if the Country-man knows, that the Foundation of the Church of *Harlem* is ſupported by a Rock, as the Houſes about *Briſtol* are; or by Gravel, as the Houſes about *London* are; or by wooden Piles, as the Houſes in *Amſterdam* are;

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call a *Load-ſtone*, and a Power to be ſo drawn, is a Part of the complex one we call *Iron*; which Powers paſs for inherent Qualities in thoſe Subjects. Becauſe every *Subſtance* being as apt, by the Powers we obſerve in it, to change ſome ſenſible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which we receive immediately from it, does, by thoſe new ſenſible Qualities introduced into other Subjects, diſcover to us thoſe Powers which do thereby mediately affect our Senſes, as regularly as its ſenſible Qualities do it immediately, *v. g.* we immediately by our Senſes perceive in *Fire* its Heat and

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it is plain, that then having a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the Thing that ſupports the Church, he does not talk of this Matter as a Child; nor will he of the Support of Accidents, when he has a clearer and more diſtinct *Idea* of it, than that it is barely *ſomething*. But as long as we think like Children, in Caſes where our *Ideas* are no clearer nor diſtincter than theirs, I agree with your Lordſhip, That *I know not how it can be remedied*, but that we muſt talk like them.

Farther, the Biſhop asks, Whether there be no Difference between the bare being of a Thing, and its Subſiſtence by it ſelf? To which our Author anſwers, Yes. But what will that do to prove, that upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch Thing as Subſtance? You ſeem by this Queſtion to conclude, That the *Idea* of a *Thing that ſubſiſts by it ſelf*, is a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of Subſtance: But I beg Leave to ask, Is the *Idea* of the Manner of Subſiſtence of a Thing, the *Idea* of the Thing it ſelf? If it be not, we may have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the Manner, and yet have none but a very obſcure and confuſed one of the Thing. For Example; I tell your Lordſhip, that I know a Thing that cannot ſubſiſt without a Support, and I know another Thing that does ſubſiſt without a Support, and ſay no more of them: Can you by having the clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of having a Support, and not having a Support, ſay, that you have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the Thing that I know which has, and of the Thing that I know which has not a Support? If your Lordſhip can, I beſeech you to give me the clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of theſe, which I only call by the general Name, Things, that have or have not Supports: For ſuch there are, and ſuch I ſhall give your Lordſhip clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of, when you ſhall pleaſe to call upon me for them; though I think your Lordſhip will ſcarce find them by the general and confuſed *Idea* of Thing, nor in the clearer

Mr. *Locke's* 3d *Letter*, p. 381.

and Colour; which are, if rightly conſidered, nothing but Powers in it, to produce theſe *Ideas* in us: We alſo by our Senſes perceive the Colour and Brittleneſs of *Charcole*, whereby we come by the Knowledge of another Power in Fire, which it has to change the Colour and Conſiſtency of Wood. By the former, Fire immediately, by the latter, it mediately diſcovers to us theſe ſeveral Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a Part of the Qualities of Fire, and ſo make them a Part of the complex *Ideas* of it. For all thoſe Powers that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the Alteration of ſome ſenſible Qualities in thoſe Subjects on which they operate, and ſo making them exhibit to us new ſenſible *Ideas*; therefore it is that I have reckoned theſe Powers amongſt the ſimple *Ideas*, which make the complex ones of the Sorts of *Subſtances*; though

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clearer and more diſtinct *Idea* of having or not having a Support.

To ſhew a Blind Man, that he has no clear diſtinct *Idea* of Scarlet, I tell him, that his Notion of it, that it is a *Thing* or *Being*, does not prove he has any clear or diſtinct *Idea* of it; but barely that he takes it to be ſomething, he knows not what. He replies, That he knows more than that, *v. g.* he knows that it ſubſiſts, or inheres in another Thing; *And is there no Difference*, ſays he, in your Lordſhip's Words, *between the bare Being of a Thing, and its Subſiſtence in another*? Yes, ſay I to him, a great deal, they are very different *Ideas*. But for all that, you have no clear and diſtinct *Idea* of *Scarlet*, not ſuch a one as I have, who ſee and know it, and have another Kind of *Idea* of it, beſides that of Inherence.

Your Lordſhip has the *Idea* of *Subſiſting by it ſelf*, and therefore you conclude, you have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of the Thing that *ſubſiſts by it ſelf*; which, methinks, is all one, as if your Country-man ſhould ſay, he hath an *Idea* of a Cedar of *Lebanon*, that it is a Tree of Nature, to need no Prop to lean on for its Support; therefore he has a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of a Cedar of *Lebanon*: Which clear and diſtinct *Idea*, when he comes to examine, is nothing but a general one of a Tree, with which his indetermined *Idea* of a Cedar is confounded. Juſt ſo is the *Idea* of *Subſtance*; which, however called clear and diſtinct, is confounded with the general indetermined *Idea* of *ſomething*. But ſuppoſe that the Manner of ſubſiſting by its ſelf, give us a clear and diſtinct Idea of Subſtance, how does that prove, *That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reaſon, that there is any ſuch Thing as Subſtance in the World*? Which is the Propoſition to be proved.

though theſe Powers, conſidered in themſelves, are truly complex *Ideas*. And in this looſer Senſe, I crave Leave to be underſtood, when I name any of theſe *Potentialities among the ſimple Ideas*, which we recollect in our Minds, when we think *of particular Subſtances*. For the Powers that are ſeverally in them, are neceſſary to be conſidered, if we will have true diſtinct Notions of the ſeveral Sorts of Subſtances.

§. 8. Nor are we to wonder, that *Powers make a great Part of our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances*; ſince their ſecondary Qualities are thoſe, which in moſt of them ſerve principally to diſtinguiſh Subſtances one from another, and commonly make a conſiderable Part of the complex *Idea* of the ſeveral Sorts of them. For our Senſes failing us in the Diſcovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute Parts of Bodies, on which their real Conſtitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make uſe of their ſecondary Qualities, as the Characteriſtical Notes and Marks whereby to frame *Ideas* of them in our Minds, and diſtinguiſh them one from another. All which ſecondary Qualities, as has been ſhewn, are nothing but bare Powers. For the Colour and Taſte of *Opium*, are as well as its Soporifick or Anodyne Virtues, meer Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is fixed to produce different Operations on different Parts of our Bodies. *And why.*

§. 9. *The* Ideas *that make our complex ones of corporeal Subſtances*, are of theſe three Sorts. *First*, The *Ideas* of the primary Qualities of Things, which are diſcovered by our Senſes, and are in them even when we perceive them not; ſuch are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the Parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we take Notice of them or no. *Secondly*, The Senſible ſecondary Qualities, which depending on theſe, are nothing but the Powers thoſe Subſtances have to produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes; which *Ideas* are not in the Things themſelves otherwiſe than as any Thing is in its Cauſe. *Thirdly*, The Aptneſs we conſider in any Subſtance, to give or receive ſuch Alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Subſtance ſo altered ſhould produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before; theſe are called active and paſſive Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice of them, terminate only in ſenſible ſimple *Ideas*. For whatever Alteration a *Load-ſtone* has the Power to make in the minute Particles of Iron, we ſhould have no Notion of any Power it had at all to operate *Three ſorts of* Ideas *make our complex ones of Subſtances.*

operate on Iron, did not its ſenſible Motion diſcover it; and I doubt not, but there are a thouſand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle, have a Power to cauſe in one another, which we never ſuſpect, becauſe they never appear in ſenſible Effects.

Powers make a great Part of our complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

§. 10. *Powers* therefore juſtly *make a great Part of our complex* Ideas *of Subſtances.* He that will examine his complex *Idea* of Gold, will find ſeveral of its *Ideas*, that make it up, to be only Powers, as the Power of being melted, but of not ſpending it ſelf in the Fire; of being diſſolved in *Aq. Regia*, are *Ideas* as neceſſary to make up our complex *Idea* of Gold, as its Colour and Weight: Which, if duly conſidered, are alſo nothing but different Powers. For to ſpeak truly, Yellowneſs is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold to produce that *Idea* in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light: And the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our *Idea* of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into Wax. Theſe are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating by the Motion and Figure of its inſenſible Parts, ſo on a Man, as to make him have the *Idea* of Heat; and ſo on Wax, as to make it capable to produce in a Man the *Idea* of White.

The now ſecondary Qualities of Bodies would diſappear, if we could diſcover the primary ones of their minute Parts.

§. 11. Had we Senſes acute enough to diſcern the minute Particles of Bodies, and the real Conſtitution on which their ſenſible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then diſappear, and inſtead of it, we ſhould ſee an admirable Texture of Parts of a certain Size and Figure. This Microſcopes plainly diſcover to us: For what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is by thus augmenting the Acuteneſs of our Senſes, diſcovered to be quite a different Thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the Proportion of the Bulk of the minute Parts of a coloured Object to our uſual Sight, produces different *Ideas* from what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glaſs, which is opaque, and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid, in a Microſcope; and a Hair ſeen this Way, loſes its former Colour, and is in a great Meaſure pellucid with a Mixture of ſome bright ſparkling Colours, ſuch as appear from the Refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies. Blood to the naked Eye, appears all red; but by a good Microſcope, wherein its leſſer Parts appear, ſhews only ſome few Globules of

of Red, ſwimming in a pellucid Liquor; and how theſe red Globules would appear, if Glaſſes could be found that yet could magnify them 1000, or 10000 Times more, is uncertain,

Our Faculties of Diſcovery ſuited to our State.

§. 12. The Infinite wiſe Contriver of us, and all Things about us, hath fitted our ſenſes, Faculties, and Organs, to the Conveniences of Life, and the Buſineſs we have to do here. We are able, by our Senſes, to know, and diſtinguiſh Things; and to examine them ſo far, as to apply them to our Uſes, and ſeveral Ways to accommodate the Exigences of this Life. We have Inſight enough into their admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire and magnify the Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this, which is ſuited to our preſent Condition, we want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we ſhould have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them: That perhaps is not in the Comprehenſion of any finite Being. We are furniſhed with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to diſcover enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and the Knowledge of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the Conveniences of Living: Theſe are our Buſineſs in this World. But were our Senſes alter'd, and made much quicker and acuter, the Appearance and outward Scheme of Things would have quite another Face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconſiſtent with our Being, or at leaſt Well-being in this Part of the Univerſe, which we inhabit. He that conſiders how little our Conſtitution is able to bear a Remove into Parts of this Air, not much higher than than we commonly breathe in, will have Reaſon to be ſatisfied, that in this Globe of Earth allotted for our Manſion, the All-wiſe Architect has ſuited our Organs, and the Bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our Senſe of Hearing were but a 1000 Times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual Noiſe diſtract us. And we ſhould in the quieteſt Retirement, be leſs able to ſleep or meditate, than in the Middle, of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that moſt inſtructive of our Senſes, Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or 10000 Times more acute than it is now by the beſt Microſcope, Things ſeveral Millions of Times leſs than the ſmalleſt Object of his Sight now, would then be viſible to his naked Eyes, and ſo he would come nearer the Diſcovery of the Texture and Motion of the minute Parts of corporeal Things; and in many of them, probably, get *Ideas* of their internal Conſtitutions: But then he would

would be in a quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the ſame to him, and others: The viſible *Ideas* of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he, and the reſt of Men, could diſcourſe concerning the Objects of Sight, or have any Communication about Colours, their Appearances being ſo wholly different. And perhaps ſuch a Quickneſs and Tenderneſs of Sight could not endure bright Sun-ſhine, or ſo much as open Day-light; nor take in but a very ſmall Part of any Object at once, and that too only at a very near Diſtance. And if by the Help of ſuch Microſcopical Eyes, (if I may ſo call them) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the ſecret Compoſition, and radical Texture of Bodies, he would not make any great Advantage by the Change, if ſuch an acute Sight would not ſerve to conduct him to the Market and Exchange; if he could not ſee Things he was to avoid at a convenient Diſtance, nor diſtinguiſh Things he had to do with, by thoſe ſenſible Qualities others do. He that was ſharp-ſighted enough to ſee the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a Clock, and obſerve upon what peculiar Structure and Impulſe its elaſtick Motion depends, would no doubt diſcover ſomething very admirable: But if Eyes ſo framed, could not view at once the Hand, and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a Diſtance ſee what a Clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by that Acuteneſs; which, whilſt it diſcovered the ſecret Contrivance of the Parts of the Machine, made him loſe its Uſe.

Conjecture about Spirits

§. 13. And here give me Leave to propoſe an extravagant Conjecture of mine, *viz.* That ſince we have ſome Reaſon (if there be any Credit to be given to the Report of Things, that our Philoſophy cannot account for,) to imagine, that Spirits can aſſume to themſelves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure, and Conformation of Parts. Whether one great Advantage ſome of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can ſo frame, and ſhape to themſelves Organs of Senſation or Perception, as to ſuit them to their preſent Deſign, and the Circumſtances of the Object they would conſider. For how much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledge, who had but the Faculty ſo to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one Senſe, as to make it capable of all the ſeveral Degrees of Viſion, which the Aſſiſtance of Glaſſes (caſually at firſt light on) has taught us to conceive? What Wonders would he diſcover, who could ſo fit his Eyes to all Sorts of Objects, as to ſee, when he pleaſed, the Figure and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other Juices

Juices of Animals, as diſtinctly as he does, at other Times, the Shape and Motion of the Animals themſelves. But to us, in our preſent State, unalterable Organs, ſo contrived, as to diſcover the Figure and Motion of the minute Parts of Bodies, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible Qualities we now obſerve in them, would, perhaps be of no Advantage. God has, no doubt, made them ſo, as is beſt for us in our preſent Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the Bodies that ſurround us, and we have to do with: And though we cannot, by the Faculties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledge of Things, yet they will ſerve us well enough for thoſe Ends above-mentioned, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's Pardon, for laying before him ſo wild a Fancy, concerning the Ways of Perception in Beings above us: But how extravagant ſoever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any Thing about the Knowledge of Angels, but after this Manner, ſome Way or other in Proportion to what we find and obſerve in our ſelves. And though we cannot but allow, that the infinite Power and Wiſdom of God, may frame Creatures with a thouſand other Faculties, and Ways of perceiving Things without them, than what we have; yet our Thoughts can go no farther than our own, ſo impoſſible it is for us to enlarge our very Gueſſes beyond the *Ideas* received from our own Senſation and Reflection. The Suppoſition, at leaſt, that Angels do ſometimes aſſume Bodies, needs not ſtartle us, ſince ſome of the moſt ancient, and moſt learned Fathers of the Church, ſeemed to believe, that they had Bodies: and this is certain, that their State and Way of Exiſtence, is unknown to us.

§. 14. But to return to the Matter in Hand; the *Ideas* we have of Subſtances, and the Ways we come by them; I ſay, our *ſpecifick* Ideas *of Subſtances* are nothing elſe but *a Collection of a certain Number of ſimple* Ideas, *conſidered as united in one Thing*. Theſe *Ideas* of Subſtances, though they are commonly called ſimple Apprehenſions, and the Names of them ſimple Terms; yet in effect, are complex and compounded. Thus the *Idea* which an *Engliſh* Man ſignifies by the Name *Swan*, is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all theſe of a certain Size, with a Power of ſwimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of Noiſe, and perhaps to a Man who has long obſerved thoſe kind of Birds, ſome other Properties, which all terminate in ſenſible ſimple *Ideas*, all united in one common Subject. *Complex* Ideas *of Subſtances.*

Idea of Spiritual Subſtances, as clear as of bodily Subſtances.

§. 15. Beſides the Complex *Ideas* we have of material ſenſible Subſtances, of which I have laſt ſpoken, by the ſimple *Ideas* we have taken from thoſe Operations of our own Minds, which we experiment daily in our ſelves, as Thinking, Underſtanding, Willing, Knowing, and Power, of beginning Motion, *&c.* co-exiſting in ſome Subſtance, we are able to frame *the complex* Idea *of an immaterial Spirit.* And thus, by putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking, Perceiving, Liberty, and Power of moving themſelves and other Things, we have as clear a Perception and Notion of immaterial Subſtances, as we have of material. For putting together the *Ideas* of Thinking and Willing, or the Power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion, joined to Subſtance, of which we have no diſtinct *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit, and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent ſolid Parts, and a Power of being moved, joined with Subſtance, of which likewiſe we have no Poſitive *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of Matter. The one is as clear and diſtinct an *Idea* as the other: The *Idea* of thinking and moving a Body, being as clear and diſtinct *Ideas*, as the *Ideas* of Extenſion, Solidity, and being moved. For our *Idea* of Subſtance is equally obſcure, or none at all in both; it is but a ſuppoſed, I know not what, to ſupport thoſe *Ideas* we call Accidents. It is for want of Reflection, that we are apt to think, that our Senſes ſhew us nothing but material Things. Every Act of Senſation, when duly conſidered, gives us an equal View of both Parts of Nature, the Corporeal and Spiritual. For whilſt I know, by Seeing or Hearing, *&c.* that there is ſome corporeal Being without me, the Object of that Senſation, I do more certainly know, that there is ſome Spiritual Being within me that ſees and hears. This I muſt be convinced cannot be the Action of bare inſenſible Matter: Nor ever could be without an immaterial thinking Being.

No Idea *of abſtract Subſtance.*

§. 16. By the complex *Idea* of extended, figured, coloured, and all other ſenſible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the *Idea* of the Subſtance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all: *Nor* after all the Acquaintance and Familiarity, which we imagine we *have* with Matter, and the many Qualities *Men* aſſure themſelves they perceive and know in Bodies, will it, perhaps, upon Examination be found, that they have any *more, or clearer, primary* Ideas *belonging to Body, than they have belonging to immaterial Spirit.*

§. 17. *The*

§. 17. *The primary* Ideas *we have peculiar to Body*, as contra-diſtinguiſhed to Spirit, *are the Coheſion of ſolid*, and conſequently ſeparable *Parts, and a Power of communicating Motion by Impulſe*. Theſe, I think, are the original *Ideas* proper and peculiar to Body; for Figure is but the Conſequence of finite Extenſion.

The Coheſion of ſolid Parts, and Impulſe, the primary Ideas *of Body.*

§. 18. *The* Ideas *we have* belonging, and *peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking, and Will*, or a Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought, and, which is conſequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but communicate its Motion by Impulſe, to another Body, which it meets with at Reſt, ſo the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or forbear to do ſo, as it pleaſes. The *Ideas* of Exiſtence, Duration, and Mobility, are common to them both.

Thinking and Motivity, the primary Ideas *of Spirit.*

§. 19. There is no Reaſon why it ſhould be thought ſtrange, that I make *Mobility belong to Spirit:* For having no other *Idea* of Motion; but Change of Diſtance, with other Beings, that are conſidered as at Reſt; and finding, that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that Spirits do operate at ſeveral Times in ſeveral Places, I cannot but attribute Change of Place to all finite Spirits; (for of the Infinite Spirit, I ſpeak not here.) For my Soul being a real Being, as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of changing Diſtance with any other Body, or Being, as Body it ſelf, and ſo is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can conſider a certain Diſtance, or a Change of that Diſtance, between two Points, one may certainly conceive a Diſtance, and a Change of Diſtance between two Spirits; and ſo conceive their Motion, their Approach or Removal, one from another.

Spirit capable of Motion.

§. 20. Every one finds in himſelf, that his Soul can think, will, and operate on his Body, in the Place where that is; but cannot operate on a Body, or in a Place, an hundred Miles diſtant from it. No Body can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at *Oxford*, whilſt he is at *London*; and cannot but know, that being united to his Body, it conſtantly changes Place all the whole Journey, between *Oxford* and *London*, as the Coach and Horſes do, that carry him: and I think may be ſaid to be truly all that while in Motion, or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear *Idea* enough of its Motion, its being ſeparated from the Body in Death, I

think, will: For to conſider it as going out of the Body, or leaving it, and yet to have no *Idea* of its Motion, ſeems to me impoſſible.

§. 21. If it be ſaid by any one, that it cannot change Place, becauſe it hath none, for Spirits are not in *Loco* but *Ubi*; I ſuppoſe that way of Talking, will not now be of much Weight to many in an Age that is not much diſpoſed to admire, or ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by ſuch unintelligible Ways of Speaking. But if any one thinks there is any Senſe in that Diſtinction, and that it is applicable to our preſent Purpoſe, I deſire him to put it into intelligible *Engliſh*; and then from thence draw a Reaſon to ſhew, that immaterial Spirits are not capable of Motion. Indeed, Motion cannot be attributed to GOD, not becauſe he is an immaterial, but becauſe he is an infinite Spirit.

Idea *of Soul and Body compared.*

§. 22. Let us *compare* then our complex *Idea* of an immaterial Spirit, with our complex *Idea* of Body, and ſee whether there be any more Obſcurity in one, than in the other, and in which moſt. Our *Idea* of Body, as I think, is an extended ſolid Subſtance, capable of communicating Motion by Impulſe: And our *Idea* of our Soul, as an immaterial Spirit, is of a Subſtance that thinks, and has a Power of exciting Motion in Body by Will or Thought. Theſe, I think, are *our complex* Ideas *of Soul and Body, as contra diſtinguiſhed*; and now let us examine which has the moſt Obſcurity in it, and Difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that People, whoſe Thoughts are immerſed in Matter, and have ſo ſubjected their Minds to their Senſes, that they ſeldom reflect on any Thing beyond them, are apt to ſay, they cannot comprehend a thinking Thing, which, perhaps, is true: But I affirm, when they conſider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended Thing.

Cohesion of ſolid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceived as Thinking in a Soul.

§. 23. If any one ſay, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the Subſtance is of that thinking Thing: No more, ſay I, knows he what the Subſtance is of that ſolid Thing. Farther, if he ſays, he knows not what he thinks; I anſwer, Neither knows he how he is extended; how the ſolid Parts of Body are united, or cohere together to make Extenſion. For though the Preſſure of the Particles of Air may account for the *Cohesion of ſeveral Parts of Matter*, that are groſſer than the Particles of Air, and have Pores

Pores leſs than the Corpuſcles of Air; yet the Weight, or Preſſure of the Air, will not explain, nor can be a Cauſe of the Coherence of the Particles of Air themſelves. And if the Preſſure of the Æther, or any ſubtiler Matter than the Air, may unite and hold faſt together the Parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies; yet it cannot make Bonds for it ſelf, and hold together the Parts that make up every the leaſt Corpuſcle of that *Materia ſubtilis*. So that that Hypotheſis, how ingeniouſly ſoever explained, by ſhewing, that the Parts of ſenſible Bodies are held together, by the Preſſure of other external inſenſible Bodies reaches not the Parts of the Æther it ſelf; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the Parts of other Bodies are held together, by the external Preſſure of the Æther, and can have no other conceivable Cauſe of their Coheſion and Union, by ſo much the more it leaves us in the Dark concerning the Coheſion of the Parts of the Corpuſcles of the Æther it ſelf; which we can neither conceive without Parts, they being Bodies, and diviſible; nor yet how their Parts cohere, they wanting that Cauſe of Coheſion, which is given of the Coheſion of the Parts of all other Bodies.

§. 24 But in Truth, *the Preſſure of any ambient Fluid*, how great ſoever, *can be no* intelligible *Cauſe of the Coheſion of the ſolid Parts of Matter*. For though ſuch a Preſſure may hinder the Avulſion of two poliſhed Superficies one from another, in a Line perpendicular to them, as in the Experiment of two poliſhed Marbles; yet it can never, in the leaſt, hinder the Separation by a Motion, in a Line parallel to thoſe Surfaces: Becauſe the ambient Fluid, having a full Liberty to ſucceed in each Point of Space, deſerted by a lateral Motion, reſiſts ſuch a Motion of Bodies ſo joined, no more than it would reſiſt the Motion of that Body, were it on all Sides invironed by that Fluid, and touched no other Body: And therefore, if there were no other Cauſe of Coheſion, all Parts of Bodies muſt be eaſily ſeparable by ſuch a lateral ſliding Motion. For if the Preſſure of the Æther be the adequate Cauſe of Coheſion, where-ever that Cauſe operates not, there can be no Coheſion. And ſince it cannot operate againſt ſuch a lateral Separation, (as has been ſhewed) therefore in every imaginary Plain, interſecting any Maſs of Matter, there could be no more Coheſion, than of two poliſhed Surfaces, which will always, notwithſtanding any imaginary Preſſure of a Fluid, eaſily ſlide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an *Idea* ſoever we think we have of the Extenſion of Body, which

is nothing but the Coheſion of ſolid Parts, he that ſhall well conſider it in his Mind, may have Reaſon to conclude, That 'tis *as eaſy* for him *to have a clear* Idea, *how the Soul thinks*, *as how the Body is extended.* For ſince Body is no farther, nor otherwiſe extended, than by the Union and Coheſion of its ſolid Parts, we ſhall very ill comprehend the *Extenſion* of Body, without underſtanding wherein conſiſts the Union and Coheſion of its Parts; which ſeems to me as incomprehenſible, as the Manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§. 25. I allow it is uſual for moſt People to wonder, how any one ſhould find a Difficulty in what they think they every Day obſerve. Do we not ſee, will they be ready to ſay, the Parts of Bodies ſtick firmly together? Is there any Thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I ſay, concerning *Thinking* and *voluntary Motion:* Do we not every Moment experiment it in our ſelves, and therefore can it be doubted? The Matter of Fact is clear, I confeſs; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and conſider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a Loſs, both in the one, and the other; and can as little underſtand how the Parts of Body cohere, as how we our ſelves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the Parts of Gold, or Braſs, (that but now in Fuſion were as looſe from one another, as the Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glaſs,) come in a few Moments to be ſo united, and adhere ſo ſtrongly one to another, that the utmoſt Force of Mens Arms cannot ſeparate them: Any conſidering Man will, I ſuppoſe, be here at a Loſs, to ſatisfy his own, or another Man's Underſtanding.

§. 26. The little Bodies that compoſe that Fluid, we call *Water*, are ſo extremely ſmall, that I never heard of any one, who by a Microſcope (and yet I have heard of ſome, that have magnified to 10000; nay to much above 100000 Times) pretended to perceive their diſtinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion; and the Particles of *Water* are alſo ſo perfectly looſe one from another, that the leaſt Force ſenſibly ſeparates them. Nay, if we conſider their perpetual Motion, we muſt allow them to have no Coheſion one with another; and yet let but a ſharp Cold come, and they unite, they conſolidate, theſe little Atoms cohere, and are not, without great Force, ſeparable. He that could find the Bonds that tie theſe Heaps of looſe little Bodies together ſo firmly; he

he that could make known the Cement that makes them ſtick ſo faſt one to another, would diſcover a great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the Extenſion of Body (which is the Coheſion of its ſolid Parts) intelligible, till he could ſhew wherein conſiſted the Union, or Conſolidation of the Parts of thoſe Bonds, or of that Cement, or of the leaſt Particle of Matter that exiſts. Whereby it appears, that this primary and ſuppoſed obvious Quality of Body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehenſible, as any Thing belonging to our Minds, and *a ſolid extended Subſtance, as hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial one*, whatever Difficulties ſome would raiſe againſt it.

§. 27. For to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that Preſſure which is brought to explain the Coheſion of Bodies, is as unintelligible as the Coheſion it ſelf. For if Matter be conſidered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one ſend his Contemplation to the Extremities of the Univerſe, and there ſee what conceivable Hoops, what Bond he can imagine to hold this Maſs of Matter in ſo cloſe a Preſſure together, from whence Steel has its Firmneſs, and the Parts of a Diamond their Hardneſs and Indiſſolubility. If Matter be finite, it muſt have its Extremes; and there muſt be ſomething to hinder it from ſcattering aſunder. If, to avoid this Difficulty, any one will throw himſelf into the Suppoſition and Abyſs of infinite Matter, let him conſider what Light he thereby brings to the *Coheſion* of Body; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by reſolving it into a Suppoſition, the moſt abſurd and moſt incomprehenſible of all other: So far is our Extenſion of Body (which is nothing but the Coheſion of ſolid Parts,) from being clearer, or more diſtinct, when we would enquire into the Nature, Cauſe, or Manner of it, than the *Idea* of Thinking.

Communication of Motion by Impulſe, or Thought, equally intelligible.

§. 28. Another *Idea* we have of Body, is the Power of *Communication of Motion by Impulſe*; and of our Souls, the Power of *exciting of Motion by Thought*. Theſe *Ideas*, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, every Day's Experience clearly furniſhes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we *are equally in the Dark*. For in the Communication of Motion by Impulſe, wherein as much Motion is loſt to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieſt Caſe, we can have

no other Conception, but of the paſſing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obſcure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or ſtop our Bodies by Thought; which we every Moment find they do. The Increaſe of Motion by Impulſe, which is obſerved or believed ſometimes to happen, is yet harder to be underſtood. We have by daily Experience, clear Evidence of Motion produced both by Impulſe, and by Thought: but the Manner how, hardly comes within our Comprehenſion; we are equally at a Loſs in both. So that however we conſider Motion and its Communication either from Body or Spirit, *the* Idea *which belongs to Spirit, is at leaſt as clear, as that that belongs to Body.* And if we conſider the active Power of moving, or, as I may call it *Motivity*, it is much clearer in Spirit, than Body, ſince two Bodies, placed by one another at reſt, will never afford us the *Ideas* of Power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed Motion: Whereas the Mind, every Day, affords *Ideas* of an active Power of moving of Bodies; and therefore it is worth our Conſideration, whether active Power be not the proper Attribute of Spirits, and paſſive Power of Matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created Spirits are not totally ſeparate from Matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure Spirit, *viz.* God, is only active; pure Matter is only paſſive; thoſe Beings that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear *Ideas* belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Subſtance of each being equally unknown to us; and the *Idea* of Thinking in Spirit, as clear as of Extenſion in Body; and the Communication of Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident as that by Impulſe, which we aſcribe to Body. Conſtant Experience makes us ſenſible of both of theſe, though our narrow Underſtandings can comprehend neither. For when the Mind would look beyond thoſe original *Ideas* we have from Senſation or Reflection, and penetrate into their Cauſes and Manner of Production, we find ſtill it diſcovers nothing but its own Short-ſightedneſs.

§. 29. To conclude; Senſation convinces us, that there are ſolid extended Subſtances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience aſſures us of the Exiſtence of ſuch Beings; and that the one hath a Power to move Body by Impulſe, the other by Thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I ſay, every Moment furniſhes us with the clear *Ideas*, both of the one and

and the other. But beyond theſe *Ideas*, as received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Cauſes, and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extenſion clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as eaſy as the other; and there is no more Difficulty to conceive how a Subſtance we know not, ſhould by Thought ſet Body into Motion, than how a Subſtance we know not, ſhould by Impulſe ſet Body into Motion. So that we are no more able to diſcover wherein the *Ideas* belonging to Body conſiſt, than thoſe belonging to Spirit. From whence it ſeems probable to me, that the ſimple *Ideas* we receive from Senſation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which, the Mind, whatever Efforts it would make, is not able to advance one Jot; nor can it make any Diſcoveries, when it would pry into the Nature and hidden Cauſes of thoſe *Ideas*.

Idea *of Body and Spirit compared.*

§. 30. So that, in ſhort *the Idea* we have *of Spirit, compared with the* Idea we have *of Body* ſtands thus: The Subſtance of Spirit is unknown to us; and ſo is the Subſtance of Body equally unknown to us: Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body, *viz.* ſolid coherent Parts and Impulſe, we have diſtinct clear *Ideas* of: So likewiſe we know, and have diſtinct clear *Ideas* of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit, *viz.* Thinking, and a Power of Action; *i. e.* a Power of beginning, or ſtopping ſeveral Thoughts or Motions. We have alſo the *Ideas* of ſeveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have the clear diſtinct *Ideas* of them: Which Qualities, are but the various Modifications of the Extenſion of cohering ſolid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewiſe the *Ideas* of ſeveral Modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which, are but the ſeveral Modes of Thinking. We have alſo the *Ideas* of Willing, and moving the Body conſequent to it, and with the Body it ſelf too; for, as has been ſhewed, Spirit is capable of Motion.

The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it, than that of Body.

§. 31. Laſtly, If this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have, perhaps, ſome Difficulties in it, not eaſy to be explained, we have therefore no more Reaſon to deny, or doubt the Exiſtence of ſuch Spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the Exiſtence of Body; becauſe the Notion of Body is cumbered with ſome Difficulties very hard, and, perhaps, impoſſible to be explained, or underſtood by us.

For

For I would fain have inſtanced any Thing in our Notion of Spirit more perplexed, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very Notion of Body includes in it; the Diviſibility *in infinitum* of any finite Extenſion, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in Conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made in our Apprehenſions conſiſtent; Conſequences that carry greater Difficulty, and more apparent Abſurdity, than any Thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Subſtance.

We know nothing beyond our ſimple Ideas.

§. 32. Which we are not all to wonder at, ſince we having but ſome few ſuperficial *Ideas* of Things, diſcovered to us only by the Senſes from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experiments in it ſelf within, have no Knowledge beyond that, much leſs of the internal Conſtitution, and true Nature of Things, being deſtitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and diſcovering in our ſelves Knowledge, and the Power of voluntary Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or diſcover in Things without us, the Coheſion and Separation of ſolid Parts, which is the Extenſion and Motion of Bodies; *we have as much Reaſon to be ſatisfied with our Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Exiſtence of the one as well as the other.* For it being no more a Contradiction, that Thinking ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from Solidity, than it is a Contradiction, that Solidity ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from Thinking, they being both but ſimple *Ideas*, independent one from another; and having as clear and diſtinct *Ideas* in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking Thing without Solidity, *i. e. immaterial*, to exiſt, as a ſolid Thing without Thinking, *i. e. Matter* to exiſt; eſpecially ſince it is no harder to conceive how Thinking ſhould exiſt without Matter, than how Matter ſhould think. For whenſoever we would proceed beyond theſe ſimple *Ideas*, we have from Senſation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature of Things, we fall preſently into Darkneſs and Obſcurity, Perplexedneſs and Difficulties; and can diſcover nothing farther but our own Blindneſs and Ignorance. But which ever of theſe complex *Ideas* be cleareſt, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident, that the ſimple *Ideas* that make them up, are no other than what we have received from Senſation or Reflection; and ſo is it of all our other *Ideas* of Subſtances, even of God himſelf.

§. 33. For

§. 33. For if we examine the *Idea* we have of the incomprehenſible ſupreme Being, we ſhall find, that we come by it the ſame Way; and that the complex *Ideas* we have both of God, and ſeparate Spirits, are made up of the ſimple *Ideas* we receive from *Reflection*: *v. g.* having from what we experiment in our ſelves, got the *Ideas* of Exiſtence and Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleaſure and Happineſs; and of ſeveral other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have, than to be without: When we would frame an *Idea* the moſt ſuitable we can to the ſupreme Being, we enlarge every one of theſe with our *Idea* of Infinite; and ſo putting them together, make our complex *Idea of God*. For that the Mind has ſuch a Power of enlarging ſome of its *Ideas*, received from Senſation and Reflection, has been already ſhewed. Idea *of God.*

§. 34. If I find that I know ſome few Things, and ſome of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an *Idea* of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number; and thus enlarge my *Idea* of Knowledge, by extending its Comprehenſion to all Things exiſting, or poſſible: The ſame alſo I can do of knowing them more perfectly, *i. e.* all their Qualities, Powers, Cauſes, Conſequences, and Relations, *&c.* till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any Way relate to them; and thus frame the *Idea* of infinite or boundleſs Knowledge: The ſame may alſo be done of Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and alſo of the Duration of Exiſtence, without Beginning or End; and ſo frame the *Idea* of an eternal Being. The Degrees or Extent, wherein we aſcribe Exiſtence, Power, Wiſdom, and all other Perfections (which we can have any *Ideas* of) to that Sovereign Being, which we call God, being all boundleſs and infinite, we frame the beſt *Idea* of him our Minds are capable of: All which is done, I ſay, by enlarging thoſe ſimple *Ideas* we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by Reflection; or by our Senſes, from exterior Things to that Vaſtneſs, to which Infinity can extend them.

§. 35. For it is Infinity, which joined to our *Ideas* of Exiſtence, Power, Knowledge, *&c.* makes that complex *Idea*, whereby we repreſent to our ſelves the beſt we can, the ſupreme Being. For though in his own Eſſence, (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real Eſſence of a Pebble, or a Fly, or of our own Idea *of God.*

ſelves)

ſelves) God be ſimple and uncompounded; yet, I think, may ſay we have no other *Idea* of him, but a complex one of Exiſtence, Knowledge, Power, Happineſs, *&c* infinite and eternal: Which are all diſtinct *Ideas*, and ſome of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been ſhewn, originally got from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, go to make up the *Idea* or Notion we have of God.

No Ideas *in our complex one of Spirits, but thoſe got from Senſation or Reflection.*

§. 36. This farther is to be obſerved, that there is no *Idea* we attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not alſo a Part of our complex *Idea* of other Spirits. Becauſe, being capable of no other ſimple *Idea*, belonging to any Thing but Body, but thoſe which by Reflection we receive from the Operation of our Minds, we can attribute to Spirits no other, but what we receive from thence: And all the Difference we can put between them in our Contemplation of Spirits, is only in the ſeveral Extents and Degrees of their Knowledge, Power, Duration, Happineſs, *&c*. For that in our *Ideas*, as well *of Spirit*, as of other Things, we are *reſtrained to thoſe we receive from Senſation and Reflection*, is evident from hence, that in our *Ideas* of Spirits, how much ſoever advanced in Perfection beyond thoſe of Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have an *Idea* of the Manner, wherein they diſcover their Thoughts one to another: Though we muſt neceſſarily conclude, that ſeparate Spirits, which are Beings that have perfecter Knowledge, and greater Happineſs than we, muſt needs have alſo a perfecter Way of communicating their Thoughts, than we have, who are fain to make Uſe of corporeal Signs, and particular Sounds, which are therefore of moſt general Uſe, as being the beſt and quickeſt we are capable of. But of immediate Communication, having no Experiment in our ſelves, and, conſequently, no Notion of it at all, we have no *Idea*, how Spirits, which uſe not Words, can with Quickneſs, or much leſs, how Spirits that have no Bodies, can be Maſters of their own Thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at Pleaſure, though we cannot but neceſſarily ſuppoſe they have ſuch a Power.

Recapitulation.

§. 37. And thus we have ſeen, *what kind of* Ideas *we have of Subſtances of all Kinds*, wherein they conſiſt, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident;

Firſt, That

Firſt, That all our *Ideas* of the ſeveral Sorts of Subſtances, are nothing but Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, with a Suppoſition of ſomething, to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt; though of this ſuppoſed ſomething, we have no clear diſtinct *Idea* at all.

Secondly, That all the ſimple *Ideas*, that thus united in one common *Subſtratum*, make up our complex *Ideas* of ſeveral Sorts of Subſtances, are no other but ſuch as we have received from *Senſation* or *Reflection*. So that even in thoſe, which we think we are moſt intimately acquainted with, and come neareſt the Comprehenſion of our moſt enlarged Conceptions, cannot reach beyond thoſe ſimple *Ideas*. And even in thoſe, which ſeem moſt remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely ſurpaſs any Thing we can perceive in our ſelves by *Reflection*, or diſcover by *Senſation* in other Things, we can attain to nothing but thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, which we originally received from *Senſation* or *Reflection*, as is evident in the complex *Ideas* we have of Angels, and particularly of God himſelf.

Thirdly, That moſt of the ſimple *Ideas*, that make up our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, when truly conſidered, are only Powers, however we are apt to take them for poſitive Qualities; *v. g.* the greateſt Part of the *Ideas*, that make our complex *Idea* of *Gold*, or Yellowneſs, great Weight, Ductilty, Fuſibility, and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*, *&c.* all united togeher in an unknown *Subſtratum*; all which *Ideas* are nothing elſe but ſo many Relations to other Subſtances, and are not really in the Gold, conſidered barely in it ſelf, tho they depend on, thoſe real and primary Qualities of its internal Conſtitution, whereby it has a Fitneſs, differently to operate, and be operated by ſeveral other Subſtances.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas *of Substances.*

One Idea.

§. 1. BEsides these complex *Ideas* of several single Substances, as of Man, Horse, Gold, Violet, Apple, *&c.* the Mind hath also *complex collective Ideas* of Substance; which I so call, because such *Ideas* are made up of many particular Substances consider'd together, as united into one *Idea*, and which so join'd, are look'd on as one; *v. g.* the *Idea* of such a Collection of Men as make an Army, though consisting of a great Number of distinct Substances, is as much one *Idea* as the *Idea* of a Man: And the great collective *Idea* of all Bodies whatsoever signified by the Name World, is as much one *Idea*, as the *Idea* of any the least Particle of Matter in it; it sufficing to the Unity of any *Idea*, that it be considered as one Representation, or Picture, though made up of never so many Particulars

Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.

§. 2. These collective *Ideas* of Substances, the Mind makes by its Power of Composition, and uniting severally, either simple or complex *Ideas* into one, as it does by the same Faculty make the complex *Ideas* of particular Substances, consisting of an Aggregate of divers simple *Ideas*, united in one Substance: And as the Mind, by putting together the repeated *Ideas* of Unity, makes the collective Mode, or complex *Idea* of any Number, as a Score, or a Gross, *&c.* So by putting together several particular Substances, it makes collective *Ideas* of Substances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a Fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he represents to his own Mind; by one *Idea*, in one View; and so under that Notion considers those several Things as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten thousand Men should make one *Idea*, than how a Man should make one *Idea*; it being as easy to the Mind, to unite into one the *Idea* of a great Number of Men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one Particular, all the distinct *Ideas* that make up the Composition of a Man, and consider them altogether as one.

§. 3. A-

§. 3. Amongſt ſuch Kind of collective *Ideas*, are to be counted moſt Part of artificial Things, at leaſt ſuch of them as are made up of diſtinct Subſtances: And in Truth, if we conſider all theſe collective *Ideas* aright, as *ARMY*, *Conſtellation*, *Univerſe*, as they are united into ſo many ſingle *Ideas*, they are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind, bringing Things very remote, and independent on one another, into one View, the better to contemplate, and diſcourſe of them, united into one Conception, and ſignified by one Name. For there are no Things ſo remote, nor ſo contrary, which the Mind cannot, by this Art of Compoſition, bring into one *Idea*, as is viſible in that ſignified by the Name *Univerſe*.

All artificial Things are collective Ideas.

CHAP. XXV.

Of RELATION.

§. 1. BESIDES the *Ideas*, whether ſimple or complex, that the Mind has of Things, as they are in themſelves, there are others it gets from their Compariſon one with another. The Underſtanding, in their Conſideration of any Thing, is not confined to that preciſe Object: It can carry any *Idea*, as it were, beyond itſelf, or at leaſt, look beyond it, to ſee how it ſtands in Conformity to any other. When the Mind ſo conſiders one Thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and ſet it by another, and carry its View from one to t'other: this is, as the Words import, *Relation* and *Reſpect*; and the Denominations given to poſitive Things, intimating that Reſpect, and ſerving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it ſelf donominated, to ſomething diſtinct from it; are what we call *Relatives*; and the Things ſo brought together, *Related*. Thus, when the Mind conſiders *Cajus*, as ſuch a poſitive Being, it takes nothing into that *Idea*, but what really exiſts in *Cajus*; *v. g.* when I conſider him as Man, I have nothing in my Mind, but the complex *Idea* of the Species, Man. So likewiſe, when I ſay *Cajus* is a white Man, I have nothing but the bare Conſideration of Man, who hath that white Colour. But when I give *Cajus* the Name *Husband*, I intimate ſome other Perſon: And when

Relation, what

when I give him the Name *Whiter*, I intimate ſome other Thing. In both Caſes my Thought is led to ſomething beyond *Cajus*, and there are two Things brought into Conſideration. And ſince any *Idea*, whether ſimple, or complex, may be the Occaſion why the Mind thus brings two Things together, and, as it were, takes a View of them at once, though ſtill conſidered as diſtinct; therefore any of our *Ideas* may be the Foundation of Relation. As in the above-mentioned Inſtance, the Contract and Ceremony of Marriage with *Sempronia*, is the Occaſion of the Denomination or Relation of Husband; and the Colour White, the Occaſion why he is ſaid whiter than Free-ſtone.

Relations without correlative Terms, not eaſily perceiv'd.

§. 2. Theſe, and the like *Relations expreſſed by relative Terms, that have others anſwering them, with a reciprocal Intimation* as Father and Son, Bigger and Leſs, Cauſe and Effect, *are very obvious* to every one, and every Body, at firſt Sight, perceives the Relation. For Father and Son, Husband and Wife, and ſuch other correlative Terms, ſeem ſo nearly to belong one to another, and, through Cuſtom, do ſo readily chime, and anſwer one another in People's Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts are preſently carried beyond the Thing ſo named; and no Body overlooks, or doubts of a Relation, where it is ſo plainly intimatimated. But where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not always ſo eaſily taken Notice of. *Concubine* is, no doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where this, and the like Words, have not a correlative Term, there People are not ſo apt to take them to be ſo, as wanting that evident Mark of Relation, which is between Correlatives, which ſeem to explain one another, and not to be able to exiſt, but together. Hence it is, that many of thoſe Names, which duly conſidered, do include evident Relations, have been called external Denominations. But all Names, that are more than empty Sounds, muſt ſignify ſome *Idea*, which is either in the Thing to which the Name is applied; and then it is poſitive and looked on as united to, and exiſting in the Thing to which the Denomination is given; Or elſe it ariſes from the Reſpect the Mind finds in it, to ſomething diſtinct from it, with which it conſiders it; and then it includes a Relation.

Some ſeemingly abſolute Terms contain Relations.

§. 3. Another Sort of *relative Term*, there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or ſo much as external Denominations;

tions; *which* yet, under the Form and Appearance of ſignifying ſomething abſolute in the Subject, do conceal a tacit, though leſs obſervable Relation. Such are the *ſeemingly poſitive* Terms of *Old*, *Great*, *Imperfect*, &c. whereof I ſhall have Occcaſion to ſpeak more at large in the following Chapters.

Relation different from the Things related.

§. 4. This farther may be obſerved, That the *Ideas* of Relation may be the ſame in Men, who have far different *Ideas* of the Things that are related, or that are thus compared; *v. g.* Thoſe who have far different *Ideas* of a *Man*, may yet agree in the Notion of a *Father*: Which is a Notion ſuperinduced to the Subſtance, or Man, and refers only to an Act of that Thing called Man; whereby he contributed to the Generation of one of his own Kind, let Man be what it will.

Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.

§ 5. The *Nature* therefore *of Relation*, conſiſts in the referring or comparing two Things one to another; from which Compariſon, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of thoſe Things be removed, or ceaſe to be, the Relation ceaſes, and the Denomination conſequent to it, though the other receive in itſelf no Alteration at all. *V. g. Cajus*, whom I conſider to Day as a Father, ceaſes to be ſo to Morrow, only by the Death of his Son, without any Alteration made in himſelf. Nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Object, to which it compares any Thing, the ſame Thing is capable of having contrary Denominations, at the ſame Time. *V. g. Cajus*, compared to ſeveral Perſons, may truly be ſaid to be older and younger, ſtronger and weaker, *&c.*

Relation only betwixt two Things.

§. 6. Whatſoever doth, or can exiſt, or be conſidered as one Thing, is poſitive: And ſo not only ſimple *Ideas*, and Subſtances, but Modes alſo are poſitive Beings, though the Parts, of which they conſiſt are very often relative one to another; but the whole together conſider'd as one Thing; and producing in us the complex *Idea* of one Thing; which *Idea* is in our Minds, as one Picture, though an Aggregate of divers Parts; and under one Name, it is a poſitive or abſolute Thing, or *Idea*. Thus a Triangle, though the Parts thereof, compared to one another, be *relative*, yet the *Idea* of the Whole is a poſitive abſolute *Idea*. The ſame may be ſaid of a Family, a Tune, *&c.* for there can be no relation, but betwixt two Things, conſidered as two Things. There muſt always be in Relation two *Ideas*, or Things, either in themſelves really ſeparate, or conſidered

fired as distinct, and then a Ground or Occasion for their Comparison.

All Things capable of Relation.

§. 7. Concerning Relation in general, these Things may be considered:

First, That there is *no one Thing*, whether simple *Idea*, Substance, Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, *which is not capable of almost an infinite Number of* Considerations, in Reference to other Things; and therefore this makes no small Part of Mens Thoughts and Words. *V. g.* One single Man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following *Relations*, and many more, *viz.* Father, Brother, Son, Grand-father, Grand-son, Father-in-Law, Son-in-Law, Husband, Friend, Enemy, Subject, General, Judge, Patron, Client, Professor, *European*, *English Man*, Islander, Servant, Master, Possessor, Captain, Superior, Inferior, Bigger, Less, Older, Younger, Contemporary, Like, Un-like, *&c.* to an almost infinite Number: He being capable of as many Relations, as there can be Occasions of comparing them to other Things, in any Manner of Agreement, Disagreement, or Respect whatsoever: For, as I said, *Relation* is a Way of comparing, or considering two Things together; and giving one, or both of them, some Appellation from that Comparison, and sometimes giving even the Relation it self a Name.

The Ideas of Relations clearer often, than of the Subjects related.

§. 8. *Secondly*, This farther may be considered concerning *Relation*, That though it be not contained in the real Existence of Things, but something extraneous, and super-induced; yet the *Ideas* which relative Words stand for, are often clearer, and more distinct, than of those Substances to which they do belong. The Notion we have of a Father or Brother, is a great deal clearer and more distinct, than that we have of a Man: Or, if You will, *Paternity* is a Thing whereof 'tis easier to have a clear *Idea*, than of *Humanity*: And I can much easier conceive what a Friend is, than what GOD. Because the Knowledge of one Action, or one simple *Idea*, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: But the knowing of any substantial Being, an accurate Collection of sundry *Ideas*, is necessary. A Man, if he compares two Things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: so that when he compares any Things together, cannot but have a very clear *Idea* of that Relation. The *Ideas* then of *Relations*, *are capable* at least *of being more perfect and distinct in our Minds*, *than those of*

of Subſtances. Becauſe it is commonly hard to know all the ſimple *Ideas*, which are really in any Subſtance, but for the moſt part eaſy enough to know the ſimple *Ideas* that make up any Relation I think on, or have a Name for. *V.g* Comparing two Men, in reference to one common Parent, it is very eaſy to frame the *Ideas* of Brothers, without having yet the perfect *Idea* of a Man. For ſignificant relative Words, as well as others, ſtanding only for *Ideas*; and thoſe being all either ſimple, or made up of ſimple ones, it ſuffices for the knowing the preciſe *Idea* the relative Term ſtands for, to have a clear Conception of that, which is the Foundation of the Relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear *Idea* of the Thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the Egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear *Idea* of the Relation of *Dam and Chick*, between the two Caſſiowaries in St. *James*'s Park; though, perhaps, I have but a very obſcure and imperfect *Idea* of thoſe Birds themſelves.

Relations all terminate in ſimple Ideas.

§. 9. *Thirdly*, Though there be a great Number of Conſiderations, wherein Things may be compared one with another, and ſo a Multitude of *Relations*; yet they *all terminate in*, and are concerned about thoſe *ſimple Ideas*, either of Senſation or Reflection; which I think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledge. To clear this, I ſhall ſhew it in the moſt conſiderable Relations that we have any Notion of; and in ſome that ſeem to be the moſt remote from *Senſe* or *Reflection:* Which yet will appear to have their *ideas* from thence, and leave it paſt Doubt, that the Notions we have of them, are but certain ſimple *Ideas*, and ſo originally derived from Senſe or Reflection.

Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are relative.

§. 10. *Fourthly*, That *Relation* being the conſidering of one Thing with another, which is extrinſical to it, it is evident, that all Words that neceſſarily lead the Mind to any other *Ideas*, than are ſuppoſed really to exiſt in that thing, to which the Word is applied, are *relative Words. V.g.* A *Man Black*, *Merry*, *Thoughtful*, *Thirſty*, *Angry*, *Extended*; theſe, and the like, are all abſolute, becauſe they neither Signify nor intimate any Thing, but what does, or is ſuppoſed really to exiſt in the Man thus denominated: But *Father*, *Brother*, *King*, *Husband*, *Blacker*, *Merrier*, &c. are Words, which, together with the Thing they denominate, imply alſo ſomething elſe ſeparate, and exterior to the Exiſtence of that Thing.

Conclusion. §. 11. Having laid down theſe Premiſes concerning *Relation* in general, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, in ſome Inſtances, how all the *Ideas* we have of *Relation* are made up, as the others are, only of ſimple *Ideas*; and that they all, how refined and remote from Senſe ſoever they ſeem, terminate at laſt in ſimple *Ideas*. I ſhall begin with the moſt comprehenſive Relation, wherein all Things that do, or can exiſt, are concerned, and that is the Relation of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. The *Idea* whereof, how deriv'd from the two Fountains of all our Knowledge, *Senſation* and *Reflection*, I ſhall in the next Place conſider.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect, and other Relations.

Whence their Ideas got. §. 1. IN the Notice that our Senſes take of the conſtant Viciſſitude of Things, we cannot but obſerve, that ſeveral particular, both Qualities and Subſtances, begin to exiſt; and that they receive this their Exiſtence from the due Application and Operation of ſome other Being. From this Obſervation we get our *Ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. That which produces any ſimple or complex *Idea*, we denote by the general Name *Cauſe*; and that which is produced, *Effect*. Thus finding, that in that Subſtance which we call Wax, Fluidity, which is a ſimple *Idea* that was not in it before, is conſtantly produced by the Application of a certain Degree of Heat, we call the ſimple *Idea* of Heat, in Relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cauſe of it, and Fluidity, the Effect. So all finding, that the Subſtance, Wood, which is a certain Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, ſo call'd by the Application of Fire, is turn'd into another Subſtance, call'd Aſhes; *i. e.* another complex *Idea*, conſiſting of a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, quite different from that complex *Idea*, which we call Wood; we conſider Fire, in relation to Aſhes, as Cauſe, and the Aſhes, as Effect. So that whatever is conſider'd by us, to conduce or operate, to the producing any particular ſimple *Idea*, or Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, whether Subſtance, or Mode, which did not before exiſt, hath thereby in our Minds the Relation of a Cauſe, and ſo is denominated by us.

§. 2. Ha-

§. 2. Having thus, from what our Senſes are able to diſcover, in the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of *Cauſe* and *Effect*; *viz.* That a *Cauſe* is that which makes any other Thing, either ſimple *Idea*, Subſtance or Mode, begin to be; and in *Effect* is that which had its Beginning from ſome other Thing. The Mind finds no great Difficulty, to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral Originals of Things into two Sorts. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.*

Firſt, When the Thing is wholly made new, ſo that no Part thereof did ever exiſt before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exiſt, *in rerum natura*, which had before no Being, and this we call Creation.

Secondly, When a Thing is made up of Particles, which did all of them before exiſt, but that very Thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting Particles, which, conſider'd all together, make up ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, had not any *Exiſtence* before, as this Man, this Egg, Roſe, or Cherry, *&c.* And this, when referred to a Subſtance, produced in the ordinary Courſe of Nature, by an internal Principle, but ſet on work by, and received from ſome external Agent, or Cauſe, and working by inſenſible Ways, which we perceive not, we call *Generation*; when the Cauſe is extrinſical, and the Effect produced by a ſenſible Separation, or *juxta* Poſition of diſcernible Parts, we call it *Making*; and ſuch are all artificial things. When any ſimple *Idea* is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration.* Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and either of them altered, when any new ſenſible Quality, or ſimple *Idea*, is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the Things thus made to exiſt, which were not there before, are *Effects*; and thoſe Things, which operated to the Exiſtence, *Cauſes.* In which, and all other Caſes, we may obſerve, that the Notion of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, has its Riſe from *Ideas* received by Senſation or Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehenſive ſoever, terminates at laſt in them. To have the *Idea* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, it ſuffices to conſider any ſimple *Idea* or Subſtance, as beginning to exiſt, by the Operation of ſome other, without knowing the Manner of that Operation.

§. 3. *Time* and *Place* are alſo the Foundations of very large Relations, and all finite Being at leaſt are concern'd in them. But having already ſhewn in another Place, how we get theſe *Ideas*, it may ſuffice here to *Relations of Time.*

intimate, that moſt of the Denominations of Things received from Time, are only Relations; Thus, when any one ſays, that Queen *Elizabeth* lived ſixty-nine, and reigned forty-five Years, theſe Words import only the Relation of that Duration to ſome other, and means no more but this, That the Duration of her Exiſtence was equal to ſixty-nine, and the Duration of her Government to forty-five Annual Revolutions of the Sun; and ſo are all Words, anſwering, *how long* Again, *William* the Conqueror invaded *England* about the Year 1070, which means this; That taking the Duration from our Saviour's Time, 'till now, for one entire great Length of Time, it ſhews at what Diſtance this Invaſion was from the two Extreams: and ſo do all Words of Time, anſwering to the Queſtion *When*, which ſhew only the Diſtance of any Point of Time, from the Period of a longer Duration, from which we meaſure, and to which we thereby conſider it, as related.

§. 4. There are yet, beſides thoſe other Words of Time, that ordinarily are thought to ſtand for poſitive *Ideas*, which yet will, when conſidered, be found to be relative; ſuch as are *Young*, *Old*, &c. which include and intimate the Relation any Thing has to a certain Length of Duration, whereof we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus having ſettled in our Thoughts the *Idea* of the ordinary Duration of a Man to be ſeventy Years, when we ſay a Man is *Young*, we mean, that his Age is yet but a ſmall Part of that which uſually Men attain to: And when we denominate him *Old*, we mean, that his Duration is run out almoſt to the End of that which Men do not uſually exceed. And ſo 'tis but comparing the particular Age, or Duration of this or that Man, to the *Idea* of that Duration which we have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that Sort of Animals: Which is plain, in the Application theſe Names to other Things; for a Man is called Young at twenty Years, and very Young at ſeven Years old: But Yet a Horſe we call old at twenty, and a Dog at ſeven Years; becauſe in each of theſe, we compare their Age to different *Ideas* of Duration which are ſettled in our Minds, as belonging to theſe ſeveral Sorts of Animals, in the ordinary Courſe of Nature. But the Sun and Stars, though they have out-laſted ſeveral Generations of Men, we call not old, becauſe we do not know what Period GOD hath ſet to that Sort of Beings. This Term belonging properly to thoſe Things, which we can obſerve in the ordinary Courſe of Things, by a natural Decay, to come to an End in a certain Period of Time; and ſo have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard,

dard, to which we can compare the ſeveral Parts of their Duration; and by the Relation they bear thereunto, call them Young or Old; which we cannot therefore do to a Ruby, or a Diamond, Things whoſe uſual Periods we know not.

§. 5. The *Relation* alſo that Things have to one another, in their Places and Diſtances, is very obvious to obſerve; as Above, Below, a Mile diſtant from *Charing-Croſs*, in *England*, and in *London*. But as in Duration, ſo in *Extenſion* and Bulk, there are ſome *Ideas* that are relative, which we ſignify by Names that are thought Poſitive; as *Great and Little, are* truly *Relations*. For here alſo having, by Obſervation, ſettled in our Minds the *Ideas* of the Bigneſs of ſeveral Species of Things, from thoſe we have been moſt accuſtomed to, we make them as it were, the Standards whereby to denominate the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, ſuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary Sort of thoſe we have been uſed to; and a little Horſe, ſuch a one as comes not up to the Size of that *Idea*, which we have in our Minds, to belong ordinarily to Horſes: And that will be a great Horſe to a *Welſh* Man, which is but a little one to a *Fleming*; they two having, from the different Breed of their Countries, taken ſeveral ſiz'd *Ideas*, to which they compare, and in Relation to which they denominate their Great, and their Little. *Relations of Place and Extenſion.*

§. 6. So likewiſe *Weak and Strong are* but *relative Denominations* of Power, compared to ſome *Ideas* we have, at that Time, of greater or leſs Power. Thus when we ſay a weak Man, we mean one that has not ſo much Strength or Power to move, as uſually Men have, or uſually thoſe of his Size have; which is a comparing his Strength to the *Idea* we have of the uſual Strength of Men, or Men of ſuch a Size. The like when we ſay the Creatures are all weak Things; Weak, there, is but a relative Term, ſignifying the Diſproportion there is in the Power of GOD, and the Creatures. And ſo abundance of Words, in ordinary Speech, ſtand only for Relations, (and, perhaps, the greateſt Part,) which, at firſt Sight, ſeem to have no ſuch Signification: *V. g.* The Ship has neceſſary Stores. *Neceſſary* and *Stores*, are both relative Words; one having a Relation to the accompliſhing the Voyage intended, and the other to future Uſe. All which Relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in *Ideas* derived from *Senſation* or *Reflection*, is too obvious to need any Explication. *Abſolute Terms often ſtand for Relations.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identiy and Diverſity.

Wherein Identity conſiſts.

§. 1. ANother Occaſion the Mind often takes of comparing, is, the very Being of Things, when conſidering any Thing as exiſting at any determin'd Time and Place, we compare it with it ſelf exiſting at another Time, and thereon form the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diverſity*. When we ſee any Thing to be in any Place in any inſtant of Time, we are ſure, (be it what it will) that it is that very Thing, and not another, which at that ſame Time exiſts in another Place, how like and undiſtinguiſhable ſoever it may be in all other reſpects: And in this conſiſts *Identity*, when the *Ideas* it is attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that Moment, wherein we conſider their former Exiſtence, and to which we compare the preſent. For we never finding, nor conceiveing it poſſible, that two Things of the ſame Kind ſhould exiſt in the ſame Place, at the ſame Time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exiſts any where at any Time, excludes all of the ſame Kind, and is there it ſelf alone. When therefore we demand, whether any Thing be the ſame or no? it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a time in ſuch a Place, which 'twas certain, at that Inſtant, was the ſame with it ſelf, and no other: From whence it follows, that one Thing cannot have two Beginnings of Exiſtence, nor two Things one Beginning, it being impoſſible for two Things of the ſame Kind to be or exiſt in the ſame Inſtant, in the very ſame Place, or one and the ſame Thing in different Places. That therefore that had one Beginning, is the ſame Thing, and that which had a different Beginning in Time and Place from that, is not the ſame, but divers. That which has made the Difficulty about this Relation has been the little Care and Attention uſed in having preciſe Notions of the things to which it is attributed.

Identity of Subſtances.

§. 2. We have the *Ideas* but of three Sorts of Subſtances; 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligences. 3. *Bodies*. Firſt, God is without Beginnning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his Identity, there can be no Doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having had each its determinate Time and Place of Begin-

Beginning to exiſt, the Relation to that Time and Place will always determine to each of them its Identity, as long as it exiſts. Thirdly, The ſame will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which no Addition or Subſtraction of Matter being made, it is the ſame. For though theſe three Sorts of Subſtances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the ſame Place; yet we cannot conceive but that they muſt neceſſarily each of them exclude any of the ſame Kind out of the ſame Place: Or elſe the Notions and Names of Identity and Diverſity would be in vain, and there could be no ſuch Diſtinction of Subſtances, or any Thing elſe one from another. For Example; could two Bodies be in the ſame Place at the ſame Time? Then thoſe two Parcels of Matter muſt be one and the ſame, take them great or little; nay, all Bodies muſt be one and the ſame. For by the ſame Reaſon that two Particles of Matter may be in one Place, all Bodies may be in one Place: Which, when it can be ſuppoſed, takes away the Diſtinction of Identity and Diverſity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a Contradiction, that two or more ſhould be one, Identity and Diverſity are Relations and Ways of comparing well founded, and of Uſe to the Underſtanding. All other Things being but Modes and Relations ultimately terminated in Subſtances, the Identity and Diverſity of each particular Exiſtence of them too, will be by the ſame Way determined. Only as to Things whoſe Exiſtence is in Succeſſion, ſuch as are the Actions of finite Being *v. g. Motion* and *Thought*, both which conſiſt in a continued Train of Succeſſion, concerning their Diverſity, there can be no Queſtion: Becauſe each periſhing the Moment it begins, they cannot exiſt in different Times, or in different Places, as permanent Beings can at different Times exiſt in diſtant Places; and therefore, no Motion or Thought, conſidered as at different Times, can be the ſame, each Part thereof having a different Beginning of Exiſtence.

Identity of Modes.

§. 3. From what has been ſaid, 'tis eaſy to diſcover what is ſo much inquired after, the *Principium Individuationis*; and that 'tis plain is Exiſtence it ſelf, which determines a Being of any Sort to a particular Time and Place incommunicable to two Beings of the ſame Kind. This, though it ſeems eaſier to conceive in ſimple Subſtances or Modes, yet when reflected on, is no more difficult in compounded ones, if Care be taken to what it is applied; *v. g.* Let us ſuppoſe an Atom, *i. e.* a continued Body under one immutable Superficies, exiſting in a determined Time

Principium Individuationis.

Time and Place; 'tis evident, that, conſidered in any Inſtant of 'its Exiſtence, it is, in that Inſtant, the ſame with it ſelf. For being in that Inſtant what it is, and nothing elſe, it is the ſame, and ſo muſt continue as long as its Exiſtence is continued; for ſo long it will be the ſame, and no other. In like Manner, if two or more Atoms be joined together into the ſame Maſs, every one of thoſe Atoms will be the ſame, by the foregoing Rule: And whilſt they exiſt united together, the Maſs conſiſting of the ſame Atoms, muſt be the ſame Maſs, or the ſame Body, let the Parts be never ſo differently jumbled: But if one of theſe Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the ſame Maſs, or the ſame Body. In the State of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Maſs of the ſame Particles, but on ſomething elſe. For in them the Variation of great Parcels of Matters alters not the Identity: An Oak growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp'd, is ſtill the ſame Oak: And a Colt grown up to a Horſe, ſometimes fat, and ſometimes lean, is all the while the ſame Horſe; though in both theſe Caſes, there may be a manifeſt Change of the Parts: So that truly they are not either of them the ſame Maſſes of Matter, though they be truly one of the ſame Oak, and the other the ſame Horſe. The Reaſon whereof is, that in theſe two Caſes of a Maſs of Matter, and a living Body, *Identity* is not applied to the ſame Thing.

Identity of Vegetables

§. 4. We muſt therefore conſider wherein an Oak differs from a Maſs of Matter, and that ſeems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Coheſion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other, ſuch a Diſpoſition of them, as conſtitutes the Parts of an Oak, and ſuch an Organization of thoſe Parts, as is fit to receive, and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, *&c.* of an Oak, in which conſiſts the vegetable Life. That being then one Plant, which has ſuch an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one common Life, it continues to be the ſame Plant, as long as it partakes of the ſame Life, though that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continued Organization, conformable to that Sort of Plants. For this Organization, being at any one Inſtant in any one Collection of *Matter*, is in that particular Concrete diſtinguiſhed from all other, and is that individual Life, which exiſting conſtantly from that Moment both forwards and backwards in the ſame Continuity of inſenſibly ſucceeding Parts united to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity, which makes the

the ſame Plant, and all the Parts of it, Parts of the ſame Plant, during all the Time that they exiſt united in that continued Organization, which is fit to convey that common Life to all the Parts ſo united.

§. 5. The Caſe is not ſo much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an Animal, and continues it the ſame. *Identity of Animals.*

Something we have like this in Machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For Example, What is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a fit Organization, or Conſtruction of Parts, to a certain End, which, when a ſufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe the Machine one continued Body, all whoſe organized Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminiſh'd by a conſtant Addition or Separation of inſenſible Parts, with one common Life, we ſhould have ſomething very much like the Body of an Animal, with this Difference, That in an Animal, the Fitneſs of the Organization, and the Motion wherein Life conſiſts, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines, the Force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away when the Organ is in Order, and well fitted to receive it.

§. 6. This alſo ſhews, wherein the Identity of the ſame *Man* conſiſts; *viz.* in nothing but a Participation of the ſame continued Life, by conſtantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succeſſion vitally united to the ſame organized Body. He that ſhall place the *Identity* of Man in any Thing elſe, but like that of other Animals in one fitly organized Body, taken in any one Inſtant, and from thence continued under one Organization of Life in ſeveral ſucceſſively fleeting Particles of matter, united to it, will find it hard to make an *Embryo*, one of Years, mad, and ſober, the ſame Man, by any Suppoſition, that will not make it poſſible for *Seth*, *Iſhmael*, *Socrates*, *Pilate*, St. *Auſtin*, and *Cæſar Borgia*, to be the ſame Man. For if the *Identity* of Soul alone makes the ſame Man, and there be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the ſame Individual may not be united to different Bodies, it will be poſſible, that thoſe Men living in diſtant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the ſame Man: Which Way of ſpeaking muſt be, from a very ſtrange Uſe of the Word *Man*, applied to an *Idea*, out of which Body and Shape is excluded: And that Way of ſpeaking would agree yet worſe with the Notions of thoſe Philoſophers, who allow of Tranſmigration, and are of Opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miſcarriages, be detruded into the Bodies of Beaſt: as fit Habitations with *Identity of Man.*

Organs

Organs ſuited to the Satisfaction of their brutal Inclinations. But yet I think, no Body, could he be ſure that the Soul of *Heliogabalus* were in one of his Hogs, would yet ſay that Hog were a *Man* or *Heliogabalus*.

Identity ſuited to the Idea.

§. 7. 'Tis not therefore Unity of Subſtance that comprehends all Sorts of *Identity*, or will determine it in every Caſe; But to conceive and judge of it a right, we muſt conſider what *Idea* the Word it is applied to, ſtands for: It being one Thing to be the ſame *Subſtance*, another the ſame *Man*, and a third the ſame *Perſon*, if *Perſon*, *Man*, and *Subſtance*, are three Names ſtanding for three different *Ideas*; for ſuch as is the *Idea* belonging to that Name, ſuch muſt be the *Identity*: Which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poſſibly have prevented a great deal of that Confuſion, which often occurs about this Matter, with no ſmall ſeeming Difficulties, eſpecially concerning *Perſonal Identity*, which therefore we ſhall in the next Place a little conſider.

Same Man.

§. 8. An Animal is a living organized Body; and conſequently the ſame Animal, as we have obſerved, is the ſame continued Life communicated to different Particles of Matter as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talked of other Definitions, ingenuous Obſervation puts its paſt Doubt, that the *Idea* in our Minds, of which the Sound *Man* in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing elſe but of an Animal of ſuch a certain Form: Since I think I may be confident, that whoever ſhould ſee a Creature of his own Shape and make, though it had no more Reaſon all its Life, than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, would call him ſtill a *Man*; or whoever ſhould hear a *Cat* or a *Parrot* diſcourſe, reaſon, and philoſophize, would call or think it nothing but a *Cat* or a *Parrot*; and ſay, the one was a dull irrational *Man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *Parrot*. A Relation we have in an Author of great Note, is ſufficient to countenance the Suppoſition of a rational *Parrot*. His Words * are,

* *Memoirs of what paſs'd in Chriſtendom from* 1672, *to* 1679, p. 365.

'I had a Mind to know from Prince *Maurice*'s own Mouth 'the Account of a common, but much credited Story, that I 'had heard ſo often from many others, of an old *Parrot* he 'had in *Braſil*, during his Government there, that ſpoke, 'and asked, and anſwered common Queſtions like a reaſon-'able Creature; ſo that thoſe of his Train there, generally 'concluded it to be Witchery or Poſſeſſion; and one of his

'Chaplains

‘ Chaplains, who lived long afterwards in *Holland*, would ne-
‘ ver from that Time endure a *Parrot*, but ſaid they all had
‘ a Devil in them. I had heard many Particulars of this Story,
‘ and aſſevered by People hard to be diſcredited, which made
‘ me ask Prince *Maurice* what there was of it. He ſaid, with
‘ his uſual Plainneſs and Dryneſs in Talk, there was ſome-
‘ thing true, but a great deal falſe of what had been reported.
‘ I deſired to know of him what there was of the firſt? He
‘ told me ſhort and coldly, that he had heard of ſuch an old
‘ *Parrot* when he came to *Braſil*; and though he believ'd
‘ nothing of it, and it was a good Way off, yet he had ſo much
‘ Curioſity as to ſend for it, that 'twas a very great and a
‘ very old one; and when it came firſt into the Room where
‘ the Prince was, with a great many *Dutch-men* about him,
‘ it ſaid preſently, *What a Company of white Men are here?*
‘ The ask'd it what he thought that Man was, pointing at the
‘ Prince? It anſwer'd, *Some General or other*;
‘ when they brought it cloſe to him, he asked
‘ it, *D'ou venez-vous?* It anſwered, *De Ma-*
‘ *rinnan.* The Prince, *A qui eſte-vous?* The
‘ Parrot, *A un Portugais.* Prince, *Que fais tu-*
‘ *la?* Parrot, *Je garde les Poulles.* The Prince
‘ laugh'd, and ſaid, *Vous gardes les Poulles?*
‘ The Parrot anſwered, *Ouy moy, & je ſcay*
‘ *bien faire*; and made the Chuck four or
‘ five Times that People uſe to make to
‘ Chickens when they call them. I ſet down
‘ the Words of this worthy Dialogue in
‘ *French*, juſt as Prince *Maurice* ſaid them
‘ to me. I asked him in what Language the
‘ *Parrot* ſpoke? and he ſaid, in *Braſilian.* I
‘ asked whether he underſtood the *Braſilian?*
‘ He ſaid, No, but he had taken Care to
‘ have two Interpreters by him, the one a
‘ *Dutch-man* that ſpoke *Braſilian*, and the other a *Braſilian*,
‘ that ſpoke *Dutch*; that he asked them ſeparately and pri-
‘ vately, and both of them agreed in telling him juſt the ſame
‘ Thing that the *Parrot* ſaid. I could not but tell this odd
‘ Story, becauſe it is ſo much out of the Way, and from the
‘ firſt Hand, and what may paſs for a good one: For I dare
‘ ſay this Prince, at leaſt, believ'd himſelf in all he told me,
‘ having ever paſſed for a very honeſt and pious Man; I leave
‘ it to Naturaliſts to reaſon, and other Men to believe as they
‘ pleaſe upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiſs to relieve

Whence come ye? It anſwer'd, From Marinnan. *The* Prince, *To whom do you belong? The* Parrot, *to a* Portugueze. Prince *What do you there?* Parrot, *I look after the Chickens, The* Prince laugh'd, and ſaid, *You look after the Chickens?* Parrot anſwered, *Yes I, and I know wellenough how to do it.*

‘ or

‘ or enliven a buſy Scene ſometimes with ſuch Digreſſions,
‘ whether to the Purpoſe or no.

Same Man. I have taken Care that the Reader ſhould have the Story at large in the Author's own Words, becauſe he ſeems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that ſo able a Man as he, who had Sufficiency enough to warrant all the Teſtimonies he gives of himſelf, ſhould take ſo much Pains, in a Place where it had nothing to do, to pin ſo cloſe not only on a Man whom he mentions as a Friend, but on a Prince, in whom he acknowledges very great Honeſty and Piety, a Story, which he himſelf thought incredible, he could not but alſo think ridiculous. The Prince 'tis plain, who vouches this Story, and our Author, who relates it from him, both of them call this Talker a *Parrot*; and I ask any one elſe, who thinks ſuch a Story fit to be told, whether if this *Parrot*, and all of its Kind, had always talked, as we have a Prince's Word for it, as this one did; whether, I ſay, they would not have paſſed for a Race of *rational Animals*; but yet, whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be Men, and not *Parrots!* For I preſume 'tis not the *Idea* of a thinking or rational Being alone, that makes the *Idea* of a *Man* in moſt People's Senſe, but of a Body, ſo and ſo ſhaped, joined to it; and if that be the *Idea* of a *Man*, the ſame ſucceſſive Body not ſhifted all at once, muſt, as well as the ſame immaterial Spirit, go to making of the ſame *Man*.

Perſonal Identity. §. 9. This being premiſed, to find wherein *perſonal Identity* conſiſts, we muſt conſider what *Perſon* ſtands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has Reaſon and Reflection, and can conſider it ſelf as it ſelf, the ſame thinking Thing in different Times and Places: which it does only by that Conſciouſneſs, which is inſeparable from Thinking, and it ſeems to be eſſential to it: It being impoſſible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we ſee, hear, ſmell, taſte, feel, meditate, or will any Thing, we know that we do ſo. Thus it is always as to our preſent Senſations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himſelf that which he calls *Self*; it not being conſidered in this Caſe whether the ſame *Self* be continned in the ſame, or divers Subſtances. For ſince Concioufneſs always accompanies Thinking, and 'tis that that makes every one to be what he calls *Self*; and thereby diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all other thinking Things; in this alone conſiſts *perſonal Identity*. *i. e.* the Sameneſs of a rational Being: And as far as this Conſciouſneſs

ouſneſs can be extended backwards to any paſt Action or Thought, ſo far reaches the Identity of that *Perſon*; it is the ſame *Self* now it was then; and 'tis by the ſame *Self* with this preſent one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal Identity.

§. 10. But it is farther enquir'd, whether it be the ſame Identical Subſtance? This, few would think they had Reaſon to doubt of, if theſe Perceptions, with their Conſciouſneſs, always remain'd preſent in the Mind, whereby the ſame thinking Thing would be always conſciouſly preſent, and, as would be thought, evidently the ſame to it ſelf. But that which ſeems to make the difficulty, is this, that this Conſciouſneſs being interrupted always by Forgetfulneſs, there being no Moment of our Lives wherein we have the whole Train of all our paſt Actions before our Eyes in one View: But even the beſt Memories loſing the Sight of one Part whilſt they are Viewing another; and we ſometimes, and that the greateſt Part of our Lives, not reflecting on our paſt Selves, being intent on our preſent Thoughts, and in ſound Sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or, at leaſt, none with that Conſciouſneſs which remarks our waking Thoughts. I ſay, in all theſe Caſes, our Conſciouſneſs being interrupted, and we loſing the Sight of our paſt *Selves*, Doubts are raiſed whether we are the ſame thinking Thing, *i. e.* the ſame Subſtance, or no. Which, however reaſonable, or unreaſonable, concerns not *perſonal Identity* at all. The Queſtion being, what makes the ſame *Perſon*, and not whether it be the ſame Identical Subſtance, which always thinks in the ſame Perſon, which in this Caſe matters not at all. Different Subſtances, by the ſame Conſciouſneſs, (where they do partake in it) being united into one Perſon, as well as different Bodies, by the ſame Life are united into one Animal, whoſe *Identity* is preſerved, in that Change of Subſtances, by the Unity of one continued Life. For it being the ſame Conſciouſneſs that makes a Man be himſelf to himſelf *perſonal Identity* depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual Subſtance, or can be continued in a Succeſſion of ſeveral Subſtances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the *Idea* of any paſt Action with the ſame Conſciouſneſs it has of it at firſt, and with the ſame Conſciouſneſs it has of any preſent Action; ſo far it is the ſame *perſonal Self*. For it is by the Conſciouſneſs it has of its preſent Thoughts and Actions, that it is *Self* to it *Self* now, and ſo will be the ſame *Self*, as far as the ſame Conſciouſneſs can extend to Actions paſt, or to come; and would be by Diſtance of Time, or Change of Subſtance, no more two *Perſons*, than a Man be two Men, by

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wearing other Clothes to Day than he did Yeſterday, with a long or ſhort Sleep between: The ſame Conſciouſneſs uniting thoſe diſtant Actions into the ſame *Perſon*, whatever Subſtances contributed to their Production.

Perſonal Identity in Change of Subſtances.

§. 11. That this is ſo, we have ſome Kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whoſe Particles, whilſt vitally united to this ſame thinking conſcious *Self*, ſo that we feel when they are touch'd, and are affected by, and conſcious of Good or Harm that happens to them, are a Part of *ourſelves*; *i. e.* of our thinking conſcious *Self*. Thus the Limbs of his Body is to every one a Part of *himſelf*: He ſympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an Hand, and thereby ſeparate it from that Conſciouſneſs he had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections, and it is then no longer a Part of that which is *himſelf*, any more than the remoteſt of Matter. Thus we ſee the *Subſtance*, whereof *perſonal Self* conſiſted at one Time, may be varied at another, without the Change of perſonal *Identity*; there being no Queſtion about the ſame Perſon, though the Limbs, which but now were a Part of it, be cut off.

§. 12. But the Queſtion is, whether if the ſame Subſtance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the ſame Perſon; or remaining the ſame, it can be different Perſons.

Whether in the Change of thinking Subſtances.

And to this I anſwer, firſt, This can be no Queſtion at all to thoſe, who place Thought in a purely material, animal Conſtitution, void of an immaterial Subſtance. For, whether their Suppoſition be true, or no; 'tis plain, they can-ceive perſonal Identity preſerved in ſomething elſe than Identity of Subſtance; as animal Identity is preſerved in Identity of Life, and not of Subſtance. And therefore thoſe, who place Thinking in an immaterial Subſtance only, before they can come to deal with theſe Men, muſt ſhew why perſonal Identity cannot be preſerved in the Change of immaterial Subſtances, or Variety of particular immaterial Subſtances, as well as animal Identity is preſerved in the Change of material Subſtances, or Variety of particular Bodies: Unleſs they will ſay, 'tis one immaterial Spirit that makes the ſame Life in Brutes, as it is one immaterial Spirit that makes the ſame Perſon in Men, which the *Carteſians* at leaſt will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking Things too.

§. 13. But next, as to the firſt Part of the Queſtion, Whether if the ſame thinking Subſtance (ſuppoſing immaterial Subſtances only to think) be changed, it can be the ſame Perſon? I anſwer,

ſwer, That cannot be reſolved, but by thoſe who know what Kind of Subſtances they are that do think; and whether the Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions can be transferr'd from one thinking Subſtance to another. I grant, were the ſame Conſciouſneſs the ſame individual Action, it could not: But it being but a preſent Repreſentation of a paſt Action, why it may not be poſſible, that that may be repreſented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be ſhewn. And therefore how far the Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions is annexed to any individual Agent, ſo that another cannot poſſibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, 'till we know what Kind of Action it is; that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Subſtances, who cannot think without being conſcious of it. But that which we call the *ſame Conſciouſneſs*, not being the ſame individual Act, why one intellectual Subſtance may not have repreſented to it, as done by it ſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps, done by ſome other Agent; why, I ſay, ſuch a Repreſentation may not poſſibly be without Reality of Matter of Fact, as well as ſeveral Repreſentations in Dreams are, which yet, whilſt dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the Nature of things. And that it never is ſo, will by us, till we have clearer Views of the Nature of thinking Subſtances, be beſt reſolv'd into the Goodneſs of God, who, as far as the Happineſs or Miſery of any of his ſenſible Creatures is concern'd in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another that Conſciouſneſs, which draws Reward or Puniſhment with it. How far this may be an Argument againſt thoſe who would place Thinking in a Syſtem of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be conſidered. But yet to return to the Queſtion before us, it muſt be allowed, That if the ſame Conſciouſneſs (which, as has been ſhewn, is quite a different Thing from the ſame numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be transferr'd from one thinking Subſtance to another, it will be poſſible, two thinking ſubſtances may make but one Perſon. For the ſame Conſciouſneſs being preſerv'd, whether in the ſame or different Subſtances, the perſonal Identity is preſerv'd?

§. 14. As to the ſecond Part of the Queſtion, Whether the ſame immaterial Subſtance remaining, there may be two diſtinct Perſons? Which Queſtion ſeems to me to be built on this, Whether the ſame immaterial Being, being conſcious of the Actions of its paſt Duration, may be wholly ſtripp'd of all the Conſciouſneſs of its paſt Exiſtence, and loſe it beyond the Power of ever retrieving again: And ſo as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a Conſciouſneſs that cannot

reach beyond this new State. All thoſe who hold Pre-exiſtence, are evidently of this Mind, ſince they allow the Soul to have no remaining Conſciouſneſs of what it did in that pre-exiſtent State, either wholly ſeparate from Body, or informing any other Body; and if they ſhould not, 'tis plain, Experience would be againſt them. So that perſonal Identity reaching no farther than Conſciouſneſs reaches, a pre-exiſtent Spirit not having continued ſo many Ages in a State of Silence, muſt needs make different Perſons. Suppoſe a *Chriſtian Platoniſt* or *Pythagorean*, ſhould, upon God's having ended all his Works of Creation the Seventh Day, think his Soul hath exiſted ever ſince; and ſhould imagine it has revolved in ſeveral Human Bodies, as I once met with one, who was perſuaded his had been the Soul of *Socrates*, (how reaſonably I will not diſpute. This I know, that in the Poſt he fill'd, which was no inconſiderable one, he paſſed for a very rational Man; and the Preſs has ſhewn that he wanted not Parts or Learning) would any one ſay, that he being not conſcious of any of *Socrates*'s Actions or Thoughts, could be the ſame Perſon with *Socrates?* Let any one reflect upon himſelf, and conclude, that he has in himſelf an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the conſtant Change of his Body keeps him the ſame; and is that which he calls himſelf: Let him alſo ſuppoſe it to be the ſame Soul that was in *Neſtor* or *Therſites*, at the Siege of *Troy*, (for Souls being, as far as we know any Thing of them in their Nature, indifferent to any Parcel of Matter, the Suppoſition has no apparent Abſurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he now having no Conſciouſneſs of any of the Actions either of *Neſtor* or *Therſites*, does, or can he, conceive himſelf the ſame Perſon with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their Actions? Attribute them to himſelf, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man that ever exiſted? So that this Conſciouſneſs not reaching to any of the Actions of either of thoſe Men, he is no more one *Self* with either of them, than if the Soul or immaterial Spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exiſt, when it began to inform his preſent Body, though it were never ſo true, that the ſame Spirit that informed *Neſtor*'s or *Therſites*'s Body, were numerically the ſame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the ſame Perſon with *Neſtor*, than if ſome of the Particles of Matter that were once a Part of *Neſtor*, were now a Part of this Man; the ſame immaterial Subſtance, without the ſame Conſciouſneſs, no more making the ſame Perſon by being united to any Body, than the ſame Particle of Matter, without Conſciouſneſs united to any Body, makes the ſame Perſon.

Perſon. But let him once find himſelf conſcious of any of the Actions of *Neſtor*, he then finds himſelf the ſame Perſon with *Neſtor*.

§. 15. And thus we may be able, without any Difficulty, to conceive the ſame Perſon at the Reſurrection, though in a Body not exactly in Make or Parts the ſame which he had here, the ſame Conſciouſneſs going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone, in the Change of Bodies, would ſcarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the *Man*, be enough to make the ſame *Man*. For ſhould the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the Conſciouſneſs of the Prince's paſt Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler, as ſoon as deſerted by his own Soul, every one ſees he would be the ſame Perſon with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would ſay it was the ſame Man? The Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I gueſs, to every Body, determine the Man in this Caſe, within the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: But he would be the ſame Cobler to every one beſides himſelf. I know that in the ordinary Way of ſpeaking, the ſame Perſon, and the ſame Man, ſtand for one and the ſame Thing. And, indeed, every one will always have a Liberty to ſpeak as he pleaſes, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what *Ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleaſes. But yet when we will enquire what makes the ſame *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Perſon*, we muſt fix the *Ideas* of *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Perſon* in our Minds; and having reſolved with our ſelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the *ſame*, and when not.

Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame Perſon.

§. 16. But though the ſame immaterial Subſtance or Soul, does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatſoever State, make the ſame Man; yet 'tis plain, Conſciouſneſs, as far as ever it can be extended, ſhould it be to Ages paſt, unites Exiſtences and Actions, very remote in Time, into the ſame Perſon, as well as it does the Exiſtence and Actions of the immediately preceeding Moment: So that whatever has the Conſciouſneſs of preſent and paſt Actions, is the ſame Perſon to whom they both belong. Had I the ſame Conſciouſneſs, that I ſaw the Ark and *Noah*'s Flood, as that I ſaw an overflowing of the *Thames* laſt Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I that write this now, that ſaw the *Thames* overflow'd laſt Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the ſame *Self*, place that *Self* in what Subſtance you pleaſe, than that I that write this am the ſame *my Self* now whilſt I write (whether I conſiſt of all the ſame Subſtance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was Yeſterday. For as to this Point of being the ſame *Self*, it matters not whe-

ther this preſent *Self* be made up of the ſame or other Subſtances, I being as much concern'd, and as juſtly accountable for any Action was done a thouſand Years ſince, appropriated to me now by this Self-conſciouſneſs, as I am for what I did the laſt Moment.

Self depends on Conſciouſneſs.

§. 17. *Self* is that conſcious thinking Thing, (whatever Subſtance, made up of whether ſpiritual, or material, ſimple, or compounded, it matters not) which is ſenſible, or conſcious of Pleaſure and Pain, capable of Happineſs or Miſery, and ſo is concern'd for it *Self*, as far as that Conſciouſneſs extends. Thus every one finds, that whilſt comprehended under that Conſciouſneſs, the little Finger is as much a Part of it *Self*, as what is moſt ſo. Upon Separation of this little Finger, ſhould this Conſciouſneſs go along with the little Finger, and leave the reſt of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger, would be the *Perſon*, the *ſame Perſon*; and *Self* then would have nothing to do with the reſt of the Body. As in this Caſe, it is the Conſciouſneſs that goes along with the Subſtance, when one Part is ſeparate from another, which makes the ſame *Perſon*, and conſtitutes this inſeparable *Self*; ſo it is in Reference to Subſtances remote in Time. That with which the *Conſciouſneſs* of this preſent thinking Thing can join it ſelf, makes the ſame *Perſon*, and is one *Self* with it, and with nothing elſe; and ſo attributes to it *Self*, and owns all the Actions of that Thing as its own, as far as that Conſciouſneſs reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects, will perceive.

Object of Rewards and Puniſhment.

§. 18. In this *Perſonal Identity* is founded all the Right and Juſtice of Reward and Puniſhment; Happineſs and Miſery being that for which every one is concerned for *himſelf*, not mattering what becomes of any Subſtance, not joined to, or effected with that Conſciouſneſs. For as it is evident in the Inſtance I gave but now, if the Conſciouſneſs went along with the little Finger, when it was cut off, that would be the ſame *Self* which was concerned for the whole Body Yeſterday, as making a Part of it *ſelf*, whoſe Actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Tho' if the ſame Body ſhould ſtill live, and immediately, from the Separation of the little Finger, have its own peculiar Conſciouſneſs, whereof the little Finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a Part of it *ſelf*, or could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§. 19. This may ſhew us, wherein *perſonal Identity* conſiſts, not in the Identity of Subſtance, but, as I have ſaid, in the Identity of *Conſciouſneſs*, wherein *Socrates* and the preſent Mayor of *Quinborough* agree, they are the ſame Perſon: If the ſame *Socrates*, waking and ſleeping do not partake of the ſame

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Conſciouſneſs, *Socrates* waking and ſleeping, is not the ſame Perſon. And to puniſh *Socrates* waking, for what ſleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conſcious of, would be no more of Right, than to puniſh one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, becauſe their Outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed; for ſuch Twins have been ſeen.

§. 20. But yet poſſibly it will ſtill be objected, ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the Memory of ſome Parts of my Life, beyond a Poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that perhaps I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; yet am I not the ſame Perſon that did thoſe Actions, had thoſe Thoughts, that I once was conſcious of, though I have not forgot them? To which I anſwer, that we muſt here take Notice what the Word *I* is applied to; which, in this Caſe, is the Man only. And the ſame Man being preſumed to be the ſame Perſon, *I* is eaſily here ſuppoſed to ſtand alſo for the ſame Perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame Man to have diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſſes at different Times, it is paſt doubt the ſame Man would at different Times make different Perſons; which, we ſee, is the Senſe of Mankind in the ſolemneſt Declaration of their Opinions, Human Laws not puniſhing the *Mad Man* for the *Sober Man's* Actions, nor the *Sober Man* for what the *Mad Man* did, thereby making them two Perſons; which is ſomewhat explained by our Way of ſpeaking in *Engliſh*, when we ſay, ſuch a one *is not himſelf*, or is *beſides himſelf*; in which Phraſes it is inſinuated, as if thoſe who now, or at leaſt, firſt uſed them, thought that *Self* was changed, the *ſelf* ſame Perſon was no longer in that Man.

Difference between Identity of Man and Perſon.

§. 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive, that *Socrates*, the ſame individual Man, ſhould be two Perſons. To help us a little in this, we muſt conſider what is meant by *Socrates*, or the ſame individual *Man*.

Firſt, It muſt be either the ſame individual, immaterial, thinking Subſtance: In ſhort, the numerical Soul, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, Or the ſame Animal, without any Regard to an immaterial Soul.

Thirdly, Or the ſame immaterial Spirit united to the ſame Animal.

Now, take which of theſe Suppoſitions you pleaſe, it is impoſſible to make perſonal Identity to conſiſt in any Thing but Conſciouſneſs; or reach any farther than that does.

For by the Firſt of them, it muſt be allowed poſſible that a Man born of different Women, and in diſtant Times, may be the ſame Man. A Way of ſpeaking, which, whoever admits, muſt allow it poſſible for the ſame Man to be two diſtinct Perſons, as any two that have lived in different Ages, without the Knowledge of one another's Thoughts.

By the Second and Third, *Socrates* in this Life, and after it, cannot be the ſame Man any Way, but by the ſame Conſciouſneſs; and ſo making *human Identity* to conſiſt in the ſame Thing wherein we place *perſonal Identity*, there will be no Difficulty to allow the ſame Man to be the ſame Perſon. But then they who place *human Identity* in Conſciouſneſs only, and not in ſomething elſe, muſt conſider how they will make the Infant *Socrates* the ſame Man with *Socrates* after the Reſurrection. But whatſoever to ſome Men makes a *Man*, and conſequently the ſame individual Man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, perſonal Identity can by us be placed in nothing but Conſciouſneſs, (which is that alone which makes what we call *Self*) without involving us in great Abſurdities.

§. 22. But is not a Man drunk and ſober the ſame Perſon, why elſe is he puniſh'd for the Fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame Perſon, as a Man that walks, and does other Things in his Sleep, is the ſame Perſon, and is anſwerable for any Miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human Laws puniſh both with a Juſtice ſuitable to their Way of Knowledge; becauſe in theſe Caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and ſo the Ignorance in Drunkenneſs or Sleep, is not admitted as a Plea. For though Puniſhment be annexed to Perſonality, and Perſonality to Conſciouſneſs, and the Drunkard perhaps be not conſcious of what he did; yet Human Judicatures juſtly puniſh him; becauſe the Fact is proved againſt him, but Want of Conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open, it may be reaſonable to think, no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of; but ſhall receive his Doom, his Conſcience accuſing or excuſing him.

Conſciouſneſs alone makes Self.

§. 23. Nothing but Conſciouſneſs can unite remote Exiſtences into the ſame Perſon, the Identity of Subſtance will not do it: For whatever Subſtance there is, however framed, without Conſciouſneſs, there is no Perſon: And a Carcaſe may be a Perſon, as well as any Sort of Subſtance be ſo without Conſciouſneſs.

Could

Could we ſuppoſe two diſtinct incommunicable Conſciouſneſſes acting the ſame Body, the one conſtantly by Day, the other by Night; and on the other Side, the ſame Conſciouſneſs, acting by Intervals, two diſtinct Bodies: I ask, in the firſt Caſe, whether the *Day* and the *Night Man* would not be two as diſtinct Perſons, as *Socrates* and *Plato?* And whether in the ſecond Caſe, there would not be one Perſon in two diſtinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the ſame in two diſtinct Clothings. Nor is it at all material to ſay, that this ſame, and this diſtinct *Conſciouſneſs*, in the Caſes above-mentioned, is owing to the ſame and diſtinct immaterial Subſtances, bringing it with them to thoſe Bodies, which, whether true or no, alters not the Caſe: Since 'tis evident, the *perſonal Identity* would equally be determined by the Conſciouſneſs, whether that Conſciouſneſs, were annexed to ſome individual immaterial Subſtance, or no. For granting, that the thinking Subſtance of Man muſt be neceſſarily ſuppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident, that immaterial thinking Thing may ſometimes part with its paſt Conſciouſneſs, and be reſtored to it again, as appears in the Forgetfulneſs Men often have in their paſt Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the Memory of a paſt Conſciouſneſs, which it had loſt for twenty Years together. Make theſe Intervals of Memory and Forgetfulneſs to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Perſons with the ſame immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former Inſtance, two Perſons with the ſame Body. So that *Self* is not determined by Identity or Diverſity of Subſtance, which it cannot be ſure of, but only by Identity of Conſciouſneſs.

§. 24. Indeed it may conceive the Subſtance whereof it is now made up, to have exiſted formerly, united in the ſame conſcious Being: But Conſciouſneſs removed, that Subſtance is no more it *Self*, or makes no more a Part of it, than any other Subſtance, as is evident in the Inſtance we have already given upon a Limb cut off, of whoſe Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any Conſciouſneſs, it is no more of a Man's Self, than any other Matter of the Univerſe. In like Manner it will be in reference to any immaterial Subſtance, which is void of that Conſciouſneſs whereby I am my *Self* to my *Self*: If there be any part of its Exiſtence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that preſent Conſciouſneſs, whereby I am now my *ſelf*, it is in that Part of its Exiſtence no more my *ſelf*, than any other immaterial Being. For whatſoever any Subſtance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by Conſciouſneſs make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a Part

of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where exiſting.

§. 25. I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this Conſciouſneſs is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Subſtance.

But let Men, according to their divers Hypotheſes, reſolve of that as they pleaſe. This every intelligent Being ſenſible of Happineſs or Miſery, muſt grant, that there is ſomething that is *himſelf* that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this *Self* has exiſted in a continued Duration more than one Inſtant, and therefore 'tis poſſible may exiſt, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain Bounds to be ſet to its Duration; and may be the *ſame Self*, by the ſame Conſciouſneſs continued on for the future. And thus, by this Conſciouſneſs, he finds himſelf to be the *ſame Self* which did ſuch or ſuch an Action ſome Years ſince, by which he comes to be happy or miſerable now. In all which Account of *Self*, the ſame numerical Subſtance is not conſidered as making the ſame *Self*. But the ſame continued Conſciouſneſs, in which ſeveral Subſtances may have been united, and again ſeparated from it, which, whilſt they continued in a vital Union with that, wherein this Conſciouſneſs then reſided, made a part of that ſame *Self*. Thus any Part of our Bodies vitally united to that which is conſcious in us, makes a Part of our *Selves*: But upon ſeparation from the vital Union, by which that Conſciouſneſs is communicated, that which a Moment ſince was Part of our *Selves*, is now no more ſo, than a Part of another Man's *Self* is a Part of me; and 'tis not impoſſible, but in a little Time may become a real Part of another Perſon. And ſo we have the ſame numerical Subſtance become a Part of two different Perſons; and the ſame Perſon preſerved under the Change of various Subſtances. Could we ſuppoſe any Spirit wholly ſtripp'd of all its Memory of Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great Part of ours, and ſometimes of them all, the Union or Separation of ſuch a ſpiritual Subſtance would make no Variation of perſonal Identity, any more than that of any Particle of Matter does. Any Subſtance vitally united to the preſent thinking Being, is a Part of that very *ſame Self* which now is: Any Thing united to it by a Conſciouſneſs of former Actions, makes alſo a Part of the *ſame Self*, which is the ſame both then and now.

Perſon, a Forenſick Term.

§. 26. *Perſon*, as I take it, is the Name of this *Self*. Where-ever a Man finds what he calls *Himſelf*, there I think another may ſay is the *ſame Perſon*. It is a Forenſick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and ſo belongs only to intelligent Agents

Agents capable of a Law, and Happineſs and Miſery. This Perſonality extends it *ſelf* beyond preſent Exiſtence to what is paſt, only by Conſciouſneſs, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it *ſelf* paſt Actions, juſt upon the ſame Ground, and for the ſame Reaſon that it does the preſent. All which is founded in a Concern for Happineſs, the unavoidable Concomitant of Conſciouſneſs, that which is conſcious of Pleaſure and Pain, deſiring that that *Self* that is conſcious, ſhould be happy. And therefore whatever paſt Actions it cannot reconcile, or appropriate to that preſent *Self* by Conſciouſneſs, it can be no more concerned in, than if they never had been done: And to receive Pleaſure or Pain, *i. e.* Reward or Puniſhment, on the Account of any ſuch Action, is all one, as to be made happy or miſerable in its firſt Being, without any Demerit at all. For ſuppoſing a Man puniſh'd now for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no Conſciouſneſs at all, what Difference is there between that Puniſhment, and being created miſerable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apoſtle tells us, that the great Day, when every one ſhall *receive according to his Doings, the Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open.* The ſentence ſhall be juſtify'd by the Conſciouſneſs all Perſons ſhall have, that *themſelves*, in what Bodies ſoever they appear, or what Subſtances ſoever that Conſciouſneſs adheres to, are the *ſame* that committed thoſe Actions, and deſerve that Puniſhment for them.

§. 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this Subject, made ſome Suppoſitions that will look ſtrange to ſome Readers, and poſſibly they are ſo in themſelves: But yet, I think, they are ſuch as are pardonable in this Ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking Thing that is in us, and which we look on as our *Selves*. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain Syſtem of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, &c. could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleaſed God, that no one ſuch Spirit ſhall ever be united to any but one ſuch Body, upon the right Conſtitution of whoſe Organs its Memory ſhould depend, we might ſee the Abſurdity of ſome of thoſe Suppoſitions I have made. But taking as we ordinarily now do (in the Dark concerning theſe Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Subſtance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of Things be no Abſurdity at all, to ſuppoſe, that the ſame Soul may, at different Times, be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that Time

one

one Man: as well as we ſuppoſe a Part of a Sheep's Body Yeſterday, ſhould be a Part of Man's Body to Morrow, and in that Union make a vital Part of *Melibœus* himſelf, as well as it did of his Ram.

The Difficulty from ill Uſe of Names.

§. 28. To conclude, whatever Subſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt, during its Exiſtence, neceſſarily be the ſame: Whatever Compoſitions of of Subſtances begin to exiſt, during the Union of thoſe Subſtances, the Concrete muſt be the ſame: Whatſoever Mode begins to exiſt, during its Exiſtence, it is the ſame: And ſo, if the Compoſition be of diſtinct Subſtances, and different Modes, the ſame Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the Difficulty or Obſcurity that has been about this Matter, rather riſes from the Names ill uſed, than from any Obſcurity in Things themſelves. For whatever makes the ſpecifick *Idea*, to which the Name is applied, if that *Idea* be ſteadily kept to, the Diſtinction of any Thing into the ſame, and divers, will eaſily be conceived, and there can ariſe no Doubt about it.

Continued Exiſtence makes Identity.

§. 29. For ſuppoſing a rational Spirit be the *Idea* of a *Man*, 'tis eaſy to know what is the *ſame Man*, *viz.* the *ſame Spirit*, whether ſeparate or in a Body, will be the *ſame Man*. Suppoſing a rational Spirit vitally united to a Body of certain Conformation of Parts to make a *Man*, whilſt that rational Spirit, with that vital Conformation of Parts, though continued in a fleeting ſucceſſive Body, remains, it will be the *ſame Man*. But if to any one the *Idea* of a Man be but the vital Union of Parts in a certain Shape; as long as that vital Union and Shape remains, in a Concrete no otherwiſe the ſame, but by a continued Succeſſion of fleeting Particles, it will be the *ſame Man*. For whatever be the Compoſition, whereof the Complex *Idea* is made, whenever Exiſtence makes it one particular Thing under one Denomination, the ſame Exiſtence continued, preſerves it the ſame Individual under the ſame Denomination *.

CHAP.

* The Doctrine of Identity and Diverſity, contained in this Chapter, the Biſhop of *Worceſter* pretends to be inconſiſtent with the Doctrines of the Chriſtian Faith, concerning the Reſurrection of the Dead. His Way of arguing from it, is this: He ſays, *the Reaſon of believing the Reſurrection of the ſame Body upon Mr.* Locke's

Locke's *Grounds, is from the* Idea *of Identity.* To which our Author ‡ anſwers: Give me Leave, my Lord, to ſay, that the *Reaſon of believing* any Articles of the Chriſtian Faith (ſuch as your Lordſhip is here ſpeaking of, to me, and *upon my Grounds*, is its being a part of Divine Revelation: Upon this Ground I believed it before I either writ that Chapter of *Identity and Diverſity*, and before I ever thought of thoſe Propoſitions which your Lordſhip quotes out of that Chapter, and upon the ſame Ground I believe it ſtill; and not *from my* Idea *of Identity.* This Saying of your Lordſhip's therefore, being a Propoſition neither ſelf-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your Foundation failing, all your large Superſtructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

‡ *In his 3d Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter, p. 167, &c.*

But my Lord, before we go any farther, I crave Leave humbly to repreſent to your Lordſhip, that I thought you undertook to *make out*, that my *Notion of Ideas* was *inconſiſtent with the Articles of the Chriſtian Faith.* But that which your Lordſhip inſtances in here, is not, that I yet know, an *Article of the Chriſtian Faith.* The *Reſurrection of the Dead*, I acknowledge to be an Article of the Chriſtian Faith: But that the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe of *the ſame Body*, is an Article of the Chriſtian Faith, is, what, I confeſs, I do not yet know.

In the New Teſtament (wherein, I think, are contained all the *Articles of the Chriſtian Faith*) I find our Saviour and the Apoſtles to preach *the Reſurrection of the Dead*, and the *Reſurrection from the Dead* in many Places: But I do not remember any Place where the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body* is ſo much as mentioned, Nay, which is very remarkable in the Caſe, I do not remember in any Place of the New Teſtament (where the general Reſurrection at the laſt Day is ſpoken of) any ſuch Expreſſion as the *Reſurrection of the Body*, much leſs *of the ſame Body.*

I ſay the general Reſurrection at the laſt Day: Becauſe where the Reſurrection of ſome particular Perſons preſently upon our Saviour's Reſurrection is mentioned, the Words are, * *The Graves were opened, and many Bodies of Saints, which ſlept, aroſe, and came out of the Graves after His Reſurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appeared to many:* Of which peculiar Way of ſpeaking of this Reſurrection, the Paſſage it ſelf gives a Reaſon in theſe Words, *appeared to many*; i. e. thoſe *who ſlept, appeared*, ſo as to be known to be riſen. But this could not be known, unleſs they brought with them the Evidence, that they were thoſe who had been dead, whereof there were two Proofs, their Graves were opened, and their Bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the ſame

* Matt. xxvii. 52, 53.

to thoſe who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been thoſe who had been dead ſo long, that all who knew them once alive, were now gone, thoſe to whom they appeared might have known them to be Men; but could not have known they were riſen from the Dead, becauſe they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was, that they were ſo many living Strangers, of whoſe Reſurrection they knew nothing. 'Twas neceſſary therefore, that they ſhould come in ſuch Bodies, as might in Make and Size, &c. appear to be the ſame they had before, that they might be known to thoſe of their Acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable they were ſuch as were newly dead, whoſe Bodies were not yet diſſolved and diſſipated; and therefore, 'tis particularly ſaid here, (differently from what is ſaid of the general Reſurrection) that their *Bodies* aroſe; becauſe they were the ſame that were then lying in their Graves, the Moment before they roſe.

But your Lordſhip endeavours to prove it muſt be the *ſame Body*: And let us grant, that your Lordſhip, nay, others too, think you have proved it *muſt* be the ſame Body; will you therefore ſay, that he holds what is inconſiſtent with an Article of Faith, who having never ſeen this your Lordſhip's Interpretation of the Scripture, nor your Reaſons for the *ſame Body*, in your Senſe of *ſame Body*; or, if he has ſeen them, yet not underſtanding them, or not perceiving the Force of them, believes what the Scripture propoſes to him, *viz.* That at the laſt Day, the *Dead ſhall be raiſed*, without determining whether it ſhall be with the very ſame Bodies or no?

I know your Lordſhip pretends not to erect your particular Interpretetions of Scripture into Articles of Faith; And if you do not, he that believes the *Dead ſhall be raiſed*, believes that Article of Faith which the Scripture propoſes: And cannot be accuſed of holding any Thing *inconſiſtent* with it, if it ſhould happen, that what he holds is *inconſiſtent* with another Propoſition, *viz. That the Dead ſhall be raiſed with the ſame Bodies*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe, which I do not find propoſed in Holy Writ as an Article of Faith.

But your Lordſhip argues, *it muſt be the ſame Body*; which, as you explain *ſame Body* ‡ *is not the ſame individual Particles of Matter, which were united at the Point of Death. Nor the ſame Particles of Matter, that the Sinner had at the Time of the Commiſſion of his Sins. But that it muſt be the ſame material Subſtance which was vitally united to the Soul here*; i. e. as I underſtand it, the ſame individual Particles of Matter, which were, ſome Time or other during his Life here, vitally united to his Soul.

‡ P. 34, 35

Your

Your firſt Argument to prove, that *it muſt be the ſame Body* in this Senſe of the *ſame Body*, is taken * from theſe Words of our Saviour, *All that are in the Graves ſhall hear his Voice, and ſhall come forth.* † From whence your Lordſhip argues, That theſe Words, *all that are in their Graves, relate to no other Subſtance than what was united to the Soul in Life*; becauſe a *different Subſtance cannot be ſaid to be in the Graves, and to come out of them.* Which Words of your Lordſhip's, if they prove any Thing, prove that the Soul too is lodg'd in the Grave, and raiſed out of it at the laſt Day. For your Lordſhip ſays, *Can a different Subſtance be ſaid to be in their Graves, and come out of them?* So that according to this Interpretation of theſe Words of our Saviour; *No other Subſtance* being raiſed, but what hears his Voice; and *no other Subſtance* hearing his Voice, but what being called, comes out of the Grave; and *no other Subſtance* coming out of the Grave, but what was in the Grave, any one muſt conclude, that the Soul, unleſs it be in the Grave, will make no part of the Perſon that is raiſed, *unleſs*, as your Lordſhip argues againſt me, * *You can make it out, that a Subſtance which never was in the Grave, may come out of it*, or tha the Soul is no *Subſtance*.

* P. 37.

† John. v. 28, 29.

* P. 37.

But letting aſide the *Subſtance* of the Soul, another Thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your Interpretation of our Saviour's Words be neceſſary to be received as their true Senſe, is, That it will not be very eaſily reconciled to your Saying, † you do not mean by the ſame Body, *The ſame individual Particles which were united at the Point of Death.* And yet by this Interpretation of our Saviour's Words, you can mean no other *Particles* but ſuch as were united at the Point of Death; becauſe you mean no other *Subſtance* but what *comes out of the Grave*; and no *Subſtance*, no Particles *come out*, you ſay, but what were *in the Grave*; and I think your Lordſhip will not ſay, that the Particles that were ſeparate from the Body *by Perſpiration* before the Point of Death, were laid up in the Grave.

† P. 34.

But your Lordſhip, I find, has an Anſwer to this, viz. * *That by comparing this with other Places, you find that the Words* [of our Saviour above quoted] *are to be underſtood of the Subſtance of the Body, to which the Soul was united, and not to* (I ſuppoſe your Lordſhip writ *of*) *thoſe individual Parti-s*, i. e. *thoſe individual Particles* that are in the Grave at the Reſurrection. For ſo they muſt be read, to make your Lordſhip's Senſe entire, and to the Purpoſe of your Anſwer here: And then methinks this laſt Senſe of our Saviour's Words given by your Lordſhip, wholly overturns the Senſe which you have given of them above, where from thoſe Words

* P. 37.

you

you preſs the Belief of the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, by this ſtrong Argument, that a *Subſtance* could not, upon hearing the Voice of Chriſt, *come out of the Grave, which was never in the Grave.* There (as far as I can underſtand your Words) your Lordſhip argues that our Saviour's Words muſt be underſtood of the Particles in the Grave, *unleſs*, as your Lordſhip ſays, *one can make it out, that a Subſtance which never was in the Grave, may come out of it.* And here your Lordſhip expreſly ſays, That our Saviour's *Words are to be underſtood of the Subſtance of that Body, to which the Soul was* [at any time] *united, and not to thoſe individual Particles that are in the Grave.* Which put together, ſeems to me to ſay, That our Saviour's Words are to be underſtood of thoſe Particles only that are in the Grave, and not of thoſe Particles only which are in the Grave, but of others alſo, which have at any Time been *vitally united to the Soul*, but never were in the Grave.

The next Text your Lordſhip brings to make the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, in your Senſe, an Article of Faith, are theſe Words of St. *Paul*; * *For we muſt all appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, that every one may receive the Things done in this Body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.* To which your Lordſhip ſubjoins † this Queſtion: *Can theſe Words be underſtood of any other material Subſtance, but that Body in which theſe Things were done? Anſwer*, A Man may ſuſpend his determining the Meaning of the Apoſtle to be, that a Sinner ſhall ſuffer for his Sins in the very *ſame Body* wherein he committed them: Becauſe St. *Paul* does not ſay he ſhall have the very *ſame Body*, when he ſuffers, that he had when he ſinn'd. The Apoſtle ſays indeed, done *in his Body*. The Body he had, and did Things in at Five or Fifteen, was, no doubt, *his Body*, as much as that, which he did Things in at Fifty, was *his Body*, though *his Body* were not *the very ſame Body* at thoſe different Ages: And ſo will the Body, which he ſhall have after the Reſurrection, be *his Body*, though it be not the very *ſame* with that, which he had at Five or Fifteen, or Fifty. He that at Threeſcore is broke on the Wheel, for a Murder he committed at Twenty, is puniſhed for what he did in *his* Body, though the Body he has, *i. e. his* Body at Threeſcore be not the ſame, *i. e.* made up of the ſame individual Particles of Matter, that that Body was, which he had forty Years before. When your Lordſhip has reſolv'd with your ſelf, what that ſame immutable *he* is, which at the laſt Judgment ſhall receive the Things done in *his* Body, your Lordſhip will eaſily ſee, that the Body he had when an *Embryo* in the Womb, when a Child playing in Coats, when a Man marrying a Wife, and when Bed-rid dying of a Conſumption, and at laſt, which he ſhall have

* 2 Cor. v. 10.

† P. 38.

have after the Reſurrection, are each of them *his* Body, though neither of them be the *ſame Body*, the one with the other.

But farther to your Lordſhip's Queſtion, *Can theſe Words be underſtood of any other material Subſtance, but that Body in which theſe Things were done? I anſwer.* Theſe Words of St. *Paul may be underſtood of another material Subſtance, than that Body in which theſe Things were done*, becauſe your Lordſhip teaches me, and gives me a ſtrong Reaſon ſo to underſtand them. Your Lordſhip ſays, * That *you do not ſay the ſame Particles of Matter, which the Sinner had at the very Time of the Commiſſion of his Sins, ſhall be raiſed at the laſt Day.* And your Lordſhip gives this Reaſon for it: † *For then a long Sinner muſt have a vaſt Body, conſidering the continual ſpending of Particles by Perſpiration.* Now, my Lord, if the Apoſtle's Words, as your Lordſhip would argue, *cannot be underſtood of any other material Subſtance, but that Body, in which theſe Things were done*; and no Body upon the Removal or Change of ſome of the Particles, that at any Time makes it up, is the ſame material Subſtance or the ſame Body; it will, I think, thence follow, that either the Sinner muſt have all the ſame individual Particles vitally united to his Soul, when he is raiſed, that he had vitally united to his Soul, when he ſinn'd: Or elſe St. *Paul*'s Words here cannot be underſtood to mean the *ſame Body in which the Things were done.* For if there were other Particles of Matter in the Body, wherein the Thing was done, than in that which is rais'd, that which is rais'd cannot be the *ſame Body* in which they were done: Unleſs that alone, which has juſt all the ſame individual Particles when any Action is done, being the ſame Body wherein it was done, that alſo, which has not the ſame individual Particles wherein that Action was done, can be the ſame Body wherein it was done; which is in Effect to make the ſame Body ſometimes to be the ſame, and ſometimes not the ſame.

* P. 34.

† P. 35.

Your Lordſhip thinks it ſuffices to make the *ſame Body* to have not all, but no other Particles of Matter, but ſuch as were ſometime or other vitally united to the Soul before: But ſuch a Body, made up Part of the Particles ſometime or other vitally united to the Soul, is no more the ſame Body wherein the Actions were done in the diſtant Parts of the *long Sinner*'s Life, than that is the ſame Body in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters of the ſame Particles, that made it up, are wanting. For Example, A Sinner has acted here in his *Body* an hundred Years; he is raiſed at the laſt Day, but with what Body? The ſame, ſays your Lordſhip, that he acted in; becauſe St. *Paul* ſays, he muſt *receive the Things done in his Body*: What therefore muſt his Body at the Reſurrection conſiſt of? Muſt it conſiſt of all the Particles of Matter that have ever been vitally united to

his

his Soul? For they, in Succeſſion, have all of them made up *his* Body wherein he did *Theſe Things:* No, ſays your Lordſhip, * that would make his Body too *vaſt*; it ſuffices to make the ſame Body in which the Things were done, that it conſiſts of ſome of the Particles, and no other but ſuch as were, ſometime during his Life, vitally united to his Soul. But, according to this Account, *his* Body at the Reſurrection, being, as your Lordſhip ſeems to limit it, near the ſame Size it was in ſome Part of his Life, it will be no more the *ſame Body* in which *the Things were done* in the diſtant Parts of his Life, than that is the *ſame Body*, in which half or three quarters, or more of the individual Matter that made it then up, is now wanting. For Example, Let *his* Body at fifty Years old conſiſt of a Million of Parts: five hundred thouſand at leaſt of thoſe Parts will be different from thoſe which made up *his* Body at ten Years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical Particles, that made up his Body at fifty, or any other Seaſon of his Life; or to gather them promiſcuouſly out of thoſe which at different Times have ſucceſſively been vitally united to his Soul, they will no more make the ſame Body, which was *his*, wherein ſome of his Actions were done, than that is the ſame Body, which has but half the ſame Particles: And yet all your Lordſhip's Argument here for the ſame Body, is, becauſe St. *Paul* ſays, it muſt be *his* Body *in which theſe Things were done*; which it could not be, *if any other Subſtance were join'd to it*, i. e. if any other Particles of Matter made up the Body, which were not vitally united to the Soul when the Action was done.

* P. 25.

Again, your Lordſhip ſays, † *That you do not ſay the ſame individual Particles* [ſhall make up the Body at the Reſurrection] *which were united at the Point of Death, for there muſt be a great Alteration in them of a lingring Diſeaſe, as if a fat Man falls into a Conſumption.* Becauſe, 'tis likely, your Lordſhip thinks theſe Particles of a decrepit, waſted, withered Body, would be too few, or unfit to make ſuch a plump, ſtrong, vigorous, well-fiz'd Body, as it has pleaſed your Lordſhip to proportion out in your Thoughts to Men at the Reſurrection; and therefore ſome ſmall Portion of the Particles formerly united vitally to that Man's Soul, ſhall be reaſſumed to make up his Body to the Bulk your Lordſhip judges convenient; but the greateſt Part of them ſhall be left out to avoid the making his Body more *vaſt* than your Lordſhip thinks will be fit, as appears by theſe your Lordſhip's Words immediately following, *viz.* * *That you do not ſay the ſame Particles the Sinner had at the very time of Commiſſion of his Sins; for then a long Sinner muſt have a vaſt Body.*

† P. 34.

* P. 35.

But

But then, pray, my Lord, what muſt the *Embryo* do, who dying within a few Hours after his Body was vitally united to his Soul, has no Particles of Matter, which were formerly united to it, to make up his Body of that Size and Proportion which your Lordſhip ſeems to require in Bodies at the Reſurrection? or muſt we believe he ſhall remain content with that ſmall Pittance of Matter, and that yet imperfect Body to Eternity, becauſe it is an Article of Faith to believe the *Reſurrection of the very ſame Body*? *i. e.* made up of only ſuch Particles as have been vitally united to the Soul. For if it be ſo, as your Lordſhip ſays, * *That Life is the Reſult of the Union of Soul and Body*, it will follow, That the Body of an *Embryo* dying in the Womb, may be very little, not the thouſandth Part of any ordinary Man. For ſince from the firſt Conception and beginning of Formation it has Life, and *Life is the Reſult of the Union of the Soul with the Body*; an *Embryo*, that ſhall die either by the untimely Death of the Mother, or by any other Accident preſently after it has Life, muſt according to your Lordſhip's Doctrine, remain a Man not an Inch long to Eternity; becauſe there are not Particles of Matter, formerly united to his Soul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made uſe of to that Purpoſe: Though what greater Congruity the Soul hath with any Particles of Matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now ſo no longer, than it hath with Particles of Matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that ſhould be demanded.

* P. 43.

By theſe and not a few other the like Conſequences, one may ſee what Service they do to Religion, and the Chriſtian Doctrine, who raiſe Queſtions, and make Articles of Faith about the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, where the Scripture ſays nothing of *the ſame Body*; or if it does, it is with no ſmall Reprimand * to thoſe who make ſuch an Enquiry. *But ſome Man will ſay, How are the Dead raiſed up? And with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou ſoweſt, is not quickned except it die. And that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that Body that ſhall be, but bare Grain, it may chance of Wheat, or of ſome other Grain. But God giveth it a Body as it hath pleaſed him.* Words I think ſufficient to deter us from determining any thing for or againſt the ſame Body being raiſed at the laſt Day. It ſuffices, that all the *Dead ſhall be raiſed*, and every one appear and anſwer for the Things done in this Life, and receive according to the Things he hath done in his Body, whether Good or Bad. He that believes this, and has ſaid nothing inconſiſtent herewith, I preſume may and muſt be acquitted from being guilty of any Thing *inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection of the Dead.*

* 1 Cor. xv. 35. &c.

But your Lordſhip, to prove *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body to be an Article of Faith*, farther asks, † *How could it be ſaid, if any other Subſtance be joined to the Soul at the Reſurrection, as its Body, that they were the Things done in or by the Body?* † P. 38. *Anſw.* Juſt as it may be ſaid of a Man at an hundred Years old, that hath then another Subſtance joined to his Soul, than he had at twenty, that the Murder or Drunkenneſs he was guilty of at twenty, *were Things done in the Body: How by the Body* comes in here, I do not ſee.

Your Lordſhip adds, *And St. Paul's Diſpute about the Manner of raiſing the Body, might ſoon have ended, if there were no Neceſſity of the ſame Body. Anſw.* When I underſtand what Argument there is in theſe Words to prove the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, without a Mixture of one new Atom of Matter, I ſhall know what to ſay to it. In the mean Time this I underſtand, That St. *Paul* would have put as ſhort an End to all Diſputes about this Matter, if he had ſaid, That *there was a Neceſſity of the ſame Body*, or that it ſhould be the *ſame Body*.

The next Text of Scripture you bring for the ſame Body is, ‡ *If there be no Reſurrection of the Dead, then is not Chriſt raiſed.* From which your Lordſhip argues, **If ſeems then other Bodies are to be raiſed as his was*, I grant other Dead, as certainly raiſed *as Chriſt was*; for elſe his Reſurrection would be of no Uſe to Mankind. But I do not ſee how it follows, that they ſhall be raiſed with the *ſame* Body as Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame Body, as your Lordſhip infers in theſe Words annexed; *And can there be any Doubt, whether his Body was the ſame material Subſtance which was united to his Soul before.* I anſwer, None at all; nor that it had juſt the ſame diſtinguiſhed Lineaments and Marks, yea, and the ſame Wounds that it had at the Time of his Death. If therefore your Lordſhip will argue from *other Bodies being raiſed as his was*, That they muſt keep Proportion with his in *Sameneſs*; then we muſt believe, that every Man ſhall be raiſed with the ſame Lineament and other Notes of Diſtinction he had at the Time of his Death, even with his Wounds yet open, if he had any, becauſe our Saviour was ſo raiſed, which ſeems to me ſcarce reconcileable with what your Lordſhip ſays, ‡ of a *fat Man falling into a Conſumption, and* dying.

‡ 2 Cor. xv. 16.

* P. 38.

‡ P. 34.

But whether it will conſiſt or no with your Lordſhip's Meaning in that Place, this to me ſeems a Conſequence that will need to be better proved, *viz.* That our Bodies muſt be raiſed the ſame, juſt as our Saviour's was: Becauſe St. *Paul* ſays, *if there be no Reſurrection of the Dead, then is Chriſt not riſen.* For it may be a good Conſequence, Chriſt is riſen, and therefore there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead; and yet this may not be a good

good Conſequence, Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame Body he had at his Death, therefore all Men ſhall be raiſed with the ſame Body they had at their Death, contrary to what your Lordſhip ſays concerning a *fat Man* dying *of a Conſumption*. But the Caſe I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and thoſe to be raiſed at the laſt Day.

1. His Body *ſaw not Corruption*, and therefore to give him another Body, new molded, mixed with other Particles, which were not contained in it as it lay in the Grave, whole and entire as it was laid there, had been to deſtroy his Body to frame him a new one without any Need. But why with the remaining Particles of a Man's Body long ſince diſſolved and molder'd into Duſt and Atoms, (whereof poſſibly a great Part may have undergone Variety of Changes, and entered into other Concretions even in the Bodies of other Men) other new Particles of Matter mixed with them, may not ſerve to make *his* Body again, as well as the Mixture of new and different Particles of Matter with the old, did in the Compaſs of his Life make *his* Body, I think no Reaſon can be given.

This may ſerve to ſhew, why though the Materials of our Saviour's Body were not changed at his Reſurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the Body of a Man dead and rotten in his Grave, or burnt, may at the laſt Day have ſeveral new Particles in it, and that without any Inconvenience: Since whatever Matter is vitally united to *his* Soul, is *his* Body, as much as is that which was united to it when he was born, or in any other Part of his Life.

2. In the next Place, the Size, Shape, Figure, and Lineaments of our Saviour's Body, even to his Wounds, into which doubting *Thomas* put his Fingers and his Hand, were to be kept in the raiſed Body of our Saviour, the ſame they were at his Death, to be a Conviction to his Diſciples, to whom he ſhew'd himſelf, and who were to be Witneſſes of his Reſurrection, that their Maſter, the very ſame Man, was crucified, dead and buried, and raiſed again, and therefore he was handled by them, and eat before them after he was riſen, to give them in all Points full Satisfaction, that it was really he, the ſame, and not another, not a Spectre or Apparition of him: Though I do not think your Lordſhip will thence argue, that becauſe *others are to be raiſed as he was*, therefore it is neceſſary to believe, that becauſe he eat after his Reſurrection, others at the laſt Day ſhall eat and drink after they are raiſed from the Dead, which ſeems to me as good an Argument, as becauſe his undiſſolved Body was raiſed out of the Grave, juſt as it there lay intire, without the Mixture of any new Particles; therefore the corrupted and conſumed Bodies of the Dead at the Reſurrection, ſhall be new framed only out of thoſe ſcatter'd Particles which were once vi-

tally united to their Souls, without the leaſt Mixture of any one ſingle Atom of new Matter. But at the laſt Day, when all Men are raiſed, there will be no Need to be aſſured of any one particular Man's Reſurrection. 'Tis enough that every one ſhall appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, to receive according to what he had done in his former Life; but in what Sort of Body he ſhall appear, or of what Particles made up, the Scripture having ſaid nothing, but that it ſhall be a *ſpiritual Body raiſed in Incorruption*, it is not for me to determine.

Your Lordſhip asks, * *Were they* [who ſaw our Sa-
* P. 39. viour after his Reſurrection] *Witneſſes only for ſome material Subſtance then united to his Soul?* I anſwer, I beg your Lordſhip to conſider, whether you ſuppoſe our Saviour was known to be the ſame Man (to the Witneſſes that were to ſee him, and teſtify his Reſurrection) by his Soul, that could neither be ſeen nor known to be the ſame; or by his Body, that could be ſeen, and by the diſcernible Structure and Marks of it, be known to be the ſame? When your Lorſhip has reſolved that, all that you ſay in that Page, will anſwer it ſelf. But becauſe one Man cannot know another to be the ſame, but by the outward viſible Lineaments, and ſenſible Marks he has been wont to be known and diſtinguiſhed by, will your Lordſhip therefore argue, That the Great Judge, at the laſt Day, who gives to each Man, whom he raiſes, his new Body, ſhall not be able to know who is who, unleſs he gives to every one of them a Body, juſt of the ſame Figure, Size and Features, and made up of the very ſame individual Particles he had in his former Life? Whether ſuch a Way of arguing for the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body, to be an Article of Faith*, contributes much to the ſtrengthening the Credibility of the Article of the Reſurrection of the Dead, I ſhall leave to the Judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving *the Reſurrection of the*
‡ P. 40. *ſame Body, to be an Article of Faith*, your Lordſhip ſays, ‡ *But the Apoſtle inſiſts upon the* Reſurrection of Chriſt, *not merely as an Argument of the Poſſibility of ours, but of the Certainty of it*; † *becauſe* he roſe, as the Firſt-
† 1 Cor. xv. Fruits; Chriſt the Firſt-Fruits, afterwards they 20, 23. that are Chriſt's at his coming. *Anſw.* No doubt, *the Reſurrection of Chriſt* is a Proof of the *Certainty of our* Reſurrection. But is it therefore a Proof of the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*, conſiſting of the ſame individual Particles which concurr'd to the making up of our Body here, without the Mixture of any one other Particle of Matter? I confeſs I ſee no ſuch Conſequence.

But your Lordſhip goes on; ‖ St. *Paul was*
‖ P. 42. *aware of the Objections in Men's Minds, about the Reſur-*

Reſurrection of the ſame Body; *and 'tis of great Conſequence as to this Article, to ſhew upon what Grounds he proceeds.* But ſome Men will ſay, How are the *Dead* raiſed up, and with what Body do *they* come? *Firſt he ſhews, that the ſeminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improv'd by the ordinary Providence of God, in the Manner of their Vegetation. Anſw.* I do not perfectly underſtand, what it is for the *ſeminal Parts of Plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the Manner of their Vegetation*: Or elſe, perhaps, I ſhould better ſee how this here tends to the Proof of the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe.

It continues, † *They* ſow bare Grain of Wheat, or of ſome other Grain, but God giveth it a Body, as it hath pleaſed him, and to every Seed his own Body. *Here*, ſays your Lordſhip, *is an Identity of the material Subſtance ſuppoſed.* It may be ſo. But to me a Diverſity *of the material Subſtance*, i. e. of the component Particles, *is here ſuppoſed*, or in direct Words ſaid. For the Words of St. *Paul* taken altogether, run thus, * *That which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not* that *Body which ſhall be, but bare Grain*, and ſo on, as your Lordſhip has ſet down the Remainder of them. From which Words of St. *Paul*, the natural Argument ſeems to me to ſtand thus. If the Body that is put in the Earth in ſowing, *is not* that *Body which ſhall be*, then the Body that is put in the Grave, *is not* that, *i. e.* the ſame *Body that ſhall be.*

† P. 40.

* V. 37.

But your Lordſhip proves it to be the *ſame Body* by theſe three *Greek* Words of the Text, *το ἴδιον σῶμα*, which your Lordſhip interprets thus, * *That proper Body which belongs to it. Anſwer*, Indeed by thoſe *Greek* Words *το ἴδιον σῶμα*, whether our Tranſlators have rightly render'd them *his own Body*, or your Lordſhip more rightly, *that proper Body which belongs to it*, I formerly underſtood no more but this, that in the Production of Wheat, and other Grain from Seed, God continued every Species diſtinct, ſo that from Grains of Wheat ſown, Root, Stalk, Blade, Ear and Grains of Wheat were produced, and not thoſe of Barley; and ſo of the reſt, which I took to be the Meaning of *to every Seed his own Body.* No, ſays your Lordſhip, theſe Words prove, That to every Plant of Wheat, and to every Grain of Wheat produced in it, is given *the proper Body that belongs to it*, is the ſame Body with the Grain that was ſown. *Anſw.* This, I confeſs, I do not underſtand; becauſe I do not underſtand how one individual Grain can be the *ſame* with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual Grains; for ſuch ſometimes is the Increaſe.

* P. 40.

But your Lordſhip proves it. For, ſays your Lordſhip, † *Every Seed having that Body in little which is afterwards ſo much inlarged; and in Grain*

† P. 40.

the Seed is corrupted before its Germination; but it hath its proper organical Parts, which make it the ſame Body with that which it grows up to. For although Grain be not divided into Lobes, as other Seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the moſt accurate Obſervations, that upon ſeparating the Membranes, theſe ſeminal Parts are diſcerned in them; which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. In which Words I crave Leave to obſerve, that your Lordſhip ſuppoſes, that a Body may be *enlarged* by the Addition of an hundred or a thouſand Times as much Bulk as its own Matter, and yet continue the *ſame Body*; which, I confeſs, I cannot underſtand.

But in the next Place, if that could be ſo; and that the Plant, in its full Growth at Harveſt, increaſed by a Thouſand or a Million of Times as much new matter added to it, as it had when it lay in little concealed in the Grain that was ſown, was the very ſame Body: Yet I do not think that your Lordſhip will ſay, that every minute, inſenſible, and inconceivably ſmall Grain of the hundred Grains, contained in that little organized ſeminal Plant, is every one of them the very ſame with that Grain which contains that whole little ſeminal Plant, and all thoſe inviſible Grains in it. For then it will follow, that one Grain is the ſame with an Hundred, and an hundred diſtinct Grains the ſame with one: Which I ſhall be able to aſſent to, when I can conceive, that all the Wheat in the World is but one Grain.

For I beſeech you, my Lord, conſider what it is St. *Paul* here ſpeaks of: It is plain he ſpeaks of *that which is ſown and dies, i. e.* the Grain that the Husbandman takes out of his Barn to ſow in his Field. And of this Grain, St *Paul* ſays, that it *is not* that *Body that ſhall be.* Theſe two, *viz. That which is ſown*, and *that Body that ſhall be*, are all the Bodies that St. *Paul* here ſpeaks of, to repreſent the Agreement or Difference of Mens Bodies after the Reſurrection, with thoſe they had before they died. Now, I crave Leave to aſk your Lordſhip, which of theſe Two is that little inviſible ſeminal Plant, which your Lordſhip here ſpeaks of? Does your Lordſhip mean by it the Grain *that is ſown*? But that is not what St. *Paul* ſpeaks of, he could not mean this *embryonated* little Plant, for he could not denote it by theſe Words, *that which thou ſoweſt*, for that he ſays muſt *die*: But this little *embryonated* Plant, contained in the Seed that is ſown, dies not: Or does your Lordſhip mean by it, *the Body that ſhall be*? But neither by theſe Words, *the Body that ſhall be*, can St. *Paul* be ſuppoſed to denote this inſenſible little *embryonated* Plant; for that is already in Being contained in the Seed that is ſown, and therefore could not be ſpoke of under the Name of *the Body that ſhall be.* And therefore, I confeſs I cannot ſee of what Uſe it is to your Lordſhip to introduce here this third Body, which St. *Paul* mentions not, and to make that the ſame, or not the ſame with any other, when

thoſe

thoſe which St. *Paul* ſpeaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, theſe two viſible ſenſible Bodies, the Grain ſown, and the Corn grown up to Ear, with neither of which this inſenſible *embryonat'd* Plant can be the ſame Body, unleſs an inſenſible Body can be the ſame Body with a ſenſible Body, and a little Body can be the ſame Body with one ten Thouſand, or an hundred Thouſand times as big as it ſelf. So that yet, I confeſs, I ſee not the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, proved from theſe Words of St. *Paul*, to be an *Article of Faith.*

Your Lordſhip goes one: * *St.* Paul *indeed ſaith* That we ſow not that Body that ſhall be; *but* * P. 41. *he ſpeaks not of the* Identity, *but the* Perfection *of it.*

Here my Underſtanding fails me again: For I cannot underſtand St. *Paul* to ſay, That the ſame identical ſenſible Grain of Wheat, which was ſown at Seed time, is the very ſame with every Grain of Wheat in the Ear at Harveſt, that ſprang from it: Yet ſo I muſt underſtand it, to make it prove, that the ſame ſenſible Body, that is laid in the Grave, ſhall be the very ſame with that which ſhall be raiſed at the Reſurrection. For I do not know of any ſeminal *Body in little*, contained in the dead Carcaſe of any Man or Womam, which, as your Lordſhip ſays, in Seeds, having its proper Organical Parts, ſhall *afterwards be enlarged*, and at the Reſurrection grow up into the *ſame Man.* For I never thought of any Seed or *ſeminal Parts*, either of *Plant* or Animal *ſo wonderfully improved by the Providence of God*, whereby the ſame Plant or Animal ſhould beget it Self; or ever heard, that it was by Divine *Providence* deſigned to produce the ſame Individuals, but for the producing of future and diſtinct Individuals, for the Continuation of the ſame Species.

Your Lordſhip's next Words are, † *And although there be ſuch a Difference from the Grain it ſelf, when* ‡ P. 41. *it comes up to be perfect Corn, with Root, Stalk, Blade, and Ear, that it may be ſaid to outward Appearance not to be the ſame Body; yet with regard to the ſeminal and organical Parts it is as much the ſame, as a Man grown up, is the ſame with the Embryo in the Womb. Anſwer*, it does not appear by any Thing I can find in the Text, That St. *Paul* here compared the *Body*, produced with the *ſeminal and organical Parts*, contained in the Grain it ſprang from, but with the whole ſenſible Grain that was ſown. Microſcopes had not then diſcovered the little *Embryo* Plant in the Seed; and ſuppoſing it ſhould have been revealed to St. *Paul*, (though in the Scripture we find little Revelation of Natural Philoſophy) yet an Argument taken from a Thing perfectly unknown to the *Corinthians*, whom he wrote to, could be of no Manner of Uſe to them; nor ſerve at all either to inſtruct or convince them. But granting that thoſe St. *Paul* wrote to knew it as well as Mr. *Lewenhoek*; yet your Lordſhip there by

proves not the raiſing of the *ſame Body*; your Lordſhip ſays it is as much the *ſame* [I crave Leave to add *Body*] *as a Man grown up is the ſame* (*ſame*, what I beſeech your Lordſhip?) *with the Embryo in the Womb.* For that the *Body* of the *Embryo* in the Womb, and *Body* of the Man grown up, is the *ſame Body*, I think no one will ſay; unleſs he can perſuade himſelf, that a *Body* that is not the hundredth Part of another, is the ſame with that other, which I think no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous *Way by Ideas* of Thinking and Reaſoning, he has learnt to ſay, that a Part and the Whole are the *ſame*.

† P. 41. Your Lordſhip goes on, † *And although many Arguments may be uſed to prove, that a Man is not the ſame, becauſe Life, which depends upon the Courſe of the Blood, and the Manner of Reſpiration, and Nutrition, is ſo different in both States; yet that Man would be thought ridiculous that ſhould ſeriouſly affirm, That it was not the* ſame Man. And your Lordſhip ſays, *I grant that the Variation of great Parcels of Matter in Plants, alters not the Identity: And that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one common Life, makes the Identity of a Plant. Anſwer*, My Lord, I think the Queſtion is not about the *ſame Man*, but the *ſame Body*.

* Eſſay, B. 2. C. 27. §. 4. For tho' I do ſay, * (ſomewhat differently from what your Lordſhip ſets down as my Words here) 'That that which has ſuch an Organization, 'as is fit to receive and diſtribute Nouriſhment, ſo as to continue 'and frame the Wood, Bark and Leaves, &c. of a Plant in 'which conſiſts the vegetable Life, continues to be the ſame 'Plant, as long as it partakes of the ſame Life, though that 'Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter, vitally 'united to the living Plant.' Yet I do not remember, that I any where ſay, That a Plant, which was once no bigger than an Oaten Straw, and afterwards grows to be above a Fathom about, is the *ſame Body*, though it be ſtill the *ſame Plant*.

The well known Tree in *Epping* Foreſt, called the *King's Oak*, which, from not weighing an Ounce at firſt, grew to have many Tuns of Timber in it, was all along the ſame Oak, the very *ſame Plant*; but no Body, I think, will ſay it was the *ſame Body* when it weighed a Ton, as it was when it weighed but an Ounce, unleſs he has a Mind to ſignalize himſelf by ſaying, That that is the *ſame Body*, which has a thouſand Particles of different Matter in in it, for one Particle that is the ſame; which is no better than to ſay, That a thouſand different Particles are but one and the ſame Particle, and one and the ſame Particle is a thouſand different Particles; a thouſand Times greater Abſurdity, than to ſay Half is the Whole, or the Whole is the ſame with the Half; which will be improved ten Thouſand Times yet farther, if a Man ſhall ſay, (as Your Lordſhip ſeems to

to me to argue here) That that great Oak is the very ſame Body with the Acorn it ſprang from, becauſe there was in that Acorn an Oak in little, which was *afterwards* (as your Lordſhip expreſſes it) ſo *much enlarged*, as to make that mighty Tree. For this *Embryo*, if I may ſo call it, or Oak in little, being not the hundreth, or perhaps the thouſandth Part of the Acorn, and the Acorn being not the thouſandth Part of the grown Oak, 'twill be very extraordinary to prove the Acorn and the grown Oak to be the *ſame Body*, by a Way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one Particle of an hundred Thouſand, or a Million, is the ſame in the one Body, that it was in the other. From which Way of Reaſoning, it will follow, that a Nurſe and her ſucking Child have the ſame Body; and be paſt Doubt, that a Mother and her Infant have the ſame Body. But this is a Way of *Certainty* found out to eſtabliſh the Articles of Faith, and to overturn the new *Method of Certainty* that your Lordſhip ſays I have *ſtarted, which is apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.*

And now I deſire your Lordſhip to conſider of what Uſe it is to you in the preſent Caſe, to quote out of my *Eſſay* theſe Words, 'That partaking of one common Life, makes the Identity of a 'Plant, ſince the Queſtion is not about the *Identity of a Plant*, 'but about the *Identity of a Body*.' It being a very different Thing to be the *ſame Plant*, and to be the *ſame Body*. For that which makes the ſame Plant, does not make the ſame Body; the one being the partaking in the ſame continued vegetable Life, the other conſiſting of the ſame numerical Particles of Matter. And therefore your Lordſhip's Inference from my Words above quoted, in theſe which you ſubjoin, * P. 42. * ſeems to me a very ſtrange one, *viz. So that in Things capable of any ſort of Life, the Identity is conſiſtent with a continued Succeſſion of Parts; and ſo the Wheat grown up, is the* ſame Body *with the Grain that was ſown.* For I believe, if my Words, from which you infer, *And ſo the Wheat grown up is the* ſame Body *with the Grain that was ſown*, were put into a Syllogiſm, this would hardly be brought to be the Concluſion.

But your Lordſhip goes on with Conſequence upon Conſequence, though I have not Eyes acute enough every where to ſee the Connexion, till you bring it to the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*. The Connexion of your Lordſhip's Words ‡ are as followeth; *And thus the Alteration* † P. 41. *of the Parts of the Body at the Reſurrection, is conſiſtent with its Identity, if its Organization and Life be the ſame; and this is a real Identity of the Body, which depends not upon Conſciouſneſs. From whence it follows, that to make the* ſame Body, *no more is required, but reſtoring to Life the organized Parts of it.* If the Queſtion were about raiſing the ſame Plant, I do not ſay but there

there might be ſome Appearance for making ſuch Inference from my Words as this, *Whence it follows, that to make the ſame* Plant, *no more is required, but to reſtore Life to the organized Parts of it.* But this Deduction, wherein from thoſe Words of mine that ſpeak only of the *Identity of a Plant*, your Lordſhip infers, there is no more required to make the *ſame Body*, than to make the *ſame Plant*, being too ſubtile for me, I leave to my Reader to find out.

Your Lordſhip goes on, and ſays, * *That I grant likewiſe*, 'That the Identity of the ſame Man conſiſts in a participation of the ſame continued 'Life, by conſtantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succeſſion, 'vitally united to the ſame organized Body'. *Anſw.* I ſpeak in theſe Words of the *Identity of the ſame* Man, and your Lordſhip thence roundly concludes; *ſo that there is no Difficulty of the Sameneſs of the* Body. But your Lordſhip knows, that I do not take theſe two Sounds, *Man* and *Body*, to ſtand for the ſame Thing nor the Identity of the *Man* to be the ſame with the Identity of the *Body*.

* P. 42.

But let us read out your Lordſhip's Words, † *So that there is no Difficulty as to the Sameneſs of the Body, if Life were continued; and if by Divine Power, Life be reſtored to that material Subſtance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it, there is Reaſon to deny the Identity of the Body. Not from the Conſciouſneſs of the Soul, but from that Life which is the Reſult of the Union of the Soul and Body.*

† P. 42.

If I underſtand your Lordſhip right, you in theſe Words, from the Paſſages above quoted out of my Book, argue, that from thoſe Words of mine it will follow, That it is or may be the *ſame Body*, that is raiſed at the Reſurrection. If ſo, my Lord, your Lordſhip has then proved, That my Book is not inconſiſtent with, but conformable to this Article of the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, which your Lordſhip contends for, and will have to be an Article of Faith: For though I do by no Means deny that the *ſame* Bodies ſhall be raiſed at the laſt Day, yet I ſee nothing your Lordſhip has ſaid to prove it to be an Article of Faith.

But your Lordſhip goes on with your Proofs, and ſays, ‖ *But St.* Paul *ſtill ſuppoſes, that it muſt be that material Subſtance to which the Soul was before united. For, ſaith he*, it is ſown in Corruption, it is raiſed in Incorruption: It is ſown in Diſhonour, it is raiſed in Glory: It is ſown in Weakneſs, it is raiſed in Power: It is ſown a Natural Body, it is raiſed a Spiritual Body. *Can ſuch a material Subſtance, which was never united to the Body, be ſaid to be* ſown *in* Corruption, *and* Weakneſs, *and* Diſhonour? *Either therefore he muſt ſpeak of the ſame Body, or his Meaning cannot be comprehended.*

‖ P. 43.

I an-

I anſwer, *Can ſuch a material Subſtance, which was* never laid in the Grave, *be ſaid to be ſown*, &c? For your Lordſhip ſays, * *You do not ſay the ſame individual Particles, which were united at the Point of Death ſhall be raiſed at the laſt Day*; and no other Particles are laid in the Grave, but ſuch as are united at the Point of Death; *either therefore your Lordſhip muſt ſpeak* of another *Body*, different from that which was *ſown*, which ſhall be raiſed, *or elſe* your *meaning*, I think, *cannot be comprehended.* * P. 34.

But whatever be your Meaning, your Lordſhip proves it to be St. *Paul*'s Meaning, That the *ſame Body* ſhall be raiſed, which was *ſown*, in theſe following Words, † *For what does all this relate to a conſcious Principle?* † P. 43.

Anſw. The Scripture being expreſs, That the ſame Perſon ſhould be raiſed and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his Body; it was very well ſuited to common Apprehenſions, (which refined not about *Particles that had been vitally united to the Soul*) to ſpeak of the Body which each one was to have after the Reſurrection, as he would be apt to ſpeak of it himſelf. For it being his Body both before and after the Reſurrection, every one ordinarily ſpeaks of *his* Body as the ſame, though in a ſtrict and philoſophical Senſe, as your Lordſhip ſpeaks, it be not the very ſame. Thus it is no Impropriety of Speech to ſay, this Body of mine, which was formerly ſtrong and plump, is now weak and waſted, though in ſuch a Senſe as you are ſpeaking in here, it be not the ſame Body. Revelation declares nothing any where concerning *the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe of *the ſame Body*, which appears not to have been thought of. The Apoſtle directly propoſes nothing for or againſt *the ſame Body*, as neceſſary to be believed: That which he is plain and direct in, is oppoſing and condemning ſuch curious Queſtions about the Body, which could ſerve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and neceſſary for them to believe, *viz.* a Day of Judgment and Retribution to Men in a future State; and therefore 'tis no Wonder that mentioning their Bodies, he ſhould uſe a Way of Speaking ſuited to vulgar Notions, from which it would be hard poſitively to conclude any thing for the determining of this Queſtion (eſpecially againſt Expreſſions in the ſame Diſcourſe that plainly incline to the other Side) in a Matter which as it appears, the Apoſtle thought not neceſſary to determine; and the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's Curioſity in.

But your Lordſhip ſays, * *The Apoſtle ſpeaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to Corruption, and is to be reſtor'd with more noble Qualities.* I wiſh your Lordſhip had quoted the Words * P. 44.

Words of St. *Paul*, *wherein he* ſpeaks plainly of that numerical *Body that was once quickened*, they would preſently decide this Queſtion. But your Lordſhip proves it by theſe following Words of St. *Paul*: *For this Corruption muſt put on Incorruption, and this Mortal muſt put on Immortality*; to which your Lordſhip adds, That *you do not ſee how he could more expreſly affirm the Identity of this corruptible Body, with that after the Reſurrection.* How expreſly it is affirmed by the Apoſtle, ſhall be conſidered by and by. In the mean time, it is paſt Doubt, that your Lordſhip beſt knows what you do or *do not ſee*. But this I will be bold to ſay, that if St. *Paul* had any where in this Chapter (where there are ſo many Occaſions for it, if it had been neceſſary to have been believed) but ſaid in expreſs Word that the *ſame Bodies* ſhould be raiſed, every one elſe, who thinks of it, will *ſee* he had *more expreſly affirmed the Identity* of the Bodies which Men now have, with thoſe they ſhall have after the Reſurrection.

† P. 44.

The Remainder of your Lordſhip's Period† is; *And that without any Reſpect to the Principle of Self* conſciouſneſs. *Anſw.* Theſe Words, I doubt not, have ſome Meaning, but I muſt own I know not what; either towards the Proof of *the Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, or to ſhew, that any thing I have ſaid concerning *Self-conſciouſneſs*, is inconſiſtent: For I do not remember that I have any where ſaid That the *Identity* of *Body* conſiſted in *Self-conſciouſneſs*.

* P. 44.

From your preceding Words, your Lordſhip concludes thus. * *And ſo if the Scripture be the ſole Foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it.* My Lord, to make the Concluſion unqueſtionable, I humbly conceive the Words muſt run thus. And ſo if *the Scripture* and your Lordſhip's Interpretation of it, *be the ſole Foundation of our Faith*, the Reſurrection of the ſame Body *is an Article of it.* For with Submiſſion, your Lordſhip has neither produced expreſs Words of Scripture for it, nor ſo proved that to be the Meaning of any of thoſe Words of Scripture which you have produced for it, that a Man who reads and ſincerely endeavours to underſtand the Scripture, cannot but find himſelf obliged to believe, as expreſly that *the ſame Bodies of the Dead*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe, ſhall be raiſed, as that *the Dead ſhall be raiſed.* And I crave Leave to give your Lordſhip this one Reaſon for it.

|| 1 Cor. xv. * V. 15, 22, 23, 29, 32, 35, 52.

He who reads with Attention this Diſcourſe of St. *Paul* || where he diſcourſes of the Reſurrection will ſee, that he plainly diſtinguiſhes between the *Dead*, that ſhall be raiſed, and *the Bodies* of the Dead. For it is νεκροὶ πάντες ὅτι, are the Nominative Caſes to * ἐγείρονται, ζωοποιηθήσονται, ἐγερθήσονται, all along, and not σώματα *Bodies*,

Bodies, which one may with Reaſon think would ſomewhere or other have been expreſſed, if all this had been ſaid, to propoſe it as an Article of Faith, that the very ſame Bodies ſhould be raiſed. The ſame manner of Speaking the Spirit of God obſerves all through the New Teſtament, where it is ſaid, * raiſe the *Dead*, *quicken* or make alive the *Dead*, the Reſurrection of the *Dead*. Nay, theſe very Words of our Saviour, † urged by your Lordſhip, for the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*, runs thus. Πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀκούσονται τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκπορεύσονται οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ τὰ φαῦλα πράξαντες εἰς ἀνάστασιν κρίσεως. Would a well-meaning Searcher of the Scriptures be apt to think, that if the Thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach, and propoſe it as an Article of Faith, neceſſary to believed by every one, that the very *ſame Bodies of the Dead* ſhould be raiſed would not, I ſay, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant ſo, the Words ſhould have rather been πάντα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, i. e. all the Bodies that *are in the Graves*, rather than *all who are in the Graves*; which muſt denote Perſons, and not preciſely Bodies?

* Matt. xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26. John v. 21. Acts xxvi. Rom. iv. 17. 2 Cor. i. 9. 1 Theſ. iv. 14, 16.

† John v. 28, 29.

Another Evidence, that St. *Paul* makes a Diſtinction between *the Dead* and the *Bodies of the Dead*, ſo that the Dead cannot be taken in this, 1 *Cor.* xv. to ſtand preciſely for the Bodies of the Dead, are theſe Words of the Apoſtle, * *But ſome Men will ſay, How are the* Dead *raiſed*? *And with what* Bodies *do* they *come*? Which Words, *Dead* and *They*, if ſuppoſed to ſtand preciſely for the *Bodies* of the Dead, the Queſtion will run thus. *How are the dead* Bodies *raiſed*? *And with what Bodies do* the dead Bodies *come*? Which ſeems to have no very agreeable Senſe.

* V. 35.

This therefore being ſo, and the Spirit of God keeps ſo expreſly to this Phraſe, or Form of ſpeaking in the New Teſtament, of *raiſing*, *quickening*, *riſing Reſurrection*, &c. of the *Dead*, where the Reſurrection of the laſt Day is ſpoken of; and that the Body is not mentioned, but in anſwer to this Queſtion, *With what Bodies ſhall thoſe Dead*, who are raiſed, *come*? So that by the Dead cannot preciſely be meant *the dead Bodies*: I do not ſee but a good Chriſtian, who reads the Scripture, with an Intention to believe all that is there revealed to him concerning the Reſurrection, may acquit himſelf of his Duty therein, without entering into the Enquiry, whether the Dead ſhall have the *very ſame Bodies* or no? Which Sort of Enquiry the Apoſtle, by the Appellation he beſtows here on him that makes it, ſeems not much to encourage. Nor, if he ſhall think himſelf

ſelf bound to determine concerning the Identity of the Bodies of the Dead raiſed at the laſt Day, will he, by the Remainder of St. *Paul*'s Anſwer, find the Determination of the Apoſtle to be much in favour of the very *ſame Body*, unleſs the being told, that the Body ſown, *is not that Body that ſhall be*? That the Body raiſed is as different from that which was laid down, as the *Fleſh of Man* is from the *Fleſh of Beaſts*, *Fiſhes* and *Birds*, or as the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars* are different one from another, or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal Body, is from an incorruptible powerful, ſpiritual, immortal Body; and laſtly, as different as a Body that is *Fleſh* and *Blood*, is from a Body that is not *Fleſh* and *Blood*. For *Fleſh and Blood cannot*, ſays St. *Paul*, in this very Place, * *inherit the Kingdom of God*, unleſs, I ſay, all this, which is contained in St. *Paul*'s Words can be ſuppoſed to be the Way to deliver this as an Article of Faith, which is required to be believed by every one, *viz.* That the *Dead ſhould be raiſed with the very ſame Bodies that they had before in this Life*; which Article propoſed in theſe or the like plain and expreſs Words, could have left no Room for Doubt in the meaneſt Capacities; nor for Conteſt in the moſt perverſe Minds.

* V. 50.

Your Lordſhip adds in the next Words, ‡ *And ſo it hath been always underſtood by the Chriſtian Church*, viz. *That the Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, in your Lordſhip's Senſe of *ſame Body*, *is an Article of Faith. Anſwer.* What the *Chriſtian Churches always underſtood*, is beyond my Knowledge. But for thoſe who coming ſhort of your Lordſhip's great Learning, cannot gather their Articles of Faith from the underſtanding of all the whole Chriſtian Church, ever ſince the preaching of the Goſpel, (who make the far greater Part of Chriſtians, I think I may ſay, nine hundred ninty and nine of a Thouſand) but are forced to have recourſe to the Scripture to find them there, I do not ſee, that they will eaſily find there this propoſed as an Article of Faith, that there ſhould be *a Reſurrection of the ſame Body*; but that there ſhall be *a Reſurrection of the Dead*, without explicitely determining, That they ſhall be raiſed with Bodies made up wholly of the ſame Particles which were once vitally united to their Souls in their former Life, without the Mixture of any one other Particle of Matter; which is that which your Lordſhip means by the *ſame Body*.

‡ P. 44.

But ſuppoſing your Lordſhip to have demonſtrated this to be an Article of Faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not ſee, that all your Lordſhip has ſaid here, makes it ſo much as probable; What is all this to me? Yes, ſays your Lordſhip in the following Words, † *My Idea of perſonal Identity is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be neceſſary to the*

†P. 44.

the Doctrine of the Reſurrection. But any material Subſtance united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body.

This is an Argument of your Lordſhip's which I am oblig'd to anſwer to. But is it not fit I ſhould firſt underſtand it, before I anſwer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is to *make a Thing not to be neceſſary to the Doctrine of the Reſurrection.* But to help my ſelf out the beſt I can, with a Gueſs, I will conjecture (which, in diſputing with learned Men, is not very ſafe) your Lordſhip's Meaning is, That *my* Idea *of perſonal Identity makes it not neceſſary*, that for raiſing the ſame Perſon, the Body ſhould be the ſame.

Your Lordſhip's next Word is *But*, to which I am ready to reply, *But* what? What does *my* Idea of perſonal Identity do? For ſomething of that Kind the adverſative Particle *But* ſhould, in the ordinary Conſtruction of our Language, introduce to make the Propoſition clear and intelligible: But here is no ſuch Thing. *But* is one of your Lordſhip's privileged Particles, which I muſt not meddle with, for fear your Lordſhip complain of me again, as ſo *ſevere a Critick*, that *for the leaſt Ambiguity in any Particle fill up Pages in my Anſwer, to make my Book look conſiderable for the Bulk of it.* But ſince this Propoſition here, *my* Idea *of a perſonal Identity makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not neceſſary to the Doctrine of the Reſurrection.* But *any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principles of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*, is brought to prove *my* Idea *of perſonal Identity inconſiſtent* with the Article of the Reſurrection; I muſt make it out in ſome direct Senſe or other, that I may ſee whether it be both true and concluſive. I therefore venture to read it thus, *My* Idea *of perſonal Identity makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be neceſſary* at the Reſurrection, *but* allows, That *any material Subſtance being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, make the ſame Body.* Ergo, *my* Idea *of perſonal Identity, is inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection of the ſame Body.*

If this be your Lordſhip's Senſe in this Paſſage, as I here have gueſſed it to be, or elſe I know not what it is. I anſwer,

1. That *my Idea of perſonal Identity* does not allow, that *any material Subſtance, being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body.* I ſay no ſuch Thing in my Book, nor any thing from whence it may be inferr'd; and your Lordſhip would have done me a Favour to have ſet down the Words where I ſay ſo, or thoſe from which you infer ſo, and ſhew'd how it follows from any thing I have ſaid.

2. Granting, that it were a Conſequence from *my Idea of perſonal Identity*, that *any material Subſtance, being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*; this would not prove that *my Idea of perſonal Identity was inconſiſtent* with this Propoſition, *That the ſame Body ſhall be raiſed*; but on the contrary, affirms it:

it: Since if I affirm, as I do, That the ſame Perſons ſhall be raiſed, and it be a Conſequence of my Idea of Perſonal Identity, that *any material Subſtance, being united to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame Body*; it follows, that if the ſame Perſon be raiſed, the ſame Body muſt be raiſed; and ſo I have herein not only ſaid nothing inconſiſtent with the Reſurrection of the ſame Body, but have ſaid more for it than your Lordſhip. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the Scripture it is revealed, That the ſame Perſons ſhall be raiſed, and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Chriſt, to anſwer for what they have done in their Bodies If therefore *whatever Matter* be joined to the ſame Principle of Conſciouſneſs make the ſame Body, it is Demonſtration, that if the ſame Perſons are raiſed, they have the ſame Bodies.

How then your Lordſhip makes this an Inconſiſtency with the Reſurrection, is beyond my Conception. Yes,

* P. 44. ſays your Lordſhip, * *It is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be neceſſary.*

3. I anſwer therefore, Thirdly, That this is the firſt Time I ever learnt, That not *neceſſary* was the ſame with *inconſiſtent*. I ſay, that a Body made up of the ſame numerical Parts of Matter, is not neceſſary to the making of the ſame Perſon; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the Reſurrection of the ſame Perſon, the ſame numerical Particles of Matter are not required. What does your Lordſhip infer from hence? To wit, this: Therefore he who thinks, that the ſame Particles of Matter are not neceſſary to the making of the ſame Perſon, cannot believe, that the ſame Perſons ſhall be raiſed with Bodies made of the very ſame Particles of Matter, if God ſhould reveal, that it ſhall be ſo, *viz.* That the ſame Perſons ſhall be raiſed with the ſame Bodies they had before. Which is all one as to ſay, That he who thought the blowing of Rams Horns was not neceſſary in it ſelf to the falling down of the Walls of *Jericho*, could not believe, that they ſhould fall upon the Blowing of Rams Horns, when God had declared it ſhould be ſo.

Your Lordſhip ſays, *My Idea of Perſonal Identity is inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection*; The Reaſon you ground it on, is this, becauſe it makes not the ſame Body *neceſſary* to the making the ſame Perſon. Let us grant Your Lordſhip's Conſequence to be good, what will follow from it? No leſs than this, That your Lordſhip's Notion (for I dare not ſay your Lordſhip has any ſo dangerous Things as *Ideas*) of perſonal Identity, is inconſiſtent with *the Article of the Reſurrec-*

† P. 34, 35. *tion.* The Denomination of it is thus; your Lordſhip ſays, † It is not neceſſary that the Body, to be raiſed at the laſt day, ſhould conſiſt of *the ſame Particles of Matter*

Matter which were united at the Point of Death; for there muſt be a great Alteration in them in a lingering Diſeaſe, as if a fat Man falls into a Conſumption: You do not ſay the ſame Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of Commiſſion of his Sins; for then a long Sinner muſt have a vaſt Body, conſidering the continual ſpending of Particles by Perſpiration. And again, here your Lordſhip ſays,

† *You allow the Notion of perſonal Identity to belong to the ſame Man under ſeveral Changes of Matter.* † P. 44.

From which Words it is evident, That your Lordſhip ſuppoſes a Perſon in this World may be continued and preſerved the ſame in a Body not conſiſting of the ſame individual Particles of Matter; from hence it demonſtratively follows, That let your Lordſhip's *Notion of perſonal Identity* be what it will, it makes *the ſame Body not to be neceſſary to the ſame Perſon*; and therefore it is by your Lordſhip's Rule *inconſiſtent with the Article of the Reſurrection.* When your Lordſhip ſhall think fit to clear your own *Notion of perſonal Identity* from this *Inconſiſtency* with the Article of the Reſurrection, I do not doubt but my *Idea of perſonal Identity* will be thereby cleared too. Till then, all *Inconſiſtency* with that Article, which your Lordſhip has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your Lordſhip's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to ſay, my Lord, That whatſoever is *not neceſſary*, does not thereby become *inconſiſtent.* It is *not neceſſary* to the ſame *Perſon*, that his Body ſhould always conſiſt of the ſame numerical Particles; this is Demonſtration, becauſe the Particles of the Bodies of the ſame Perſons in this Life change every Moment, and your Lordſhip cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not *inconſiſtent* with God's preſerving, if he thinks fit, to the ſame Perſons, Bodies conſiſting of the ſame numerical Particles always from the Reſurrection to Eternity. And ſo likewiſe, though I ſay any thing that ſuppoſes it *not neceſſary*, that the ſame numerical Particles, which were vitally united to the Soul in this Life, ſhould be re-united to it at the Reſurrection, and conſtitute the Body it ſhall then have: Yet it is not *inconſiſtent* with this, That God may, if he pleaſes, give to every one a Body conſiſting only of ſuch Particles as were before vitally united to his Soul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my Book from all that *Inconſiſtency* which your Lordſhip charges on it, and would perſuade the World it has with the *Article of the Reſurrection of the Dead.*

Only before I leave it, I will ſet down the Remainder of what your Lordſhip ſays upon this Head, that though I ſee not the Coherence or Tendency of it, nor the Force of any Argument in it againſt me; yet that nothing may be omitted that your Lordſhip has thought fit to entertain your Reader with on this new Point, nor any one have Reaſon to ſuſpect, that I have paſ-

ſed by any Word of your Lordſhip's, (on this new firſt introduced Subject) wherein he might find your Lordſhip had proved what you had promiſed in your Title-Page. Your

*P. 44. remaining Words are theſe; * *The Diſpute is not how far perſonal Identity in itſelf may conſiſt in the very ſame material Subſtance; for we allow the Notion of perſonal Identity to belong to the ſame Man under ſeveral Changes of Matters; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital Union between the Soul and Body, and the Life, which is conſequent upon it; and therefore in the Reſurrection, the ſame material Subſtance muſt be re-united, or elſe it cannot be called a Reſurrection, but a* Rennovation, i. e. *it may be a new Life, but not raiſing the Body from the Dead.* I confeſs, I do not ſee how what is here uſhered in by the Words *and therefore*, is a Conſequence from the preceding Words; but as to the Propriety of the Name, I think it will not be much queſtioned, that if the ſame Man riſe who was Dead, it may very properly be called the *Reſurrection of the Dead*; which is the Language of the Scripture.

I muſt not part with this Article of the Reſurrection, without returning my Thanks to your Lordſhip for

‡ P. 62. making me ‡ take Notice of a Fault in my *Eſſay*. When I wrote that Book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the Scripture had mention'd in expreſs Terms, *the Reſurrection of the Body*. But upon the Occaſion your Lordſhip has given me in your laſt Letter, to look a little more narrowly into what Revelation has declar'd concerning the *Reſurrection*, and finding not ſuch expreſs Words in the Scripture, as that the Body *ſhall riſe* or *be raiſed*, or the *Reſurrection of the Body*. I ſhall in the next

* Eſſay, B. 4. C. 18. § 7. Edition of it change theſe Words of my Book, * *The dead Bodies of Men ſhall riſe*, into theſe of Scripture, *The Dead ſhall riſe*. Not that I queſtion, that the Dead ſhall be raiſed with Bodies; but in Matters of Revelation, I think it not only ſafeſt, but our Duty, as far as any one delivers it ſo. Revelation, to keep cloſe to the Words of Scripture, unleſs he will aſſume to himſelf the Authority of one inſpired, or make himſelf wiſer than the Holy Spirit himſelf. If I had ſpoke of the Reſurrection in preciſely Scripture Terms, I had avoided giving your Lordſhip the

|| P. 63. Occaſion of making || here ſuch a verbal Reflection on my Words; *What not, if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body?*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Other RELATIONS.

§. 1. BEſides the before-mentioned Occaſions of Time, Place and Cauſualty of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there are, as I have ſaid, infinite others, ſome whereof I ſhall mention. *Proportional.*

Firſt, The firſt I ſhall name, is ſome one ſimple *Idea*, which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an Occaſion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in Reſpect of that ſimple *Idea*, *v. g. Whiter*, *Sweeter Bigger*, *Equal*, *More*, &c. theſe Relations depending on the Equality and Exceſs of the ſame ſimple *Idea*, in ſeveral Subjects, may be called, if one will, *Proportional*; and that theſe are only converſant about thoſe ſimple *Ideas* received from Senſation or Reflection, is ſo evident, that nothing need be ſaid to evincce it.

§ 2. *Secondly*, Another Occaſion of comparing Things together, or conſidering one thing, ſo as to include in that Conſideration ſome other thing, is the Circumſtances of their Origin or Beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations depending thereon as laſting as the Subjects to which they belong; *v. g. Father* and *Son*, *Brothers*, *Couſin-Germans*, &c. which have their Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in ſeveral Degrees; *Countrymen*, i. e. th ſe who were born in the ſame Country, or Tract of Ground; and theſe I call *natural Relations*: Wherein we may obſerve, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the Uſe of common Life, and not to the Truth and Extent of Things. For 'tis certain, that in Reality the Relation is the ſame betwixt the Begetter and the Begotten, in the ſeveral Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet 'tis ſeldom ſaid, This Bull is the Grandfather of ſuch a Calf; or that two Pidgeons are Couſin-Germans. It is very convenient, that by diſtinct Names theſe Relations ſhould be obſerved, and marked out in Mankind, there being Occaſion, both in Laws, and other Communications one with another, to mention and take Notice of Men under theſe Relations: From whence alſo ariſe the Obligations of ſeveral Duties amongſt Men: Whereas in Brutes, Men having very little or no Cauſe to mind theſe Relations, they have not thought fit to give them diſtinct and *Natural.*

peculiar Names. This, by the Way, may give us ſome Light into the different State and Growth of Languages: Which being ſuited only to the Convenience of Communication, are proportioned to the Notions Men have, and the Commerce of Thoughts familiar amongſt them; and not the Reality or Extent of Things, nor to the various Reſpects might be found among them; nor the different abſtract Conſiderations might be framed about them. Where they had no Philoſophical Notions, there they had no Terms to expreſs them: And 'tis no wonder Men ſhould have framed no Names for thoſe Things they found no Occaſion to diſcourſe of. From whence it is eaſy to imagine, why, as in ſome Countries, they may not have ſo much as the Name for a Horſe; and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their Horſes than of their own, that there they may have not only Names for particular Horſes, but alſo of their ſeveral Relations of Kindred one to another.

Inſtituted.

§. 3. *Thirdly*, Sometimes the Foundation of conſidering Things, with Reference to one another, is ſome Act whereby any one comes by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do ſomething. Thus a *General* is one that hath Power to command an Army; and an Army under a General, is a Collection of armed Men obliged to obey one Man. A *Citizen*, or *Burgher*, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that Place. All this Sort depending upon Mens Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call *inſtituted*, or *voluntary*, and may be diſtinguiſhed from the natural, in that they are moſt, if not all of them, ſome way or other alterable, and ſeparable from the Perſons to whom they have ſometimes belonged, though neither of the Subſtances, ſo related, be deſtroy'd. Now, though theſe are all reciprocal, as well as the reſt, and contain in them a Reference of two Things one to the other; yet, becauſe one of the two Things often wants a relative Name, importing that Reference, Men uſually take no Notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd, *v. g.* a *Patron* and *Client* are eaſily allow'd to be Relations: But a *Conſtable*, or *Dictator*, are not ſo readily, at firſt Hearing, conſidered as ſuch; becauſe there is no peculiar Name for thoſe who are under the Command of a Dictator or Conſtable, expreſſing a Relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain Power over ſome others; and ſo is ſo far related to them, as well as a Patron is to his Client, or General to his Army.

Moral.

§. 4. *Fourthly*, There is another Sort of Relation, which is the Conformity, or Diſagreement, Mens voluntary Actions have to a Rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think,

think, may be called *Moral Relation*, as being that which denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined, there being no Part of Knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined *Ideas*, and avoid, as much as may be, Obscurity and Confusion. Human Actions, when with their various Ends, Objects, Manners and Circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex *Ideas*, are, as has been shewn, so many *mixed Modes*, a great Part whereof have Names annexed to them. Thus, supposing Gratitude to be a Readiness to acknowledge and return Kindness receiv'd; Polygamy to be the having more Wives than one at once. When we frame these Notions thus in our Minds, we have there so many determined *Ideas* of Mixed Modes. But this is not all that concerns our Actions: It is not enough to have determined *Ideas* of them, and to know what Names belong to such and such Combinations of *Ideas*. We have a farther and greater Concernment, and that is, to know whether such Actions, so made up, are morally good or bad.

§. 5. Good and Evil, as hath been shewn, B. II. Ch. XX. §. 2. and Ch. XXI. §. 42. are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. *Moral Good and Evil* then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good and Evil is drawn on us from the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our Observance, or Breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call *Reward* and *Punishment*. *Moral Good and Evil.*

§. 6. Of these *Moral Rules*, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to me to be *three Sorts*, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil to determine his Will, we must, wherever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being to set a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power to reward the Compliance with, and punish Deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil, that it is not the natural Product and Consequence of the Action it self: For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of it self without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the Nature of all *Law*, properly so called. *Moral Rules.*

Laws.

§. 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The *Divine* Law. 2. The *Civil* Law. 3. The Law of *Opinion* or *Reputation*, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins, or Duties; by the second, whether they be criminal, or innocent; and by the third, whether they be Virtues or Vices.

Divine Law, the Measure of Sin and Duty.

§. 8. *First*, The *Divine* Law whereby I mean that Law which God hath set the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation. That God has given a Rule whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there is no Body so brutish as to deny. He has a Right to do it; we are his Creatures: He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to that which is best; and he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite Weight and Duration, in another Life; for no Body can take us out of his Hands. This is the only true Touch-stone of *Moral Rectitude*; and by comparing them to this Law, it is that Men judge of the most considerable *Moral Good* or *Evil* of their Actions; that is, whether as *Duties*, or *Sins*, they are like to procure them Happiness or Misery from the Hands of the ALMIGHTY.

Civil Law, the Measure of Crimes and Innocence.

§. 9. *Secondly*, The *Civil* Law, the Rule set by the Commonwealth, to the Actions of those who belong to it, is another Rule to which Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be *criminal* or no. This Law no Body over-looks; the Rewards and Punishments that enforce it being ready at Hand, and suitable to the Power that makes it; which is the Force of the Commonwealth, engaged to protect the Lives, Liberties, and Possessions of those who live according to its Laws, and has Power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods from him who disobeys: which is the Punishment of Offences committed against this Law.

Philosophical Law, the Measure of Vertue and Vice.

§. 10. *Thirdly*, The *Law of Opinion or Reputation*, Vertue and Vice are Names pretended, and supposed every where to stand for Actions in their one Nature right or wrong: And as far as they really are so applied, they so far are co-incident with the *Divine Law* above-mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these Names, *Vertue* and *Vice*, in the particular Instances of their Application, through the several Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are constantly

conſtantly attributed only to ſuch Actions, as in each Country and Society are in Reputation or Diſcredit. Nor is it to be thought ſtrange, that Men every where ſhould give the Name of *Vertue* to thoſe Actions, which amongſt them are judged Praiſe-worthy; and call that *Vice*, which they account blameable: Since, otherwiſe, they would condemn themſelves, if they ſhould think any Thing *wrong*, to which they allow'd not Condemnation; any Thing *wrong*, which they let paſs without Blame. Thus the Meaſure of what is every where called and eſteemed *Vertue* and *Vice*, is this Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Blame, which by a ſecret and tacit Conſent eſtabliſhes it ſelf in the ſeveral Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World, whereby ſeveral Actions come to find Credit or Diſgrace amongſt them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Faſhions of that Place. For though Men uniting into politick Societies, have reſigned up to the Publick the diſpoſing of all their Force, ſo that they cannot employ it againſt any Fellow-Citizen, any farther than the Law of the Country directs; yet they retain ſtill the Power of Thinking well or ill, approving or diſapproving of the Actions of thoſe whom they live amongſt, and converſe with: And by this Approbation and Diſlike, they eſtabliſh amongſt themſelves what they will call *Vertue* and *Vice*.

§. 11. That this is the common *Meaſure of Vertue and Vice*, will appear to any one, who conſiders, that though that paſſes for *Vice* in one Country, which is counted a *Vertue*, or at leaſt not *Vice* in another; yet every where, *Vertue* and Praiſe, *Vice* and Blame go together. *Vertue* is every where that which is thought Praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the Allowance of Publick Eſteem, is called *Vertue*. **Vertue* and Praiſe are ſo united, that they are called often by the ſame Name.

* Our Author, in his Preface to the fourth Edition, taking Notice how apt Men have been to miſtake him, added what here follows. 'Of this the Ingenious Author of *the Diſcourſe* '*concerning the Nature of Man*, has given me a late Inſtance, to 'mention no other. For the Civility of his Expreſſions, and the Candor that belongs to his Order, forbid me to think, that he would have cloſed his Preface with an Inſinuation, as if in what I had ſaid, Book II. Chap. 28. concerning the third Rule, which Men refer their Actions to, I went about to make *Vertue Vice* and *Vice Vertue*, unleſs he had miſtaken my Meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himſelf the Trouble

Sunt ſua præmia Laudi, ſays *Virgil*; and ſo *Cicero*, *Nihil habet natura præſtantius, quam Honeſtatem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus*, which, he tells you, are all Names for the ſame Thing, *Tuſc.* l. 2. This is the Language of the Heathen Philoſophers, who well underſtood wherein their Notions of *Vertue* and *Vice* conſiſted. And though, perhaps, by the different Temper, Education, Faſhion, Maxims, or Intereſt of different Sorts of Men, it fell out, that what was thought Praiſe-worthy in one Place, eſcaped not Cenſure in another; and ſo in different Societies, *Vertues* and *Vices* were chang'd: Yet, as to the Main, they for the moſt Part kept the ſame every where. For ſince nothing can be more natural,

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Trouble to conſider what the Argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief Deſign of that Chapter, plainly enough ſet down in the fourth Section, and thoſe following. For I was there, not laying down moral Rules, but ſhewing the Original and Nature of moral *Ideas*, and enumerating the Rules Men make uſe of in moral Relations, whether thoſe Rules were true or falſe. And purſuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that Denomination, which in the Language of that Place anſwers to *Vertue* and *Vice* in ours, which *alters not the Nature of Things*, though Men generally do judge of, and denominate their Actions according to the Eſteem and Faſhion of the Place, or Sect they are of.

If he had been at the Pains to reflect on what I had ſaid, Book I. Chap. 3. §. 18. and in this preſent Chapter, §. 13, 14. 15, and 20, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable Nature of Right and Wrong, and what I call *Vertue* and *Vice*: And if he had obſerved, that in the Place he quotes, I only report as Matter of Fact what others call *Vertue* and *Vice*, he would not have found it liable to any great Exception. For, I think, I am not much out in ſaying, That one of the Rules made uſe of in the World for a Ground or Meaſure of a moral Relation, is that Eſteem and Reputation, which ſeveral Sorts of Actions find variouſly in the ſeveral Societies of Men, according to which they are called *Vertues* or *Vices*: And whatever Authority the Learned Mr. *Lowde* places in his *old Engliſh Dictionary*, I dare ſay, it no where tells him (if I ſhould appeal to it) that the ſame Action is not in Credit, call'd and counted a *Vertue* in one Place, which being in Diſrepute, paſſes for, and under the Name of *Vice* in another. The taking Notice that Men beſtow the Names of *Vertue* and *Vice* according to this Rule of Reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to

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natural, than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that, wherein every one finds his Advantage; and to blame and discountenance the contrary; 'tis no Wonder, that Esteem and Discredit, Vertue and Vice, should in a great Measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion, as the Neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally

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my Charge to have done, towards the making *Vice Vertue*, and *Vertue Vice*. But the good Man does well, and as becomes his Calling, to be watchful in such Points, and to take the Alarm, even at Expressions, which standing alone by themselves, might sound ill, and be suspected.

'Tis to this Zeal allowable in his Function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, these Words of mine in §. 11. of this Chapter. *The Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute, whatsoever Things are lovely, whatsoever Things are of good Report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praise*, &c. *Phil.* iv. 8. without taking Notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them, and run thus: *Woerely in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved: So that even the Exhortations of inspired Teachers*, &c. By which Words, and the rest of that Section, it is plain, that I brought that Passage of St. *Paul* not to prove, that the general Measure of what Men call *Vertue* and *Vice*, throughout the World, was the Reputation and Fashion of each particular Society within it self; but to shew, that though it were so, yet, for Reasons I there give, Men, in that way of denominating their Actions, did not, for the most Part, much vary from the Law of Nature, which is that standing and unalterable Rule by which they ought to judge of the moral Rectitude and Pravity of their Actions, and accordingly denominate them *Vertues* or *Vices*. Had Mr. *Lowde* considered this, he would have found it little to his Purpose, to have quoted that Passage in a Sense that I used it not; and would, I imagine, have spared the Explication he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this second Edition will give him Satisfaction in the Point, and that this Matter is now so expressed, as to shew him there was no Cause of Scruple.

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nerally miſtake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that Side, that really deſerved it not. Nay, even thoſe Men, whoſe Practice was otherwiſe, failed not to give their Approbation right; few being depraved to that Degree as not to condemn, at leaſt in others, the Faults they themſelves were guilty of: Whereby even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preſerved. So that even the Exhortations of inſpired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute: *Whatſoever is lovely, whatſoever is of good Report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praiſe*, &c. Phil. iv. 8.

§. 12. If

Though I am forced to differ from him in thoſe Apprehenſions he has expreſſed in the latter End of his Preface, concerning what I had ſaid about *Vertue* and *Vice*; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he ſays in his third Chapter, p. 78. concerning *natural Inſcription*, and *innate Notions*. I ſhall not deny him the Privilege he claims, p. 52. to ſtate the Queſtion as he pleaſes, eſpecially when he ſtates it ſo, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have ſaid: For according to him, *Innate Notions being conditional Things depending upon the Concurrence of ſeveral other Circumſtances, in order to the Soul's exerting them*, all that he ſays for *innate, imprinted, impreſſed Notions*, (for of *innate Ideas* he ſays nothing at all) amounts at laſt only to this; That there are certain Propoſitions, which tho' the Soul from the Beginning, or when a Man is born, does not know, yet by *Aſſiſtance from the outward Senſes, and the help of ſome previous Cultivation*, it may afterwards come certainly to know the Truth of: which is no more than what I have affirm'd in my firſt Book. For I ſuppoſe by the *Soul's* exerting them, he means its Beginning to know them, or elſe the *Soul's exerting of Notions*, will be to me a very unintelligible Expreſſion; and I think at beſt is a very unfit one in this Caſe, it miſleading Mens Thoughts by an Inſinuation, as if theſe Notions were in the Mind before the *Soul exerts them*, i. e. before they are known: whereas, truly, before they are known, there is nothing of them in the Mind, but a Capacity to know them, when the *Concurrence of thoſe Circumſtances*, which this ingenious Author thinks neceſſary, *in order to the Soul's exerting them*, brings them into our Knowledge.

P. 50. I find him expreſs it thus; *Theſe natural Notions are not ſo imprinted upon the Soul, as that they naturally and neceſſarily exert themſelves (even in Children and Ideots) without any Aſſiſtance from the outward Senſes, or without the Help of ſome previous Cultivation.* Here he

§. 12. If any one ſhould imagine, that I have forgot my own Notion of a Law when I make the *Law*, whereby Men judge *of Vertue and Vice*, to be nothing elſe, but the Conſent of private Men, who have not Authority enough to make a Law: Eſpecially wanting that, which is ſo neceſſary and eſſential to a Law, a Power to inforce it: I think, I may ſay, that he who imagines Commendation and Diſgrace not to be ſtrong Motives on Men, to accommodate themſelves to the Opinions and Rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeems little skill'd in the Nature or Hiſtory of Mankind: The greateſt Part whereof he ſhall find to govern themſelves chiefly, if not ſolely, by this Law of Faſhion; and ſo they do that which keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regarding the Laws of God or the Magiſtrate. The Penalties that attend the Breach of God's Laws, ſome, nay, perhaps, moſt Men ſeldom ſeriouſly reflect on; and amongſt thoſe that do, many, whilſt they break the Law entertain Thoughts of future Reconciliation, and making their Peace for ſuch Breaches: And as to the Puniſhments due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter themſelves with the Hope of Impunity. But no Man 'ſcapes the Puniſhment of their Cenſure and Diſlike, who offends againſt the Faſhion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himſelf to. Nor is there one of ten thouſand, who is ſtiff and inſenſible enough to bear up under the conſtant Diſlike and Condemnation of his own Club. He muſt be of a ſtrange and unuſual Conſtitution, who can content himſelf to live in conſtant Diſgrace and Diſrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude many Men have ſought, and been reconciled to: But no Body, that has the leaſt Thought or Senſe of a Man about him, can live in Society under the conſtant Diſlike

Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Diſcredit.

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he ſays, *they exert themſelves*, as p. 78. that the *Soul exerts them*. When he has explain'd to himſelf or others, what he means by the *Soul's exerting innate Notions*, or *their exerting themſelves*, and what that *previous Cultivation* and *Circumſtances*, *in order* to their being *exerted*, are, he will, I ſuppoſe, find there is ſo little of Controverſy between him and me in the Point, bating that he calls that *exerting of Notions*, which I in a more vulgar Stile call *knowing*, that I have Reaſon to think he brought in my Name upon this Occaſion only out of the Pleaſure he has to ſpeak civilly of me, which I muſt gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as ſome others have done, a Title I have no Right to.

like and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and thoſe he converſes with. This is a Burthen too heavy for Human Sufferance: And he muſt be made up of irreconcilable Contradictions, who can take Pleaſure in Company, and yet be ſenſible of Contempt and Diſgrace from his Companions.

Theſe three Laws the Rules of Moral Good and Evil.

§. 13. Theſe there then, *Firſt*, The Law of God. *Secondly*, The Law of politick Societies. *Thirdly*, The Law of Faſhion, or private Cenſure, are thoſe to which Men variouſly compare their Actions: And 'tis by their Conformity to one of theſe Laws, that they take their Meaſures, when they would judge of their Moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad.

Morality is the Relation of Actions to theſe Rules.

§. 14. Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touch-ſtone, we bring our voluntary Actions to examine them by, and try their Goodneſs, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the Value we ſet upon them: Whether, I ſay, we take that Rule from the Faſhion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is eaſily able to obſerve the Relation any Action hath to it; and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or diſagrees with the Rule; and ſo hath a Notion of *Moral Goodneſs or Evil*, which is either Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action, to that Rule: And therefore is often called Moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas*, the Conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the Action, that the ſimple *Ideas* belonging to it, may correſpond to thoſe which the Law requires. And thus we ſee how Moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in theſe ſimple *Ideas* we have received from Senſation or Reflection. For Example, Let us conſider the complex *Idea* we ſignify by the Word Murder; and when we have taken it aſunder, and examined all the Particulars, we ſhall find them to amount to a Collection of ſimple *Ideas* derived from Reflection or Senſation, *viz.* *Firſt*, From Reflection on the Operations of our own Minds, we have the *Ideas* of Willing, Conſidering, Purpoſing before-hand, Malice, or wiſhing Ill to another; and alſo of Life, or Perception, and Self-Motion. *Secondly*, From Senſation, we have the Collection of thoſe ſimple ſenſible *Ideas* which are to be found in a Man, and of ſome Action, whereby we put an End to Perception and Motion in the Man; all which ſimple *Ideas*, are comprehended in the Word Murder. This Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, being found by me to agree or diſagree with the Eſteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held by moſt Men there, worthy Praiſe or Blame,

Blame, I call the Action Vertuous or Vicious: If I have the Will of a ſupreme, inviſible Law-maker for my Rule; then, as I ſuppoſed the Action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: And if I compare it to the Civil Law, the Rule made by the Legiſlative of the Country, I call it Lawful, or Unlawful, a Crime, or no Crime. So that whenceſoever we take the Rule of Moral Actions, or by what Standard ſoever we frame in our Minds the *Ideas* of Vertues or Vices, they conſiſt only, and are made up of Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, which we originally received from Senſe or Reflection, and their Rectitude or Obliquity conſiſts in the Agreement or Diſagreement with thoſe Patterns preſcribed by ſome Law.

§. 15. To conceive rightly of *Moral Actions*, we muſt take Notice of them under this two-fold Conſideration. *Firſt*, As they are in themſelves each made up of ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*. Thus *Drunkenneſs* or *Lying* ſignify ſuch or ſuch a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*, which I call mixed Modes: And in this Senſe they are as much *poſitive abſolute Ideas*, as the drinking of a Horſe, or ſpeaking of a Parrot. *Secondly*, Our Actions are conſidered as good, bad, *or* indifferent; and in this Reſpect, they are *Relative*; it being their Conformity to, or Diſagreement with ſome Rule, that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: And ſo, as far as they are compared with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a Man, as it is a certain poſitive Mode, or particular Sort of Action, by particular *Ideas*, diſtinguiſhed from all others, is called *Duelling*: Which, when conſidered in Relation to the Law of God, will deſerve the Name Sin; to the Law of Faſhion, in ſome Countries, Valour and Vertue; and to the municipal Laws of ſome Governments, a capital Crime. In this Caſe, when the poſitive Mode has one Name, and another Name as it ſtands in Relation to the Law, the Diſtinction may as eaſily be obſerved, as it is in Subſtances, where one Name, *v. g. Man*, is uſed to ſignify the Thing, another, *v. g. Father*, to ſignify the Relation.

The Denominations of Actions often miſlead us.

§. 16. But becauſe very frequently the poſitive *Idea* of the Action, and its Moral Relation, are comprehended together under one Name, and the ſame Word made Uſe of to expreſs both the Mode or Action, and its Moral Rectitude or Obliquity; therefore the Relation it ſelf is leſs taken Notice of; and there is often no *Diſtinction* made *between the Poſitive Idea* of the Action, *and the Reference it has to a Rule*. By which Confuſion of theſe two diſtinct Conſiderations under one Term, thoſe who yield too eaſily to the Impreſſ-

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ons of Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often misled in their Judgment of Actions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly called *Stealing:* But that Name being commonly understood to signify also the Moral pravity of the Action, and to denote its Contrariety to the Law, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called Stealing, as an ill Action, disagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the Private taking away his Sword from a Mad-man, to prevent his doing Mischief, though it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as the Name of such a *mixed Mode*; yet when compared to the Law of God, and considered in its Relation to that supreme Rule, it is no Sin or Transgression, though the Name *Stealing* ordinarily carries such an Intimation with it.

Relations innumerable.

§. 17. And thus much for the Relation of Human Actions to a Law, which therefore I call *Moral Relations.*

'Twould make a Volume to go over all Sorts of *Relations:* 'Tis not therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It suffices to our present Purpose, to shew by these, what the *Ideas* are we have *of* this comprehensive Consideration, call'd *Relation:* Which is so *various*, and the Occasions of it so *many*, (as many as there can be of comparing Things one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to Rules, or under just Heads. Those I have mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such, as may serve to let us see from whence we get our *Ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument, from what has been said, give me leave to observe.

All Relations terminate in simple Ideas

§. 18. *First*, That it is evident, that all *Relations terminate in*, and are ultimately founded on those *simples Ideas* we have *got from Sensation or Reflection:* So that all that we have in our Thoughts our selves, (if we think of any Thing, or have any Meaning) or would signify to others, when we use Words standing for Relations, is nothing but some simple *Ideas*, or Collections of simple *Ideas*, compared one with another. This is so manifest in that Sort called *Proportional*, that nothing can be more. For when a Man says, Honey is sweeter than Wax, it is plain, that his Thoughts in this Relation, terminate in this simple *Idea*, Sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; though, where they are compounded, or decompounded the simple *Ideas* they are made up of, are perhaps, seldom taken notice of: *v. g.* when the Word Father is mentioned: *First*, there is meant that particular Species, or collective *Idea*, signified

ſignified by the Word Man. *Secondly*, Thoſe ſenſible ſimple *Ideas* ſignified by the Word Generation: And, *Thirdly*, The Effect of it, and all the ſimple *Ideas* ſignified by the Word Child. So the Word Friend, being taken for a Man who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all theſe following *Ideas*, to the making of it up. *Firſt*, all the ſimple *Ideas*, comprehended in the Word Man, or intelligent Being. *Secondly*, The *Idea* of Love. *Thirdly*, The *Idea* of Readineſs or Diſpoſition. *Fourthly*, The *Idea* of Action, which is any Kind of Thought or Motion. *Fifthly*, The *Idea* of Good which ſignifies any Thing that may advance his Happineſs, and terminates at laſt, if examined, in particular ſimple *Ideas* of which the Word *Good* in general ſignifies any one, but if removed from all ſimple *Ideas* quite, it ſignifies nothing at all. And thus alſo all Moral Words terminate at laſt, though, perhaps, more remotely, in a Collection of ſimple *Ideas*: The immediate Signification of Relative Words, being very often other ſuppoſed known Relations; which, if traced one to another, ſtill end in ſimple *Ideas*.

§. 19. *Secondly*, That in Relation, we have for the moſt Part, if not always, *as clear a Notion for the Relation, as we have of thoſe ſimple* Ideas, *wherein it is founded*: Agreement or Diſagreement, whereon Relation depends, being Things whereof we have commonly as clear *Ideas* as of any other whatſoever; it being but the diſtinguiſhing ſimple *Ideas*, or their Degrees one from another, without which we could have no diſtinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a clear *Idea* of Sweetneſs, Light, or Extenſion, I have too, of equal, or more, or leſs, or each of theſe: If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman, *viz. Sempronia*, I know what it is for another Man to be born of the ſame Woman, *Sempronia*; and ſo have as clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and, perhaps, clearer. For if I believed, that *Sempronia* digged *Titus* out of the Parſly-Bed (as they uſe to tell Children) and thereby became his Mother; and that afterwards in the ſame Manner, ſhe digged *Cajus* out of the Parſly-Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife; the Notion that the ſame Woman contributed as Mother, equally to their Births, (though I were ignorant or miſtaken in the Manner of it) being that on which I grounded the Relation; and that they agreed in that Circumſtance of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their Deſcent from the ſame Perſon, without knowing the particular Circumſtances of that Deſcent, is enough to found my Notion of their having or not having

We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.

having the Relation of Brothers. But though the *Ideas* of particular *Relations* are capable of being as clear and distinct in the Minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of mixed Modes, and more determinate, than those of Substances; yet the Names belonging to *Relation*, are often of as doubtful and uncertain Signification, as those of Substances or mixed Modes; and much more than those of simple *Ideas*: Because Relative Words being the Marks of this Comparison, which is made only by Mens Thoughts, and is an *Idea* only in Mens Minds, Men frequently apply them to different Comparisons of Things, according to their own Imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same Names.

The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compared to be true or false.

§. 20. *Thirdly*, That in these I call *Moral Relations*, I have a true Notion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule, whether the Rule be true or false. For if I measure any thing by a Yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed Yard, though, perhaps, the Yard I measure by, be not exactly the Standard: Which, indeed, is another Enquiry. For though the Rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the Agreement or Disagreement observable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the Relation. Though measuring by a wrong Rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its Moral Rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true Rule; but I am not mistaken in the Relation which that Action bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is Agreement, or Disagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas.

Ideas *some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused.*

§. 1. HAving shewn the Original of our *Ideas*, and taken a View of their several Sorts; considered the Difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of Modes, Substances and Relations, all which, I think, is necessary to be done by one, who would acquaint himself throughly with the Progress of the Mind in its Apprehension and Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the Examination of *Ideas*. I must, nevertheless, crave Leave to offer some few other Considerations

derations concerning them. The firſt is, that ſome are *clear*, and others *obſcure*; ſome *diſtinct*, and others *confuſed*.

§. 2. The Perception of the Mind being moſt aptly explained by Words relating to the Sight, we ſhall beſt underſtand what is meant by *clear* and *obſcure* in our *Ideas*, by reflecting on what we call *clear* and *obſcure* in the Objects of Sight. *Clear and obſcure explain'd by Sight.*

Light being that which diſcovers to us viſible Objects, we give the Name of *obſcure* to that which is not placed in a Light ſufficient to diſcover minutely to us the Figure and Colours, which are obſervable in it, and which, in a better Light, would be diſcernible. In like Manner our *ſimple Ideas* are *clear*, when they are ſuch, as the Objects themſelves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered Senſation or Perception, preſent them. Whilſt the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the Mind, whenever it has Occaſion to conſider them, they are *clear Ideas*. So far as they either want any thing of that original Exactneſs, or have loſt any of their firſt Freſhneſs, and are, as it were, faded or tarniſhed by Time, ſo far are they *obſcure*. *Complex Ideas*, as they are made up of ſimple ones, ſo they are *clear*, when the *Ideas* that go to their Compoſition are clear; and the Number and Order of thoſe ſimple *Ideas*, that are the Ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§. 3. The *Cauſe* of *Obſcurity* in ſimple *Ideas*, ſeems to be either dull Organs, or very ſlight and tranſient Impreſſions made by the Objects; or elſe a Weakneſs in the Memory not able to retain them as received. For to return again to viſible Objects, to help us to apprehend this Matter: If the Organs or Faculties of Perception, like Wax over-harden'd with Cold, will not receive the Impreſſion of the Seal, from the uſual Impulſe wont to imprint it; or, like Wax of a Temper too ſoft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or elſe ſuppoſing the Wax of a Temper fit, but the Seal not applied with a ſufficient Force to make a clear Impreſſion: In any of theſe Caſes, the Print left by the Seal, will be *obſcure*. This, I ſuppoſe, needs no Application to make it plainer. *Cauſes of Obſcurity.*

§. 4. As a *clear Idea* is that whereof the Mind has ſuch a full and evident Perception, as it does receive from an outward Object operating duly on a well-diſpoſed Organ, ſo a *diſtinct Idea* is that wherein the Mind perceives a Difference from all other; and a *confuſed Idea* is ſuch an one, as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ought to be different. *Diſtinct and confuſed, what.*

Objection.

§. 5. If no *Idea be confuſed*, but ſuch as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ſhould be different, it will be hard, may any one ſay, to find any where a *confuſed Idea*. For let any *Idea* be as it will, it can be no other but ſuch as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very Perception ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes it from all other *Ideas*, which cannot be other, *i. e.* different, without being perceived to be ſo. No *Idea* therefore can be undiſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ought to be different, unleſs you would have it different from it ſelf: For from all other it is evidently different.

Confuſion of Ideas is in Reference to their Names.

§. 6. To remove this Difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the *Confuſion Ideas* are at any Time chargeable with, we muſt conſider that Things ranked under diſtinct Names, are ſuppoſed different enough to be diſtinguiſhed, that ſo each Sort, by its peculiar Name, may be marked, and diſcourſed of a-part upon any Occaſion: And there is nothing more evident than that the greateſt Part of different Names are ſuppoſed to ſtand for different Things. Now every *Idea* a Man has, being viſible what it is, and diſtinct from all other *Ideas* but it ſelf, that which makes it *confuſed*, is, when it is ſuch, that it may as well be called by another Name, as that which it is expreſſed by, the Difference which keeps the Thoughts (to be ranked under thoſe two different Names) diſtinct, and makes ſome of them belong rather to the one, and ſome of them to the other of thoſe Names, being left out; and ſo the Diſtinction, which was intended to be kept up by thoſe different Names, is quite loſt.

Defaults which make Confuſion. Firſt complex Ideas *made up of too few ſimple ones.*

§. 7. The *Defaults which* uſually *occaſion* this *Confuſion*, I think, are chiefly theſe following.

Firſt, When any complex *Idea* (for 'tis complex *Ideas* that are moſt liable to Confuſion) is made up of *too ſmall a Number of* ſimple *Ideas*, and ſuch only as are common to other Things, whereby the Differences that make it, deſerve a different Name, are left out. Thus he that has an *Idea* made up of barely the ſimple ones of a Beaſt with Spots, has but a confuſed *Idea* of a Leopard, it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from a Lynx and ſeveral other Sorts of Beaſts that are ſpotted. So that ſuch an *Idea*, though it hath the peculiar Name Leopard, is not diſtinguiſhable from thoſe deſigned by the Names Lynx, or Panther, and may as well come under the Name Lynx, as Leopard. How much the Cuſtom of defining of Words by general Terms, contri-

contributes to make the *Ideas* we would express by the confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that confused *Ideas* are such as render the Use of Words uncertain, and take away the Benefit of distinct Names. When the *Ideas*, for which we use different Terms, have not a Difference answerable to their distinct Names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

Secondly, Or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.

§. 8. *Secondly*, Another Default which makes our *Ideas* confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any *Idea*, are in Number enough; yet they are so *jumbled together*, that is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the Name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this Confusion, than a Sort of Pictures usually shewn, as surprizing Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on the Table it self, mark out very odd and unusual Figures, and have no discernible Order in their Position. This Draught, thus made up of Parts, wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is, in it self, no more a confused Thing, than the Picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein though there be a little Order of Colours or Figures to be found, yet no Body thinks it a confused Picture. What is it then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of Symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not; for another Draught made, barely in Imitation of this, could not be called confused. I answer, That which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to some Name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other. *V.g.* When it is said to be the Picture of a Man, or *Cæsar*, then any one with Reason counts it confused: Because it is not discernible, in that State, to belong more to the Name Man or *Cæsar*, than to the Name Baboon, or *Pompey*; which are supposed to stand for different *Ideas* from those signified by Man or *Cæsar*. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, placed right, hath reduced those irregular Lines on the Table into their due Order and Proportion, then the Confusion ceases, and the Eye presently sees that it is a Man, or *Cæsar*; i. e. That it belongs to those Names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a Baboon, or *Pompey*; i. e. From the *Ideas* signified by those Names. Just thus it is with our *Ideas*, which are as it were, the Pictures of Things. No one of these mental Draughts, however the Parts are put together, can be called confused, (for they are plainly discernible as they are,) 'till it be ranked under some ordinary Name, to which it

cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it is done to some other Name of an allowed different Signification.

Thirdly, Or are mutable and undetermined.

§. 9. *Thirdly*, A third Defect that frequently gives the Name of confused to our *Ideas*, is, when any one of them is *uncertain and undetermined*. Thus we may observe Men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary Words of their Language, till they have learn'd their precise Signification, change the *Idea* they make this or that Term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his *Idea* of *Church*, *or Idolatry*, every Time he thinks of either and holds not steady to any one precise Combination of *Ideas* that makes it up, is said to have a confused *Idea* of Idolatry, or the Church: Though this be still for the same Reason that the former, *viz.* because a mutable *Idea* (if we will allow it to be one *Idea*) cannot belong to one Name, rather than another; and so loses the Distinction that distinct Names are designed for.

Confusion without Reference to Names hardly Conceiveable.

§. 10. By what has been said, we may observe how much *Names*, as supposed steady Signs of Things, and by their Difference to stand for, and keep Things distinct, that in themselves are different, are the *Occasion of denominating* Ideas *distinct or confused*, by a secret and unobserved Reference the Minds makes of its *Ideas* to such Names. This perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words, in the Third Book, has been read and considered. But without taking notice of such a Reference of *Ideas* to distinct Names, as the Signs of distinct Things, it will be hard to say what a *confused Idea* is. And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a Sort of Things, or any one particular Thing, distinct from all others, the complex *Idea* he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more particular the *Ideas* are and the greater and more determinate the Number and Order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable Differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all *Ideas* belonging to other Names, even those that approa h neares to it, and thereby all Confusion with them is avoided.

Confusion concerns always two Ideas.

§. 11. *Confusion* making it a Difficulty to separate two Things that should be separated, *concerns always two* Ideas; and those most, which most aproach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any *Idea* to be *confused*, we must examine what other

other it is in Danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot eafily be feparated from, and that will always be found an *Idea* belonging to another Name, and fo fhould be a different Thing from which yet it is not fufficiently diftinct being either the fame with it, or making a Part of it, or at leaft, as properly call'd by that Name as the other it is ranked under; and fo keeps not that Difference from that other *Idea*, which the different Names import.

Caufes of Confufion.

§. 12. This, I think, is the *Confufion* proper to *Ideas*, which ftill carries with it a fecret Reference to Names. At leaft, if there be any other Confufion of *Ideas*, this is that which moft of all diforders Mens Thoughts and Difcourfes: *Ideas*, as ranked under Names, being thofe that for the moft Part Men reafon of within themfelves, and always thofe which we commune about with others. And therefore, where there are fuppofed two different *Ideas* marked by two different Names, which are not as diftinguifhable as the Sounds that ftand for them, there never fails to be *Confufion:* And where any *Ideas* are diftinct, as the *Ideas* of thofe two Sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no *Confufion*. *The way to prevent it*, is to collect and unite into one complex *Idea*, as precifely as is poffible, all thofe Ingredients, whereby it is differenced from others; and to them fo united in a determinate Number or Order, apply fteadily the fame Name. But this neither accommodating Men's Eafe or Vanity, or ferving any Defign, but that of naked Truth, which is not always the Thing aimed at, fuch Exactnefs is rather to be wifhed than hoped for. And fince the loofe Application of Names to undetermined, variable, and almoft no *Ideas*, ferves both to cover our own Igorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no fhonder that moft Men fhould ufe it themfelves, whilft they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no fmall Part of the *Confufion* to be found in the Notions of Men, might by Care and Ingenuity be avoided; yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some *Ideas* are fo complex, and made up of fo many Parts, that the Memory does not eafily retain the very fame precife Combination of fimple *Ideas*, under one Name; much lefs are we able conftantly to divine for what precife complex *Idea* fuch a Name ftands in another Man's Ufe of it. From the firft of thefe, follows *Confufion* in a Man's own Reafonings and Opinions within himfelf; from the latter, frequent *Confufion* in difcourfing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of Words, their Defects and Abufes, in the following Book, I fhall here fay no more of it.

Complex Ideas *may be distinct in one Part, and confused in another.*

§. 13. Our *complex Ideas* being made up of Collections, and so Variety of simple ones *may* accordingly *be very clear and distinct in one Part, and very obscure and confused in another.* In a Man who speaks of a *Chiliaedron*, or a Body of a thousands Sides, the *Idea* of the Figure may be very confus'd, tho' that of the Number be very distinct; so that he being able to discourse, and demonstrate concerning that Part of his complex *Idea*, which depends upon the Number of a Thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct *Idea* of a *Chiliaedron*; though it be plain, he has no precise *Idea* of its Figure, so as to distinguish it, by that, from one that has but 999 Sides. The not observing whereof, causes no small Error in Mens Thoughts, and Confusion in their Discourses.

This if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.

§. 14. He that thinks he has a distinct *Idea* of the Figure of a *Chiliaedron*, let him for Tryal's sake take another Parcel of the same uniform Matter, *viz.* Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a Figure of 999 Sides: He will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two *Ideas* one from another, by the Number of Sides; and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his Thoughts and Reasoning to that Part only of these *Ideas*, which is contained in their Numbers; as that the Sides of the one could be divided into two equal Numbers; and of the other, not, *&c.* But when he goes about to distinguish them by their Figure, he will there be presently at a Loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two *Ideas*, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare Figure of those two Pieces of Gold; as he could, if the same parcel of Gold were made one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five Sides. In which incompleat *Ideas* we are very apt to impose on our selves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar Names. For being satisfied in that Part of the *Idea*, which we have clear; and the Name which is familiar to us, being applied to the Whole, containing that Part also which is imperfect and obscure, we are apt to use it for that confused Part, and draw Deductions from it in the obscure Part of its Signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

Instance in Eternity.

§. 15. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name *Eternity*, we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive *Idea* of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no Part of that Duration which is not clearly contained in our *Idea*. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so, may have a clear *Idea* of Dura-

tion;

tion; he may also have a very clear *Idea* of a very great Length of Duration; he may also have a clear *Idea* of the Comparison of that great one, with still a greater: But it not being possible for him to include in his *Idea* of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration, where he supposes no End, that part of his *Idea*, which is still beyond the bounds of that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in Disputes and Reasonings, concerning Eternity, or any other *Infinite*, we are apt to blunder, and so involve our selves in manifest Absurdities.

Divisibility of Matter.

§. 16. In Matter, we have no clear *Ideas* of the Smallness of Parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our Senses; and therefore when we talk of the Divisibility of Mattter *in infinitum*, though we have clear *Ideas* of Division and Divisibility, and have also clear *Ideas* of Parts made out of a Whole by Division; yet we have but very obscure and confused *Ideas* of Corpuscles, or minute Bodies so to be divided, when by former Divisions they are reduced to a Smallness much exceeding the Perception of any of our Senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct *Ideas* of, is of what Division in general or abstractly is, and the Relation of *Totum* and *Pars*: But of the Bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain Progressions, I think, we have no clear nor distinct *Idea* at all. For I ask any one, whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever saw, he has any distinct *Idea* (bating still the Number which concerns not Extension) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1000,000 Part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his *Ideas* to that Degree, without losing Sight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of those Numbers. Such a Degree of Smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed, since a Division carried on so far, brings it no nearer the End of infinite Division, than the first Division into two Halfs does. I must confess, for my Part, I have no clear distinct *Ideas* of the different Bulk or Extension of those Bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Division of Bodies *in infinitum*, our *Idea* of their distinct Bulks, which is the Subject and Foundation of Division, comes, after a little Progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in Obscurity. For that *Idea*, which is to represent only Bigness, must be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten Times as big, but only by Number; so that we have clear, distinct *Ideas*, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct *Ideas* of two such Extensions. 'Tis

plain, from hence, that when we talk of infinite Diviſibility of Body, or Extenſion, our diſtinct and clear *Ideas* are only of Numbers: But the clear, diſtinct *Ideas* of Extenſion, after ſome Progreſs of Diviſion, is quite loſt; and of ſuch minute Parts, we have no diſtinct *Ideas* at all; but it returns, as all our *Ideas* of infinite do, at laſt to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any diſtinct *Idea* of actual, infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a clear *Idea* of Diviſion, as often as we will think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear *Idea* of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a clear *Idea* of an infinite Number, by being able ſtill to add new Numbers to any aſſigned Number we have: Endleſs Diviſibility, giving us no more a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of actually infinite Parts, than endleſs Addibility (if I may ſo ſpeak) gives us a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of an actually infinite Number. They both being only in a Power ſtill of increaſing the Number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added, (wherein conſiſts the Infinity) we have but an obſcure, imperfect, and confuſed *Idea*; from or about which we can argue or reaſon with no Certainty or Clearneſs, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number, of which we have no ſuch diſtinct *Idea*, as we have of 4 or 100. but only this relative obſcure one, that compared to any other, it is ſtill bigger: And when we have no more a clear, poſitive *Idea* of it, when we ſay or conceive it is bigger or more than 400,000,000, than if we ſhould ſay, it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a Proportion to the End of Addition or Number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and ſo proceeds, ſhall as ſoon come to the End of all Addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And ſo likewiſe in Eternity, he that has an *Idea* of but four Years, has as much a poſitive compleat *Idea* of Eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of Years: For what remains of Eternity beyond either of theſe two Numbers of Years, is as clear to the one as the other; *i. e.* neither of them has any clear, poſitive *Idea* of it at all. For he that adds only 4 Years to 4, and ſo on, ſhall as ſoon reach Eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of Years, and ſo on; or if he pleaſe, doubles the Increaſe, as often as he will; The remaining Abyſs being ſtill as far beyond the End of theſe Progreſſions, as it is from the Length of a Day, or an Hour. For nothing finite bears any Proportion to infinite; and therefore our *Ideas*, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is alſo in our *Idea* of *Extenſion*, when we encreaſe it by Addition, as well as when we diminiſh it by Diviſion, and would enlarge our Thoughts to infinite Space.

After

After a few Doublings of thoſe *Ideas* of Extenſion, which are the largeſt we are accuſtomed to have, we loſe the clear diſtinct *Ideas* of that Space: It becomes a confuſedly great one, with a Surplus of ſtill greater; about which, when we would argue or reaſon, we ſhall always find our ſelves at a Loſs; confuſed *Ideas*, in our Arguings and Deductions from that Part of them which is confuſed, always leading us into Confuſion.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

§. 1. BEſides what we have already mentioned concerning *Ideas*, other Conſiderations belong to them, in Reference to Things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent; and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold Diſtinction; and are,

Real Ideas *are conformable to their Archetypes*

Firſt, Either real or fantaſtical.

Secondly, Adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, True or falſe.

Firſt, By *Real Ideas*, I mean ſuch as have a Foundation in Nature; ſuch as have a Conformity with the real Being and Exiſtence of Things, or with their Archetypes. *Fantaſtical* or *Chimerical*, I call ſuch as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that Reality of Being, to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to the Archetypes. If we examine the ſeveral Sorts of *Ideas* before-mentioned, we ſhall find, that,

§. 2. *Firſt*, *Our ſimple* Ideas *are all real*, all agree to the Reality of Things, Not that they are all of them the Images, or Repreſentations of what does exiſt, the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already ſhewed. But though Whiteneſs and Coldneſs are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet thoſe *Ideas* of Whiteneſs and Coldneſs, Pain, *&c.* being in us the Effects of Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us ſuch Senſations; they are real *Ideas* in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the Qualities that are really in Things themſelves. For theſe ſeveral Apearances being deſigned to be the Marks whereby we are to know and diſtinguiſh Things which we have to do with, our *Ideas* do as well ſerve us to that purpoſe, and are as real diſtinguiſhing Characters, whether they be only conſtant Effects, or elſe exact Reſem-

Simple Ideas *all real.*

Reſemblances of ſomething in the Things themſelves; the Reality lying in that ſteady Correſpondence they have with the diſtinct Conſtitutions of real Beings. But whether they anſwer to thoſe Conſtitutions, as to Cauſes or Patterns, it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them. And thus our ſimple *Ideas* are all real and true, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe Powers of Things which produce them in our Minds, that being all that is requiſite to make them real, and not Fictions at Pleaſure. For in ſimple *Ideas*, (as has been ſhewn,) the Mind is wholly confin'd to the Operation of Things upon it, and can make to it ſelf no ſimple *Idea*, more than what it has received.

Complex Ideas *are voluntary Combinations.*

§. 3. Though the Mind be wholly paſſive, in reſpect of its ſimple *Ideas*; yet I think, we may ſay, it is not ſo in reſpect of its complex *Ideas*: For thoſe being Combinations of ſimple *Ideas* put together, and united under one general Name; 'tis plain that the Mind of Man uſes ſome Kind of Liberty, in forming thoſe complex *Ideas*; How elſe comes it to paſs, that one Man's *Idea* of Gold, or Juſtice, is different from another's? But becauſe he has put in, or left out of his ſome ſimple *Idea* which the other has not. The Queſtion then is, Which of theſe are real, and which barely imaginary Combinations? What Collections agree to the Reality of Things, and what not? And to this, I ſay, That,

Mixed Modes made of conſiſtent Ideas, *are real.*

§. 4. *Secondly*, *Mixed Modes and Relations*, having no other *Reality* but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more required to thoſe Kind of *Ideas*, to make them *real*, but that they be ſo framed, that there be a Poſſibility of exiſting conformable to them. Theſe *Ideas* being themſelves Archetypes, cannot differ from their Archetypes, and ſo *cannot be chimerical*, unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent *Ideas*. Indeed, as any of them have the Names of a known Language aſſigned to them, by which he that has them in his Mind would ſignify them to others, ſo bare Poſſibility of exiſting is not enough; they muſt have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical: As if a Man would give the Name of Juſtice to that *Idea*, which common Uſe calls Liberality. But this Fantaſticalneſs relates more to Propriety of Speech, than Reality of *Ideas*: For a Man to be undiſturbed in Danger, ſedately to conſider what is fitteſt to be done, and to execute it ſteadily, is a mixed Mode, or a complex *Idea* of an Action which may exiſt.

But

But to be undisturbed in Danger, without using one's Reason or Industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an *Idea* as the other. Though the first of these having the Name *Courage* given to it, may, in Respect of that Name, be a right or wrong *Idea*: But the other, whilst it has not a common received Name of any known Language assigned to it, is not capable of any Deformity, being made with no Reference to any Thing but it self.

§. 5. *Thirdly*, Our *complex* Ideas *of Substances* being made all of them in Reference to Things existing without us, and intended to be Representations of Substances, as they really are, are no farther *real*, than as they are such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are really united, and co-exist in Things without us. On the contrary, those are *fantastical*, which are made up of such Collections of simple *Ideas* as were really never united, never were found together in any Substance; *v. g.* a rational Creature, consisting of a Horse's Head, joined to a Body of Human Shape, or such as the *Centaurs* are described: Or, a Body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than common Water: Or, an uniform, unorganized Body, consisting as to Sense, all of similar Parts, with Perception and voluntary Motion joined to it. Whether such Substances as these can possibly exist, or no, 'tis probable we do not know: But be that as it will, these *Ideas* of Substances being made conformable to no Pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such Collections of *Ideas*, as no Substance ever shewed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: But much more are those complex *Ideas* so, which contain in them any Inconsistency or Contradiction of their Parts.

Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of Things.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§. 1. OF our real *Ideas*, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call *adequate*, which perfectly represent those Archetypes which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate Ideas* are such, which are but a partial, or incompleat Repre-

Adequate Ideas, or such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.

Repreſentation of thoſe Archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which Account it is plain.

Simple Ideas *all adequate.*

§. 2. *Firſt*, That *all our ſimple* Ideas *are adequate*; Becauſe being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers in Things, fitted and ordained by GOD, to produce ſuch Senſations in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe Powers: And we are ſure they agree to the Reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us the *Idea* which we call Whiteneſs and Sweetneſs, we are ſure there is a Power in Sugar to produce thoſe *Ideas* in our Minds, or elſe they could not have been produced by it. And ſo each Senſation anſwering the Power that operates on any of our Senſes, the *Idea* ſo produced, is a real *Idea*, (and not a Fiction of the Mind, which has no Power to produce any ſimple *Idea*;) and cannot but be adequate, ſince it ought only to anſwer that Power: And ſo all ſimple *Ideas* are adequate. 'Tis true, the Things producing in us theſe ſimple *Ideas*, are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the Cauſes of them; but as if thoſe *Ideas* were real Beings in them. For though Fire be called painful to the Touch, whereby is ſignified the Power of producing in us the *Idea* of Pain; yet it is denominated alſo Light, and Hot; as if Light and Heat, were really ſomething in the Fire, more than a Power to excite theſe *Ideas* in us; and therefore are called *Qualities* in, or of the Fire. But theſe being nothing, in Truth, but Powers to excite ſuch *Ideas* in us, I muſt, in that Senſe, be underſtood, when I ſpeak of ſecondary *Qualities*, as being in Things; or of their *Ideas*; as being in the Objects that excite them in us. Such Ways of ſpeaking, though accommodated to the vulgar Notions, without which one cannot be well underſtood; yet truly ſignify nothing, but thoſe Powers which are in Things, to excite certain Senſations or *Ideas* in us. Since were there no fit Organs to receive the Impreſſions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch; nor a Mind joined to thoſe Organs to receive the *Ideas* of Light and Heat, by thoſe Impreſſions from the Fire, or the Sun, there would yet be no more Light or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain, if there were no ſenſible Creature to feel it, though the Sun ſhould continue juſt as it is now, and Mount *Ætna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and Extenſion, and the Termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Reſt, whereof we have the *Ideas*, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any ſenſible Being to perceive them, or no: And therefore thoſe we have Reaſon to look on, as the real Modifications of Matter, and ſuch as are the exciting Cauſes of all our various Senſations from Bodies. But this being an

Enquiry

Enquiry not belonging to this Place, I ſhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to ſhew, what complex *Ideas* are *adequate*, and what not.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Our *complex* Ideas *of Modes*, being voluntary Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, which the Mind puts together, without Reference to any real Archetypes, or ſtanding Patterns, exiſting any where, *are* and cannot but *adequate Ideas*: Becauſe they not being intended for Copies or Things really exiſting, but for Archetypes made by the Mind, to rank and denominate Things by, cannot want any Thing; they having each of them that Combination of *Ideas*, and thereby that Perfection which the Mind intended they ſhould: So that the Mind acquieſces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the *Idea* of a Figure, with three Sides meeting at three Angles, I have a compleat *Idea* wherein I require nothing elſe to make it perfect. That the Mind is ſatisfied in the Perfection of this its *Idea*, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any Underſtanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect *Idea* of that Thing it ſignifies by the Word *Triangle*, ſuppoſing it to exiſt, than it ſelf has in that complex *Idea* of three Sides, and three Angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be eſſential to it, or neceſſary to compleat it, whereever, or however it exiſts. But in our *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, it is otherwiſe. For there deſiring to copy Things, as they really do exiſt, and to repreſent to our ſelves that Conſtitution on which all their Properties depend, we perceive our *Ideas* attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they ſtill want ſomething we ſhould be glad were in them; and ſo are all *inadequate*. But *mixed Modes*, and *Relations*, being Archetypes without Patterns, and ſo having nothing to repreſent but themſelves, cannot but be *adequate*, every Thing being ſo to it ſelf. He that at firſt put together the *Idea* of Danger, perceived Abſence of Diſorder from Fear, ſedate Conſideration of what was juſtly to be done, and executing of that without Diſturbance, or being deterred by the Danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex *Idea* made up of that Combination, and intending it to be nothing elſe, but what it is; nor too have in it any other ſimple *Ideas*, but what it hath, it could not alſo but be an *adequate Idea*: And laying this up in his Memory, with the Name *Courage* annexed to it, to ſignify it to others, and denominate from thence any Action he ſhould obſerve to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to meaſure and denominate Actions by, as they agreed to it. This *Idea* thus made, and laid up for a Pattern, muſt neceſſarily be *adequate*, being referred to nothing elſe

Modes are all adequate.

elſe but it ſelf, nor made by any other Original, but the Good liking and Will of him that firſt made this Combination.

Modes in Reference to ſettled Names, may be inadequate.

§. 4. Indeed, another coming after, and in Converſation learning from him the Word *Courage*, may make an *Idea*, which he gives that Name *Courage*, different from what the firſt Author applied it to, and has in his Mind, when he uſes it. And in this Caſe, if he deſigns, that his *Idea* in Thinking, ſhould be conformable to the other's *Idea* as the Name he uſes in Speaking is conformable in Sound to his, from whom he learned it, his *Idea* may be very wrong and *inadequate*: Becauſe in this Caſe, making the other Man's *Idea* the Pattern of his *Idea* in Thinking, as the other Man's Word, or Sound, is the Pattern of his in Speaking, his *Idea* is ſo far defective and *inadequate*, as it is diſtant from the Archetype and Pattern he refers it to, and intends to expreſs and ſignify by the Name he uſes for it; which Name he would have to be a Sign of the other Man's *Idea*, (to which, in its proper Uſe, it is primarily annexed,) and of his own, as agreeing to it: To which, if his own does not exactly correſpond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§. 5. Therefore theſe *complex* Ideas *of Modes*, when they are referred by the Mind, and intended to correſpond to the *Ideas* in the Mind of ſome other intelligent Being, expreſſed by the Names we apply to them, they *may be* very deficient, wrong, and *inadequate*: Becauſe they agree not to that, which the Mind deſigns to be their Archetype and Pattern: In which Reſpect only, any *Idea* of *Modes* can be wrong, imperfect, or *inadequate*. And on this Account, our *Ideas* of *mixed Modes* are the moſt liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper Speaking, than knowing Right.

Ideas *of Subſtances, as refer'd to real Eſſences, not adequate.*

§. 6. *Thirdly*, What *Ideas we have of Subſtances*, I have above ſhewed: Now, thoſe *Ideas* have in the Mind a double Reference: 1. Somtimes they are referred to a ſuppoſed real Eſſence of each Species of Things. 2. Sometimes they are only deſign'd to be Pictures and Repreſentations in the Mind of Things that do exiſt by *Ideas* of thoſe Qualities that are diſcoverable in them. In both which Ways theſe Copies of thoſe Originals and Archetypes, *are* imperfect and *inadequate*.

Firſt, It is uſual for Men to make the Names of Subſtances ſtand for Things, as ſuppoſed to have certain real Eſſences, whereby they are of this or that Species: And Names ſtanding for nothing but the *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds, they muſt conſe-

conſequently refer their *Ideas* to ſuch real Eſſences, as to their Archetypes. That Men (eſpecially ſuch as have been bred up in the Learning taught in this Part of the World) do ſuppoſe certain ſpecifick Eſſences of Subſtances, which each Individual, in its ſeveral Kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of, is ſo far from needing Proof, that it will be thought ſtrange, if any one ſhould do otherwiſe. And thus they ordinarily apply the ſpecifick Names they rank particular Subſtances under, to Things, as diſtinguiſhed by ſuch ſpecifick real Eſſences. Who is there almoſt, who would not take it amiſs, if it ſhould be doubted, whether he called himſelf Man, with any other Meaning, than as having the real Eſſence of a Man? And yet if you demand, what thoſe real Eſſences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant, and knew them not. From whence it follows, that the *Ideas* they have in their Minds, being referred to real Eſſences, as to Archetypes which are unknown, muſt be ſo far fron being *adequate*, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any Repreſentation of them at all. The complex *Ideas* we have of Subſtances, are, as it has been ſhewn, certain Collections of ſimple *Ideas* that have been obſerved or ſuppoſed conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex *Idea* cannot be the real Eſſence of any Subſtance; for then the Properties we diſcover in that Body, would depend on that complex *Idea*, and be deducible from it, and their neceſſary Connexion with it be known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they are diſcoverable, are deducible from the complex *Ideas* of three Lines, including a Space. But it is plain, that in our complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, are not contained ſuch *Ideas*, on which all the other Qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common *Idea* Men have of *Iron*, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight, and Hardneſs; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is Malleableneſs. But yet this Property has no neceſſary Connexion with that complex *Idea*, or any Part of it: And there is no more Reaſon to think, that Malleableneſs depends on that Colour, Weight, and Hardneſs, than that that Colour, or that Weight depends on its Malleableneſs. And yet, though we know nothing of theſe real Eſſences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men ſhould attribute the Sorts of Things to ſuch Eſſences. The particular Parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is forwardly, by moſt Men, ſuppoſed to have a real Eſſence, whereby it is *Gold*; and from whence thoſe Qualities flow, which I find in it, *viz.* its peculiar Colour, Weight, Hardneſs, Fuſibility, Fixedneſs, and Change of Colour upon a ſlight Touch of Mercury, *&c.* This Eſſence, from which all theſe Properties flow,

flow, when I enquire into it, and ſearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot diſcover: The fartheſt I can go, is only to preſume, that it being nothing but Body, its real Eſſence, or internal Conſtitution, on which theſe Qualities depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size, and Connexion of its ſolid Parts; of neither of which, I having any diſtinct Perception at all, I can have no *Idea* of its Eſſence, which is the Cauſe that it has that particular ſhining Yellowneſs, a greater Weight than any Thing I know of the ſame Bulk, and a Fitneſs to have its Colour changed by the Touch of Quickſilver. If any one will ſay, that the real Eſſence, and internal Conſtitution, on which theſe Properties depend, is not the Figure, Size, and Arrangement or Connexion of its ſolid Parts, but ſomething elſe, call'd its particular *Form*; I am farther from having any *Idea* of its real Eſſence, than I was before; for I have an *Idea* of Figure, Size, and Situation of ſolid Parts in general, tho' I have none of the particular Figure, Size, or putting together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-mentioned are produced; which Qualities I find in that particular Parcel of Matter that is on my Finger, and not in a another Parcel of Mattter, with which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that ſomething beſides the Figure, Size, and Poſture of the ſolid Parts of that Body, is its Eſſence, ſomething called *ſubſtantial Form*; of that, I confeſs, I have no *Idea* at all, but only of the Sound *Form*; which is far enough from an *Idea* of its real Eſſence, or Conſtitution. The like Ignorance as I have of the real Eſſence of this particular Subſtance, I have alſo of the real Eſſence of all other natural ones: Of which Eſſences I confeſs, I have no diſtinct *Ideas* at all; and I am apt to ſuppoſe others, when they examine their own Knowledge, will find in themſelves, in this one Point, the ſame Sort of Ignorance.

§. 7. Now then, when Men apply to this particular Parcel of Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in Uſe, and denominate it *Gold*, do they not ordinarily, or are they not underſtood to give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies, having a real internal Eſſence; by having of which Eſſence, this particular Subſtanee comes to be of that Species, and to be called by that Name? If it be ſo, as it is plain it is, the Name by which Things are marked, as having that Eſſence, muſt be referred primarily to that Eſſence; and conſequently the *Idea* to which that Name is given, muſt be referred alſo to that Eſſence, and be intended to repreſent it. Which Eſſence, ſince they, who ſo uſe the Names, know not their Ideas *of Subſtances* muſt be *all inadequate* in that Reſpect, as not containing in them that real Eſſence which the Mind intends they ſhould.

§. 8.

§. 8. *Secondly*, Thoſe who neglecting that uſeleſs Suppoſition of unknown real Eſſences, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed, endeavour to copy the Subſtances that exiſt in the World, by putting together the *Ideas* of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which are found co-exiſting in them, though they come much nearer a Likeneſs of them, than thoſe who imagine they know not what real ſpecifick Eſſences: Yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate *Ideas* of thoſe Subſtances they would thus copy into their Minds; nor do thoſe Copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their Archetypes. Becauſe thoſe Qualities, and Powers of Subſtances, whereof we make their complex *Ideas*, are ſo many and various, that no Man's complex *Idea* contains them all. That our abſtract *Ideas* of Subſtances, do not contain in them all the ſimple *Ideas* that are united in the Things themſelves, is evident, in that Men do rarely put into their Complex *Idea* of any Subſtance, all the ſimple *Ideas* they do know to exiſt in it. Becauſe endeavouring to make the Signification of their ſpecifick Names as clear, and as little cumberſome as they can, they make their ſpecifick *Ideas* of the Sorts of Subſtances, for the moſt Part, of a few of thoſe ſimple *Ideas* which are to be found in them: But theſe having no original Precedency, or Right to be put in, and make the ſpecifick *Idea* more than others that are left out, 'tis plain, that both theſe Ways, *our* Ideas *of Subſtances* are deficient and *inadequate*. The ſimple *Ideas*, whereof we make our complex ones of Subſtances, are all of them (bating only the Figure and Bulk of ſome Sorts) Powers, which being Relations to other Subſtances, we can never be ſure that we know all the Powers that are in any one Body, till we have tried what Changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other Subſtances, in their ſeveral Ways of Application: Which being impoſſible to be tried upon any one Body, much leſs upon all, it is impoſſible we ſhould have adequate *Ideas* of any Subſtance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

Ideas *of Subſtances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.*

§. 9. Whoſoever firſt light on a Parcel of that Sort of Subſtance we denote by the Word *Gold*, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he obſerved in that Lump, to depend on its real Eſſence or internal Conſtitution. Therefore thoſe never went into his *Idea* of that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight, were the firſt he abſtracted from it, to make the complex *Idea* of that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes after ſuch a

Manner, and to produce in us that *Idea* we call Yellow; and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal Bulk, they being put into a Pair of equal Scales, one againſt another. Another, perhaps, added to theſe, the *Ideas* of Fuſibility and Fixedneſs, two other paſſive Powers, in Relation to the Operation of Fire upon it; another, its Ductility and Solubility in *Aq. Regia*; two other Powers, relating to the Operation of other Bodies, in changing its outward Figure or Separation of it into inſenſible Parts. Theſe, or part of theſe, put together, uſually make the complex *Idea* in Mens Minds, of that Sort of Body we call *Gold*.

§. 10. But no one, who hath conſidered the Properties of Bodies in general, or this Sort in particular, can doubt, that this called *Gold*, has infinite other Properties, not contained in that complex *Idea*. Some, who have examined this Species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten Times as many Properties in *Gold*, all of them as inſeparable from its internal Conſtitution, as its Colour, or Weight: And, 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties that are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred Times as many *Ideas* go to the complex *Idea* of *Gold*, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet, perhaps, that not be the thouſandth Part of what is to be diſcovered in it. The Changes that one Body is apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon due Application, exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear ſo much a Paradox to any one, who will but conſider how far Men are yet from knowing all the Properties of that one, no very Compound Figure, a *Triangle*, though it be no ſmall Number, that are already by Mathematicians diſcovered of it.

Ideas of Subſtances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.

§. 11. So that *all our complex* Ideas of *Subſtances*, are imperfect and *inadequate*. Which would be ſo alſo in Mathematical Figures, if we were to have our complex *Ideas* of them, only by collecting their Properties in Reference to other Figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our *Ideas* be of an *Ellipſis*, if we had no other *Idea* of it, but ſome few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain *Idea*, the whole Eſſence of that Figure, we from thence diſcover thoſe Properties, and demonſtratively ſee how they flow, and are inſeparable from it.

Simple Ideas ἐκτυπα, *and adequate.*

§. 12. Thus the Mind has three Sorts of abſtract *Ideas*, or nominal Eſſences:

Firſt, *Simple* Ideas, which *are* ἐκτυπα, or *Copies*, but yet certainly *adequate*. Becauſe being intended

intended to expreſs nothing but the Power of Things to produce in the Mind ſuch a Senſation, that Senſation, when it is produced, cannot but be the Effect of that Power. So the Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light, (I ſpeak according to the common Notion of Light,) to produce in me the Senſation which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of ſuch a Power, in ſomething without the Mind, ſince the Mind has not the Power to produce any ſuch *Idea* in it ſelf, and being meant for nothing elſe but the Effect of ſuch a Power; that ſimple *Idea* is real and *adequate*: The Senſation of White, in my Mind, being the Effect of that Power, which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly *adequate* to that Power; or elſe, that Power would produce a different *Idea*.

Ideas *of Subſtances are* ἐκτυπα *inadequate.*

§. 13. *Secondly*, The *complex* Ideas *of Subſtances*, *are Ectypes*, or *Copies* too; but not perfect ones, nor *adequate*: Which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever Collection of ſimple *Ideas* it makes of any Subſtance that exiſts, it cannot be ſure, that it exactly anſwers all that are in that Subſtance: Since not having tried all the Operations of all other Subſtances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cauſe in other Subſtances, it cannot have an exact *adequate* Collection of all its active and paſſive Capacities; and ſo *not* have an *adequate* complex *Idea* of the Powers of any Subſtance exiſting, and its Relations, which is that Sort of complex *Idea* of Subſtances we have. And, after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex *Idea*, an exact Collection of all the ſecondary Qualities or Powers of any Subſtance, we ſhould not yet thereby have an *Idea* of the Eſſence of that Thing. For ſince the Powers or Qualities, that are obſervable by us, are not the real Eſſence of that Subſtance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatſoever of theſe Qualities, cannot be the real Eſſence of that Thing. Whereby it is plain, that our *Ideas* of Subſtances are not *adequate*; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Beſides, a Man has no *Idea* of Subſtance in general, nor knows what Subſtance is in it ſelf.

Ideas *of Modes and Relations, are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.*

§. 14. *Thirdly*, *Complex* Ideas *of Modes and Relations*, *are* Originals, and *Archetypes*; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Exiſtence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to anſwer. Theſe being ſuch Collections of ſimple *Ideas*, that the Mind it ſelf puts together, and ſuch Collections, that each of them contains in it preciſely all that the Mind intends it ſhould,

they are Archetypes and Essences of Modes that may exist; and so are designed only for, and belong only to such Modes, as, when they do exist, have an exact Conformity with those complex *Ideas*. The *Ideas* therefore of Modes and Relations, can never but be *adequate*.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

Truth and Falshood properly belong to Propositions.

§ 1. THough Truth and Falshood belong in Propriety of Speech only to Propositions; yet *Ideas* are oftentimes termed *True* or *False*, (as what Words are there that are not used with great Latitude, and with some Deviation from their strict and proper Significations?) Though, I think, that when *Ideas* themselves are termed true or false there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination: As we shall see, if we examine the particular Occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of Affirmation, or Negation, which is the Reason of that Denomination. For our *Ideas*, being nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or *false*, no more than a single Name of any Thing can be said to be *true* or *false*.

Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.

§. 2. Indeed, both *Ideas* and Words *may* be said to be *true in a Metaphysical Sense* of the Word Truth, as all other Things, that any Way exist, are said to be true; *i. e.* really to be such as they exist. Though in Things called *true*, even in that Sense, there is perhaps, a secret Reference to our *Ideas*, look'd upon as the Standards of that *Truth*, which amounts to a mental Proposition, though it be usually not taken Notice of.

No Idea *as an Appearance in the Mind, true or false.*

§. 3 But it is not in that Metaphysical Sense of Truth which we enquire here, when we examine, whether our *Ideas* are capable of being *true* or *false*; but in the more ordinary Acceptation of those Words: And so I say, that the *Ideas* in our Minds, being only so many Perceptions, or Appearances there, none of them are *false*. The *Idea* of a Centaur having no more Falshood in it, when it appears in our Minds, than the Name Centaur has Falshood in it, when it

it is pronounced by our Mouths, or written on Paper. For Truth or Falſhood, lying always in ſome Affirmation, or Negation, Mental or Verbal, our *Ideas* are *not capable*, any of them, *of being falſe*, till the Mind paſſes ſome Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them.

§. 4. Whenever the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to any Thing extraneous to them, they are then *capable to be called true or falſe*. Becauſe the Mind in ſuch a Reference, makes a tacit Suppoſition of their Conformity to that Thing: which Suppoſition, as it happens to be *true* or *falſe*; ſo the *Ideas* themſelves come to be denominted. The moſt uſual Caſes wherein this happens, are theſe following.

Ideas referr'd to any Thing may be true or falſe.

§. 5. *Firſt*, When the Mind ſuppoſes any *Idea* it has, *conformable to* that in *other Mens* Minds, called by the ſame common Name; *v. g.* when the Mind intends or judges its *Ideas* of *Juſtice*, *Temperance*, *Religion*, to be the ſame with what other Men give theſe Names to.

Other Mens Ideas, real Eſſence and ſuppoſed real Eſſence, what Men uſually refer Ideas to.

Secondly, When the Mind ſuppoſes any *Idea* it has in it ſelf, to be *conformable to ſome real Exiſtence*. Thus the two *Ideas*, of a Man, and a Centaur, ſuppoſed to be the *Ideas* of real Subſtances, are the one *true*, and the other *falſe*; the one having a Conformity to what has really exiſted, the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind *refers* any of its *Ideas to* that *real* Conſtitution, and *Eſſence* of any Thing, whereon all its Properties depend: And thus the greateſt Part, if not all our *Ideas* of Subſtances, are *falſe*.

§. 6. Theſe Suppoſitions, the Mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own *Ideas*. But yet if we will examine it, we ſhall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abſtract complex *Ideas*. For the natural Tendency of the Mind being towards Knowledge; and finding that, if it would proceed by, and dwell upon only particular Things, its Progreſs would be very ſlow, and its Work endleſs: Therefore to ſhorten its Way to Knowledge, and make each Preception the more comprehenſive; the firſt Thing it does, as the Foundation of the eaſier enlarging its Knowledge, either by Contemplation of the Things themſelves, that it would know, or Conference with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles, and rank them ſo into Sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with Aſſurance extend to all of that Sort; and advance by larger Steps in that, which is its great Buſineſs, Knowledge. This,

The Cauſe of ſuch References.

as I have elsewhere shewn, is the Reason why we collect Things under comprehensive *Ideas*, with Names annexed to them, into *Genera* and *Species*, *i. e.* into Kinds and Sorts.

§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe, that Course it usually takes in its Way to Knowledge, we shall, I think, find, that the Mind having got any *Idea*, which it thinks it may have Use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse, the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory as containing the Essence of a Sort of Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new Thing of a Kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry, nothing but the Name. As if the Name carried with it the Knowledge of the Species, or the Essence of it, whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and it is generally supposed annexed to it.

The Cause of such References.

§. 8. But this abstract *Idea* being something in the Mind between the Things that exist, and the Name that is given to it; it is in our *Ideas* that both the Rightness of our Knowledge, and the Propriety or Intelligibleness of our Speaking, consists. And hence it is, that Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract *Ideas* they have in their Minds, are such as agree to the Things existing without them, to which they are referred, and the same also, to which the Names they give them, do, by the Use and Propriety of that Language, belong. For without this *double Conformity of* their *Ideas*, they find they should both think amiss of Things themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

Simple Ideas may be false, in Reference to others of the same Name, but are least liable to be so.

§. 9. *First* then, I say, That *when the Truth of our* Ideas *is judged of, by the Conformity they have to the* Ideas *which other Men have, and commonly signify by the same Name, they may be any of them false.* But yet *simple* Ideas are *least* of all *liable to be so mistaken:* Because a Man by his Senses, and every Day's Observation, may easily satisfy himself what the simple *Ideas* are, which their several Names that are in common Use stand for, they being but few in Number, and such, as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the Objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes in his Names of simple *Ideas* or applies the Name *Red*, to the *Idea* of Green; or the Name *Sweet*, to the *Idea* Bitter: Much less are Men apt to confound the Names of *Ideas*, belonging to different Senses; and call a Colour,

Colour, by the Name of a Taſte, &c. whereby it is evident that the ſimple *Ideas* they call by any Name, are commonly the ſame that others have and mean, when they uſed the ſame Names.

§. 10. *Complex* Ideas *are much more liable to be falſe in this Reſpect; and the complex* Ideas *of mixed Modes, much more than thoſe of Subſtances:* Becauſe in Subſtances, (eſpecially thoſe which the common and unborrowed Names of any Language are applied to) ſome remarkable ſenſible Qualities, ſerving ordinarily to diſtinguiſh one Sort from another, eaſily preſerve thoſe, who take any Care in the Uſe of their Words, from applying them to Sorts of Subſtances to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed Modes, we are much more uncertain, it being not ſo eaſy to determine of ſeveral Actions, whether they are to be called *Juſtice*, or *Cruelty*; *Liberality*, or *Prodigality*. And ſo in referring our *Ideas* to thoſe of other Men, call'd by the ſame Names, ours may be *falſe*; and the *Idea* in our Minds, which we expreſs by the Word, *Juſtice*, may, perhaps, be that which ought to have another Name.

Ideas *of mixed Modes moſt liable to be falſe in this Senſe.*

§. 11. But whether or no our *Ideas* of mixed Modes are more liable than any Sort, to be different from thoſe of other Men, which are marked by the ſame Names: This at leaſt is certain, That *this Sort if falſhood is much more familiarly attributed to* our *Ideas* of *mixed Modes*, *than to any other.* When a Man is thought to have a falſe *Idea* of *Juſtice*, or *Gratitude*, or *Glory*, it is for no other Reaſon, but that his agrees not with the *Ideas* which each of thoſe Names are the Signs of in other Men.

Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.

§. 12. *The Reaſon whereof* ſeems to me to be this, That the abſtract *Ideas* of mixed Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of ſuch a preciſe Collection of ſimple *Ideas*; and ſo the Eſſence of each Species being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other ſenſible Standard exiſting any where, but the Name it ſelf, or the Definition of that Name: We have nothing elſe to refer theſe our *Ideas* of mixed Modes to, as a Standard, to which we would conform them, but the *Ideas* of thoſe, who are thought to uſe thoſe Names in their moſt proper Significations; and ſo, as our *Ideas* conform, or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe. And thus much concerning the *Truth* and *Falſhood* of our *Ideas*, in Reference to their Names.

And why.

As referred to real Existences, none of our Ideas *can be false, but those of Substances.*

§. 13. *Secondly*, As to the *Truth and Falshood of our* Ideas *in Reference* to the *real Existence* of Things, when that is made the Standard of their Truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our complex *Ideas* of Substances.

First, Simple Ideas *in this Sense not false, and why.*

§. 14. *First*, Our simple *Ideas* being barely such Perceptions, as God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects to produce in us by established Laws, and Ways, suitable to his Wisdom and Goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their Truth consists in nothing else but in such Appearances as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those Powers he has placed in external Objects, or else they could not be produced in us: And thus answering those Powers, they are what they should be, *true Ideas*. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of *Falshood*, if the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges these *Ideas* to be in the Things themselves. For God, in his Wisdom, having set them as Marks of Distinction in Things, whereby we may be able to discern one Thing from another, and so chuse any of them for our Uses, as we have Occasion, it alters not the Nature of our simple *Idea*, whether we think, that the *Idea* of Blue be in the Violet it self, or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light, after a certain Manner, to be in the Violet it self. For that Texture in the Objects, by a regular and constant Operation, producing the same *Idea* of Blue in us, it serves us to distinguish by our Eyes, that from any other Thing, whether that distinguished Mark, as it is really in the *Violet*, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or else that very Colour, the *Idea* whereof (which is in us) is the exact Resemblance. And it is equally from that Appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that causes in us that *Idea*: Since the Name *Blue* notes properly nothing, but that Mark of Distinction that is in a *Violet*, discernible only by our Eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our Capacities distinctly to know, and, perhaps, would be of less Use to us, if we had Faculties to discern it.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any Imputation of *Falshood* to our simple *Ideas* [illegible] by the different Circumstances of our Organs, or Constitutions [illegible] *several Mens* [illegible] the same time; *v. g.* if the

the *Idea* that a *Violet* produced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a *Marigold* produced in another Man's, and *vice versâ*. For since this could never be known; because one Man's Mind could not pass in another Man's Body, to perceive what Appearances were produced by those Organs; neither the *Ideas* hereby, nor the Names would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either. For all Things that had the Texture of a *Violet*, producing constantly the *Idea* which he called *Blue*; and those which had the Texture of a *Marigold*, producing constantly the *Idea* which he has constantly called *Yellow*, whatsoever those Appearances were in his Mind, he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by those Appearances, and understand and signify those Distinctions, marked by the Names *Blue* and *Yellow*, as if the Appearances, or *Ideas* in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same with the *Ideas* in other Mens Minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible *Ideas* produced by any Object in different Mens Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reasons offer'd: But that being besides my present Business, I shall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little Use, either for the Improvement of Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.

First, simple Ideas in this Sense not false, and why.

§. 16. From what has been said concerning our simple *Idea*, I think it evident, That our *simple* Ideas can *none of them be false, in respect of Things* existing without us. For the Truth of these Appearances, or Perceptions in our Minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the Powers in external Objects, to produce by our Senses such Appearances in us, and each of them being in the Mind, such as it is, suitable to the Power that produced it, and which alone it represents, it cannot upon that Account, or as referr'd to such a Pattern, be *false*. *Blue* or *Yellow*, *Bitter* or *Sweet*, can never be false *Ideas*, these Perceptions in the Mind are just such as they are there, answering the Powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are, and are intended to be. Indeed the Names may be misapply'd; but that, in this Respect, makes no Falshood in the *Ideas*: As if a Man, ignorant in the *English* Tongue, should call *Purple*, *Scarlet*.

Secondly, Modes not false.

§. 17. *Secondly*, *Neither can* our *complex* Ideas *of Modes, in Reference to the Essence of any*

Things

Thing really existing, be false. Because whatever complex *Idea* I have of any Mode, it hath no Reference to any Pattern existing, and made by Nature: It is not supposed to contain in it any other *Ideas*, than what it hath; nor to represent any Thing, but such a Complication of *Ideas* as it does. Thus when I have the *Idea* of such an Action of such a Man, who forbears to afford himself such Meat, Drink, and Cloathing, and other Conveniencies of Life, as his Riches and Estate will be sufficient to supply, and his Station requires, I have no *false Idea*; but such an one as represents an Action, either as I find or imagine it; and so is capable of neither *Truth* nor *Falshood*. But when I give the Name *Frugality* or *Vertue*, to this Action, then it may be called a *false Idea*, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that *Idea*, to which, in Propriety of Speech, the Name of *Frugality* doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law, which is the Standard of *Virtue* and *Vice*.

Thirdly, Ideas *of Substances when false.*

§. 18. *Thirdly*, Our complex *Ideas of Substances, being all referred to Patterns in Things themselves may be false*. That they are all *false*, when looked upon as the Representations of the unknown Essences of Things is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical Supposition, and consider them as Collections of simple *Ideas* in the Mind, taken from Combinations of simple *Ideas* existing together constantly in Things, of which Patterns they are the supposed Copies: And in this Reference to them, to the Existence of Things, they *are false* Ideas. 1. *When* they put together simple *Ideas*, which in the real Existence of Things have no Union; as when to the shape and Size that exist together in a Horse, is joined, in the same complex *Idea*, the Power of barking like a Dog: Which three *Ideas*, however put together into one in the Mind, were never united in Nature; and this therefore may be called a *false Idea* of an Horse. 2. *Ideas* of Substances are, in this Respect, also *false*, when from any Collection of simple *Ideas* that do always exist together, there is separated by a direct Negation, any other simple *Idea* which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if to Extension, Solidity, Fusibility, the peculiar Weightiness, and yellow Colour or Gold, any one join in his Thoughts the Negation of a greater Degree of Fixedness than is in Lead or Copper, he may be said to have a false complex *Idea*, as well as when he joins to those other simple ones, the *Idea* of perfect absolute Fixedness. For either Way, the complex *Idea* of Gold, being made up of such simple ones as have no Union in Nature, may be termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex *Idea*, that of Fixedness quite, with-

without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his Mind, it is, I think, to be looked on, as an inadequate and imperfect *Idea*, rather than a *false* one; since though it contains not all the simple *Ideas* that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

Truth or Falshood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.

§. 19. Though in compliance with the ordinary Way of Speaking, I have shewed in what Sense, and upon what Ground our *Ideas* may be sometimes called *true* or *false*; yet if we will look a little nearer into the Matter in all Cases, where any *Idea* is call'd *true*, or *false*; it is from some Judgment that the Mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is *true* or *false*. *For Truth* and *Falshood*, being *never without some Affirmation* or *Negation*, express or tacit, it is not to be found but where Signs are joined or separated, according to the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Things they stand for. The Signs we chiefly use, are either *Ideas*, or Words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal Propositions. *Truth* lies in so joining or separating these Representatives, as the Things they stand for, do in themselves agree or disagree; and *Falshood* in the contrary, as shall be more fully shewed hereafter.

Ideas *in themselves neither true nor false.*

§. 20. Any *Idea* then which we have in our Minds, whether comformable or not to the Existence of Things, or to any *Ideas* in the Minds of other Men, cannot properly for this alone be called *false*. For these Representations, if they have nothing in them, but what is really existing in Things without, cannot be thought *false*, being exact Representations of something: Nor yet if they have any Thing in them, differing from the Reality of Things, can they properly be said to be false Representations, or *Ideas* of Things, they do not represent. But the Mistake and *Falshood* is,

But are false. First, when judged agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so.

§. 21. *First, when the Mind* having any *Idea*, it *judges* and concludes *it the same that is in other Mens Minds, signified by the same Name*; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received Signification or Definition of that Word, when indeed it is not: Which is the most usual Mistake in mixed Modes, though other *Ideas* also are liable to it.

Secondly, When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.

§. 22. *Secondly*, when it having a complex *Idea* made up of such a Collection of simple ones, as Nature never puts together, *it judges it to agree to a Species of Creatures really existing*; as when it joins the Weight of Tin to the Colour, Fusibility, and Fixedness of Gold.

§. 23.

Thirdly, when judged adequate, without being so.

§. 23. *Thirdly.* When in its complex *Idea*, it has united a certain Number of simple *Ideas* that do really exist together in some Sorts of Creatures, but has also left out others, as much inseparable, *it judges this to be a perfect compleat* Idea *of a Sort of Things which really it is not*; *v. g.* having joined the *Ideas* of Substance, yellow malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that Complex *Idea* to be the compleat *Idea* of Gold, when yet its peculiar Fixedness and Solubility in *Aqua Regia*, are as inseparable from those other *Ideas* or Qualities of that Body, as they are one from another.

Fourthly, When judged to represent the real Essence.

§. 24. *Fourthly*, The Mistake is yet greater, *when I judge, that this complex* Idea *contains in it the real Essence of any Body existing*; when at least it contains but some few of those Properties which flow from its real Essence and Constitution. I say, only some few of those Properties; for those Properties consisting mostly in the active and passive Powers, it has, in Reference to other Things, all that are vulgarly known of any one Body, and of which the complex *Idea* of that Kind of Things is usually made, are but a very few, in Comparison of what a Man, that has several Ways tried and examined it, knows of that one Sort of Things; and all that the most expert Man knows, are but few, in Comparison of what are really in that Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution. The Essence of a Triangle, lies in a very little Compass, consists in a very few *Ideas*; three Lines including a Space, make up that Essence: But the Properties that flow from this Essence, are more than can be easily known, or enumerated. So I imagine it is in Substances, their real Essences lie in a little Compass; though the Properties flowing from that internal Constitution, are endless.

Ideas, when false.

§. 25. To conclude, a Man having no Notion of any Thing without him, but by the *Idea* he has of it in his Mind, (which *Idea* he has a Power to call by what name he pleases) he may, indeed, make an *Idea* neither answering the Reality of Things, nor agreeing to the *Ideas* commonly signified by other People's Words; but cannot make a wrong or false *Idea* of a Thing which is no otherwise known to him, but by the *Idea* he has of it, *v. g.* when I frame an *Idea* of the Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horse's Head and Neck, I do not make a *false Idea* of any Thing; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a *Man*, or *Tartar*,

and

and imagine it either to represent some real being without me or to be the same *Idea* that others call by the same Name; in either of these Cases, I may err. And upon this Account it is, that it comes to be termed a *false Idea*; though, indeed, the *Falshood* lies not in the *Idea*, but in that tacit mental Proposition, wherein a Conformity and Resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an *Idea* in my Mind, without Thinking, either that Existence, or the Name *Man* or *Tartar*, belongs to it, I will call it *Man* and *Tartar*, I may be justly thought fantastical in the Naming; but not erroneous in my Judgment; nor the *Idea* any Way *false*.

More properly to be called Right or Wrong.

§. 26. Upon the whole Matter, I think, That our *Ideas*, as they are considered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper Signification of their Names, or in Reference to the Reality of Things, *may* very fitly *be called right or wrong* Ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them *true* or *false*, 'tis fit he use a Liberty, which every one has, to call Things by those Names he thinks best; though in Propriety of Speech, *Truth* or *Falshood*, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some Way or other, vertually contain in them some mental Proposition. The *Ideas* that are in a Man's Mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent Parts are jumbled together. All our *Ideas* are in themselves right; and the Knowledge about them, right and true Knowledge: But when we come to refer them to any Thing, as to their Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such Archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Association of Ideas.

Something unreasonable in most Men.

§. 1. THere is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in it self really extravagant in the Opinions, Reasonings, and Actions of other Men. The least Flaw of this Kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the Authority of Reason forwardly condemn,

demn, though he be guilty of much greater Unreasonableness in his own Tenets and Conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

Not wholly from Self-love.

§. 2. This proceeds not only from Self-love, though that has often a great Hand in it. Men of fair Minds, and not given up to the overweening of Self-flattery, are frequenty guilty of it; and in many Cases one with Amazement hears the Arguings, and is astonish'd at the Obstinacy of a worthy Man, who yields not to the Evidence of Reason, though laid before him as clear as Day-light.

Nor from Education.

§. 3. This Sort of Unreasonableness is usually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and for the most Part truly enough, though that reaches not the Bottom of the Disease, nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned the Cause, and Prejudice is a good general Name for the Thing itself: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of Madness to the Root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew whence this Flaw has its Original in very sober and rational Minds, and wherein it consists.

A Degree of Madness.

§. 4. I shall be pardon'd for calling it by so harsh a Name as *Madness*, when it is considered, that Opposition to Reason deserves that Name, and is really Madness; and there is scarce a Man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all Occasions, argue or do as in some Cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for *Bedlam*, than Civil Conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the Power of an unruly Passion, but in the steady calm Course of his Life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh Name, and ungrateful Imputation on the greatest Part of Mankind is, that enquiring a little by the bye into the Nature of Madness. *B.* II. *c.* 11. §. 13 I found it to spring from the very same Root, and to depend on the very same Cause we are here speaking of. This Consideration of the Thing it self, at a Time when I thought not the least on the Subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a Weakness to which all Men are so liable; if this be a Taint which so universally infects Mankind, the greater Care should be taken to lay it open under its due Name, thereby to excite the greater Care in its Prevention and Cure.

§. 5 Some

§. 5. Some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correspondence and Connexion with one another: it is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace these, and hold them together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Besides this, there is another Connexion of *Ideas* wholly owing to Chance or Custom; *Ideas* that in themselves are not at all of Kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them, they always keep in Company, and the one no sooner at any Time comes into the Understanding, but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole Gang, always inseparable, shew themselves together. *From a wrong Connexion of* Ideas.

§. 6. This strong Combination of *Ideas*, not allay'd by Nature, the Mind makes in itself either voluntary, or by Chance; and hence it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their different Inclinations, Educations, Interests, &c. Custom settles Habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going, continue in the same Steps they have been used to, which by often treading, are worn into a smooth Path, and the Motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, thus *Ideas* seem to be produced in our Minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual Train, when once they are put into that Tract, as well as it does to explain such Motions of the Body. A Musician used to any tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his Head, the *Ideas* of the several Notes of it will follow one another orderly in his Understanding, without any Care or Attention, as regularly as his Fingers move orderly over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune he has begun, though his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a wandring. Whether the natural Cause of these *Ideas*, as well as of that regular Dancing of his Fingers, be the Motion of his Animal Spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this Instance, it appears to be so: But this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual Habits, and of the tying together of *Ideas*. *This Connexion how made.*

§. 7. That there are such Associations of them made by Custom in the Minds of most Men, I think no Body will question, who as well consider'd himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the Sympathies and Antipathies *Some Antipathies an Effect of it.*

Antipathies

tipathies observable in Men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular Effects as if they were natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other Original but the accidental Connexion of two *Ideas*, which either the Strength of the first Impression, or future Indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept Company together in that Man's Mind, as if they were but one *Idea*. I say, most of the Antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original Constitution, and are born with us; but a great Part of those which are accounted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early Impressions, or wanton Phancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the Original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown Person surfeiting with Honey, no sooner hears the Name of it; but his Phancy immediately carries Sickness and Qualms to his Stomach, and he cannot bear the very *Idea* of it; other *Ideas* of Dislike and Sickness, and Vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturb'd, but he knows from whence to date this Weakness, and can tell how he got this Indisposition: Had this happen'd to him by an over Dose of Honey, when a Child, all the same Effects would have followed, but the Cause would have been mistaken, and the Antipathy counted natural.

§. 8. I mention this not out of any great Necessity there is in this present Argument, to distinguish nicely betweeen natural and acquired Antipathies, but I take Notice of it for another Purpose, (*viz.*) that those who have Children, or the Charge of their Education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of *Ideas* in the Minds of young People. This is the Time most susceptible of lasting Impressions; and though those relating to the Health of the Body, are by discreet People minded and fenced against; yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the Mind, and terminate in the Understanding, or Passions, have been much less heeded than the Thing deserves; nay, those relating purely to the Understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most Men wholly overlook'd.

A great Cause of Errors.

§. 9. This wrong Connexion in our Minds of *Ideas*, in themselves, loose and independent one of another, has such an Influence, and is of so great Force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves: that perhaps there is not any one Thing that deserves more to be looked after.

§. 10. The

§. 10. The *Ideas* of *Goblins* and *Sprights*, have really no more to do with Darkneſs, than Light; yet let but a fooliſh Maid inculcate theſe often on the Mind of a Child, and raiſe them there together, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives; but Darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it thoſe frightful *Ideas*, and they ſhall be ſo joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other. *Inſtances.*

§. 11. A Man receives a ſenſible Injury from another, thinks on the Man and that Action over and over, and by ruminating on them ſtrongly, or much in his Mind, ſo cements thoſe two *Ideas* together, that he makes them almoſt one; never thinks on the Man, but the Pain and Diſpleaſure he ſuffered comes into his Mind with it, ſo that he ſcarce diſtinguiſhes them, but has as much an Averſion for the one as the other. Thus Hatreds are often begotten from ſlight and almoſt innocent Occaſions, and Quarrels propagated and continued in the World.

§. 12. A Man has ſuffered Pain or Sickneſs in any Place, he ſaw his Friend die in ſuch a Room; though theſe have in Nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *Idea* of the Place occurs to his Mind, it brings (the Impreſſion being once made) that of the Pain and Diſpleaſure with it, he confounds them in his Mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§. 13. When this Combination is ſettled, and whilſt it laſts, it is not in the Power of Reaſon to help us, and relieve us from the Effects of it. *Ideas* in our Minds, when they are there, will operate according to their Natures and Circumſtances; and here we ſee the Cauſe why Time cures certain Affections, which Reaſon, though in the right, and allowed to be ſo, has not Power over, nor is able againſt them to prevail with thoſe who are apt to hearken to it in other Caſes. The Death of a Child, that was the daily Delight of his Mother's Eyes, and Joy of Her Soul, rends from her Heart the whole Comfort of her Life, and gives her all the Torment imaginable: Uſe the Conſolations of Reaſon in this Caſe, and you were as good preach Eaſe to one on the Rack, and hope to allay, by rational Diſcourſes, the Pain of his Joints tearing aſunder: 'Till Time has by Diſuſe leſſened the Senſe of that Enjoyment, and its Loſs from the Idea of the Child returning to her Memory, all Repreſentations, though never ſo reaſonable, are in vain; and therefore thoſe, in whom the Union between theſe *Ideas* is never diſſolved, *Why Time cures ſeveral Diſorders in the Mind which Reaſon cannot*

ſpend their Lives in Mourning, and carry an incurable Sorrow to their Graves.

Farther Inſtances of the Effect of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

§. 14. A Friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of Madneſs by a very harſh and offenſive Operation. The Gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great Senſe of Gratitude and Acknowledgment, owned the Cure all his Life after, as the greateſt Obligation he could have received; but whatever Gratitude and Reaſon ſuggeſted to him, he could never bear the Sight of the Operator: That Image brought back with it the *Idea* of that Agony which he ſuffer'd from his Hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§. 15. Many Children imputing the Pain they endured at School to their Books they were corrected for, ſo join thoſe *Ideas* together, that a Book becomes their Averſion, and they are never reconciled to the Study and Uſe of them all their Lives after; and thus reading becomes a Torment to them, which otherwiſe poſſibly they might have made the great Pleaſure of their Lives. There are Rooms convenient enough, that ſome Men cannot ſtudy in, and Faſhions of Veſſels, which though never ſo clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by Reaſon of ſome accidental *Ideas* which are annexed to them, and make them offenſive; and who is there that hath not obſerved ſome Man to flag at the Appearance, or in the Company of ſome certain Perſon, not otherwiſe ſuperior to him, but becauſe having once on ſome Occaſion got the Aſcendant, the *Idea* of Authority and Diſtance goes along with that of the Perſon, and he, that has been thus ſubjected, is not able to ſeparate them.

§. 16. Inſtances of theſe Kinds are ſo plentiful every where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleaſant Oddneſs of it. It is of a Young Gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great Perfection, there happened to ſtand an old Trunk in the Room where he learnt. The *Idea* of this remarkable Piece of Houſhold-Stuff had ſo mixed it ſelf with the Turns and Steps of all his Dances, that though in that Chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilſt that Trunk was there, nor could he perform well in any other Place, unleſs that, or ſome ſuch other Trunk, had its Poſition in the Room. If this Story ſhall be ſuſpected to be dreſſed up with ſome comical Circumſtances, a little beyond preciſe Nature: I anſwer for my ſelf, that I had it ſome Years ſince from a very ſober and worthy Man, upon his own Knowledge, as I report it; and I dare ſay, there are very few inquiſitive

sitive Persons, who read this, who have not met with Accounts, if not Examples, of this Nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

§. 17. Intellectual Habits and Defects, this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the *Ideas* of Being and Matter be strongly joined either by Education or much Thought, whilst these are still combined in the Mind, what Notions, what Reasonings, will there be about separate Spirits? Let Custom, from the very Childhood, have join'd Figure and Shape to the *Idea* of God, and what Absurdities will that Mind be liable to about the Deity? *Its Influence on intellectual Habits.*

Let the *Idea* of Infallibility be inseparably join'd to any Person, and these two constantly together possess the Mind, and then one Body, in two Places at once, shall unexamined be swallow'd for a certain Truth, by an implicit Faith, whenever that imagined infallible Person dictates and demands Assent without Enquiry.

§. 18. Some such wrong and unnatural Combinations of *Ideas* will be found to establish the irreconcileable Opposition between different Sects. Sects of Philosophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their Followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse Truth offer'd by plain Reason. Interest, though it does a grat deal in the Case, yet cannot be thought to work whole Societies of Men to so universal a Perverseness, as that every one of them to a Man should knowingly maintain Falshood: Some at least must be allow'd to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to pursue Truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their Understandings, and makes them not see the Falshood of what they embrace for real Truth. That which thus captivates their Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold for common Sense, will, when examin'd, be found to be what we are speaking of: Some independent *Ideas*, of no Alliance to one another, are by Education, Custom, and the constant Din of their Party, so coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more separate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one *Idea*, and they operate as if they were so. This gives Sense to *Jargon*, Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Nonsense, and is the Foundation of the greatest, I had almost said, of all the Errors in the World; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders Men from seeing and examining. *Observable in different Sects.*

When two Things

in themselves disjoin'd, appear to the Sight constantly united; if the Eye sees these Things riveted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the Mistakes that follow in two *Ideas*, that they have been accustom'd so to join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the Deceit of it, makes them uncapable of Conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error; and the Confusion of two different *Ideas* which a customary Connexion of them in their Minds hath to them made in Effect but one, fills their Heads with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.

Conclusion. §. 19. Having thus given an Account of the Original, Sorts, and Extent of our *Ideas*, with several other Considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) Instruments, or Materials of our Knowledge; the Method I at first proposed to my self, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to shew, what Use the Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. This was that, which, in the first general View I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: But upon a nearer Approach, I find, that there is so close a Connexion between *Ideas* and Words; and our abstract *Ideas*, and general Words have so constant a Relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the Business of the next Book.

The End of the First Volume.

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